FOUNDATIONS    OF   MODERN 
EUROPE 


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THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  •    BOSTON  •   CHICAGO 
ATLANTA  •    SAN   FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •    BOMBAY   •    CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


FOUNDATIONS  OF 

MODERN    EUROPE 

TWELVE   LECTURES 

DELIVERED  IN  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  LONDON 
BY 

EMIL    REICH 

DOCTOR   JURIS 

AUTHOR  OF   "GENERAL   HISTORY   OF   WESTERN   NATIONS,"   "ATLAS 

ANTIQUUS,"  "  A  NEW  STUDENT'S  ATLAS   OF  ENGLISH.  HISTORY," 

"GRAECO-ROMAN    INSTITUTIONS,"    "HISTORY   OF 

CIVILIZATION,"   ETC. 


SECOND,  REVISED  EDITION 


THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 
1915 

Att  rights  reserved 


5 


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nrT>T  w  r»»»T 


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COFYRIGHT,   1908, 

By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.    Published  April,  1908.    Reprinted 
December,  1915. 


Norisoob  ^ttst 

J.  8.  CuBhing  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 

Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

THE  present  work  attempts  to  give  a  short  sketch 
of  the  main  facts  and  tendencies  of  European 
history  that,  from  the  year  1756  onwards,  have  con- 
tributed to  the  making  of  the  present  state  of  politics 
and  civilization.  It  has  grown  out  of  a  series  of  public 
lectures  which  the  author  delivered  at  the  request  of 
the  University  of  London  in  the  central  hall  of  the 
University,  in  South  Kensington,  London,  during  the 
Lent  term  of  1903.  The  author  is  fully  aware  of 
the  mass  and  apparent  unwieldiness  of  the  innumerable 
details  known  about  the  period,  which,  it  would  appear, 
it  is  almost  an  insolence  to  attempt  to  describe  in  a 
small  book  of  a  couple  of  hundred  pages.  Yet  it  may 
be  urged  that  in  history,  as  well  as  in  nature,  the  greater 
the  extent  of  movements  and  phenomena  in  general, 
the  more  readily  must  they  yield  to  certain  general 
formulation.  There  is  no  Kepler's  law  for  the  move- 
ments of  tiny  leaves  falling  in  autumn ;  but  we  have 
long  known  the  laws  regulating  the  movements  of  the 
planets.  The  events  of  history  from  1756  to  181 5  are 
so  vast  and  so  plastic,  that  on  that  very  account  they 
can  more  easily  be  treated  and  summarized  than  could, 
for  instance,  the  incoherent  and  meaningless  facts  of 
the  history  of  some  negro  state  in  Africa. 

Throughout  the  lectures  (and  the  present  work)  the 
main  object  was  to  indicate  not  only  the  body  of  the 

....  -^^  -^91 

I V  J-fei-t^' *^-'' «--' ^-^ -*- 


Vi  PREFACE 

general  facts,  but  more  particularly  their  soul,  their 
meaning.  In  that,  very  probably,  the  author  has  fre- 
quently been  mistaken ;  just  as  he  cannot  help  stating, 
that  other  writers  on  the  same  period  have  not  always 
been  successful  in  reading  aright  the  drift  or  the  causes 
of  modern  history.  The  author  craves  permission  to 
assure  the  reader  that  he  has  not  only  carefully  read  a 
considerable  number  of  the  original  "  sources  "  bearing 
on  the  period  from  1756  to  1871,  but  also  that  he  has 
tried  to  acquire  an  intimate  and  personal  acquaintance 
with  the  nations  whose  modern  history  he  has  en- 
deavoured to  trace.  An  acquaintance  ever  so  intimate 
with  the  life  and  language  of  each  of  the  leading  modern 
nations  is,  by  itself,  no  guarantee  for  a  correct  insight 
into  their  history  and  civilization.  Yet,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  cannot  but  state  in  rather  uncompromising 
terms  that  no  amount  of  patient  research  in  archives 
or  books  can  ever  be  held  to  replace  that  living  know- 
ledge of  nations  which  a  lengthy  sojourn  in  the  different 
countries,  rendered  more  instructive  by  the  fight  for 
life  in  those  countries,  can  alone  convey.  To  write 
the  history  of  a  country  not  only  neatly  or  eruditely, 
but  well,  one  must  love  that  country,  one  must  have 
much  suffered  and  much  enjoyed  in  that  country. 
History  ought  indeed  to  be  written  quellengerecht  (from 
and  in  keeping  with  the  sources),  as  the  Germans  call 
it;  however,  it  is  usually  overlooked  that  the  most 
abundant  as  well  as  safest  historical  "  source  "  is  to  be 
found  in  that  very  personal  acquaintance  with  five  to 
six  essentially  different  types  of  modern  national  civil- 
ization, which  it  is  somewhat  difficult  to  acquire  in  the 
silent  vaults  of  archives  alone. 


PREFACE  VU 

The  author  takes  this  opportunity  to  thank  the  nu- 
merous ladies  and  gentlemen  who  have  honoured  him 
with  their  attendance,  for  their  patience  and  kindness. 
A  Hungarian  is,  as  a  rule,  sure  of  sympathy  in  Great 
Britain ;  yet  the  spirit  of  absolute  fairness  with  which 
the  audience  received  many  an  opinion  running  counter 
to  some  of  the  best  cherished  national  views  of  history, 
was  very  much  more  than  could  be  expected  in  many 
another  country.  May  the  readers  of  this  book  extend 
the  same  fairness  to  views  prompted  neither  by  malice, 
nor,  it  is  hoped,  by  inexcusable  ignorance. 

EMIL  REICH. 
London, 

33,  St.  Luke's  Road,  W., 

January  14, 1904. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2008  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/foundationsofmodOOreicrich 


CONTENTS 

LHCTURE  PAGE 

I.    The  War  of  American  Independence,  i 763-1 783  i 

II.    The  French  Revolution.  —  I         ....  26 

III.  The  French  Revolution.  —  II        ....  40 

IV.  Napoleon.  —  I 48 

V.    Napoleon.  —  II 63 

VI.    Napoleon.  — Ill 84 

VII.    Napoleon. — IV 105 

VIII.    The  Reaction 128 

IX.    The  Revolutions 156 

X.    The  Unity  of  Italy 172 

XI.    The  Unity  of  Germany 184 

XII.    The  Franco-German  War 207 

Epilogue      .       .       .       .       .    ^ 220 

Index 225 


FOUNDATIONS   OF   MODERN 
EUROPE,  1760-1871 

I 

THE   WAR  OF   AMERICAN   INDEPENDENCE 
I 763-1 783 

THE  history  of  the  great  war  of  American  Inde- 
pendence suffers  from  a  peculiar  combination  of 
circumstances,  all  making  for  oblivion  or  neglect  of  the 
true  causes  and  real  trend  of  its  momentous  events. 
The  Americans  themselves,  with  few  exceptions,  have 
related  it  in  the  manner  in  which,  from  the  Hellenes 
downwards,  all  great  nations  have  arranged  rather  than 
stated  the  beginnings  of  their  ultimate  grandeur.  The 
vanity  of  nations,  growing  apace  with  their  real  great- 
ness, nay,  constantly  outmarching  it,  has  done,  in  this 
case,  what  it  never  fails  to  do  in  cases  of  even  much 
smaller  dimensions  :  vanity  has  been  fighting  its  clever 
and  deceptive  rearguard-fights,  in  order  to  hide  or  let 
escape  the  really  important  corps  of  combatants.  In 
the  States  the  name  of  Lafayette  is  seen  and  heard  in 
each  town,  in  each  county,  in  each  state.  Innumerable 
streets,  very  numerous  towns  and  institutions,  parks,  etc., 
are  named  after  the  young  French  Marquis,  who,  in 
reality,  performed  none  of  the  decisive  or  important  acts 


2  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

or  measures  leading  to  the  independence  of  the  thirteen 
colonies.  Of  Vergennes  or  Beaumarchais,  on  the  other 
hand,  few,  if  any,  Americans  have  ever  heard  a  word  of 
praise  or  appreciation.  Even  Captain  Mahan  (^Influence 
of  Sea-Power,  1660-1783,  p.  345)  speaks  of  "a  French- 
man named  Beaumarchais."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
influence  of  Beaumarchais  was,  one  may  boldly  say,  im- 
measurably greater  than  that  of  Lafayette.  The  vast 
admiration  bestowed  upon  the  French  aristocrat  has 
undoubtedly  been  suggested  for  the  sake  of  saving  the 
pride  of  the  Americans.  Flattery  to  Lafayette  does 
not  imply  the  serious  reduction  of  American  merit 
which  recognition  of  Beaumarchais  would  unmistakably 
entail. 

As  with  Lafayette,  so  with  the  decisive  military  move- 
ments of  the  war.  The  Americans  who,  single-handed, 
won  only  one  important  success,  the  surrender  of  the 
British  army  at  Saratoga,  have  naturally  enough  no 
strong  interest  whatever  in  dwelling  on  the  decisive 
and  clinching  naval  manoeuvres  of  the  summer  of  178 1, 
which  were  conducted  solely  by  the  French.  As  in  the 
case  of  the  contemporary  Italians,  who  won  their  unity 
at  the  hands  of  the  same  nation  that  drove  the  English 
from  the  American  colonies,  the  new  nation  feels  only  a 
cold  gratitude  towards  its  saviour  friend.  Each  would 
wax  very  indignant  were  it  to  be  told  that,  one  in  the 
period  from  1775  to  1783,  the  other  from  1859  to  1866, 
was  the  godfather  rather  than  the  father  of  its  own 
liberty  and  independence.  In  saying  that,  we  mean  no 
irony  whatever.  As  gratitude  appears  to  be  a  native 
quality  of  some  animals  rather  than  of  man,  and  would, 
moreover,  ill  suit  the  "state  of  nature"  in  which  nations 


THE  WAR  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  3 

have  always  stood  to  one  another;  so,  on  the  other 
hand,  extremely  few  nations  have  been  honoured  by 
the  gods  with  the  gift  and  opportunity  of  Marathon, 
Salamis,  or  Plataea. 

As  to  English  narrators  of  the  great  war,  it  is  need- 
less to  prove  that  they  have  never  been  overeager  to 
admit,  that  in  1781  they  met,  at  the  hands  of  the 
French,  with  a  Waterloo  far  more  destructive  of  British 
interests  than  was  the  last  battle  of  Napoleon  to  the 
interests  of  France.  Moreover,  the  documents  in  the 
Record  Office  in  London  are,  as  a  rule,  not  fully  acces- 
sible after  the  date  of  October  20th,  1760. 

Finally,  the  French,  the  real  victors  in  that  great 
struggle,  have  never  cared  to  go  into  the  details  of  an 
"  affaire !'  all  the  actors  and  events  of  which  were  soon 
obscured  and  overshadowed  by  the  gigantic  tragedy  of 
the  French  Revolution.  It  was  only  some  thirteen 
years  ago,  that  the  French,  in  H.  Doniol's  Histoire  de 
la  participation  de  la  France  a  V htablissement  des  Etats- 
UniSy  received  many  of  the  official  documents  bearing 
on  the  interference  of  France  in  America ;  and  to  be 
quite  correct,  Doniol's  great  work  was  terminated  only 
a  short  time  ago.  As  to  the  allies  of  the  French  at  that 
time,  the  Spanish  and  the  Dutch,  their  important  inter- 
ference has  as  yet  not  been  written  up  in  a  satisfactory 
historical  work. 

These  are  the  pecuUar  circumstances  rendering  a  fair 
view  of  all  the  factors  in  the  War  of  American  Inde- 
pendence a  matter  of  great  difficulty.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  historian  must  necessarily  look  for  consolation 
to  the  just  remark,  that  the  larger,  the  more  comprehen- 
sive the  waves  of  historical  events,  the  smaller  is  the 


4  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

number  of  their  controlling  causes.  The  study  of  the 
history  of  science  cannot  but  confirm  us  in  the  belief, 
that  vast  movements  are  caused  not  by  a  concourse  of 
an  infinite  number  of  small  causes,  but  a  restricted  num- 
ber of  large  causes.  Newton's  triumph  in  proving  the 
correctness  of  the  simple  assumption  of  gravitation,  sug- 
gested or  implied  by  Kepler,  Bullialdus,  and  others,  as 
a  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  vast  motions  in  our 
planetary  system,  is  both  the  best  illustration  and  the 
strongest  proof  of  the  doctrine  of  diminishing  number 
of  causes  in  increasingly  vast  movements. 

It  will  accordingly  not  be  impossible  to  discover,  in 
the  immense  maze  of  persons,  events,  and  measures  fill- 
ing the  canvas  of  time  from  1775  to  1783,  a  few  of  the 
controlling  causes  shaping  events,  directing  its  currents, 
and  covering  its  undercurrents. 

The  War  of  American  Independence  is  held  to  be, 
more  particularly  with  the  English-speaking  nations,  a 
matter  preeminently  of  English  or  American  history. 

It  is  in  reality  and  par  excellence  a  European,  an  inter- 
national event.  It  happened  in  a  period  when  for  al- 
most exactly  two  hundred  years,  all  the  great  wars  were 
European  wars.  From  1618  to  1815  Europe  was  rav- 
aged, with  few  important  exceptions,  by  international, 
or  inter-European  wars  only.  In  strong  contrast  to  this 
broad  fact  we  note,  that  Europe  has,  since  18 15,  care- 
fully avoided  such  international  wars,  and  always  suc- 
ceeded in  localizing  combats  that  threatened  to  set  ablaze 
the  whole  of  Europe,  such  as  the  Crimean  war,  or  the 
Franco-German  war.  This  desistance  from  international 
wars  has,  it  may  be  advanced,  little  or  nothing  to  do  with 
the  progress  of  ethical  ideals,  the  realization  of  which 


THE  WAR  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  5 

has  not  yet  left  the  precincts  of  pious  hopes.  It  is 
due  to  the  fact  that  since  18 15  each  of  the  Great  Powers 
of  Europe  has  secured  its  territorial  self-contentedness. 
Previous  to  181 5  each  of  the  continental  states  consisted 
of  a  great,  occasionally  bewildering,  number  of  "  en- 
claves "  (see  p.  220)  straggling  over  various  latitudes ; 
so  that  Prussia,  or  Austria,  or  Bavaria  had  no  territorial 
unity  whatever.  The  direct  consequence  was,  that  each 
of  these  states,  having  vulnerable  points  in  all  directions, 
was  deeply  interested  in  the  policy  of  all  the  neighbour- 
ing nations  which,  eventually,  might  encroach  upon  or 
further  its  own  territorial  hopes.  After  181 5  the  num- 
ber of  "  enclaves  "  was  more  and  more  reduced,  so  that 
Germany,  France,  Austria,  Italy,  etc.,  have  long  since 
ceased  to  lack  territorial  unity.  Unless,  therefore,  one 
of  these  countries  is  attacked  directly,  it  has  no  seri- 
ous interest  in  meddling  with  the  affairs  of  the  other 
nations. 

In  the  eighteenth  century  the  case  was  quite  differ- 
ent. The  war  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  1701-1713; 
the  war  of  the  Austrian  Succession,  1740- 1748;  the 
great  war  ("Seven  Years'  War")  of  Frederick  the 
Great,  1756-1763;  the  wars  of  the  French  Revolution, 
1 792-18 1 5  :  all  of  them  were  international  wars  proper. 
In  all  of  them  substantial,  i.e.  territorial,  interests  of  all 
the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  were  engaged,  and  all  of 
them  were  settled  by  international  treaties  of  peace, 
such  as  the  peace  of  Utrecht  and  Rastadt,  171 3  and 
1 7 14;  the  peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  1748;  the  treaties 
of  Hubertusburg  and  Paris,  1763;  and  the  treaties  of 
Basle,  1795,  Campo  Formio,  1797,  Lun^ville,  1801, 
Amiens,    1802,  Pressburg,    1805,  Tilsit,    1807,  Vienna 


6  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

(or  Schonbrunn),  1809,  and  the  Congress  of  Vienna, 
1814-1815. 

The  American  War  of  Independence  is  one  of  these 
international,  or  inter-European  events  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  terminated  by  the  (second)  treaty  of  Paris,  1783. 
As  in  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  France 
and  Prussia  and  England  had  strong  political  interests 
in  promoting  the  unity  of  Italy,  so  it  was  in  the  sixties 
and  seventies  of  the  eighteenth  century  a  vital  interest  of 
some  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  outside  England  to 
wrest  the  American  colonies  from  the  British.  This  is 
the  essence  of  the  whole  struggle  extending  over  eight 
years,  and  fought  in  all  the  seas  of  the  four  continents. 

But  while  this  inter- European  interest  is  undoubtedly 
the  chief  motor  and  cause  of  the  ultimate  success  of 
the  colonists  in  America,  we  must,  on  careful  investi- 
gation of  the  facts,  take  into  consideration  the  interests 
of  those  colonists  themselves.  Much  as  France,  Spain, 
and  Holland  desired  to  weaken  and  humiliate  England, 
their  combined  efforts  would  have  proved  inefficient, 
had  the  colonists  not  been  induced  to  persevere  in  the 
attempt  at  severance  from  the  mother-country  in  the 
teeth  of  all  the  misery  and  despair  that  a  struggle  with 
mighty  England  could  not  but  entail.  In  order,  there- 
fore, to  seize  adequately  the  home  or  American  cause 
of  the  Revolt  and  its  ultimate  success,  we  must,  before 
going  into  the  details  of  inter-European  policy,  study 
the  true  cause  of  that  powerful  discontent  that  urged 
the  colonists  first  into  adverse  reflections,  then  into 
threatening  petitions,  riotous  acts,  half  disloyal  con- 
ventions and  congresses,  overt  acts  of  rebellion,  and 
finally  into  open  war  against  England. 


THE  WAR  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  7 

The  current  view  of  the  causes  of  discontent  is 
centred  on  the  indignation  of  the  colonists  at  the 
various  measures  of  unconstitutional,  or,  at  any  rate, 
unwise  taxation  of  the  American  colonies  proposed, 
in  turn,  by  Grenville,  Townshend,  North,  and,  chief 
of  all,  by  George  III.  The  Stamp  Act  of  1765,  the 
taxes  on  various  commodities  in  1770,  1772,  and 
1774 — these  and  similar  measures,  although  in  no 
way  financially  oppressive  to  the  colonists  (the  taxes 
never  yielded  more,  nor  could  yield  more,  than  a  paltry 
sum)  are  said  to  have,  in  addition  to  single  and 
isolated  acts  of  high-handed  autocracy,  so  exasperated 
the  fine  moral  or  legal  fibre  of  the  colonists  as  to 
drive  them  into  rebellion.  This  explanation  has  the 
advantage  of  being  pleasing  both  to  the  British  and 
the  Americans.  The  British,  with  a  smile  of  parental 
pride,  enjoy  the  spectacle  of  their  own  kin  rushing 
into  revolt  for  ideal  motives  of  Right  and  Law  that 
animated  the  breasts,  it  is  held,  of  the  barons  on  the 
fields  of  Runnymede  in  King  John's  time  (121 5),  or 
in  the  clouded  age  of  the  Oxford  Provisions  (1258), 
let  alone  in  the  classic  period  of  the  "  Nineteen 
Propositions"  (June,  1642),  or  the  "Bill  of  Rights" 
(1688).     Or,  as  Tennyson  says: 

"  O  thou,  that  sendest  out  the  man 
To  rule  by  land  and  sea, 
Strong  mother  of  a  Lion-line, 
Be  proud  of  those  strong  sons  of  thine 
Who  wrenched  their  rights  from  thee  I " 

The  Americans  again,  with  a  distinctly  British  passion 
for  ethical  beating  of  the  breast,  dehght  and  thus 
believe  in  the  deep  moral  indignation  of  the  men  and 


8  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

women  of  the  colonies  as  the  main  cause  of  the  deep- 
seated  discontent  that  broke  out  in  the  grave  events 

of  1775. 

Without  in  the  least  trying  to  minimize  the  value 
and  theoretical  beauty  of  moral  indignation,  it  may 
be  intimated  that  such  ethical  shivers  do  not,  as  a 
rule,  prove  of  long  duration,  unless  supported  by 
abiding  considerations  of  material  profit.  Ideal  motives 
are  no  doubt  at  work,  stealthily  or  openly,  in  all  the 
greater  historic  achievements  of  white  humanity;  but 
from  their  very  intensity  it  must  be  inferred  that  their 
power  of  extension  in  time  and  space  is  always  some- 
what limited.  The  profound  wisdom  of  the  Christian 
Religion  has  manifested  itself  in  few  things  to  a 
greater  advantage  than  in  the  firm,  if  not  original 
establishment  of  one  ideal  day  in  seven,  this  being 
about  the  true  ratio  of  the  force  of  ideal  motives  to 
motives  savouring  more  of  terrestrial  and  mundane 
sources.  In  historical  investigations,  at  any  rate,  it 
will  be  wiser,  if  not  nobler,  to  search,  in  any  long  and 
wearisome  struggle,  for  causes  less  ethereal  and  more 
compact  and  concrete. 

Nor  is  it  a  matter  of  inordinate  difficulty  to  point 
out  that  compact  and  concrete  cause  which,  in  all 
human  probability,  did  infinitely  more  in  stiffening 
the  hearts  and  minds  of  the  colonials,  than  could  ever 
be  done  by  the  abstract  reasonings  on  constitutional 
questions  by  Otis  and  Richard  Bland,  or  by  the  moral 
uprising  of  the  Puritans  of  New  England.  History,  in 
Europe,  and  still  more  outside  Europe,  is  written 
largely,  if  not  wholly,  in  characters  of  that  geography, 
or,  as  we  prefer  to  call  it,  geo-politics,  that  has,  as  the 


THE  WAR  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  9 

true  bass  of  the  harmonic  and  enharmonic  melodies  of 
history,  determined  the  trend  and  tenor  of  decisive 
events.  Undoubtedly  history  is  not  a  mere  game  of 
chess,  in  which  man  figures  only  as  an  insignificant 
pawn.  Yet,  with  all  due  recognition  of  the  influence 
of  men,  and  especially  of  historic  personalities,  we  can- 
not but  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  man  is  inclined, 
precipitated,  or  retarded,  by  that  Great  Constant, -the 
Earth  and  its  physiographic  configuration.  To  use  the 
language  of  the  scientist:  in  history  man  represents 
the  ordinatcB^  Earth  the  abscisses.  It  is  evident  that  for 
a  true  construction  of  the  curve  of  events,  we  must 
have  the  abscisses  first,  and  then  the  ordinate^. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  abiding,  material, 
and  yet,  prospectively  at  least,  also  ideal  cause  of  the 
deep-seated  antagonism  of  the  colonials  to  the  British 
Government  was  the  fatally  wrong  policy  of  the  Court 
of  St.  James's  with  regard  to  the  vast  hinterland  of  the 
colonies.  It  was  for  the  possession  of  that  vast  hinter- 
land, by  treaty-rights  stretching  from  the  Alleghany 
Mountains  to  the  Mississippi  —  practically,  however,  to 
the  Pacific  —  that  the  colonials  had  cheerfully  joined  in 
the  British  war  against  the  French  from  1755  to  1762. 
It  was  already  then  well-known,  from  the  writings  of 
French  Jesuits  and  other  explorers,  that  the  colonies 
were  surrounded,  or  rather  supplemented,  by  the  most 
fertile  and  at  the  same  time  the  vastest  hinterland  in 
history.  Neither  Central  nor  South  America;  neither 
modern  Egypt,  nor  South  Africa,  let  alone  Canada  or 
Australia,  are  endowed  with  a  hinterland  at  once  so 
vast  and  so  easily  accessible  or  amenable  to  purposes 
of  cultivation.     In  that  hinterland,  fully  described  in 


10  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN   EUROPE 

the  works  of  Jonathan  Carver,  Robert  Rogers,  James 
Adair,  William  Smith,  and  of  other  colonials  long  before 
the  battle  of  Lexington,  the  colonials  were  conscious  of 
having  the  possibility  and  the  guarantee  of  indefinite 
progress  and  unlimited  prosperity.  As  modern  Russia, 
instead  of  wasting  untold  treasures  of  men  and  money 
in  barren  wars  with  Prussia  or  Austria,  has  consist- 
ently preferred  to  occupy  and  utiHze  its  immense  hinter- 
land from  the  Ural  to  Manchuria,  even  so  the  colonials 
in  British  America  consciously  or  subconsciously  felt 
that  their  real  and  great  destiny  was  in  their  hinterland, 
and  not  in  their  connection  with  Great  Britain.  So 
clear  was  this,  the  all-decisive  factor,  to  most  thinking 
men  of  that  time,  that  men  as  different  in  every  other 
respect  as  were  Montcalm,  French  commander  of 
Canada ;  Turgot,  philosopher  and  economist ;  and  Ver- 
gennes,  French  ambassador  at  Constantinople,  —  all 
predicted  the  secession  of  the  colonials  as  soon  as  the 
French  were  driven  out  from  the  Ohio  valley  and  the 
Lakes  district  —  that  is,  as  soon  as  the  question  of 
the  hinterland  was  made  a  problem  of  actual  politics. 
King  George  III.  had,  however,  no  sooner  concluded 
peace  with  the  French  in  1763,  than  he  issued,  on 
October  7th,  1763,  a  proclamation,  in  which  the  king's 
"  loving  subjects "  in  the  colonies  were  forbidden  to 
make  purchases  of  land  from  the  Indians,  or  to  farm 
any  settlement  west  of  the  Alleghany  Mountains.  Nor 
did  this  proclamation  remain  a  dead  letter.  As  late  as 
1772  a  colonial's  petition  for  settlement  on  the  Ohio 
River  was  categorically  refused  by  the  Lord  Commis- 
sioners for  Trade ;  Lord  Hillsborough  holding  that  the 
proclamation  of  1763  was  too  expHcit  to  be  interpreted 


THE  WAR  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  1 1 

in  any  other  sense.  This  proclamation  did  not,  of 
course,  prevent  numberless  colonials  from  making  re- 
peated attempts  at  the  occupation  of  the  .  forbidden 
hinterland.  There  are  still  numerous  legal  and  admin- 
istrative documents  in  the  Record  Office  in  London, 
referring  to  the  incessant  encroachment  of  the  colonials 
upon  the  territory  west  of  the  Alleghany  Mountains. 
It  is  in  these  documents  that  we  can  feel  the  real  pulse 
of  the  time.  Nations,  like  individuals,  are  as  a  rule  not 
clearly  conscious  of  the  prime  motive  prompting  their 
actions.  We  cannot,  therefore,  expect  the  pamphleteers 
or  m^moire  writers  of  that  time  to  tell  us  in  set  terms 
what  was  at  the  bottom  of  all  that  curiously  persistent 
ill-will  shown  by  most  of  the  colonials  to  any  kind  of 
measures  that  the  British  Government  proposed  or  de- 
creed. Any  kind,  we  say.  For  it  is  now  well  known, 
that  the  British  Government  repeatedly,  and  after  1774 
almost  invariably,  behaved  with  all  the  conciliation  that 
a  loyal  colony  can  fairly  expect  from  its  metropolis.  It 
was  all  in  vain.  Neither  the  moderation  of  Chatham, 
nor  the  wisdom  of  Burke ;  neither  the  cold  imperious- 
ness  of  King  George  or  Lord  North,  nor  the  ingenious 
argumentativeness  of  Fox  could  alter  matters.  The 
colonials  were,  and  had  long  been,  but  too  well  resolved 
to  accept  no  other  solution  than  that  of  a  complete  rup- 
ture. Once  carried  away,  and  justly  too,  by  the  great 
destiny  awaiting  them  at  the  bidding  of  the  powers  of 
the  very  soil  they  occupied  and  legitimately  desired  to 
extend,  they  were  naturally  unable  to  listen  to  or  accept 
any  possible  offer  short  of  one  securing  for  them,  undis- 
turbed and  uncontrolled  by  British  statutes  or  British 
capitalists,  the  vast  expanse  of  fertile  hinterland,  at  once 


12  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

the  inexhaustible  source  of  their  material,  and  the  safe 
guarantee  of  their  national,  greatness. 

It  is  customary  to  condemn  George  III.,  Lord  North, 
Townshend,  and  Grenville.  But  did  Lord  Chatham, 
Burke,  or  Fox  discern  the  true  causes  of  the  American 
revolt  any  more  clearly  }  Did  they  seize  the  real,  the 
ultimate  cause  of  the  colonials'  discontent  any  better  ? 
In  fact,  harsh  or  strange  as  it  may  seem,  if  guilt  there 
must  be,  there  is  little  doubt  that  Lord  Chatham  had  a 
greater  share  in  the  loss  of  the  colonies  than  had  either 
George  III.  or  Lord  North.  The  colonials  may  have 
had,  as  they  actually  had,  very  potent  motives  to  wish 
for  a  separation  from  England.  From  such  a  wish, 
though  ever  so  legitimate,  to  its  realization  was,  how- 
ever, a  very  far  cry.  England  had  never  been  more 
powerful,  more  enterprising,  more  dreaded,  than  from 
1763  to  1775.  Her  navy  had  had  great  and  decisive 
successes  in  European,  American,  and  Asiatic  waters ; 
and  her  armies  had  shown  great  fighting  powers  in 
Germany,  America,  and  India.  For  the  first  time  in  her 
history  she  found  herself  constituted  as  a  real  empire. 
Bengal,  Behar,  and  Orissa  in  India  were  hers,  since 
1764;  the  French  were  driven  out  of  America,  and 
their  vast  colonies  conquered;  in  Europe  her  prestige 
was  very  great.  Last  not  least,  together  with  that  un- 
precedented expansion  of  power  —  political  and  military 
—  England  just  then  started  on  her  imposing  career  as 
the  first  industrial  power  of  the  world.  Inventions  in 
technology,  such  as  no  other  nation  could  boast,  were 
made  in  Great  Britain  almost  daily,  and  the  resources 
of  British  industry  and  commerce  created  a  national 
wealth    that   bade  fair  to   outstrip   that  of    all   other 


THE  WAR  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  1 3 

nations  put  together.  Under  such  circumstances  it  was 
by  no  means  easy  to  start  a  revolt  against  England 
with  any  sound  hopes  of  ultimate  success.  Had  Lord 
Chatham,  in  1766  or  1767,  practised  the  wise  modera- 
tion of  Bismarck  in  1866,  he  might,  by  depriving  the 
American  colonials  of  French  help,  have  so  isolated 
them  as  to  render  any  decisive  military  success  on 
their  part  practically  impossible.  Bismarck  in  1866 
suddenly,  and  in  the  midst  of  the  most  signal  military 
triumph  over  Austria,  abandoned  the  secular  policy 
of  Prussia  towards  Austria.  He  clearly  perceived  that 
that  poHcy  had,  after  Sadowa,  no  raison  (Tetre  any 
longer.  Far  from  yielding  to  the  Prussian  military 
party,  which  loudly  clamoured  for  triumphal  entry  into 
Vienna,  Bismarck  threatened  rather  to  commit  suicide 
than  to  consent  to  any  unnecessary  humiHation  of 
Austria,  whose  friendship  he  knew  he  would  need  later 
on,  after  having  neutralized  or  paralyzed  its  hostility. 
Lord  Chatham,  after  1763,  was  placed  in  exactly  the 
same  position  towards  France  that  Bismarck  held 
towards  Austria  in  August,  1866.  Hitherto,  i.e.  up  to 
1763,  France  had  been  in  reality,  for  various  reasons, 
the  hereditary  enemy  of  England.  After  1763  that 
enmity  had,  on  the  part  of  England,  lost  all  its  raison 
d'etre.  England  had  no  more  colonies  to  take  from 
France ;  and  no  continental  possession  (Hanover)  to 
dread  from  either  Prussia  or  France.  Scotland  had 
definitively  accepted  its  place  within  Great  Britain 
since  1746,  and  Ireland  was  quiet;  French  intrigues 
could  stir  up  neither. 

It  was,   then,  evidently  the   policy  for  Chatham  to 
irritate  France  as  little  as  possible,  in   fact,  to  obtain 


14  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

her  friendship.  From  her  position  in  the  very  centre  of 
all  the  Great  Powers  of  the  west,  and  also  from  her 
geographical  configuration  as  both  a  sea-  and  land-power, 
France  was  almost  more  dangerous  when  on  the  de- 
fensive than  when  taking  the  offensive.  In  the  latter 
case,  France  always  roused  (under  Louis  XIV.  as  well 
as  under  Napoleon)  the  hostiUty  of  the  surrounding 
nations,  and  was  obUged,  even  when  unbeaten  in  the 
field,  to  give  up  her  excessive  ambition.  When,  how- 
ever, France  is  on  the  defensive,  she  always  is  and 
always  will  be  able  to  form  one  of  the  most  formidable 
factors  in  war.  She  can  strengthen  both  the  naval  and 
the  land  forces  of  her  allies  on  the  most  considerable 
scale,  and  thus  contribute  decisively  to  the  final  result. 
From  this  evident  lesson  of  French  history,  together 
with  the  consideration  mentioned  above,  Chatham  had 
all  imaginable  motives  of  good  policy  for  abandoning 
the  secular  idea  of  France  as  the  hereditary  enemy  of 
England.  The  idea  had  no  basis  any  longer.  It  was 
merely  floating  on  the  waters  of  political  thinking  by 
its  very  emptiness,  by  silly  traditionalism. 

There  is  no  better  proof  for  this  statement  than  an 
ever  so  brief  consideration  of  the  international  and 
diplomatic  position  created  during  and  by  the  Seven 
Years'  War  (i 756-1 763)  in  Europe.  The  same  prob- 
lem that  Chatham  was  confronted  with  in  regard  to 
the  "  hereditary  enemy  "  of  his  country,  presented  it- 
self also  to  three  other  great  governments  of  the  time, 
to  France,  to  Austria,  and  to  Russia.  In  France  an 
identical  question  had  been  mooted  and  intrigued 
about  for  some  time.  The  Bourbons  of  France  had 
always    observed,    as    the    keynote    of   their    foreign 


THE  WAR  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  1 5 

policy,  a  very  hostile  attitude  towards  the  Austrian 
Habsburgs.  The  Habsburgs  were  the  "hereditary 
enemy  "  of  the  Bourbons.  In  the  fifties  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century,  however.  Count  Kaunitz,  the  Austrian 
ambassador  in  Paris,  and  later  on,  his  successor, 
Count  Starhemberg,  persuaded  the  French  Govern- 
ment to  abandon  their  secular  enmity  to  Austria,  and 
to  conclude  an  alliance  with  the  Habsburgs  (December, 
1756,  and  again  in  1757)  against  Prussia.  This  amaz- 
ing "  about  face,"  the  triumph  of  the  cunning  and 
persistence  of  Kaunitz  and  Maria  Theresa,  was  with- 
out question  one  of  the  least  wise  measures  ever 
taken  by  a  French  king.  That  alliance  could  not, 
and  did  not,  confer  on  France  anything  worth  fighting 
for,  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  proved  to  France  a  most 
fatal  step,  the  immediate  cause  of  all  her  disasters  in 
America,  Europe,  and  Asia  from  1757  to  1763.  It 
was  concluded  chiefly  at  the  instigation  of  a  young 
woman.  La  Marquise  de  Pompadour,  the  French  king's 
mistress  and  first  minister,  who  was  destitute  of  the 
most  elementary  knowledge  of  politics. 

The  problem,  then,  that  Chatham  failed  to  seize  ade- 
quately after  1763,  the  French  Government,  that  is,  the 
Marquise  de  Pompadour,  likewise  failed  to  comprehend 
in  1756.  Not  so  the  two  other  monarchs,  both  women. 
Maria  Theresa,  brought  up  in  the  firm  belief  of  the 
hereditary  hostility  between  Habsburg  and  Bourbon  — 
a  belief  to  which  she  gave  unguarded  expression  even 
after  the  Franco- Austrian  alliance  —  Maria  Theresa 
wisely  suppressed  her  feelings  and  acquiesced,  under 
somewhat  humiliating  conditions,  in  a  complete  revolu- 
tion in  the  foreign  policy  of  her  house.     While  she  did 


1 6  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

not  materially  better  her  position  by  that  unexpected 
move,  yet  she  was  able  to  inflict  on  Frederick's  lands 
and  people,  if  not  on  him,  all  the  horrors  of  a  seven 
years'  war  which  barely  touched  her  own  provinces. 

The  last  of  the  women  then  controlling  a  great  coun- 
try was  Katharine  II.  of  Russia.  In  1762  she  came  to 
the  throne,  and  soon  rid  herself  of  her  insipid  husband. 
She,  too,  was  at  once  called  upon  to  decide  on  the  sense 
and  direction  of  her  foreign  policy,  more  especially  of 
that  towards  her  neighbour,  Prussia.  At  that  time  the 
Russians,  as  well  as  the  Russian  Government,  had  a 
firm  belief  that  Prussia  was  the  "  hereditary  enemy  "  of 
the  Muscovites.  Katharine's  predecessor,  the  Czarina 
Elizabeth,  had  sacrificed  milHons  of  money  and  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  men  to  that  belief.  But  Katharine 
was  not  to  be  impressed  by  mere  Chauvinist  illu- 
sions. She  clearly  saw  that  Prussia,  at  enmity  with 
France  and  Austria,  could  never  become  dangerous  to 
Russia,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  Prussia  was  too  poor 
to  be  a  promising  booty  for  Russia.  So  the  late  Ger- 
man princess,  now  Czarina  of  Russia,  publicly  declared 
with  great  show  of  indignation,  that  she  too  would  un- 
swervingly continue  the  old  Russian  policy  of  hostility 
to  that  arch-fiend,  the  King  of  Prussia ;  in  private,  how- 
ever, she  sent,  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  a  special 
courier  to  Frederick,  assuring  him  that  her  pubHc 
declaration  was  only  meant  for  the  official  ear  of  the 
King,  or,  in  other  words,  for  the  gallery  in  Russia. 
Nothing  can  prove  Katharine's  genius  more  conclu- 
sively. In  assuring  Frederick  of  her  friendship,  she 
proved  what  Russo-Prussian  history  has  shown  ever 
since,  the  correctness  of  her  view,  in  that  neither  of  the 


THE  WAR  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  1 7 

two  countries  has  had,  since  1762,  a  serious  reason  to 
make  war  on  the  other. 

It  is  somewhat  discomforting  to  note  that  two  women, 
Katharine  and  Maria  Theresa,  grasped  the  essentials  of 
the  political  situation  about  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth 
century  far  better  than  did  "the  only  man,"  to  use 
Frederick's  saying,  to  whom  England  had  given  birth 
at  the  same  time.  Chatham,  before  and  after  the  treaty 
of  1763,  invariably  viewed  France  as  the  great  enemy 
of  England.  He  never  tired  of  rousing  the  British 
national  feeling  against  the  "hereditary  enemy."  He 
could  not  but  be  aware  that  one  single  article  of  that 
treaty  (Article  XHI.)  was  alone  sufficient  to  fill  the 
French  with  an  undying  thirst  for  revenge.  In  that 
article  France. consented  to  the  destruction  of  the  fortifi- 
cations of  her  harbour  at  Dunkirk,  in  the  most  huftiili- 
ating  fashion.  It  is  said  in  that  article :  "  La  Cunette  [at 
Dunkirk]  sera  d^truite  immediatement  apr^s  I'^change 
des  ratifications  du  present  traite,  ainsi  que  les  forts  et 
batteries  qui  defendent  I'entr^e  du  c6te  de  la  mer;  et 
il  sera  pourvu,  en  meme  temps,  ^  la  salubrit6  de  I'air, 
et  ^  la  sant6  des  habitants  par  quelque  autre  moyen  cl 
la  satisfaction  du  Roi  de  la  Grande  Bretagne."^  A 
high-spirited  nation  will  never  accept  such  arrogant 
deaHng  with  a  harbour  and  place  of  arms  on  her  im- 
mediate territory.  And  if  one  considers,  that  England, 
by  the  acquisition  of   Canada  and  the  vast  American 

i"The  Cunette  (at  Dunkirk)  shall  be  destroyed  immediately  after  the 
exchange  of  ratifications  of  the  present  treaty,  as  well  as  the  forts  and  bat- 
teries that  defend  the  entrance  from  the  sea  ;  and  provision  shall  be  made 
at  the  same  time  for  insuring  good  air  and  the  health  of  the  inhabitants, 
by  such  means  as  shall  be  approved  by  the  King  of  Great  Britain." 
c 


l8  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

hinterland  had  then  acquired  a  territory  more  than 
sufficient  for  the  widest  imperial  expansion  of  the  Brit- 
ish nation  for  generations  to  come,  and  all  that  at  the 
expense  of  France,  it  is  rather  difficult  to  comprehend 
why  Chatham  should  still  persist  in  rancorous  hatred 
of  France,  a  country  no  longer  in  a  condition  either  to 
hurt  or  thwart  the  most  ambitious  hopes  of  Great  Brit- 
ain. 

Yet  so  he  did.  Instead  of  doing  what  Katharine  did 
with  regard  to  Prussia,  in  1762,  or  Bismarck  with  regard 
to  Austria  in  1866,  Chatham  continued  to  inflame  his 
people  with  the  old,  now  groundless  hatred  of  France. 
It  may  be  that  his  grave  bodily  infirmities  reduced  the 
clearness  of  his  mind.  At  any  rate,  instead  of  pacify- 
ing France  by  all  possible  means,  he  never  ceased  to 
widen  and  envenom  the  wound  from  which  France  and 
the  French  were  smarting. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  is  only  a  matter  of 
course  that  the  French,  a  nation  whose  energy  may  be 
slackened  but  never  suppressed,  were  eagerly  on  the 
lookout  for  an  opportunity  to  avenge  the  treaty  of  1763 
on  the  English.  Nor  did  that  opportunity  fail  to  turn 
up.  It  was,  in  the  first  place,  one  of  a  more  academic 
character,  but  it  soon  transformed  itself  into  a  chance 
of  resorting  to  the  gravest  mihtary  and  political  meas- 
ures. The  academic  interference  of  the  French  with 
the  immense  American  colonies  of  the  EngHsh  pro- 
ceeded in  the  shape  of  the  impression  exercised  by  the 
French  Encyclopaedists  on  the  colonials. 

The  influence  of  Diderot,  Rousseau,  Montesquieu, 
Voltaire,  Holbach,  Condorcet,  d'Alembert,  and  the 
other  great  authors  of  the  famous  Encyclop^die  ou  Die- 


THE  WAR  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  19 

tionnaire  raisonn^  des  sciences^  des  arts  et  des  mitiers^  on 
the  whole  mental  attitude  of  Europe  and  America  in 
the  latter  half  of  the  eighteenth  century,  seems  rather 
puzzling  to  the  modern  mind.  On  reading  the  articles 
of  the  Encyclop^die  (articles,  it  must  be  admitted,  art- 
fully garbled  by  the  timorous  publisher)  one  cannot  but 
be  amazed  both  at  the  mildness  and  unaggressiveness 
of  their  tone,  and  at  the  relatively  small  originality  of 
their  ideas.  In  our  times,  we  have  seen  articles  and 
books  propounding  doctrines  infinitely  bolder  and  more 
radical.  The  novelty  of  the  Encyclop^die  was  not  in  its 
doctrines;  its  historic  position  was  determined  by  the 
marvellous  effect  it  had  on  its  contemporaries.  Doc- 
trines formerly  discussed  in  Latin  folios  meant  for  re- 
cluse scholars ;  such  as  the  political  views  of  Spinoza, 
or  of  Althusius,  were  now  for  the  first  time  placed 
before  the  general  public  in  a  form  at  once  solid  and 
attractive.  To  this  the  personality  of  the  Encyclopae- 
dists contributed  not  a  little.  The  brilliant  men  meet- 
ing in  the  salons  of  those  women  famous  for  their  tact 
and  charm,  Madame  Geoffrin,  Mademoiselle  de  L'Es- 
pinasse,  Madame  d'Epinay,  and  others,  were  one  and  all 
men  of  intense  powers  of  personal  fascination.  Their 
conversations  were  listened  to,  reported,  and  read  all 
over  the  civilized  world,  and  it  is  probably  understating 
the  reality  when  we  compare  the  influence  of  the  con- 
versations, letters,  and  pamphlets  of  the  Encyclopae- 
dists to  the  moral  and  intellectual  influence  exerted 
nowadays  by  the  "  leaders "  and  articles  of  the  great 
representatives  of  the  press. 

One  of  the  most  impressive  of  the  works  of  the  En- 
cyclopaedists was  the  Du  Contrat  Social  of  Rousseau, 


20  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

published  in  1762.  Written  in  language  the  splendour 
and  clearness  of  which  have  rarely  been  equalled,  it 
contains  a  body  of  political  teaching  appealing  with  a 
passionate  warmth  to  the  deepest  political  cravings  of 
the  masses.  It  was  inevitable  that  a  political  work  by 
the  author  of  La  Nonvelle  Hdoise  and  Emile,  then  the 
most  famous  novels  of  the  day,  should  rapidly  find  its 
way  into  the  colonies  in  America,  where  the  latent  and 
unavowed  wishes  of  the  people  made  them  only  too 
prone  to  views  such  as  Rousseau  propagated  in  lan- 
guage aglow  with  all  the  inspirations  of  passion  and 
truth.  It  is  certain,  and  can  easily  be  proved  in  detail, 
that  the  political  views  of  the  wayward  Genevese  and 
of  his  colleagues  of  the  Encyclopedic  had  a  very  consid- 
erable effect  on  the  colonials,  amongst  whom  they  were 
eagerly  read  and  discussed.  The  "imponderable"  in- 
fluence of  these  French  ideas  must  not  be  undervalued, 
although  it  cannot  be  credited  with  a  force  of  the  first 
magnitude.  Far  greater  was  the  secorjd,  or  more  mate- 
rial interference  of  France  in  the  great  struggle  of  the 
colonials  against  Great  Britain. 

That  material  influence  was  set  in  motion  chiefly 
by  a  man  whose  entire  moral  and  literary  personality 
seemed  to  destine  him  for  exploits  of  a  totally  different 
kind.  We  mean  Beaumarchais.  A  thorough  Parisian, 
full  of  the  inexhaustible  verve  and  dash  of  his  own  im- 
mortal creation,  "Figaro"  in  his  Le  Manage  de  Figaro ^ 
Beaumarchais  was  watchmaker,  inventor,  harpist  to  the 
court,  promoter  of  interminable  and  vast  business  enter- 
prises, publisher  of  Voltaire's  works,  author  of  an  im- 
mortal comedy,  incomparable  pamphleteer,  involved  in 
endless  intrigues,  duels,  adventures,  and  political  secret 


THE  WAR  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  21 

missions  to  England  and  Germany, — in  short,  a  man  of  the 
most  astounding  vitality  and  resourcefulness.  His  wit  and 
superb  literary  gift  irradiated  the  most  commonplace  of 
his  actions,  and  his  fundamentally  honest  and  generous 
nature  ennobled  his  life  with  the  glory  of  true  manliness. 
Bold,  intrepid,  a  battler  and  fighter  of  a  thousand  com- 
bats legal  or  political,  he  was  all  through  his  life  a  warm- 
hearted, true  man.  No  one  could  have  applied  Rostand's 
famous  lines  with  greater  aptness  to  himself : 

"  And  wearing  my  exploits  like  ornaments, 
Twirling  my  wits,  as  one  would  a  moustache, 
Passing  among  the  crowds  and  scattered  groups, 
I  make  Truth  ring  out,  brave  as  ringing  spurs !  " 

It  was  this  "frivolous  Frenchman"  who  had  long 
made  up  his  mind  to  avenge  his  country  on  England, 
and  to  wipe  out  the  shame  of  the  treaty  of  1763  in 
the  most  terrible  loss  ever  caused  to  Great  Britain.  He 
clearly  foresaw  the  war  long  before  it  actually  broke 
out,  and  by  means  of  incessant  memorializing  of  the 
French,  and  later  of  the  Spanish  Government  too,  he  in- 
spired Vergennes,  the  great  foreign  minister  of  France, 
and  likewise  Aranda,  Vergennes's  colleague  in  Spain, 
and  prevailed  upon  them  to  support  his  vast  plans.  At 
first  two,  then  more,  million  francs  were  placed  at  the 
disposal  of  the  author  of  "  Figaro  "  by  the  two  Bourbon 
Governments,  and  Beaumarchais,  almost  two  years 
before  France  and  Spain  openly  declared  war  against 
England,  established  his  headquarters  at  Le  Havre, 
under  the  name  of  Rodrigue  Hortalh  et  Cie.  It  was 
from  Havre  that  Beaumarchais  sent  to  the  Americans 
vast  stores  of  tents,  provisions,  and  equipments  of  all 
kinds,  amongst  others,  30,ocx)  rifles,  over  200  cannon, 


22  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

etc.,  in  1776  and  1777.  "  My  fleets,"  as  he  called  them, 
were  in  constant  connection  with  the  colonials,  and  his 
lieutenants,  more  particularly  de  Kalb  and  the  indis- 
pensable Steuben,  were  organizing  the  army  of  the 
colonials.  His  correspondence  with  his  captains,  officers, 
and  his  home  government ;  his  dealings,  frequently  far 
from  pleasant,  with  Arthur  Lee,  Silas  Deane,  and  the 
stately  and  prudent  Franklin  in  Paris,  were  numberless. 
He  never  was  at  a  loss  how  to  meet  the  countless  emer- 
gencies of  financial  or  military  embarrassment,  and  it  is 
only  the  sober  truth  to  say,  that  without  his  genius  and 
energy  the  Americans  could  not  have  carried  on  the 
war  in  the  first  two  years.  With  all  the  staunch  vigour 
and  honesty  of  Washington,  the  American  army,  as 
is  now  well  known,  suffered  very  severely  from  de- 
sertion, treachery,  indifference,  pusillanimity.  It  was 
France,  it  was,  previous  to  the  summer  of  1778,  Beaumar- 
chais,  who  never  flagged,  never  despaired,  never  failed  to 
send  help  where  help  was  most  needed.  His  merit  was 
never  recognized  by  the  government  of  the  Republic,  and 
when,  many  years  later,  reduced  almost  to  indigence, 
he  asked  for  partial  reimbursement  of  his  undoubted 
personal  losses  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  he 
and  his  children  met  with  the  coldest  and,  let  us  confess, 
most  unjustifiable  ingratitude.  No  statue  to  his  honour 
has  ever  been  erected  in  any  public  place  in  America ; 
to  most  Americans  he  is  either  quite  unknown,  or  known 
only  as  a  clever  playwright.  The  Americans  have,  very 
late  it  is  true,  at  last  raised  a  statue  to  Rochambeau,  one 
of  the  two  Frenchmen  to  whom  the  clinching  victories 
in  1 78 1  are  due.  One  would  like  to  entertain  the  hope 
that  they  will  see  their  way  to   raise   several  similar 


THE  WAR  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  23 

monuments  to  him  who,  more  than  any  other  single 
non-military  man,  helped  them  to  raise  the  noble  fabric 
of  their  national  independence. 

The  war  itself,  although  its  extent  both  in  time  and 
space  was  of  the  most  considerable  dimensions,  is  in 
reality  a  very  simple  event.  It  lasted  for  eight  years 
and  was  carried  on  in  the  eastern  territory  of  the  United 
States,  and  in  nearly  all  the  seas.  The  strategic  prob- 
lem was  reduced  to  the  question  of  sea-power.  As 
long  as  the  British  were  able  to  hold  the  Atlantic,  they 
could  easily  pour  ever  new  armies  (if  mostly  hired  ones) 
into  the  colonies.  Once  the  British  lost  the  command 
of  the  sea,  their  hold  on  the  American  colonies  was 
practically  lost.  The  colonials,^  by  their  victory  at 
Saratoga  in  October,  1777,  wh^^less  than  4000  British 
soldiers,  under  Burgoyne,  were  forced  to  surrender  to 
14,000  colonials,  under  Gates,  had  practically  secured 
the  possession  of  the  northern  colonies  before  the  third 
year  of  the  war  was  over ;  but  New  York,  the  central, 
and  the  southern  colonies  were  still  controlled  by  CUnton, 
Cornwallis,  and  other  British  commanders.  However, 
in  August  and  September,  1781,  the  French,  under 
the  Comte  de  Grasse,  baffled  all  the  attempts  of  the 
British  admirals.  Hood  and  Graves,  to  enter  Chesapeake 
Bay  for  the  purpose  of  relieving  Cornwallis,  who  was 
besieged  in  Yorktown  by  a  Franco-American  army  con- 
sisting of  about  7000  men  each  under  Rochambeau 
and  Washington.  The  naval  engagements  of  de  Grasse 
lasted  for  five  days,  and  were  fought  off  Cape  Henry. 
This  all-important  battle,  or  series  of  battles,  which 
definitively  deprived  the  British  of  the  command  of  the 
sea  in  the  middle  Atlantic,  and  which  sealed  the  fate  of 


24  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

Cornwallis;  this  naval  Waterloo  of  the  British — is  one 
of  the  least  noticed  military  events  of  modern  times. 
Not  one  Englishman  or  American  in  ten  thousand  has 
ever  heard  the  name  of  the  battle  of  Cape  Henry.  The 
full  details  of  that  clinching  victory  have  never  been 
published,  and  in  books  on  the  American  War  the 
battle  is,  as  a  rule,  given  neither  its  precise  name,  nor 
placed  in  the  right  historic  perspective.  It  was,  in  reality, 
not  a  very  dramatic  affair.  This,  however,  need  not  de- 
ceive any  one  into  a  false  construction  of  its  fundamental 
importance.  Battles,  like  men,  are  important,  not  for 
their  dramatic  splendour,  but  for  their  efficiency  and  con- 
sequences. The  battle  of  the  White  Mountain,  in  1620, 
was  really  no  serious  fight  at  all ;  while  the  battle  of 
Marengo,  in  1800,  was,  as  far  as  Napoleon  was  con- 
cerned, a  positive  defeat  of  the  French  army.  Yet  by 
the  "  affair  "  of  the  White  Mountain  the  Bohemians 
have  lost  their  independence  to  the  present  day ;  and 
by  Marengo,  Napoleon,  or  rather  Desaix,  established 
the  first  Empire.  The  battle  off  Cape  Henry  had  ulti- 
mate effects  infinitely  more  important  than  those  of 
Waterloo.  Even  the  naval  victories  won  by  Le  Bailli 
de  Suffren  in  the  seas  between  Madras  and  Ceylon  over 
the  British  fleet  in  1782  and  1783,  cannot,  in  point  of 
effect,  compare  with  the  decisive  advantage  obtained  by 
de  Grasse  off  Cape  Henry.  Suffren's  victories  remained 
barren  ;  de  Grasse's  action  entailed  upon  the  British  the 
final  loss  of  the  thirteen  colonies  in  America.  What  the 
French  Encyclopaedists  had  done  by  suggestion,  and 
what  Beaumarchais  had  set  in  movement  by  ingenious 
personal  exertion,  de  Grasse  had  brought  to  a  termina- 
tion by  a  successful  naval  engagement. 


THE  WAR  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  2$ 

It  is  customary  to  accuse  Napoleon  of  having  fool- 
ishly overreached  himself.  It  is  likewise  a  common- 
place to  blame  Louis  XIV.  for  an  ambition  striving  for 
the  absurd  idea  of  subjugating  Europe.  It  is  less 
known  that  George  III.  failed  in  his  attempt  of  retain- 
ing the  thirteen  colonies  within  the  British  Empire 
chiefly  because  of  an  ambition  essentially  identical 
with  that  of  Napoleon  and  Louis  XIV.  King  George 
did  not,  it  is  true,  try  to  dominate  Europe,  he  only 
attempted  to  defy  the  leading  powers  of  Europe.  While 
fighting  the  Americans,  he  had  the  boldness  to  fight 
the  French,  the  Spanish,  and  the  Dutch  too,  rousing 
at  the  same  time  the  hostility  of  the  Baltic  Powers. 
As  Louis  XIV.,  for  a  similar  defiance,  suffered  the  de- 
feats of  Blenheim,  Turin,  and  Malplaquet;  and  as 
Napoleon,  for  the  same  crime  of  defying  Europe,  was 
crushed  at  Leipsic  and  at  Waterloo ;  so  King  George, 
committing  the  same  fatal  error,  lost  England's  princi- 
pal force,  her  sea-power,  and  thus  the  vastest  and  most 
fertile  colonies  ever  possessed  by  an  empire.  Europe, 
the  heir  of  Hellenic  intellect  and  Roman  military 
strength,  can  be  defied  neither  by  any  one  or  two 
European  powers,  nor  by  the  rest  of  the  non-European 
countries  put  together.  Persia  fell  for  defying  Hellas ; 
Carthage  sank  for  opposing  Rome ;  the  United  States 
arose  mainly  owing  to  England's  unwise  defiance  of 
Europe  in  the  eighteenth  century. 


II 


THE   FRENCH    REVOLUTION. — I 

THE  French  Revolution  is  undoubtedly  the  most 
important  event  of  modern  history.  As  we  can- 
not distinctly  trace  its  origin,  so  we  cannot  clearly 
point  out  its  termination  in  time  or  space ;  for  like  a 
great  wave  in  agitated  seas  it  is  still  spreading  to 
countries  that  in  the  eighteenth  century  took  no  notice 
of  it ;  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  seems  more  adequate 
to  consider  the  French  Revolution  as  only  one  part  of 
an  immense  European  revolution  which  assumed  a  politi- 
cal and  aggressive  form  in  France,  while  in  Germany 
it  was  clothed  in  forms  literary  and  philosophical. 
It  is  more  than  a  coincidence  that  the  vast  revolu- 
tionary upheaval  in  France  culminated  in  the  immense 
personality  of  Napoleon  ;  while  in  Germany  the  equally 
vast  intellectual  stir  culminated  in  the  Jupiter  of  Ger- 
man thought  —  Goethe. 

The  uniqueness  and  grandeur  of  the  French  Revo- 
lution are  alone  sufficient  to  render  an  explanation  ex- 
ceedingly difficult,  more  especially  when  we  attempt, 
as  we  should,  to  give  a  specific  explanation. 

It  has  been  customary  to  account  for  historical  facts 
by  general  ethical  remarks  on  human  nature,  or  on  the 
temper  of  the  French,  of  the  German,  or  the  English. 
However,  the  very  generality  of  these  explanations  de- 
prives them  of  any  real  value. 

26 


THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION.  —  I  2/ 

For  the  historian  proper,  the  problem  of  the  French 
Revolution  stands  thus  :  how  are  we  to  account  for  the 
outbreak  of  that  Revolution  under  Louis  XVI.,  consid- 
ering that  the  long  reign  of  Louis  XV.  (171 5-1774) 
was  to  all  intents  and  purposes  a  far  more  likely  time 
for  a  revolution  in  France  ? 

Under  Louis  XV.  the  French  people  had  an  ever  in- 
creasing number  of  motives  to  criticise,  to  fall  foul  of, 
to  attack,  and  finally  to  subvert  the  government.  Many 
of  those  abuses  were  removed  under  Louis  XVL  ;  in 
fact,  the  government  of  Louis  XVI.  under  Turgot, 
Necker,  even  Calonne,  worked  heroically  at  the  re- 
moval of  the  worst  abuses  of  the  old  French  monarchy. 

Moreover,  the  foreign  policy  of  Louis  XVI.  was,  in 
comparison  with  that  of  Louis  XV.,  a  most  brilliant 
advance.  Louis  XV.  was  mortally  humiliated  by  Eng- 
land in  the  Peace  of  1763.  England  was  mortally  hu- 
miliated in  turn  by  Louis  XVI.  in  the  Peace  of  1783. 
Vergennes,  at  the  head  of  foreign  policy  in  France 
under  Louis  XVI.,  was  in  the  highest  degree  success- 
ful, and  yet  the  people,  far  from  acknowledging  the 
good  intentions  of  the  government  at  home,  and  its 
great  successes  abroad,  continued  to  be  dissatisfied, 
and  finally  broke  out  in  the  ever  famous  Revolution  of 
1789.  Unless  we  can  account  for  this  specific  date,  or 
at  any  rate  for  the  connection  of  the  Revolution  with 
Louis  XVI. 's  reign,  we  have  fulfilled  but  very  poorly 
our  real  task  as  historian. 

If  now  we  view  the  well-known  works  of  Taine, 
Tocqueville,  Sybel,  Buckle,  Sorel,  and  others,  on  the 
French  Revolution,  we  shall  at  once  see  that  neither 
the  apparently  scientific  and  cold  analysis  of  Taine,  nor 


28  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN   EUROPE 

the  philosophical  reflections  of  Tocqueville,  neither  the 
laborious  arguments  of  the  learned  German  professor, 
nor  the  dignified  diplomatic  phrases  of  Sorel,  have  in 
reality  advanced  our  insight  into  the  causes  of  the 
French  Revolution. 

After  all  these,  and  similar  authors,  we  still  fail  to 
see  (i)  why  the  French  Revolution  broke  out  under 
Louis  XVI.  and  not  before,  and  (2)  why  it  at  once  as- 
sumed dimensions  so  colossal,  so  intense,  as  to  dwarf 
any  other  historical  movement,  such  as  the  Renaissance 
or  the  Reformation,  into  comparative  insignificance. 

The  sober  truth  is,  we  do  not  understand  the  French 
Revolution.  Auerbach  once  said  that  most  people  were 
not  yet  "  Goethe  reif  {i.e.  ripe  for  the  understanding 
of  Goethe).  We  must  confess  that  we  are  not  yet 
"  Revolution-ripe " ;  and  that,  in  spite  of  the  serious 
and  philosophical  studies  devoted  to  that  Revolution, 
the  best  part  of  our  knowledge  of  that  great  event  is 
probably  still  contained  in  the  classical  witticism  of 
Boerne :  "  One  man  alone  could  have  prevented  the 
French  Revolution  —  Adam  —  if  he  had  drowned  him- 
self before  his  marriage." 

While  acknowledging  the  exceeding  difficulty  of  ac- 
counting for  the  French  Revolution,  we  may  yet  try  to 
point  out  one  or  two  of  the  circumstances  hitherto  un- 
noticed or  neglected  as  the  precursors,  if  not  the  spe- 
cific causes  of  the  French  Revolution. 

It  is  well  known  that  the  prevalent  opinion  ascribes 
the  French  Revolution  to  the  intolerable  anarchy  and 
oppression  degrading  the  people  of  France  under  the 
ancien  regime. 

Works,   such  as  the  books  of  the  famous  Arthur 


THE  FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  — 1  29 

Young,  who  travelled  through  France  shortly  before  the 
outbreak  of  the  French  Revolution,  are  quoted  to  prove 
the  utter  misery  of  the  peasantry  and  smaller  bourgeoisie 
(middle  classes),  and  the  wretched  decadence  of  the  no- 
bility. However,  it  has  long  been  proved  that  Arthur 
Young  had  been  completely  taken  in  by  the  most  art- 
ful of  innocents  in  Europe,  i.e.  by  the  peasantry  of 
France.  It  is  indeed  somewhat  grotesque  to  assume,  as 
Arthur  Young  did,  that  any  peasant  would  reveal  to  him 
what  he  as  a  rule  does  not  even  communicate  to  his  wife, 
that  is,  all  the  details  of  his  household  and  farm. 

We  now  positively  know  that  in  districts  of  France 
where  the  people  were  stated  (by  Arthur  Young)  to 
have  been  utterly  poor,  they  had  during  that  time  made 
extensive  purchases  of  land  and  farms.  The  economic 
history  of  peasants  cannot  be  written  from  their  own 
oral  statements.  It  must  be  looked  for  in  acts  of  nota- 
ries and  other  legal  documents. 

The  alleged  misery  of  the  people  under  the  ancien 
regime  was,  it  is  now  admitted,  very  much  less  severe 
under  Louis  XVI.  than  under  Louis  XV.  On  the  other 
hand,  we  have  positive  knowledge  (not  only  from  the 
well-known  discourse  of  Savaron)  that  the  people  under 
Louis  XI 1 1.  (16 14)  were  literally  crushed  down  by  the 
most  abject  misery. 

It  is  true  that  Savaron  said  to  Louis  XIII. :  "  Que 
diriez-vous,  sire,  si  vous  aviez  vu  dans  vos  pays  de 
Guyenne  et  d'Auvergne  les  hommes  pattre  I'herbe  a 
la  mani^re  de  btes.-*"^  Yet  the  (Catholic)  people 
never  rose  under  Louis  XIII. 

1 "  What  would  you  say,  Sire,  if  you  had  seen  in  your  territories  of 
Guyenne  and  AuTcrgne,  men  eating  grass  like  beasts?  " 


30  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

The  circumstance  above  alluded  to  as  probably  one 
of  the  preparatory  causes  of  the  French  Revolution  is 
the  startling  homogeneity  of  the  French  people.  In 
modern  times,  more  especially  in  America,  we  are  so 
used  to  the  phenomenon  of  millions  of  people  conform- 
ing to  one  and  the  same  standard  of  religion,  opinions, 
dress,  and  manners,  that  we  easily  forget  that  in  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  such  homoge- 
neous masses  were  by  far  the  exception.  In  the  seven- 
teenth century  a  Provencal  or  a  Breton  would  have 
taken  it  almost  as  an  insult  to  be  called  a  Frenchman. 
In  the  seventeenth  century,  previous  to  1685  (Revoca- 
tion of  the  Edict  of  Nantes),  there  was  in  France  a 
very  considerable  number  of  Huguenots,  that  is,  people 
who  had,  besides  the  language,  very  little  in  common 
with  the  rest  of  Catholic  France.  Nay,  within  Catho- 
lic France  the  Jansenists  formed  a  most  distinct,  and 
most  characteristically  differentiated,  group  of  people. 
In  various  provinces  there  still  pulsated  an  autonomous 
life  of  their  own,  and  the  social  strata  were  still  so  sepa- 
rated from  one  another  as  to  make  the  bourgeois  practi- 
cally an  impossibility  in  the  refined  drawing-rooms  of 
the  aristocracy  or  the  court. 

France  was  in  the  seventeenth  century  very  far  from 
being  a  homogeneous  nation.  The  complaint  of  one 
class  or  one  group  found  no  echo  in  that  of  another 
group,  and  could  thus  acquire  no  momentum  of  politi- 
cal importance.  Complaints  {doUances)  such  as  were 
submitted  by  the  whole  of  France  in  1 788-1 789,  were 
of  frequent  occurrence,  even  in  the  seventeenth  century ; 
but  the  complaints  of  one  province,  or  sect,  or  class 
met  with  so  little  encouragement  on  the  part  of  other 


i 


THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION.— I  3 1 

provinces,  sects,  or  classes,  that  they  invariably  ended 
in  sheer  indifference  and  neglect.  When,  on  the 
other  hand,  we  regard  France  under  Louis  XVI.  we 
are  struck  with  a  most  remarkable  homogeneity  of  the 
people. 

The  Huguenots  had  been  expelled  in  1685  ;  the  Jan- 
senists  suppressed  by  the  Bull  Unigenitus^  1 7 1 3-  The  au- 
tonomous rights  and  local  political  life  of  various  prov- 
inces had  been  levelled  out  by  the  great  centralizations 
of  Colbert,  Louvois,  and  the  other  great  ministers  of 
Louis  XIV.,  and  the  bourgeoisie  under  Louis  XV.  had 
penetrated  into  most  of  the  aristocratic  salons.  The 
bourgeois  furnished  the  great  types  of  the  stage,  they 
monopolized  nearly  the  whole  intellect  of  France,  and 
claimed  successfully  the  recognition  of  social  equality. 

This  homogeneity  then  had  caifcd  the  mental  atti- 
tud*e  of  most  Frenchmen  to  be  the  same,  at  least  with 
regard  to  certain  fundamental  principles  of  politics,  phi- 
losophy, and  society.  This  homogeneity  must,  we  take 
it,  be  admitted  as  the  first  and  indispensable  condition 
of  the  great  event  called  the  French  Revolution.  For 
what  do  we  find }  As  soon  as  clever  or  important 
thoughts  on  politics  were  published  in  Paris,  whether 
in  pamphlet  form,  in  a  book,  or  in  a  discourse  (whether 
it  was  Turgot,  Necker,  Condorcet,  the  Abbe  Siey^s,  or 
some  provincial  municipality),  the  rest  of  France,  or 
certainly  the  majority  of  Frenchmen,  at  once  took  it 
up,  discussed  it,  refuted  it,  accepted  it ;  in  short,  in- 
tensely interested  themselves  in  it.  This  was  a  new 
phenomenon. 

The  obscure  official  in  the  Dauphind,  whose  political 
reflections  would   have  fallen  stillborn  from  the  press 


32  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

thirty  years  before,  was  now,  in  the  eighties  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  sure  of  a  hearing,  of  an  audience, 
of  a  general  discussion.  So  great  and  intense  was  that 
growing  homogeneity  that  it  extended  even  to  common 
human  sentiments.  From  July  27th  to  August  ist, 
1789,  happened  what  is  commonly  called  La  grande 
peur.  Suddenly,  in  a  most  inexplicable  manner,  the 
rural  population  of  the  whole  of  France  was  smitten 
with  a  most  mysterious  fear  —  with  a  common  physical 
fear  of  brigands,  robbers,  and  burglars,  who  were  ex- 
pected to  roam  over  the  whole  of  France,  sacking  and 
pillaging  everything  they  could  lay  hands  on.  The 
fear  was  pure  imagination ;  there  were  no  brigands,  no 
burglars.  The  grande  peur  unmistakably  proves  that 
in  addition  to  and  beyond  the  mental  homogeneity  of 
the  people,  there  was  a  homogeneity  of  sentiments,  of 
sensation.  People  thought  the  same  way  and  felt  the 
same  way;  nothing  was  more  natural  than  that  they 
should  act  the  same  way.  For  the  first  time  in  French 
history  the  French  became  conscious  of  their  unity,  as  a 
people,  and  of  their  strength.  Once  the  French  people 
became  conscious  of  their  strength  it  was  only  too  natu- 
ral that  they  should  attempt  to  assert  their  rights  against 
the  crown. 

The  crown,  unfortunately,  was  then  held  by  two  per- 
sons, neither  of  whom  had  by  nature  or  education  the 
power  to  wield  or  to  articulate  the  wishes  of  the  people. 
King  Louis  XVI.  was  limited  in  mind,  small  in  character, 
and  indifferent  in  temper.  Nothing  characterizes  him 
better  than  the  famous  entry  in  his  diary  on  the  day  of 
the  taking  of  the  Bastille,  that  is,  on  the  day  when  the 
most  formidable  onslaught  on  French  monarchical  insti- 


THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION.  —  I  33 

tutions  was  made.  Rien,  "  Nothing,"  was  the  entry  in 
the  King's  diary  for  that  day.  As  to  Marie  Antoinette, 
she  was  an  Austrian  proper,  that  is,  a  woman  endowed 
with  many  charms,  but  none  of  a  serious  character. 
Often,  indeed,  it  may  be  said  that  she  was  possessed  of 
deficiencies  that  had  no  corresponding  virtues,  and  her 
very  advantages  were  devoid  of  efficiency.  She  was 
pleasure-loving,  undiscerning,  hare-brained ;  she  repelled 
all  the  men  of  importance,  and  loved  to  pass  her  time  in 
the  presence  of  mediocrities.  Personally  virtuous,  she 
yet  had  none  of  the  powers  of  female  virtue.  She  re- 
sisted her  passion  for  Fersen,  the  Swedish  chevalier,  and 
yet  did  not  know  how  to  make  use  of  Fersen  in  critical 
moments.  The  powers  of  the  French  nation  set  in  mo- 
tion by  the  homogeneity  mentioned  above,  could  there- 
fore be  neither  controlled  nor  guided  by  the  King  or  the 
Queen.  Moreover,  the  extreme  prodigality  of  the  Queen 
(she  permitted  Calonne  to  buy  her  St.  Cloud  and  Ram- 
bouillet  for  a  sum  of  about  twenty  million  francs,  at  a 
time  when  the  French  finances  were  in  the  lowest  pos- 
sible condition)  was  not  likely  to  endear  her  to  an  ex- 
ceedingly thrifty  people  like  the  French ;  and  when  in 
August,  1786,  the  famous  necklace  trial  was  practically 
decided  against  her,  her  prestige  had  suffered  an  irre- 
mediable loss. 

The  extraordinary  circumstances  so  characteristic  of 
the  year  1789  had,  it  is  true,  given  rise  to  an  extraordi- 
nary man,  who,  as  many  have  supposed,  might  have 
staved  off  the  worst  features  of  the  French  Revolution. 
That  man  was  Mirabeau.  He  came  of  a  high  aristo- 
cratic family ;  but  both  through  his  genius  and  his  fail- 
ings, he  had  long  unlearned  the  prejudices  and  reactionary 


34  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

ideas  of  the  French  nobility.  His  was  a  temper  both 
passionate  in  sentiment  and  cool  in  judgment.  His  in- 
sight into  the  political  structure  of  the  leading  states  of 
his  time ;  his  knowledge  of  the  great  issues  of  interna- 
tional policy ;  his  acquaintance  with  all  the  leading  men 
of  his  age,  and,  more  than  anything  else,  his  power  of 
focussing  and  generalizing  huge  clusters  of  facts,  en- 
dowed him  with  a  superiority  that  nobody  could  rival  in 
his  lifetime,  and  few  have  equalled  after  him.  In  prac- 
tical politics,  however,  he  suffered  from  a  bad  private 
reputation,  from  sordid  indebtedness  to  innumerable 
creditors,  and  also  from  debauches  that  weakened  both 
his  bodily  health  and  his  prestige,  so  that  even  his  mar- 
vellous oratory  and  political  insight  won  for  him  more 
admiration  than  actual  influence. 

To  say  that  Mirabeau  might  have  warded  or  staved 
off  the  worst  consequences  of  the  French  Revolution 
is  probably  an  overstatement.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
is  certain  that  he  alone  amongst  practical  statesmen 
was  the  first  to  foresee  the  stages  of  the  Revolution, 
and  its  final  development  into  an  empire  ruled  by  an 
omnipotent  Caesar.  Finally,  the  early  and  premature 
death  of  Mirabeau  (179 1)  deprived  France  of  the  man 
who  was  then  her  only  possible  leader,  and  so  the  fierce 
powers  of  the  Revolution  swept  over  the  country  and 
over  Europe,  without  meeting  any  serious  force  that 
could   control  them. 

Calonne,  after  having  convoked  the  nobility  in  1787, 
convinced  himself  and  the  King  that  the  dissatisfac- 
tion of  the  nation,  as  well  as  the  evils  of  the  state, 
could  be  remedied  only  by  the  convocation  of  all  the 
orders;  accordingly  in  December,  1788,    all   the  three 


THE  FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  —  I  35 

orders,  the  nobility,  clergy,  and  Tiers-Etat  (Third 
Estate),  or  bourgeoisie^  were  convened,  to  meet  in  a 
common  assembly  for  the  purpose  of  healing  the  wounds 
of  the  country.  From  January  to  April,  1789,  the  peo- 
ple of  France,  meeting  in  innumerable  local  assemblies, 
drew  up  their  famous  cahiers  de  dol^ances  (lists  of  griev- 
ances), in  which  they  criticised  in  the  most  sincere  and 
audacious  manner  the  abuses  then  prevalent,  together 
with  the  persons  then  governing  France.  By  an  indi- 
rect method  of  election,  over  a  thousand  deputies  or 
representatives  were  sent  up  to  the  capital,  and  thus 
the  first  genuine  Parliament  since  16 14  was  opened 
on  May  5th  at  Versailles  ;  the  frivolous  King  decid- 
ing for  Versailles  on  account  of  the  hunting  parties  in 
which  he  was  there  indulging. 

The  two  superior  orders,  the  nobility  and  the  higher 
clergy,  at  first  refused  to  join  the  Tiers-Etat^  but  the 
determined  attitude  of  Mirabeau  and  the  members  of 
the  Tiers-Etat  in  the  end  prevailed  upon  the  nobility 
and  higher  clergy,  and  on  June  27th,  1789,  the  three 
orders  met  in  one  and  the  same  room,  and  constituted 
themselves  as  the  Assemblee  Nationale.  That  famous 
Assemble  has  long  been  called  the  Assemblee  Consti- 
tuante. 

Neither  the  King  nor  the  Queen,  let  alone  the  nu- 
merous members  of  the  Court,  was  able  or  even  willing 
to  see  the  immense  significance  of  the  new  assembly. 
The  King,  a  Philistine  to  the  backbone ;  the  Queen,  a 
girlish  woman  without  any  notion  of  politics,  neither 
could  nor  would  see  that  France  had  entered  on  an 
entirely  new  period  of  her  history.  It  is  probably  in- 
judicious  to   blame   the   royal  couple    for  their  short- 


36  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

sightedness,  when  we  consider  that  one  of  the  broadest 
and  deepest  minds  of  the  United  Kingdom  —  Edmund 
Burke  —  was  utterly  unable  to  view  the  events  hap- 
pening in  France  in  their  right  historical  perspective. 
A  glance  at  Burke  will  readily  induce  us  to  absolve 
Louis  XVI.  and  Marie  Antoinette.  Burke,  far  from 
appreciating  the  immense  significance  of  the  French 
Revolution,  devoted  all  his  unrivalled  power  of  oratory 
to  a  wholesale  condemnation  of  that  great  event. 
Under  these  circumstances  we  need  not  wonder  that 
Louis  XVL  so  utterly  misread  the  spirit  of  his  time 
that,  on  the  nth  July,  he  dismissed  the  most  popular 
of  Ministers  —  Necker — and  that  on  the  14th  July 
the  French  demolished  the  Bastille,  that  symbol  of 
absolutistic  regime.  The  King  was  more  than  ever 
incapable  of  appreciating  an  event  which  threw  all 
the  liberal  minds  of  Europe,  including  England,  into  a 
state  of  frenzied  joy.  But  what  the  great  philosopher 
of  England  and  the  small  King  of  France  were  unable 
to  see,  several  leading  members  of  the  French  aristoc- 
racy were  only  too  ready  to  acknowledge,  and  on  the 
night  of  August  4th,  1789,  the  Due  de  Noailles  and 
the  Due  d'Aiguillon  spontaneously  proposed  a  whole- 
sale abolition  of  all  the  ancient  rights  and  privileges 
of  the  nobility.  Thus  the  ancien  regime  was,  under 
the  pressure  of  the  spirit  of  the  times,  abolished  by  its 
very  devotees. 

In  August,  September,  and  October  the  Assemble 
proceeded  to  lay  down  in  the  most  explicit,  not  to 
say  doctrinaire,  manner,  the  general  principles  gov- 
erning the  relation  of  the  individual  to  the  state.  All 
the    ideas   of   Rousseau,  moderated   by   the   practical 


THE  FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  —  I  37 

wisdom  of  Mirabeau,  were  applied  to  build  up,  on  the 
ruins  of  the  ancient  state,  a  commonwealth  based  on 
the  equality  of  citizens  before  the  law,  on  the  absence 
of  all  castes,  on  the  absence  of  religious  intolerance, 
and  finally  on  the  destruction  of  those  local  provin- 
cialisms which  had  long  prevented  the  French  nation 
from  blending  into  one  homogeneous  mass  of  equal 
citizens. 

So  far  (1789- 1 790)  the  worst  enemies  of  the  French 
cannot  but  admit  that  the  French  Revolution  had  kept 
within  bounds,  threatening  nowise  her  neighbours  or 
the  other  powers  of  Europe.  The  French  Government 
had  declared,  that  nothing  was  more  removed  from  their 
minds  than  a  policy  of  aggression,  more  particularly 
towards  Prussia  and  England ;  the  most  explicit  assur- 
ances were  given  that  France  desired  neither  the  ter- 
ritories on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  nor  Belgium. 
However,  the  great  powers  were  unable  to  rise  to  a 
clear  and  impartial  view  of  the  French  Revolution,  and 
were  convinced  that  France  would  share  the  fate  of 
Poland,  i.e.  partition  at  the  hands  of  her  neighbours. 
The  great  powers,  we  say,  were  determined  to  force  a 
war  upon  France.  For,  this  is  the  historical  fate  of 
France,  that  any  great  French  movement  or  event  will 
inevitably  rouse  the  apprehension,  interest,  or  admira- 
tion of  the  rest  of  Europe  to  a  greater  extent  than 
events  happening  in  any  other  country.  Nor  is  this 
circumstance  difficult  to  explain.  If,  on  a  map  of 
Europe,  we  place  one  point  of  the  compass  in  the  cen- 
tre of  France,  say  at  Bourges,  and  the  other  point  at 
Edinburgh,  and  then  draw  a  circle  round  Bourges, 
we  shall  find  that  the  greatest  enemies  and  rivals  of 


38  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

France  are  all  at  equal  distances  from  Bourges  —  such 
as  England,  Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome,  Madrid.  This  cen- 
tral position  of  France  rendered  any  such  event  as 
the  French  Revolution  of  the  highest  importance  to  her 
neighbours,  and  a  revolution  spreading  in  what  was  then 
the  centre  of  Europe  could  not  but  affect  the  other 
great  powers  in  the  most  direct  fashion :  and  this  (in 
addition  to  the  undoubtedly  moral  and  literary  con- 
quests that  the  French  and  French  literature  had  made 
all  over  Europe  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries)  accounts  for  the  fact  that  Europe  took  an 
infinitely  greater  interest  in  the  French  Revolution 
than  it  had  taken  in  the  great  Civil  War  in  England 
(1642-165 1),  or  in  the  Dutch  revolt  (1566-1648).  It 
was  thus  only  a  matter  of  expediency  when  the  great 
powers  determined  to  begin  their  actual  invasion  of 
France. 

The  Declaration  of  Pillnitz,  in  August,  1791,  was 
only  a  stage  thunder.  In  the  spring  of  1792  the  Aus- 
trians,  and  in  August,  1792,  the  Prussians  also,  in- 
vaded France.  The  latter  campaign  is  known  by  the 
name  of  the  "  Cannonade  of  Valmy,"  where  the  Prince 
of  Brunswick,  at  the  head  of  a  considerable  Austro- 
Prussian  army,  gave  a  half-hearted  battle  to  the  French 
under  Dumouriez  (in  September,  1792),  and  finding 
himself  unable  to  break  the  ranks  of  the  French, 
retired  into  Germany. 

Amongst  the  spectators  present  at  that  campaign 
was  Goethe.  In  the  evening,  after  the  cannonade, 
Goethe,  on  being  asked  what  he  thought  of  the  events 
of  the  day,  answered :  **  Gentlemen,  from  this  place 
and  from  to-day  a  new  epoch  of  world-history  is  be- 


THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION.— I  39 

gun,  and  you  may  say  that  you  have  assisted  at  it." 
("  Hier  und  heute  geht  eine  neue  Epoche  der  Welt- 
geschichte  aus,  und  ihr  konnet  sagen,  ihr  seid  dabei 
gewesen.") 


Ill 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  —  II 

THE  first  period  of  the  French  Revolution,  when 
the  French  people  were  filled  with  the  highest 
ideals  about  liberty  and  community  of  nations,  was 
ended  in  the  month  of  June,  1791.  In  that  fatal  month 
the  royal  couple  took  the  ill-advised  measure  of  trying 
to  escape  from  their  people  by  a  flight  to  Germany. 
The  way  the  flight  was  prepared  and  carried  out  was 
singularly  clumsy,  and  far  from  being  astonished  at  the 
capture  of  the  King  by  the  postmaster  of  Varennes  on 
the  French  frontier,  one  rather  wonders  that  the  King 
had  not  been  discovered  soon  after  leaving  Paris. 

He  and  the  Queen  were  brought  back  to  the  capital 
amidst  the  sullen  silence  of  an  indignant  nation.  It 
now  became  clear  that  the  animosity  of  the  foreign 
powers  was  shared  by  the  King,  and  that  the  entire 
nation  was  at  the  mercy  of  a  European  conspiracy. 
There  is  no  nation  in  Europe  that  has,  in  mediaeval 
or  modern  times,  ever  found  itself  in  a  situation  so 
tragic,  so  exasperating.  From  all  sides  of  the  horizon 
the  French  people  felt  the  underground  and  overt  at- 
tacks of  the  rest  of  Europe.  In  Sweden  and  Russia, 
King  Gustavus  III.  and  Catherine  the  Great ;  in  Austria 
and  Prussia,  Leopold  II.  and  Frederick  William  II. ;  in 
England  and  in  all  other  countries,  threats  of  invasion, 

40 


THE  FRENCH   REVOLUTION.— -H  4 1 

menaces  of  the  most  terrible  kind  were  levelled  at  the 
people  whose  King  had  just  given  unmistakable  proofs 
of  treachery  and  cowardice,  which  alone  are  sufficient 
to  drive  a  nation  into  despair. 

Yet  the  French  people  even  then,  under  the  most 
trying  circumstances,  continued  to  be  loyal  to  the  King, 
and  instead  of  making  open  war  on  him  —  as  had  been 
done  in  England  in  1642,  when  King  Charles  I.  left 
London  —  the  French  people,  after  a  few  weeks,  in- 
trusted Louis  XVL  with  the  government  of  the  country. 
Even  then  very  few  people  seriously  thought  of  a  repub- 
lic, and  Louis  XVL  had  many  a  fair  chance  of  consoli- 
dating his  shaken  position.  However,  the  plans  of  the 
Powers  against  France  became  so  manifest ;  their  inten- 
tion of  treating  France  as  they  had  dealt  with  Poland 
in  the  seventies  became  so  evident;  the  War  Party, 
headed  by  the  Girondists  and  General  Dumouriez,  be- 
came by  the  end  of  1791  so  influential,  that  a  conflict 
between  France  on  the  one  hand  and  Europe  on  the 
other  was  only  a  question  of  days. 

The  actions  of  the  Powers,  more  especially  of  Prussia 
and  Austria,  were  based  on  a  total  misconception  of 
the  resources  and  conditions  of  France.  The  numerous 
imigrh  (political  refugees)  from  France  had  spread  the 
belief  (still  shared  by  many  historians)  that  the  revolu- 
tion in  France  was  in  reality  only  a  local  anarchy  in 
Paris,  countenanced  in  no  wise  by  the  bulk  of  the  French 
nation.  Moreover,  the  ^migr^s  plausibly  remarked  that 
owing  to  the  law  of  1781  the  French  nation  was,  through 
the  emigration  of  the  nobles,  deprived  of  their  officers 
—  officers  in  the  French  army  since  1781  being  aristo- 
crats only. 


42  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

The  very  atrocity  of  the  situation,  however,  aroused 
all  the  latent  energy  of  the  French  nation,  and  when 
in  September,  1792,  the  Prussians  and  Austrians  ad- 
vanced on  the  Rhine,  the  French,  far  from  being 
cowed  and  discouraged,  were  more  than  ever  deter- 
mined to  resist  the  unprovoked  hostility  of  their  allied 
enemies. 

One  need  only  read  the  proclamation,  signed  if  not 
drawn  up  by  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  and  dated  from 
Coblentz,  to  understand  the  heroic  resolution  of  the 
French  and  their  determination  to  defend  their  country 
—  even  at  the  most  painful  loss  in  men  and  money. 
That  proclamation  is  unique  in  all  history,  unless  we 
compare  it  with  the  actions  of  Attila,  Genghis  Khan,  or 
some  other  barbarous  "  Scourge  of  heaven."  Bruns- 
wick threatened  the  people  of  France  to  raze  Paris  to 
the  ground,  and  to  reduce  their  country  to  a  desert, 
unless  they  restored  the  old  monarchy  and  abandoned 
all  the  rights  of  the  nation  acquired  since  May,  1789. 

This  atrocious  document  was  replied  to  by  the  French 
by  the  so-called  September  massacres.  During  five 
days,  early  in  September,  numerous  individuals,  many 
of  them  innocent  or  invalids,  were  massacred  in  the 
streets,  hospitals,  and  prisons  of  Paris  by  the  mob  mad- 
dened by  the  terror  of  the  near  extinction  of  France  at 
the  hands  of  the  allies. 

The  horrors  of  those  massacres  can  certainly  not  be 
excused  ;  they  are,  however,  in  keeping  with  the  be- 
haviour of  most  nations  in  times  of  unexampled  popular 
excitement. 

In  the  great  Civil  War  in  England  the  popular  ex- 
citement vented  itself  in  the  wholesale  execution  of  so- 


THE  FRENCH   REVOLUTION.  —  II  43 

called  witches  and  sorcerers,  of  whom,  as  Mr.  Lecky 
says,  a  greater  number  was  cruelly  put  to  death  during 
the  great  Civil  War  than  during  all  the  other  periods 
of  English  history  put  together.  From  1645  to  1647 
over  150  witches  were  executed  in  the  counties  of  Suf- 
folk and  Essex  alone.  The  fascination  of  cruelty  on  an 
excited  mob  is  a  dark  problem ;  but  at  any  rate  we  may 
say  that  Danton,  who  did  nothing  to  stop  the  Septem- 
ber massacres,  cannot  seriously  be  held  to  be  the  author 
of  those  misdeeds.  With  the  bUnd  but  unerring  in- 
stinct of  fierce  animality,  the  people  of  France,  who 
had  on  the  loth  August,  1792,  practically  deposed  the 
King,  now,  in  the  face  of  extreme  danger,  ventured  to 
give  a  practical  illustration  of  their  unprecedented  reso- 
lution to  keep  up  the  unity  of  France  both  against  home 
and  foreign  assailants. 

If  we  condemn  the  September  massacres,  we  must, 
at  any  rate,  credit  them  also  with  a  considerable  share 
in  the  great  victory  of  Valmy  a  few  days  later.  In  that 
battle,  in  itself  an  insignificant  engagement,  a  new  spirit, 
the  spirit  of  a  united  and  determined  nation,  was  proved 
to  be  stronger  than  the  might  of  Prussia  and  Austria. 
The  enemy  was  driven  out  of  the  country ;  Dumouriez, 
the  victor  of  Valmy,  marched  northward,  and  after  in- 
flicting upon  the  Austrians  the  defeat  of  Jemmapes,  he 
pushed  them  back  on  the  Rhine,  and  occupied  Belgium 
and  parts  of  Holland  (autumn,  1792).  The  great  victo- 
ries won  by  the  army  indefinitely  increased  the  prestige 
of  the  Girondists  —  amongst  whom  Vergniaud,  Gen- 
sonn6,  Guadet,  and  Madame  Roland  were  most  influen- 
tial —  and  they  quickly  brought  the  King  to  the  block. 
And  now  at  last  France,  clearly  conscious  of  the  exas- 


44  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

perating  hostility  of  Europe,  took  measures  to  intensify 
by  concentration  her  powers  of  resistance,  so  abundant 
in  that  old  historic  country. 

To  the  student  of  history  the  spectacle  of  France 
resisting  single-handed  the  might  of  the  rest  of  Europe 
is  one  which  appeals  very  strongly,  both  to  the  heart 
and  to  the  mind.  With  the  exception  of  the  ancient 
Hellenes  and  the  English  under  Elizabeth,  no  other 
nation  of  any  magnitude  has  been  given  the  means  to 
go  unaided  through  the  grand  trial  of  one  nation 
fighting  the  world  for  the  recovery  of  her  independence 
and  liberty.  It  is  this  standpoint  which  must  be  un- 
waveringly held  in  view  to  enable  us  to  do  justice  to 
the  events  of  1 793  and  1 794 ;  events,  coloured,  stained, 
distorted,  and  yet  glorified  by  the  most  ruthless  atroci- 
ties, as  well  as  by  the  most  astounding  glory  of  events, 
military  and  human.  That  period  is  well  known  by  the 
name  of  "  La  Terreur."  It  would  be  superfluous  to 
enumerate  or  to  describe  the  excesses  committed  by 
the  men  of  the  "  Convention,"  or  Third  Parliament  of 
the  French  Revolution.  They  are  in  all  books,  in 
thousands  of  novels,  in  numberless  biographies  and 
Mhnoires. 

The  names  of  Marat,  Hubert,  Robespierre,  Camille 
Desmoulins,  Fouquier-Tinville,  St.  Just,  and  other 
celebrities  of  "The  Terror"  are  well  known  to  every- 
body. What,  however,  must  be  pointed  out,  and  of 
what  most  students  of  that  period  must  constantly  be 
reminded,  is  the  undeniable  connection  and  correlation 
between  those  atrocities,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  re- 
generation of  France,  nay,  of  Europe,  accomplished 
by  Frenchmen  of  that  period,  on  the  other.     The  un- 


THE  FRENCH   REVOLUTION.— II  45 

paralleled  deeds  and  successes  of  the  French  generals  in 
1794-1795-1796;  the  host  of  social  reforms  introduced 
during  "  The  Terror "  and  now  all  but  universally  ac- 
cepted, could  never  have  been  thought  of  but  for  that 
fierce  and  unparalleled  energy  of  which  the  home  ex- 
cesses of  the  French  were  only  the  dark  reverse. 

He  who  studies  "  The  Terror  "  in  its  totality,  that  is, 
the  acts  and  measures  taken  by  the  French  Parliament, 
by  the  Comitd  de  Salut  Public  (Committee  of  Public 
Safety),  by  the  leaders  of  the  Paris  municipality,  cannot 
but  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  while  the  Paris  muni- 
cipality and  its  wire-pullers  represented  the  dark  side  of 
the  medal,  the  Comity  de  Salut  Public  (whether  under 
Danton  or  under  Robespierre)  represented  the  terrible 
determination  of  the  French  to  keep  up  the  unity  and 
integrity  of  their  country ;  and  the  "  Convention " 
proper,  or  Parliament,  endowed  France  with  institu- 
tions securing  order  in  peace  and  power  in  war.  The 
Comity  de  Salut  Public^  the  most  centralized  of  all 
governments  of  modern  times,  really  a  dictatorship  in 
Committee,  so  efficiently  organized  the  administrative 
and  military  services  of  the  country,  especially  through 
its  representatives  in  the  provinces,  that  France  was 
enabled  to  throw  huge  armies  on  the  frontier,  and, 
finally,  in  the  battle  of  Fleurus,  June,  1794,  drive  out 
the  allies  again  from  Belgium  and  Holland,  let  alone 
from  Alsace.  The  "  Convention,"  on  the  other  hand, 
introduced  the  metrical  system;  reformed  all  the 
schools  for  higher  education,  legalized  religious  tolera- 
tion, reformed  the  law,  and  anticipated  in  many  of  its 
measures  the  reorganization  of  France  as  completed  by 
Napoleon  I. 


46  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

Consider  the  extreme  shortness  of  time  in  which  the 
French  carried  out  legal  and  social  reforms  of  the  most 
comprehensive  nature ;  compare  the  few  years  they 
needed  for  all  these  reforms  with  the  generations  of 
labor  and  struggle  required  by  other  nations  to  obtain  the 
same  result,  and  we  are  driven  to  the  conclusion  that 
such  high-strung  and  unparalleled  national  activity  was 
possible  only  at  the  instigation  of  a  national  exaltation, 
the  over-exuberance  of  which  was  bound  to  lead  to 
abuses.  Or,  instead  of  considering  things  and  institu- 
tions, let  us  for  a  moment  study  the  leading  persons  of 
that  period.  In  them  we  find  reflected  the  same  energy, 
and  hence  the  same  abuses  found  in  the  nation  at  large. 

The  terrific  push  and  dash  of  Danton,  balanced  by 
the  most  enthusiastic  and  true  patriotism,  aided  by  deep 
political  insight  into  home  and  foreign  matters,  and  glo- 
rified by  the  greatest  rhetorical  power  of  that  time,  stands 
out  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  vile,  venomous,  wretched 
ambition  of  the  lawyer  of  Arras,  the  cold-blooded, 
villainous  Robespierre,  whose  black  soul  is  rendered 
only  more  disgusting  by  his  sickly  sentimentality.  In 
M.  Camille  Desmoulins  and  his  fierce  power  as  a  publi- 
cist and  speaker ;  in  St.  Just,  with  his  Draconic  severity 
in  carrying  out  matters  for  the  salvation  of  his  country ; 
in  so  many  anonymous  heroes  for  whom  death  had  lost 
its  terrors ;  in  the  numerous  women,  from  Charlotte 
Corday,  who,  a  young  girl  of  perfect  innocence,  found 
the  force  to  murder  the  fiend  Marat ;  in  Madame  Roland ; 
in  all  the  other  well-known  characters  of  the  French 
Revolution,  we  note  the  whole  scale  of  human  energy  in 
all  its  shades,  reflecting  the  vast  impulse  with  which 
the  French    Revolution  imbued  the  French  nation.     If 


THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION,  —  II  47 

Europe  by  her  most  interested  action  must  be  declared 
to  have  provoked  many  an  excess  of  the  French  Revo- 
lution, the  glory  of  having  turned  the  new  vital  powers 
of  the  nation  to  the  realization  of  reforms  and  to  exploits 
of  the  first  order,  remains  entirely  with  the  French.  In 
March,  1793,  every  foot  of  the  French  frontier  on  land 
and  on  sea  was  attacked  by  all  the  Powers  of  Europe. 
Fifteen  months  later  all  the  land  Powers  had  been 
driven  back  and  beaten  by  the  French,  while  the  might 
of  England  on  sea  could  boast  only  one  barren  victory, 
the  battle  of  the  ist  June,  1794,  when  Howe,  although 
disabling  the  fleet  of  Villaret  de  Joyeuse,  was  unable  to 
prevent  a  large  French  convoy  from  the  West  Indies 
from  entering  Brest.  The  decisive  victories  of  the 
French  in  the  summer  of  1794  rendered  the  anarchy  at 
home  objectless,  and  the  victories  of  the  army  "furiously 
conspired  "  against  Robespierre.  He  and  his  followers 
suffered  death  on  the  Place  de  la  Republique,  the  fate  of 
Danton,  Hubert,  and  so  many  other  "  Conventionnels," 
and  in  1795  the  Directoire  was  introduced,  a  government 
which  was  neither  in  person  nor  constitution  either  im- 
portant or  helpful.  Very  early  in  1795  the  Republic 
had  succeeded  in  making  peace  with  Prussia,  and  Spain 
by  the  Treaty  of  Basle  (1795).  The  military  position  of 
France  was  excellent,  and  the  centre  of  disturbances  came 
more  and  more  to  fall  outside  France.  Already  in  1769 
and  from  that  time  onward,  French,  or  rather  European, 
history  begins  to  spell  that  name  that  dominated  the 
events  of  the  world  until  181 5  —  Napoleon  ! 


IV 

NAPOLEON. — I 

OF  all  the  characters  of  modern  history  Napoleon 
has  been  most  admired  and  most  condemned. 
He  is  generally  credited  with  having  been  the  greatest 
captain  of  modern  times,  one  of  the  greatest  statesmen, 
and  at  the  same  time  one  of  the  most  selfish  and  ruth- 
less characters  on  record.  On  the  other  hand,  numerous 
historians,  both  French  and  non-French,  are  almost 
fanatic  in  their  unconditioned  admiration  of  the  genius 
as  well  as  of  the  character  of  the  great  emperor.  The 
number  of  documents,  books,  and  essays  published  on 
the  career  of  the  incomparable  Corsican  is  so  immense, 
and  is  increasing  so  constantly,  that  we  might  easily 
indulge  in  the  beHef  that  we  are  at  present  fully 
equipped  for  an  equitable  and  adequate  appreciation 
of  Napoleon.  However,  as  in  the  case  of  the  French 
Revolution,  we  must  not  for  a  moment  ignore  the 
fact  that  we  are  as  yet  not  in  a  position  to  pass  final 
sentence  on  a  man  whose  personality  was  deeper  and 
more  complex  than  that  of  Goethe ;  whose  diplomatic 
activity  was  more  comprehensive  than  that  of  Riche- 
lieu, Kaunitz,  and  Metternich  put  together;  whose 
military  exploits  covered  the  whole  of  Europe  and 
parts  of  Africa  and  Asia;  and  whose  activity  as  a 
legislator  was   so  immense  that   modern   France  may 

48 


NAPOLEON.  — I  49 

truly  be  said  to  be  the  direct  offspring  of  the  adminis- 
trative measures  and  institutions  decreed  by  Napoleon. 

Personality  as  a  rule  does  not  yield  to  analysis ; 
but  when  personality  becomes  one  of  dimensions  so 
vast  and  of  depths  so  unfathomable  as  was  that  of 
the  great  Emperor  of  the  French,  all  the  resources  of 
psychological  or  ethical  analysis  fail  us.  If,  moreover, 
one  considers  the  incredible  mass  of  misrepresenta- 
tions spread  wholesale  all  over  the  Napoleonic  litera- 
ture in  Europe  and  America,  the  pose  of  so  many 
modern  historians  as  judges  on  a  man  like  Napoleon 
cannot  but  seem  absurd.  Every  student  of  history 
knows  that  nearly  three  hundred  and  fifty  years  after 
the  death  of  Charles  V.  we  are  not  yet  in  a  position  to 
pronounce  definitely  on  the  character  and  historical 
position  of  that  sombre  Habsburg.  It  is  absurd  to 
think  that  we  are  already  capable  of  giving  a  right 
historical  perspective  to  a  ruler  of  infinite  superiority 
to  Charles  V.,  and  whose  death  occurred  not  quite 
three  generations  ago.  Certainly  with  regard  to  Na- 
poleon, if  in  any  case  of  historical  study,  the  student 
must  give  up  the  faintest  tendency  to  rash  and  im- 
modest judgment.  The  actions  and  facts  made  or 
directly  inspired  by  Napoleon  are  in  number  so  im- 
mense that  by  picking  out  some  of  them  one  can  easily 
believe  Napoleon  to  have  been  afflicted  with  the  greatest 
or  most  villainous  of  vices ;  just  as  by  selecting  other 
facts  one  can  demonstrate  him  to  have  been  a  man  of 
the  most  exalted  and  sublime  character.  Like  every 
great  doer.  Napoleon  did  both  good  and  bad  actions,  gen- 
erous and  mean  ones,  he  was  grateful  and  ungrateful. 

In  1 796-1 797,  on  the  Bridge  of  Lodi  or  in  the  swamps 


50  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

of  Arcole,  he  showed  extraordinary  physical  courage. 
In  1 8 14,  after  his  first  abdication,  he  showed  extreme 
physical  cowardice.  He  was  an  excellent  husband, 
yet  he  brutally  divorced  his  first  wife,  whom  at  heart 
he  never  ceased  to  love.  He  was  a  faithful  son  and 
brother,  yet  he  treated,  at  times,  the  members  of  his 
family  with  extreme  severity.  Nor  need  we  be  aston- 
ished at  all  that.  It  is  the  symptom  and  essence  of  a 
great  personality  to  harbour  in  one  and  the  same  soul 
the  most  conflicting  qualities,  the  most  contradictory 
tendencies.  Napoleon,  who  can  properly  be  compared 
only  to  Alexander  the  Great  and  Caesar,  showed  in 
his  varied  life  the  same  bewildering  mass  of  apparently 
incoherent  phenomena  that  has  made  a  judgment  on 
the  great  king  of  Macedon  and  on  the  founder  of  the 
Roman  Empire  a  matter  of  the  utmost  difficulty.  To 
the  present  day  we  are  still  under  the  influence  of 
Caesar,  let  alone  of  Napoleon.  Broad  and  comprehen- 
sive facts  still  bespeak  the  unique  greatness  of  the  two 
men,  and  to  the  present  day  the  opinions  on  Caesar 
differ  as  widely  as  do  those  on  Napoleon. 

While  it  is  thus  impossible  to  bracket  the  character 
and  genius  of  Napoleon  into  one  neat  formula  of  ethi- 
cal judgment,  it  is,  we  take  it,  not  quite  impossible 
to  account  for  the  strange  fact  that  the  greatest  states- 
man and  captain  of  modern  times  came  from  an  obscure 
and,  in  point  of  European  history,  quite  unimportant 
little  island,  from  Corsica.  Twice  in  modern  times  we 
may  notice  this  peculiar  connection  of  a  political  mind 
of  the  first  magnitude  with  a  place  of  origin  quite  out  of 
proportion  to  the  ultimate  result.  The  builder  of  the 
mightiest  body  politic  in  modern  times,  the  originator  of 


NAPOLEON. —  I  51 

the  most  important  and  in  many  ways  the  most  impos- 
ing political  association  of  the  last  four  centuries,  St. 
Ignatius  Loyola,  the  founder  of  the  Jesuits,  came  from 
the  obscure,  poor,  and  insignificant  country  of  the 
Basques.  The  man  whose  powerful  mind  has  framed, 
animated,  and  organized  the  "  Society  of  Jesus"  was  a 
Basque.  In  the  case  of  Napoleon,  however,  we  can  do 
more  than  merely  state  the  interesting  fact  that  the  first 
Emperor  of  the  French  in  modern  times  came  from 
Corsica. 

The  Corsicans,  although  their  history  has  generally 
been  ignored,  were  in  reality  one  of  the  most  remark- 
able nations  in  the  Mediterranean.  Unlike  the  people 
of  the  island  of  Sardinia  who  have  at  no  time  in  history 
played  an  important  r61e,  the  Corsicans  had  been  wag- 
ing a  secular  war  against  the  mighty  republic  of  Genoa, 
and  forty  years  before  the  birth  of  Napoleon  the  Corsi- 
cans fought  that  war  of  national  resistance  not  only 
against  the  Genoese  but  frequently  against  mighty 
French  armies  too.  So  great  was  their  military  capacity 
and  genius  that  they  repeatedly  defeated  both  the 
French  and  Genoese  armies ;  it  was  only  at  the  end  of 
forty  years'  uninterrupted  fighting  that  the  French  were 
enabled  to  take  possession  of  the  island  to  some  extent. 
During  these  great  national  fights,  Arrigo  de  la  Rocca, 
the  Paolis,  and  numerous  other  Corsicans  showed  the 
greatest  genius  for  military  and  political  work,  and  Na- 
poleon Bonaparte  may  be  said  to  be  only  the  climax  of 
a  long  series  of  heroes  who,  trained  in  the  most  unequal 
war,  had  naturally  acquired  gifts  of  perspicacity  such  as 
at  that  time  no  other  European  nation  had  the  oppor- 
tunity of  developing.     At  any  rate,  we  cannot,  in  an 


52  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

estimate  of  Napoleon's  military  genius,  omit  the  fact 
that  he  lived  in  one  of  those  border  countries  attacked 
by  neighbouring  and  mighty  empires  in  which  at  times 
the  constant  habit  of  fighting  against  great  odds  has 
brought  to  light  the  Themistocles,  the  Robert  Bruces, 
the  Shamyls,  etc.,  and  Napoleon. 

However,  to  point  out  only  the  Corsican  antecedents 
of  Napoleon  would  be  manifestly  unfair  to  the  connec- 
tion of  Napoleon  with  France  proper.  It  cannot  be 
denied  that  Napoleon  was  the  embodiment  and  final 
culminating  development  of  the  French  Revolution. 
That  that  great  event  would  ultimately  lead  to  some 
towering  personality  was,  long  before  the  advent  of 
Napoleon,  the  common  belief  of  most  Frenchmen,  and 
of  most  thinking  persons  outside  France.  Napoleon 
himself,  at  St.  Helena,  repeatedly  expressed  his  convic- 
tion that  had  he  not  been  the  Emperor  of  the  French, 
somebody  else  would  have  played  his  r61e.  The  French, 
after  trying  every  possible  party,  could  not  but  see  that 
the  salvation  of  the  country  was  neither  in  the  moderates 
nor  in  the  radicals ;  neither  in  the  return  to  the  laws  of 
the  ancien  regime,  nor  in  the  maintenance  of  an  abso- 
lutely democratic  republic.  Under  these  circumstances 
it  was  evident  that  only  one  powerful  will  and  mind  was 
able  to  steer  France  through  the  maze  of  wars  and 
policies  that  had  ever  since  1795  completely  changed 
and  displaced  the  old  political  life  of  Europe.  It  is, 
moreover,  a  usual  phenomenon  in  history  that  vast  and 
deeply  agitated  movements,  whether  of  a  political  or  a 
mental  character,  are  terminated  by  the  appearance  of  a 
personality  which  combines  their  various  elements  and 
thus  controls  them.     Thus  arose  the  great  founders  of 


NAPOLEON.  — I  53 

religions  at  the  end  of  long,  sometimes  secular  religious 
revolutions ;  so  came  Henry  IV.  to  France,  Cromwell  to 
England,  Bismarck  to  Germany. 

The  relation  of  these  great  personalities  to  their  time 
is  that  of  the  blossom  to  the  leaf  and  stem.  They  can 
neither  be  said  to  have  created  their  time,  nor  to  be 
nothing  but  the  creation  thereof  —  they  are  both.  Napo- 
leon is  unthinkable  without  the  French  Revolution,  and 
the  French  Revolution  without  Napoleon  would  repre- 
sent only  wild  and  bootless  anarchy.  The  French  Revo- 
lution and  Napoleon  form  the  most  important  event  in 
modern  history. 

In  person  this  extraordinary  man  was  small,  well-knit, 
with  classical  features,  of  robust  health,  and  most  tem- 
perate in  his  habits.  He  ate  very  little  and  drank  less  ; 
his  usual  beverage  being  a  little  Sauterne.  In  youth 
he  was  very  thin  and  pale ;  after  his  thirty-eighth 
year  he  became  rather  bloated  and  heavy.  He  required 
little  sleep  and  took  it  at  odd  times  during  the  day  or  the 
night.  His  power  of  work  was  immense ;  he  frequently 
tired  out  a  number  of  secretaries  without  in  the  least 
feeling  fatigued  himself,  and  could  turn  from  one  sub- 
ject to  another  without  the  least  effort.  He  used  to  say 
that  all  the  subjects  and  persons  interesting  him  were 
put  away  into  so  many  "  drawers,"  and  when  he  wanted 
subject  "A,"  he  only  pulled  out  its  respective  "drawer." 
His  love  and  sense  of  detail  were  just  as  remarkable  as 
his  power  of  grasping  great  dominating  traits  covering 
an  immense  array  of  details.  He  delighted  in  reading 
military  reports  of  the  minutest  kind,  and  his  memory 
had  stored  away  all  the  numberless  details  of  his  armies, 
his  ships,  his  fortresses  and  his  officials,  of  all  of  which 


54  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

he  had  the  most  accurate  and  ready  knowledge.  He 
frequently  corrected  reports,  sent  to  him  by  his  govern- 
ors or  agents,  about  far-off  provinces  from  memory  with- 
out consulting  any  reference  book  or  minutes.  In  fact, 
it  is  quite  correct  to  say  that  his  mind  was  essentially 
*'  topographical,"  that  is,  on  his  mind  was  impressed  a 
huge  map  of  Europe  in  which  every  physical  feature, 
such  as  mountains,  rivers,  lakes,  brooks,  ravines,  passes, 
gorges,  were  carefully  entered  together  with  all  the 
political  and  social  information  of  each  country.  For 
great  as  his  genius  was,  his  successes  were  undoubtedly 
due  to  superior  information  in  the  first  place. 

Like  Richelieu,  who  through  his  agents  was  the 
best  informed  man  in  France  about  the  actual  state  of 
his  country,  so  Napoleon,  trusting  nobody,  invariably 
had  the  most  accurate  personal  information  about  the 
country  he  was  going  to  contend  with;  and  although 
he  mostly  fought  in  countries  of  which  very  detailed 
maps  had  long  been  made,  yet  he  constantly  demanded 
fresh  and  better  maps.  He  despatched  his  best-trained 
officers  to  survey  anew  even  such  a  well-known  country 
as  Bavaria,  and  he  was  constantly  studying  all  the 
maps  he  could  secure.  In  addition  to  that  he  had  the 
real  "  objective "  temper  which  enables  the  man  of 
genius  to  see  things  not  in  the  light  of  his  desire  or 
personal  "bias,"  but  in  their  own  light. 

Nobody  was  more  just  to  the  capacity  or  resources 
of  his  enemies,  or  less  conceited  with  regard  to  his 
own  genius  than  Napoleon.  As  a  rule  he  neither  over- 
rated nor  underrated  his  enemies.  His  strategical 
classical  victory  at  Ulm  in  1805  was  due  mainly  to  his 
correct  appreciation   of   the  Austrian   general,    Mack, 


NAPOLEON.  — I  55 

who  was  then  generally  held  to  be  a  strategist  of  the 
first  order,  whom  Napoleon,  however,  rightly  judged 
to  be  a  muddle-headed  dilettante. 

On  the  other  hand.  Napoleon  fully  appreciated  the 
gifts  of  Archduke  Charles,  his  great  opponent.  And  as 
with  individuals,  so  with  nations;  whatever  judgment 
he  passed  in  public  for  political  purposes  (such  as  the 
famous  words  spoken  of  the  English  that  they  were 
"  une  nation  de  boutiquiers''  —  a  nation  of  shopkeepers), 
in  his  correspondence  with  his  friends  and  officials  we 
note  that  he  had  a  very  just  appreciation  of  the  great 
qualities  of  the  English,  and  even  of  those  of  the  Por- 
tuguese and  Spanish.  His  successes,  therefore,  were 
based  on  the  best  attainable  information  and  on  inces- 
sant work ;  we  need,  therefore,  not  be  astounded  that 
his  unprecedented  military  victories  have  always  been 
considered  to  follow'rather  from  a  systematic  strategy  — 
or,  as  he  used  to  say,  des  regies  de  Vart  ("  the  rules  of 
the  art")  —  than  from  mere  luck  or  fortunate  incident. 

There  is  now  little  doubt  that  Napoleon  was  the 
greatest  strategist  of  modern  times.  The  word  strategy y 
although  in  constant  use  in  newspapers  and  in  common 
conversation,  is  rarely  grasped  in  its  technical  and  true 
meaning.  It  may  be  reduced  to  a  very  simple  expres- 
sion, in  fact,  to  a  single  word.  Strategy  really  means 
a  line :  the  line  of  operations  —  that  is,  the  direction 
which  leads  a  general,  if  he  is  victorious,  to  a  decisive 
victory,  to  a  victory  that  forces  his  opponent  to  sur- 
render. In  campaigns  it  is  not  sufficient  to  win  battles. 
There  has  scarcely  ever  been  a  general  of  any  note 
who  has  not  won  a  greater  or  smaller  number  of  en- 
gagements.    What  makes  a  general  is  not  the  number 


56  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

of  his  tactical  victories,  nor  the  number  of  persons  and 
arms  taken.  It  is  only  the  rapidity  of  decisive  actions 
that  constitutes  a  great  general.  Military  leaders  who 
make  their  points  only  after  wearisome  fighting  for 
years  and  years,  entailing  enormous  loss  of  men  and 
treasure,  may,  indeed,  be  called  good  generals,  but 
they  are  certainly  not  great  strategists.  In  the  Thirty 
Years'  War,  for  instance,  although  the  number  of  clever 
and  efficient  generals  on  both  sides  was  very  great, 
there  was  only  one  great  general — Gustavus  Adolphus ; 
for  he  alone  knew  where  and  when  to  give  battle,  and 
he  alone  arrived  rapidly  at  a  decisive  and  final  success. 
To  make  this  point  absolutely  clear  we  have  only  to 
compare  the  campaign  of  Napoleon  in  1805,  on  the 
Upper  Danube,  with  the  campaign  of  Marlborough  and 
Prince  Eugene  in  the  same  region  almost  exactly  one 
hundred  years  before,  in  1704. 

The  military  problem  that  both  Marlborough  and 
Napoleon  had  to  solve  was  practically  identical.  For 
Marlborough's  and  Eugene's  main  point  was  to  separate 
the  French  general,  Tallard,  from  his  German  ally, 
the  Bavarian  elector.  Max  Emmanuel;  in  other  words, 
to  prevent  the  junction  of  the  French  and  Bavarian 
armies.  In  Napoleon's  case  the  problem  was  to  pre- 
vent the  junction  of  the  Austrian  general,  Mack,  at 
and  around  Ulm,  with  his  ally,  the  Russian  general, 
Kutusow.  Marlborough  and  Eugene  were  unable  to 
prevent  the  junction  of  their  opponents,  and  were 
therefore  forced  to  fight  a  formidable  battle,  the  battle 
of  Blenheim,  entailing  severe  loss  on  both  of  them. 
Napoleon,  on  the  other  hand,  so  arranged  the  marches 
of  the  various  columns,  and  so  successfully  duped  Mack 


NAPOLEON.  — I  57 

as  to  the  real  route  of  the  French  army,  that  Mack's 
army,  with  slight  exceptions,  was  forced  to  surrender 
to  Napoleon  after  a  few  unimportant  engagements. 
These  remarks  are  made  from  a  purely  technical 
standpoint;  for,  historically,  every  one  knows  that 
Marlborough  was  in  a  considerably  less  advantageous 
position  than  was  the  Emperor,  owing  to  his  (Marl- 
borough's) being  hampered  by  the  Dutch  and  the 
German  princes.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  Napo- 
leon's campaigns  to  the  present  day  are  constantly 
being  studied  in  all  the  military  schools,  whereas  even 
in  Prussia  or  Germany  the  campaigns  of  Frederick, 
with  few  exceptions,  are  never  made  the  subject  of 
elaborate  study  in  military  schools. 

The  campaigns  of  Napoleon  are,  indeed,  typical 
and  classical  campaigns ;  they  are  dominated  by  a 
leading  and  general  strategic  idea  arising  from  a  com- 
plete knowledge  of  the  country.  Thus  in  1796  we  see 
Napoleon  enter  Italy  from  the  south  on  the  so-called 
Corniche,  or  the  route  from  Savona  to  Genoa,  and  in 
1800  again  we  see  him  enter  Italy  by  the  Lake  of 
Geneva  and  the  Little  St.  Bernard. 

His  dominating  idea  was  to  place  himself  between 
the  enemy  and  the  enemy's  communications.  In  addi- 
tion to  that,  he  invariably  sacrificed  minor  points  to 
the  essential  points.  Even  in  1809,  when  he  was  again 
forced  to  fight  Austria  in  the  valley  of  the  Danube, 
he  intentionally  ignored  the  preparing  Walcheren  ex- 
pedition, that  is  to  say,  the  forty  thousand  English 
soldiers  sent  to  fall  upon  his  flank  in  Belgium,  for  he 
correctly  estimated  that  if  he  succeeded  in  defeating 
Austria,  the  English  would  be   in  the  air  without  his 


58  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

striking  at  them  at  all.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  was 
unsuccessful  with  Austria,  his  prestige  and  his  mili- 
tary position  would  be  completely  ruined.  It  is  well 
known  that  Napoleon  constantly  taught  the  system  of 
concentration,  the  system  so  powerfully  imitated  by 
the  German  generals  in  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  and 
a  system  constantly  sinned  against  in  our  own  times 
for  non-military  considerations.  Napoleon,  who  was 
both  ruler  and  general,  had  the  advantage  of  not  per- 
mitting political  considerations  to  warp  his  military 
judgment.  That  strategy  was  the  most  important 
feature  of  Napoleon's  military  genius  is  evident  from 
the  fact  that  he  neither  stimulated  the  invention  of  new 
arms,  nor  favoured  the  adoption  of  any  new  mechanical 
invention.  The  rifle  of  his  soldiers  was  still  the  old 
rifle  of  Louis  XVI.,  and  so  was  the  cannon.  Fulton's 
immortal  invention — first  offered  to  Napoleon  —  found 
no  favour  with  the  Emperor.  Napoleon  clearly  saw 
its  possible  value ;  but,  as  we  now  know,  Fulton's 
steamship  was  then  very  primitive.  Another  still  more 
striking  proof  is  that  Napoleon  invariably  held  it  to 
be  his  duty  to  arrive  on  the  battlefield  with  more 
soldiers  than  his  enemy.  In  fact,  while  he  thought, 
and  in  his  military  correspondence  incessantly  repeats, 
that  a  campaign  ought  if  reasonably  prepared  ("in 
accordance  with  the  rules  of  the  art ")  never  to  be 
lost,  he  just  as  frequently  insists  on  the  precarious 
nature  of  a  battle.  Battles,  he  says,  very  frequently 
depend  on  some  incident  or  misunderstanding,  on  par- 
ticular events  that  nobody  can  foresee.  It  is  therefore 
safer,  he  adds,  to  trust  to  numbers.  Yet  he  himself  re- 
peatedly beat  his  adversaries  when  he  was  in  numerical 


NAPOLEON.  — I  59 

inferiority  —  especially  at  Austerlitz  in  1805,  and  at 
Dresden  in  18 13.  As  to  the  question  whether  Napo- 
leon's luck  must  not  be  considered  as  a  considerable 
element  of  his  success,  it  can  certainly  not  be  denied 
that  like  all  great  captains  his  \wh»-  an  astounding  luck. 
Yet  we  cannot  but  admit,  especially  after  a  study  of 
his  correspondence,  that  until  18 10,  that  is,  so  long  as 
he  did  not  overrate  himself,  and  had  still  contrived  to 
stave  off  the  European  coalition  against  himself,  Napo- 
leon's wonderful  success  was  chiefly  based  on  the  won- 
derful care  and  genius  with  which  he  prepared  it. 
Neither  England  nor  any  other  country  possessed  a 
statesman  or  general  equal  to  him.  Pitt's  greatness 
was  in  home  matters,  and  he  died  in  January,  1806. 
The  Austrian  statesmen  were  great  neither  at  home 
nor  abroad,  and  Prussia  was  governed  by  a  beautiful, 
but  politically  insignificant  queen,  and  a  senseless, 
heavy  king.  The  throne  of  Spain  was  disgraced  by 
the  most  wretched  of  her  numerous  royal  failures, 
and  on  the  throne  of  Russia  was  a  Czar  who  joined  to 
the  vanity  of  a  fop,  the  cunning  of  a  Tartar  and  the 
sentimentality  of  a  false  mystic.  He  was  in  no  wise 
a  match  for  Napoleon's  statecraft  or  military  genius. 
The  stories  according  to  which  Alexander  I.  of  Russia, 
or  later  on  Prince  Metternich,  the  Austrian  statesman, 
duped  Napoleon,  are  on  a  level  with  the  well-known 
legend  that  Bliicher,  as  the  Prussians  say,  or  the  Duke 
of  Wellington,  as  the  English  say,  brought  about  the 
downfall  of  Napoleon. 

Napoleon  was  duped  and  defeated  by  one  man 
only  :  by  himself.  After  18 10  he  completely  overrated 
himself,  and  persistently    deceiving  himself  about  the 


6o  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

nature  of  tasks,  the  impossibility  of  which  he  was  the 
first  to  point  out  (such  as  the  Peninsular  War  and  the 
Russian  War),  he  finally  roused  the  whole  of  Europe 
into  a  coalition :  that  is,  he  contrived  to  create  a 
European  union  such  as  has  never  been  known  in 
the  whole  of  history,  not  in  the  time  of  Charles  V., 
nor  of  Louis  XIV. ;  and  the  end  was  —  St.  Helena. 

In  1796  Napoleon  married  Josephine  Beauharnais,  a 
frivolous  but  exceedingly  charming  widow  of  thirty- 
three,  who  cared  nothing  for  Napoleon,  and  probably 
never  could  understand  him,  but  who  was  loved  by 
the  young  general  with  the  most  passionate  devotion, 
and  had  to  her  very  end,  in  18 14,  the  most  remark- 
able power  over  him. 

Barras,  one  of  the  Directors,  and  a  former  lover  of 
Josephine,  procured  Napoleon  the  position  of  general- 
in-chief  of  the  Italian  army,  and  so  began  the  ever 
memorable  campaign  of  1796.  That  campaign  was 
only  one  of  four  attacks  which  the  French  in  1796 
were  planning  against  the  English  on  the  one  hand, 
and  against  the  House  of  Habsburg  on  the  other. 

The  attack  on  England  was  to  be  by  sea,  vid  Ire- 
land ;  the  attack  on  Austria  was  to  be  carried  out  by 
two  considerable  armies,  one  under  Jourdan,  in  the 
valley  of  the  Main,  the  other  by  Moreau,  in  the  valley 
of  the  Danube.  Finally,  Napoleon  with  a  small  army 
of  from  30,000  to  40,000  men  was  to  make  what  was 
then  considered  a  diversion  in  Lombardy,  where 
Austria  still  had  the  Milanese  and  other  Italian 
dominions.  Napoleon's  campaign  was  at  the  begin- 
ning considered  to  be  the  least  important  of  the  great 
attacks  planned  by  Carnot.     In  fact,  the  Directors  con- 


NAPOLEON.  — I  6 1 

sented  to  the  Italian  campaign  mainly  in  hopes  of 
seizing  the  rich  towns  of  Lombardy,  of  extorting 
money  and  works  of  art,  and  other  treasures.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  however,  all  their  attacks  on  England 
by  sea  in  1 796-1 797,  as  well  as  the  campaigns  of  Jour- 
dan  and  Moreau,  quickly  turned  out  to  be  failures ; 
so  that  the  whole  weight  of  the  French  attack  on  the 
Habsburgs  came  to  rest  on  the  shoulders  of  the  young 
hero  in  Italy.  He  alone  of  all  the  generals  sent  by 
Carnot  against  England  and  Austria  was  completely 
successful.  In  less  than  a  month  he  conquered  the 
western  half  of  Lombardy,  and  in  a  few  more  months 
the  other  half  and  the  whole  of  central  Italy,  and  in 
less  than  a  year  after  crossing  the  Austrian  Alps  in 
Carinthia,  Carniola,  and  Styria,  he  stood  a  few  miles 
from  terror-stricken  Vienna. 

From  his  battles  beginning  in  April,  1796,  at  Monte- 
notte,  Dego,  Mondovi,  when  he  successfully  separated 
Beaulieu,  the  Austrian  general,  from  Colli,  the  Sar- 
dinian commander,  to  his  great  battles  for  the  reduction 
of  the  so-called  ^'^  qtiadrilateraV  {i.e.  the  fortresses  of 
Peschiera,  Verona,  Legnago,  and  Mantua,  all  south  of 
Lake  Garda),  he  and  some  of  his  generals,  especially 
Augier  and  Massena,  invariably  practised  the  true  prin- 
ciples of  the  "  rules  of  the  art,"  that  is,  concentration 
and  placing  one's  self  on  the  enemy's  connections;  so  that 
the  victories  of  Lonato  and  Castiglione,  of  Arcole  and 
Rivoli,  not  only  defeated  the  Austrian  armies  under 
Wurmser  and  Alvinczy  respectively,  but  also  secured 
for  Napoleon  the  possession  of  the  best,  most  formidable, 
and  yet  unconquered  of  the  four  fortresses,  i.e.  Mantua. 
In   February,   1797,   Napoleon's   rapid    march   on   the 


62  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

Pope's  little  army  as  far  as  Tolentino,  where  the  Pope 
made  peace  with  the  French,  and  his  equally  rapid 
march  across  the  Austrian  Alps  to  Leoben,  were  only  in 
the  nature  of  appendices  to  his  great  campaign  in  Lom- 
bardy.  Nobody  appreciated  this  campaign  more  pro- 
foundly than  did  Napoleon  himself.  He  knew  that  he 
had  not  only  won  a  series  of  brilliant  battles,  and  revealed 
the  remarkable  gifts  of  his  generals,  but  he  himself  stood 
fully  revealed  to  his  own  mind.  What  none  of  his  con- 
temporaries as  yet  saw,  he  alone  grasped  with  absolute 
clearness,  to  wit,  that  his  was  the  rdle  of  the  final  saviour 
of  France ;  that  his  was  to  be  the  career  of  the  modern 
Cromwell.  He  felt  the  value  of  each  card  he  held,  and 
mapping  out  his  life  carefully,  he  hastened  to  make 
peace  with  the  Austrians  at  Campo  Formio,  with  a 
view  of  returning  to  Paris  at  the  earliest  possible  op- 
portunity to  occupy  the  position  he  was  already  deter- 
mined to  obtain.  This  accounts  for  the  surprisingly 
lenient  conditions  he  granted  to  the  Austrians  at  Campo 
Formio.  Austria  obtained  the  territory  of  the  Venetian 
Republic,  including  Dalmatia,  and  thus  for  the  first  time 
in  her  history  she  obtained  a  direct  outlet  on  the  Adri- 
atic, having  had  a  maritime  outlet  so  far  only  in  Belgium, 
at  that  time  the  ''  Austrian  Netherlands."  Napoleon 
was  prompted  in  his  attitude  also,  by  the  motive  of 
making  Austria  appear  as  a  traitor  to  Germany. 
France  obtained  all  the  territory  west  of  the  Rhine,  and 
the  first  act  of  the  great  Napoleonic  drama  was  finished 
in  scenes  of  unparalleled  glorification,  when  Napoleon 
on  returning  to  Paris  was  made  the  subject  of  an  apo- 
theosis by  his  enraptured  fellow-citizens. 


NAPOLEON.  —  II 

THE  great  victories  of  Napoleon  acquired  for  him 
both  the  unbounded  admiration  of  his  people  and 
the  jealousy  of  the  Directors.  The  latter  motive  was 
probably  the  strongest  in  the  formation  of  the  strange 
plan,  in  which  Napoleon  was  to  destroy  British  power 
through  an  invasion  of  Egypt  and  Syria.  That  the 
"  Gift  of  the  Nile,"  the  country  of  the  ancient  Pharaohs, 
was,  and  is,  in  many  ways  the  centre  of  the  political 
and  commercial  world,  had  long  been  acknowledged 
and  seen.  In  the  seventies  of  the  seventeenth  century 
the  great  philosopher  Leibniz  went  to  Paris  to  propose 
to  Louis  XIV.  that  the  King  of  France  should  conquer 
Egypt  instead  of  wasting  his  power  in  bootless  inva- 
sions of  Germany.  Leibniz  in  a  memoir  well  known  to 
Napoleon  expatiated,  with  the  foresight  of  a  great 
thinker,  on  the  immense  advantages  accruing  to  France 
from  the  possession  of  Egypt,  where,  as  he  remarked, 
the  two  diagonals  drawn  through  the  three  continents 
of  Asia,  Africa,  and  Europe  intersect  in  their  centre. 
Napoleon,  for  strategical  and  political  reasons,  was  of 
the  same  opinion.  It  cannot,  however,  be  denied,  that 
into  his  Asiatic  plans  there  entered  largely  a  mystic 
element.  He  himself  tells  us  that  when  he  trod  on 
the  historic  soil  of  Egypt  and  Syria,  where  Sesostris, 
Alexander  the  Great,  Caesar,  the  great  French  crusad- 

63 


64  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

ers,  and  so  many  other  heroes,  had  been  doing  great 
deeds,  he  felt  himself  in  a  sort  of  hypnotic  state.  Vi- 
sions of  things  to  come  centuries  after  his  death,  yet 
possibly  to  be  realized  by  him,  were  constantly  flitting 
before  his  enchanted  mind.  So  true  is  the  old  experi- 
ence that  men  reprehend  in  others  no  fault  with  greater 
acrimony  than  the  very  defect  from  which  they  are  suf- 
fering themselves.  Napoleon  constantly  sneered  at 
what  he  called  "  idealogists,"  and  he  himself  was  the 
most  remarkable  specimen  of  that  class  of  men  of  action 
hypnotized  by  a  vague  ideal. 

However  that  may  be.  Napoleon  started  for  Egypt, 
called  at  Malta,  which  he  occupied,  avoided  Nelson  and 
his  fleet,  who  were  chasing  him  all  over  the  Mediter- 
ranean, and  entered  Egypt  in  July,  1798.  Nelson 
finally  did  meet  the  French  fleet  on  August  ist,  1798, 
and  signally  defeated  it  in  the  great  battle  of  Aboukir 
Bay.  That  did  not  interfere  with  Napoleon's  plans. 
After  a  rapid  campaign,  by  which  he  secured  both  the 
eastern  side  of  Egypt,  from  Suez  to  the  town  of  Kossir 
on  the  Red  Sea,  the  complete  delta  of  the  Nile,  and  the 
Nile  beyond  Thebes  (the  latter  by  the  ingenious  and 
successful  campaign  conducted  by  Desaix),  he  at  once 
commenced  organizing  the  country.  As  he  profoundly 
remarked,  Egypt,  depending,  as  it  does,  entirely  on  the 
artificially  regulated  inundations  of  the  Nile,  is  a 
country  in  which  the  Civil  Service  or  centralized  ad- 
ministration is  of  the  utmost  importance,  and  hence 
republican  or  decentralized  institutions  are  unpractical. 
To  complete  his  success  in  Egypt  he  entered  Syria 
along  the  coast  of  ancient  Phoenicia ;  he  failed  before 
Acre,  defended  by  Sir  W.  Sidney  Smith  and  Phelip- 


NAPOLEON.  — II  65 

peaux,  a  French  ^migr/,  but  beat  the  Turks  on  Mount 
Tabor.  An  outbreak  of  pestilence,  however,  forced 
him  to  come  back  to  Egypt,  and  learning  about  the 
anarchical  state  in  France,  where  the  Directors  had 
completely  failed  to  keep  the  various  contending  parties 
in  order.  Napoleon  resolved  to  return  to  Paris  and  to 
abandon  his  Egyptian  plan. 

In  the  year  1799  the  French  armies  had  at  first  been 
exceedingly  unfortunate ;  the  Powers,  especially  Eng- 
land, Russia,  and  Austria,  hoping  to  be  able  to  cope 
with  the  French  in  the  absence  of  their  best  general, 
invaded  French  territory,  both  in  the  north,  where  an 
Anglo-Russian  army  entered  Holland,  but  was  com- 
pletely defeated  by  Brune  at  Bergen,  not  far  from 
Alkmaar;  in  the  centre,  under  Archduke  Charles  in 
Switzerland,  where  Mass^na  was  at  the  head  of  the 
French  armies ;  finally  in  Italy,  where  an  Austro-Russian 
army  under  Suwarow  was  advancing  through  Lombardy, 
winning  a  series  of  victories  over  several  French  gen- 
erals. The  state  of  France,  then,  in  summer,  1 799,  was 
exceedingly  precarious.  Had  Suwarow  been  able  to 
join  the  Archduke  in  Switzerland,  the  allies  might  have 
entered  France  proper  and  undone  all  the  work  of  the 
previous  campaigns.  But  Mass^na  beat,  in  the  terrible 
battle  of  Zurich,  the  Austro-Russian  army  in  Switzer- 
land, and  Suwarow,  who  had  with  brutal  disregard  for 
human  life  crossed  the  St.  Gothard  in  order  to  join  his 
allies  in  Switzerland,  learning  the  result  of  Zurich, 
suddenly  changed  his  mind  and  abandoned  Switzerland 
altogether  to  the  French.  However,  Lombardy  re- 
mained lost  to  the  French,  and  Melas  (of  Austria)  was 
in  actual  possession  not  only  of  the  west  of  Lombardy, 


66  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

but  was  also  trying  to  invade  southeastern  France.  The 
danger,  therefore,  largely  averted  by  the  victories  of 
Brune  and  Mass^na,  was  not  yet  totally  removed. 

Under  these  circumstances  Lucien,  the  brother  of 
Napoleon,  and  President  of  the  Lower  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, made  up  his  mind  to  put  his  brother  into 
power.  It  is  well  known  how  the  victor  of  so  many 
battles  on  the  day  when  Lucien's  conspiracy  was  actu- 
ally carried  out  (i8th  of  Brumaire)  lost  all  presence  of 
mind,  repeatedly  fainted  and  could  scarcely  recover, 
even  when  he  learnt  that  his  own  soldiers  by  tyrannizing 
Parliament  had  made  him  practically  the  head  of  the 
State.  The  reader  will  remember  a  remark  made  in 
the  previous  lecture,  that  in  natures  like  that  of  Napo- 
leon, which  are  both  excessively  self-conscious  and  abso- 
lutely nalfve,  the  ordinary  physiological  manifestations 
of  emotions,  such  as  trembling,  fainting,  crying,  sobbing, 
are  the  regular  accompaniments  of  the  actions  of  a  mind 
which  otherwise  seems  to  be  devoid  of  any  human  frailty. 
Thus  Napoleon  cried  like  a  child  when  one  of  the  Vene- 
tian senators  implored  him  not  to  abolish  the  old  Re- 
public, and  he  trembled  like  a  child  on  the  day  when  he 
was  made  First  Consul.  Once  in  power,  he  immediately 
recommenced  the  campaign  in  Italy,  to  recover  all  the 
territories  which  he  had  secured  by  his  victories  in  1796 
and  1797.  The  campaign  of  Marengo  in  1800  was,  as  far 
as  Napoleon  was  concerned,  a  strategical  victory,  if,  tacti- 
cally speaking,  not  a  glorious  achievement.  It  is  well 
known  that  in  the  battle  of  Marengo,  near  Alessandria, 
the  French  army,  technically  beaten  by  the  Austrians 
under  Melas,  was  saved  by  the  sudden  appearance  of 
Desaix,  who   had  been  sent  by  Napoleon  in  a  wrong 


NAPOLEON.  — II  ^J 

direction  southward  towards  Genoa,  but  who,  on  hearing 
the  thunder  of  the  cannon,  at  once  took  in  the  new  situa- 
tion, and  unlike  Grouchy  in  the  identical  position  in  the 
campaign  of  Waterloo,  came  up  in  time  to  renew  the  bat- 
tle of  Marengo,  which  he  won,  but  in  which  he  was  killed. 

Tactically,  the  result  of  Marengo  is,  therefore,  due  to 
Desaix,  as  the  tactical  failure  of  Waterloo  is  due  to 
Grouchy.  Strategically,  however.  Napoleon,  by  having 
placed  himself  on  the  communications  of  Melas,  had 
won  the  battle  before  he  had  fought  it.  The  result  was 
the  recovery  of  Lombardy  by  the  French ;  and  since 
Moreau  in  a  campaign  in  Bavaria  succeeded  in  com- 
pletely defeating  the  Austrians  at  Hohenlinden  a  few 
months  after  Marengo,  the  Austrians  were  again  forced 
to  sue  for  peace,  which  was  made  in  1801  at  Lundville. 
From  1800  to  1803,  then.  Napoleon  was  not  only  at  the 
head  of  the  French  State,  but  by  his  decisive  victories 
had  acquired  for  France  such  an  absolute  ascendency 
over  all  the  other  powers  of  the  Continent,  that  in  his 
antechamber  one  could  meet  all  the  princes  of  Ger- 
many asking  for  favours  which  he  alone  was  able  to 
give,  although  legally  all  those  princes  were  under  the 
power  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire. 

Talleyrand,  his  great  Foreign  Minister,  who  took 
bribes  and  promises  from  all  the  parties,  arranged  for  a 
recasting  of  the  map  of  Germany,  and  already,  in  1803, 
the  first  of  the  two  great  processes  by  which  the 
checkered  area  of  Germany  was  reduced  to  simpler 
aspects  was  inaugurated.  That  first  process  was  the 
secularizing  of  the  vast  territories  owned  by  sovereign 
Roman  Catholic  dignitaries,  that  is,  bishops,  arch- 
bishops, priors,  etc.     The  second  process,  which  oc- 


68  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN   EUROPE 

curred  in  1805  and  1806,  was  the  mediatization  of  a 
great  number  of  small  sovereign  territories  in  the 
power  of  imperial  knights,  counts,  and  other  smaller 
sovereigns.  Both  processes  were  formulated  and  exe- 
cuted at  the  hands  of  Napoleon  and  his  agents.  It 
is  incontestable  that  just  as  Napoleon  was  the  first  to 
unite  almost  the  whole  of  Italy  {i.e.  Italian  republics, 
principalities,  kingdoms,  and  other  small  territories  of 
still  smaller  sovereigns),  even  so  it  was  Napoleon  who 
rendered  Bismarck's  final  triumph  possible.  When  Na- 
poleon first  fought  his  Italian  campaign,  Germany- 
consisted  of  nearly  1000  petty  principalities.  When  Na- 
poleon was  sent  to  St.  Helena,  little  over  forty  principali- 
ties, kingdoms,  etc.,  made  up  the  whole  of  Germany. 
His  historic  vocation,  in  which  he  so  fully  believed, 
showed,  therefore,  with  the  utmost  clearness,  both  in 
Italy  and  in  Germany,  and  from  that  standpoint  it  is 
to  be  regretted  that  the  Spaniards  conceived  such  an 
unconquerable  hatred  against  the  man  who  alone  of  all 
the  rulers  and  statesmen  would  have  been  able  to  elec- 
trify their  dormant  powers,  and  to  give  them  a  chance 
of  recovering  their  ancient  greatness. 

If  now  we  look  at  France,  the  great  vocation  of  Na- 
poleon, the  abiding  and  immense  work  that  he  has  done 
for  the  French,  becomes  evident  in  every  department 
of  French  public  or  private  life.  In  fact.  Napoleon  is 
the  creator  of  modern  France,  of  her  centralized  insti- 
tutions. Foreshadowed,  anticipated,  no  doubt,  by  the 
work  of  the  Convention,  it  was  fully  articulated  and 
legalized  by  the  powerful  organizing  mind  of  the  in- 
comparable Corsican. 

Napoleon  placed  the  whole  of  the  education  of  French- 


NAPOLEON.  — II  69 

men  on  the  basis  on  which  it  has  been  proceeding  to 
the  present  day.  The  college  and  university  teaching, 
the  division  of  scientific  labour  in  the  various  high 
schools  for  technical  and  scholarly  researches,  were 
all  organized  by  him.  He  created  and  organized  the 
Banque  de  France ;  he  established  the  Legion  d'Hon- 
neur ;  chiefly  he  codified  the  laws  of  France,  which  had 
hitherto  consisted  of  an  ungovernable  mass  of  usages 
and  royal  ordinances  defying  all  system  and  forming  an 
encumbrance  in  every  part  of  practical  life.  It  would 
be  the  greatest  possible  mistake  to  assume  that  Napo- 
leon's participation  in  that  great  work,  in  his  Code  Civil, 
Code  Criminel,  etc.,  was  only  one  of  the  kind  in  which 
the  Emperor  Justinian  or  Frederick  the  Great  partici- 
pated in  the  making  of  the  codes  bearing  their  names. 
Napoleon  assisted  at  nearly  every  meeting  of  the  legis- 
lators and  codifiers,  and  whole  sections  of  his  codes 
bear  the  direct  impress  of  his  mighty  personality,  of 
his  deep  insight  into  the  realities  of  life.  With  charac- 
teristic sagacity  he  used  to  remark  to  M.  Tronchet  and 
the  other  jurists  who  aided  him  :  "  You  know  only  the 
theoretic  law,  I  know  real  life.  I  have  fed  and  cared 
for  thousands  of  men.  I  know  not  Man  and  Woman  in 
the  abstract,  I  know  them  in  the  concrete.  I  know  the 
young  and  the  old,  the  healthy  and  the  ill,  the  widow 
and  the  married  woman.  I  know  the  lawyer  and  the 
doctor,  the  clergyman  and  the  artisan,  and  I  mean  to 
give  to  my  nation  a  law  that  shall  in  its  every  part  bear 
the  impress  of  realities."  Nothing  can  be  truer.  Al- 
though Napoleon  was  deprived  of  all  power  in  June, 
181 5,  yet  for  nearly  a  century,  i.e.  until  the  recent 
(1900)  promulgation  of  the  new  code  of  civil  law  in 


70  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

Germany,  a  great  number  of  German  countries,  such 
as  Baden  and  the  Rhenish  provinces,  long  freed  from 
the  rule  of  Napoleon,  preferred  to  keep  his  code  as 
the  embodiment  of  common  sense  and  justice;  and 
one  may  fairly  say  that  of  white  nations  the  majority 
have  either  completely  accepted  the  code  of  Napoleon 
or  have  taken  the  chief  inspiration  and  guiding  prin- 
ciples from  the  study  of  that  masterpiece  of  fairness 
and   real  insight   into   human   relations. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  Napoleon  took  a  somewhat 
mechanical  view  of  humanity,  and  in  his  attempt  to  reg- 
ulate and  formularize  all*  the  relations  of  the  countries 
under  his  rule,  he  appears  sometimes  to  have  over- 
stepped the  limit  of  moderation.  Yet  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
France  has,  in  spite  of  a  frequent  change  of  her  r^gimey 
kept  all  the  Napoleonic  institutions  —  his  regulation  of 
the  Church  to  the  State,  his  system  of  education,  his 
method  of  dealing  with  the  great  task  of  civil  adminis- 
tration, his  conception  of  the  colonial  system ;  and  what 
is  still  stranger,  most  of  the  Continental  states  have  con- 
formed to  the  French  model,  so  that  with  slight  differ- 
ences in  local  and  minor  matters,  the  political  machine 
made  by  Napoleon  is  now  the  political  machine  of 
nearly  every  Continental  country.  This  immense  and 
lasting  work  of  Napoleon  is  frequently  lost  sight  of. 
Nor  need  we  wonder  at  that.  People,  as  a  rule,  study 
history  for  its  dramatic  effects,  and  so  they  prefer  to 
linger  over  the  dramatic  scenes  of  Austerlitz  or  the 
terrible  defeats  of  Napoleon  at  Leipsic  and  at  Waterloo, 
rather  than  study  the  great  reforms,  the  new  poUtical 
life,  which  he  introduced.  True,  Napoleon  was  greatest 
probably  as  a  military  leader ;  however,  one  cannot  for- 


NAPOLEON.  — II  71 

get  that  his  ideas  as  to  the  regulation  of  modern  states 
have  long  proved  to  be,  on  the  whole,  the  only  possible 
political  system,  so  that  the  theories  of  the  great  Ency- 
clopaedists and  other  thinkers  on  practical  politics  have 
more  or  less  given  way  to  the  ideas  introduced  by  the 
greatest  captain  of  modern  times. 

The  prosperity  of  France  from  1800  to  18 12  was  un 
exampled.  Napoleon,  who  in  1802  had  been  made  Con- 
sul for  life,  and  in  1804,  with  practical  unanimity. 
Emperor  of  the  French,  hated  to  levy  too  heavy  taxes 
upon  his  people,  and  so  procured  money  either  by  new 
wars,  or,  as  in  the  case  of  Louisiana,  by  the  sale  of  huge 
colonies.  The  industrial  and  commercial  opportunities 
of  the  French  were  infinitely  increased  by  Napoleon's 
commercial  hostility  to  England,  and  the  French  ac- 
tually hoped  from  1800  to  1805  that  their  position  as  the 
leading  nation  of  the  world  would  forever  be  placed  on  an 
unshakable  basis,  considering  that  they  had  just  emerged 
from  the  most  terrible  revolution  of  all  times,  not  only 
unscathed,  not  only  as  the  victors  over  all  their  enemies, 
but  also  as  the  prudent  organizers  of  their  conquests  and 
the  subject  of  great  sympathy  on  the  part  of  most  of  their 
conquered  enemies.  The  French  mind,  very  much  in 
contradiction  to  what  in  England  and  America  it  is  held 
to  be,  is  in  reality  most  sober,  matter-of-fact,  and  moderate. 
The  French  are  not  in  the  least  as  nervous  as  are  the 
Americans,  and,  as  a  rule,  less  given  to  sudden  changes 
than  even  the  EngHsh.  This  may  appear  paradoxical  to  the 
student  of  phenomena  in  French  life  which  the  French 
themselves  do  not  take  seriously,  such  as  the  deahngs  or 
transactions  in  their  parliaments  or  in  their  bestowal  of 
popularity  on  a  man  whom  nobody  really  takes  seriously. 


72  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

But  at  the  bottom  of  the  French  soul  there  is  a  fund  of 
prudent  moderation  such  as  is  natural  in  persons  with 
whom  habits  of  the  most  rigorous  thrift,  and  the  most 
untiring  energy  and  love  of  labour,  are  the  most  usual 
and  most  carefully  thought-out  feature.  These  remarks 
are  necessary  to  explain  how  the  French  as  a  nation 
were,  in  1805,  not  at  all  enchanted  or  over-enthusiastic 
about  the  great  victories  of  Napoleon.  It  was  the  gen- 
eral opinion  of  the  French  that  any  new  conquests 
outside  France,  which  had  then  reached  its  natural 
boundaries,  were  superfluous,  and  it  is  a  fact  that  even  the 
astounding  and  marvellous  victory  of  Austerlitz  on  the 
2d  December,  1805,  over  Russia  and  Austria  —  a  victory 
which  for  years  to  come  completely  nullified  the  great- 
est naval  victory  of  modern  times,  Trafalgar  (21st  Octo- 
ber, 1805)  —  was  received  in  Paris  with  relative  coldness. 
Both  the  common  people  and  men  of  the  shrewdness  of 
Talleyrand,  nay,  Josephine  herself,  could  not  help  re- 
marking that  even  this  splendid  victory  could  scarcely 
lead  to  any  new  and  valuable  results  except  to  compli- 
cations, giving  no  doubt  new  opportunities  for  startling 
victories,  but  no  guarantees  of  that  peace  and  glory 
which  the  French  rightly  thought  they  had  forever  se- 
cured, when  in  1802  even  England  had  considered  it 
necessary  to  conclude  peace  with  France  at  Amiens. 
This  discrepancy  between  the  feelings  and  wishes  of  the 
French  nation  and  the  policy  of  the  Emperor  is  the 
most  ominous  phenomenon  in  his  career.  For  while,  on 
the  one  hand,  it  is  certain  that  Napoleon  was  brought  to 
fall  through  his  own  abuse  of  his  genius,  yet  on  the 
other  hand,  one  cannot  help  noticing  that  had  the 
French  warmly  and  sincerely  clung  to  Napoleon,  even 


NAPOLEON.  — II  73 

m  the  time  of  his  disasters  from  1812  to  1815,  as  they 
had  done  one  hundred  years  before  to  King  Louis  XIV. 
during  the  terrible  years  of  1706- 171 1,  Napoleon  might, 
with  relative  facility,  have  overcome  even  the  grandest 
of  coalitions  against  him,  that  of  18 14.  It  is  custom- 
ary in  Germany  to  speak  of  Napoleon's  downfall  as  be- 
ing due  to  Bliicher,  Biilow,  Gneisenau,  and  other  Prussian 
leaders;  in  England,  again,  few,  if  any,  ever  seriously 
doubt  that  the  Iron  Duke  brought  Napoleon  to  his  fall ; 
while  in  Spain  every  honest  patriot  is  convinced  that 
Palafox,  Castaiios,  and  other  great  Spanish  heroes  were 
the  ruin  of  the  Emperor  ;  let  alone  Russian  generals  and 
popular  heroes,  to  whose  deeds  alone,  every  Russian 
holds.  Napoleon's  ruin  must  be  traced.  In  reality,  how- 
ever, one  nation  alone,  the  French,  has  the  doubtful 
glory  of  having  brought  to  his  knees  the  greatest  of 
their  captains  and  their  statesmen,  the  greatest  of  mod- 
ern men.  Had  they  clung  to  him  as  they  ought  to  have 
done,  they  would  have  spared  themselves  the  terrible 
disasters  which  have  befallen  them  ever  since.  Truly, 
it  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  a  nation  which,  twenty- 
seven  years  after  the  death  of  Napoleon  the  Great,  was 
content  to  accept  his  nephew,  a  weak,  mediocre,  and 
dreamy  personage,  and  acknowledge  him  for  over 
twenty-two  years  as  their  ruler,  ought  in  common  sense 
to  have  done  everything  to  retain  the  great  Napoleon  at 
all  costs  as  the  only  man  who  could  promise  and  guaran- 
tee them  power,  honour,  and  glory. 

Twice  in  their  history  the  French  dealt  by  their 
greatest  character  and  their  greatest  glory  in  the  most 
inexcusable  and  unpardonable  fashion.  Jeanne  d'Arc, 
who  through  her  unique  and  incomparable  personality 


74  FOUNDATIONS   OF  MODERN   EUROPE 

roused  France  from  the  most  ignominious  lethargy, 
and  in  a  few  months  rid  a  large  portion  of  Central 
France  from  the  foreigner  who  had  held  the  French 
nation  in  subjection  or  terror  for  nearly  fifteen  years : 
Jeanne  d'Arc  was  made  a  prisoner  through  one  of  the 
incidents  of  feudal  warfare,  and  fci.'  into  the  hands  of 
the  English,  who  put  her  in  a  dungeon  at  Rouen  (1430). 
Jeanne  d'Arc  could  have  easily  been  liberated  and  again 
placed  at  the  head  of  the  French  nation,  which  under 
her  inspiring  and  ingenious  leadership,  considering  the 
demoralization  of  the  English  and  the  vacillating  policy 
of  the  Burgundian  allies,  would  have  undoubtedly  re- 
duced the  rest  of  the  great  conflict  called  the  Hundred 
Years'  War,  or  the  period  from  1430  to  1453,  to  an 
affair  of  a  few  months,  or  in  the  worst  case,  of  a  year. 
The  atrocious  behaviour  of  French  bishops  and  clergy- 
men to  the  greatest  of  French  women,  who  has  long 
been  canonized  by  the  public  opinion  of  Europe,  if  not 
yet  by  the  opinion  of  the  Roman  Curia,  cost  France 
twenty-two  more  horrible  years  of  warfare  in  Nor- 
mandy, Brittany,  Poitou,  and  Guienne,  thousands  of 
lives,  millions  of  treasure,  and  the  general  devastation 
of  the  country. 

It  is  no  exaggeration  to  hold  that  the  ingratitude  and 
indifference  of  the  French  to  their  greatest  character 
in  modern  times  entailed  upon  them  the  same  terrible 
consequences  that  followed  in  the  wake  of  their  un- 
speakably shameful  neglect  of  the  Saint  of  Domr^my. 
Like  every  nation,  the  French  tried  to  disguise  their 
own  fault  by  exaggerating  the  power  of  the  English 
and  other  allies,  just  as  the  Americans,  as  we  have  seen 
in  the  first  lecture,  overdo  the  merits  oi  Lafayette  in 


NAPOLEON.  — II  75 

order  to  save  their  own  self-conceit.  It  remains,  alas, 
but  too  true  that  Napoleon's  downfall  was  owing  in  the 
first  place  to  his  own  faults ;  but  of  nations  who  con- 
tributed to  his  downfall  the  French  are  the  guiltiest. 
At  present,  nearly  a  century  after  Waterloo,  the  sense 
of  that  historic  ingratitude  is  slowly  coming  over  the 
French  nation,  and  for  the  last  ten  years  there  has  been 
an  astounding  revival  of  interest  in  Napoleon  and  his 
time.  The  French  do  not  seem  ever  to  get  enough 
books  and  articles  about  the  great  conqueror,  and  every 
new  book  promising  some  new  revelation,  even  of  de- 
tails or  minor  points,  is  received  and  read  with  avidity. 
It  is  said  that  when  Louis  Philippe,  in  February,  1848, 
wanted  to  accede  as  a  last  resort  to  the  demands  of 
the  people,  he  was  told  the  famous  words,  "  Trop  tardy 
Sire''  ("Too  late.  Sire").  One  may  with  equal  justice 
now  say  to  the  French  nation,  with  regard  to  their 
belated  admiration  for  Napoleon,  "  Messieurs^  dest  trop 
tardr 

The  campaigns  of  1805-6-7,  just  on  account  of  their 
classical  completeness  and  perfection,  are,  in  spite  of 
the  bewildering  details,  simple  and  easily  intelligible. 
When  Napoleon  learnt  that  the  Austrians  and  the  Rus- 
sians were  marching  against  him  in  the  valley  of  the 
Danube,  while  he  was  apparently  watching  England 
from  his  camp  at  Boulogne,  he  suddenly  hurled  his 
whole  army  from  the  north  of  France  across  the  Rhine 
to  the  Upper  Danube.  As  already  mentioned  in  another 
lecture.  Napoleon's  chief  point  was  to  prevent  the  Rus- 
sians from  joining  the  Austrians.  To  that  effect  he 
directed  the  marches  of  his  various  columns  in  the 
minutest  details,  timing  them  for  every  hour  of  their 


^  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

march.  He  never  doubted  that  the  Austrians  under 
General  Mack,  who  was  at  Ulm,  would  expect  him  to 
debouch  from  the  Black  Forest,  that  is,  to  make  on 
Mack  a  frontal  attack.  For  although  Napoleon  had 
in  all  his  previous  campaigns  invariably  given  clear 
signs  of  his  predilection  for  flanking  movements,  and 
of  his  constant  anxiety  to  place  himself  on  his  enemy's 
communications,  yet  he  rightly  credited  Mack  with  utter 
neglect  of  the  elements  of  true  strategy. 

The  French  columns  had  rapidly  converged  on  the 
Upper  Danube,  near  Dillingen,  long  before  Kutusow, 
the  Russian  general,  had  joined  Mack,  and  a  few  bat- 
tles fought  by  Napoleon's  marshals  against  disconcerted 
Mack  finished  the  circumvention  of  the  Austrian  gen- 
eral, so  that  he  was  forced  to  surrender  with  nearly 
his  whole  army  at  Ulm.  It  was  then  that  the  French 
troopers,  seizing  the  great  strategy  of  their  Emperor, 
summed  up  the  whole  Ulm  campaign  in  the  famous 
remark,  "  Now  the  little  Corporal  [meaning  Napoleon] 
makes  us  win  his  campaign  by  our  legs."  Napoleon, 
after  that  signal  victory,  at  once  advanced  through  the 
valley  of  the  Danube  on  Vienna,  which  he  entered; 
the  allied  Austrians  and  Russians  had  moved  up  to 
Moravia,  whither  they  wanted  to  entice  Napoleon,  so 
as  to  crush  him  by  one  great  victory,  thousands  of  miles 
from  his  natural  basis.  However,  Napoleon  had  care- 
fully secured  both  his  left  flank  in  Bohemia,  and  his 
right  flank  on  the  Danube,  so  that  even  in  the  worst 
case  he  could  have  returned  unmolested  on  his  own 
communications.  Instead  of  being  defeated,  Napoleon 
won,  on  December  2d,  1805,  what  was  probably  the 
most  classical  of  his  victories  over  the  Austro-Russian 


NAPOLEON.  — II  'J*J 

army.  In  that  battle,  where  he  had  fewer  soldiers  than 
the  allies,  Napoleon  assumed  a  defensive  attitude;  he 
waited  for  the  allies  to  attack  him  and  hoped  to  avail 
himself  of  their  blunders.  Napoleon's  army  facing  the 
east  of  Moravia  was  drawn  up  in  three  divisions,  and 
according  to  his  correct  conception  the  allies  ought  to 
have  attacked  his  left  flank.  However,  they  attacked 
first  his  right  flank,  and  when  he  saw  from  a  distance 
that  the  allies  were  moving  on  his  right  flank,  he  im- 
mediately grasped  their  profound  strategic  error  and 
exclaimed,  '' Cette  armh  est  d  mot/"  ("That  army  is 
mine !  ")  For  in  the  whole  battle  the  great  tactical  and 
strategical  idea  was  to  drive  the  allies  in  the  direction 
in  which  they  could  not  but  move  further  south  to  the 
frozen  lakes  of  Satzau,  while  Napoleon's  left  flank  was 
enveloping  them  in  their  rear,  in  their  own  left  flank. 
The  battle  was  formidable,  but  Napoleon's  victory  was 
complete.  Alexander  of  Russia  was  dismayed,  Francis 
of  Austria  sued  for  peace,  and  by  the  treaty  of  Press- 
burg  Austria  was  completely  deprived  of  a  large  part 
of  her  territory  and  was  reduced  to  a  third-rate  Power. 
The  position  now  obtained  by  Napoleon  gave  him  the 
power  to  raise,  as  a  counterpoise  to  Austria,  some  minor 
states  of  Germany  to  positions  of  higher  dignity  and 
power,  and  accordingly  he  made  Bavaria  and  Saxony 
into  kingdoms,  endowing  them  with  a  great  number  of 
ecclesiastical  and  other  territories,  and  thereby  attach- 
ing them  solidly  to  his  own  interest.  This,  together 
with  the  great  territorial  redistribution  of  Germany  in 
1805  (mentioned  above),  completed  the  disunion  of  the 
ancient  Holy  Roman  Empire,  which  in  the  next  year, 
1806,  was  formally  declared  extinct  by  the  Emperor 


^S  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

Francis  himself.  The  immediate  consequences,  there- 
fore, of  the  campaign  of  1805  were  the  extinction  of 
the  Holy  Roman  Empire  and  the  commencement  of  an 
entirely  new  Germany,  the  forerunner  of  modern  Ger- 
many. 

The  next  great  campaign,  against  Prussia,  occurred 
in  1806,  in  October.  Prussia  had  so  far  abstained  from 
all  the  military  complications  caused  by  the  French 
Revolution  and  Napoleon,  since  the  beginning  of  1795, 
and  had  thereby  committed  the  gravest  blunder  that 
any  great  state  in  Europe  can  possibly  commit.  It  be- 
longs to  the  elements  of  European  policy  ever  since  the 
Renaissance,  that  each  great  state  must  in  turn  take 
an  active  interest  in  all  the  great  questions  of  Europe. 
Such  as  preach  peace  and  non-intervention  preach  in 
reality  war  and  degradation.  Europe  can,  from  its  very 
historic  growth,  never  be  turned  into  a  peaceful  United 
States.  The  peace  kept  by  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  since  1865  in  a  territory  almost  as  large  as  the 
whole  of  Europe  is  owing  mainly  to  the  very  circum- 
stance, to  the  very  cause,  of  which  in  Europe  there 
does  not  exist  the  faintest  trace.  That  circumstance, 
that  cause,  is  the  marvellous  uniformity  and  homo- 
geneity of  the  American  people.  In  Europe  the  dif- 
ferentiation of  nations  and  peoples  is,  on  the  other 
hand,  so  far  advanced ;  the  individualization,  the  per- 
sonal characters  and  traits  of  each  little  nation  are  so 
marked,  so  profound,  so  uncompromising,  so  irrecon- 
cilable, that  peace,  non-intervention,  and  all  similar 
ideal  dreams  of  rich  bankers  or  multi-millionaires  can- 
not possibly  apply  to  Europe.  Whenever  in  European 
history  we  study  the  period  of  a  nation  that  has  for 


NAPOLEON.  — II  79 

one  motive  or  another  kept  peace,  given  up  martial 
aggressiveness,  in  other  words  acted  up  to  the  advice 
of  the  modern  millionaire  philanthropists,  we  invariably 
find  that  nation  come  to  grief  and  to  ruin.  Consider 
in  modern  times  the  dual  Empire  on  the  Danube, 
Austro-Hungary.  Since  1866  she  has  carefully  and 
most  unwisely  abstained  from  interfering  with  the  wars 
of  the  French,  the  English,  the  Russians,  etc.,  and  has 
consequently  suffered  an  abatement  of  prestige  and  a 
loss  of  real  power  such  as  she  never  suffered  in  the 
times  of  her  greatest  defeats  under  Napoleon. 

This  reflection  literally  applies  to  Prussia  under 
Frederick  William  II.  and  Frederick  William  III. 
Having  kept  peace  and  abstained  from  any  military 
interference  from  April,  1795,  to  October,  1806,  that 
is,  for  nearly  eleven  years,  during  which  time  Europe 
was  shaking  with  the  most  tremendous  campaigns, 
waged  from  Cape  St.  Vincent  to  Copenhagen,  and  from 
the  county  of  Kerry  in  Ireland  to  the  desert  shores  of 
Syria,  Prussia  was  now  reaping  the  benefit  of  that  peace- 
ful abstention.  While  the  French  had,  during  all  these 
wars,  created  an  army  of  the  highest  order  and  developed 
the  greatest  of  modern  military  captains;  while  the 
French  people  at  large  had  received  a  political  education 
such  as  neither  themselves  nor  any  other  nation  has  ever 
obtained  for  the  vast  majority  of  its  population  ;  in 
Prussia  the  army  was  rotten,  the  officers  and  generals 
were  rotten,  the  people  were  rotten. 

For  it  is  now  well  known  that  in  October  and  No- 
vember, 1806,  Europe  witnessed  with  amazement  the 
terrible  collapse  of  the  Prussian  monarchy  and  people, 
when   in   consequence  of   one   double  victory  at  Jena 


So  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

and  Auerstaedt  on  the  same  day,  October  14th,  1806, 
the  whole  of  the  Prussian  monarchy,  with  nearly  all 
its  fortresses  (many  of  which  surrendered  on  being 
summoned  by  a  few  French  cavalry  battalions)  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  French,  and  Napoleon,  a  few 
days  after  the  victory  of  Jena,  entered  Berlin.  What 
stigmatized  that  collapse  as  one  of  unprecedented  shame 
is  that  the  Prussian  nation,  as  has  been  said,  not  only 
did  not  manifest  the  slightest  desire  or  intention  of 
resisting  the  French,  but  in  their  moral  degradation, 
actually  and  positively  toadied  to  them,  receiving  the 
great  conqueror  with  cheers  when  he  entered  Berlin. 
From  the  interesting  memoirs  of  Thi^bault  we  learn 
the  most  astounding  details  about  the  entire  incapacity 
of  the  Prussians  to  comprehend  the  immensity  of  their 
disaster.  Really,  in  thinking  of  the  facility  with  which 
in  times  without  railways  and  telegraphs.  Napoleon 
was  able  to  conquer  Austria  and  Prussia  and  the  whole 
of  Germany  in  a  few  weeks,  one  cannot  but  admit  that 
his  vast  dreams  of  a  real  world-empire  do  not,  from 
the  military  standpoint,  seem  to  have  been  unjustified. 
As  we  now  know  from  the  study  of  all  his  campaigns, 
the  only  serious  and  persistent  resistance  that  Napo- 
leon found  in  Europe  previous  to  181 3,  was  on  the  part 
of  the  Spanish  and  Russians  on  land  and  the  English 
on  sea,  so  that  both,  the  powers  the  most  backward  on 
land  and  the  most  advanced  and  richest  nation  on  sea, 
formed  the  only  serious  obstacle  to  Napoleon's  dreams 
of  a  world  conqueror. 

The  campaign  in  1807  waged  in  Poland  and  north- 
east Prussia  ended,  after  great  difficulties  which 
Napoleon  vainly  attempts  to  disguise  in   his   official 


NAPOLEON.  — II  8 1 

despatches,  with  the  hard-won  victory  of  Friedland 
(1807).  During  that  campaign  Napoleon  had  all  the 
opportunities  of  studying  and  organizing  the  great 
problem  of  unfortunate  Poland.  The  Poles  themselves 
considered  him  as  their  liberator,  and  hoping  as  they 
did  to  undo  through  his  might  the  three  partitions 
of  Poland  (of  1772,  1793,  and  1795),  by  which  that 
once  powerful  repubUc  had  been  parcelled  out,  and 
thus  extinguished,  they  helped  Napoleon  in  every 
possible  way,  finding  food  and  soldiers  for  him;  and 
one  of  their  charming  women,  Madame  de  Walewska, 
for  whom  Napoleon  had  a  very  serious  attachment, 
was  used  by  the  Poles  as  an  instrument  for  the  res- 
toration of  the  whole  monarchy  at  the  hands  of  Na- 
poleon. However,  Napoleon  would  not  grant  them 
their  chief  dream,  and  only  restored  the  independence 
of  Poland  as  a  duchy,  united,  as  in  the  first  half  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  with  Saxony.  It  may  be  doubted 
whether  Napoleon's  Polish  policy  was  not  after  all  a 
greater  blunder  than  his  Spanish  poHcy  proved  to  be. 
It  can  scarcely  be  questioned  that  had  he,  by  the 
restoration  of  independent  Poland,  attached  to  himself 
the  interest,  the  enthusiasm,  and  the  genius  of  that 
gifted  nation,  he  would  have  had,  whether  against 
Russia  or  against  Germany,  an  ally  more  useful,  more 
efficient,  than  either  Saxony  or  Bavaria  could  ever  be. 
It  is  difficult  to  say  what  motives  prompted  Napoleon 
to  create  in  west-central  Germany  a  so-called  Rhenish 
Confederation,  and  to  omit  creating  a  strong  Poland 
in  the  east  of  Germany  and  under  the  very  eyes  of 
Russia.  For  rather  than  create  that  artificial  Rhenish 
Confederation  which   had  its  roots  neither  in  history 


82  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN   EUROPE 

nor  in  the  soil,  he  ought  to  have  consolidated  a  strongly 
timbered  Poland,  and  thus  have  had  a  very  reliable  basis 
in  the  east  of  Europe,  as  he  had  one  in  the  west  (France) 
and  in  the  south  (Italy). 

Instead  of  all  that.  Napoleon,  after  the  victory  of 
Friedland,  practically  proposed  to  Alexander  a  parti- 
tion of  the  world,  although  nobody  saw  more  clearly 
than  Napoleon  that  there  was  no  possible  reliance  in 
the  cunning  Russian  Emperor,  whose  sentimentality 
and  esprit  were  only  the  guise  of  an  uncontrollable, 
false,  hypocritical,  and  untrustworthy  character.  The 
treaty  of  Tilsit  concluded  by  the  two  Emperors  placed 
Napoleon  for  the  next  four  years  at  the  head  of  all  the 
Powers.  Even  Prince  Metternich,  who  now  came  to 
the  fore,  told  his  Austrian  master  with  unfeigned  frank- 
ness that  Napoleon  was  invincible,  that,  far  from  any 
idea  of  combating  him  in  the  field,  Austria's  only  policy 
was  to  win  his  favour. 

In  Prussia,  on  the  other  hand,  whose  beautiful,  emo- 
tional, and  unpolitic  queen,  the  mother  of  the  late 
William  I.,  had  by  her  impetuousness  precipitated 
the  war  of  1806,  and  had  lived  to  see  the  deepest  hu- 
miliation of  her  country,  there  was  no  life  left.  Noth- 
ing can  prove  this  more  clearly  than  the  fact  that  all 
the  great  men  who  now  set  themselves  to  the  work  of  re- 
storing Prussia,  her  system  of  education,  her  army,  her 
municipal  organization,  her  industries,  etc.,  were  non- 
Prussian.  The  most  famous  of  them  was  Stein.  He 
was  joined  by  Hardenberg,  by  Bliicher,  Gneisenau, 
Scharnhorst.  They  all  came  from  non-Prussian  coun- 
tries, and  it  is  to  their  initiative  and  to  their  power  of 
work  that  Prussia  owes  her  restoration. 


NAPOLEON.  — n  83 

In  the  next  year  (1808)  Napoleon,  as  if  to  show 
to  the  universe  that  at  his  feet  lay  defeated  Europe, 
; assembled  nearly  all  the  foreign  princes  of  Europe  in 
a  sort  of  congress  which  was  held  at  Erfurt.  To  the 
great  French  actor  Talma,  who  performed  before  the 
sovereigns,  Napoleon  had  promised  a  "pit  of  kings." 
This  was  the  heyday  of  Napoleon's  life. 


VI 

NAPOLEON.  —  III 

WE  are  now  going  to  study  the  last  period  of  Napo- 
leon, the  period  from  1810  to  181 5.  With  re- 
gard to  that  agitated  time  we  have  a  superabundance 
of  sources,  nearly  every  general  and  statesman  engaged 
in  the  military  or  poHtical  affairs  of  that  period  having 
left  us  memoirs,  letters,  or  despatches.  Nor  have  mod- 
ern scholars  been  slow  to  avail  themselves  of  the  im- 
mense material.  On  the  other  hand,  the  contradictions 
between  the  sources  are  so  flagrant,  that  on  many  a 
detail  and  with  regard  to  many  a  great  feature  of  politics, 
let  alone  greater  features  of  the  campaigns,  we  are  still 
in  the  position  of  suspending  our  judgment,  of  hesitat- 
ing to  say  the  final  word.  In  no  struggle  of  modern 
times  have  the  vanity  and  pride  of  nations  and  the 
deepest  and  finest  susceptibilities  of  sovereigns  been 
engaged,  irritated,  nay,  outraged,  so  strongly  as  in  the 
campaigns  and  diplomatic  negotiations  of  Napoleon 
from  1810  to  1815. 

Vanity,  like  any  other  quality  of  our  heart,  may 
take  the  most  different  kinds  of  forms.  It  may  be 
disguised  under  the  thin  cloak  of  contempt,  or  become 
easily  audible  in  the  loud  cries  of  indignation.  It  so 
happens  that  the  pride  and  vanity  of  the  English, 
the  pride  and  ambition  of  the  Russians  and  Germans, 
have  been  stung  to  the  quick  by  the  fruitlessness  of 
all  their  efforts  to  bring  to  fall  a  man  who  had  done 

84 


j  NAPOLEON.  — Ill  85 

1 

them  boundless  harm,  and  had  for  over  fifteen  years 
disregarded  their  most  sacred  traditions  and  their  deep- 
rooted  conceit.  Napoleon  never  disguised  his  contempt 
for  the  British  army,  he  thought  nothing  of  the  German 
corps,  and  had  scarcely  a  word  of  praise  for  the  unde- 
niable physical  courage  of  the  Russians.  It  cannot 
be  denied  that  in  18 10,  when  all  his  ambition  had  been 
crowned  by  the  marriage  with  a  Princess  of  the  House 
of  Habsburg,  Napoleon  conceived  of  the  most  un- 
measured, disproportionate,  and,  in  common  sense, 
absurd  plans.  This  is  meant  not  as  a  criticism  of  Na- 
poleon, which  the  author  is  far  from  arrogating  to 
himself.  For  even  though  we  must  admit  that  Napo- 
leon's plans  after  1810  appear  to  us  —  that  is,  to  com- 
mon-sense or  ordinary  judgment  —  as  plans  impossible 
of  execution,  yet  we  must  not  for  a  moment  forget  that 
what  appears  absurd  to  us  is  not,  therefore,  necessarily 
absurd  when  conceived  and  carried  out  by  Napoleon. 
In  the  world  of  science  great  thinkers  conceiving  of 
ideas  infinitely  in  advance  of  their  time  have  been  de- 
clared absurd,  insane,  or  foolish ;  sometimes,  as  in  the 
case  of  Descartes,  a  great  thinker  himself  has  declared 
that  certain  scientific  attempts  were  doomed  to  hopeless 
failure.  Yet  even  in  the  case  of  Descartes  we  see,  that 
he  who  had  discouraged  any  attempt  at  creating  a  cal- 
culus of  the  infinitesimal  was  quickly  disproved  by 
Leibniz  and  Newton,  who,  independently,  both  in- 
vented and  established  that  calculus  in  the  teeth  of 
Descartes's  predictions.  Other  examples  in  the  history 
of  science  abound  on  every  side.  May  it  not  be  so  also 
in  the  realm  of  politics  ?  May  not  the  apparently  absurd 
ideas  of  Napoleon,  that  is  to  say,  his  Oriental  plans,  his 


86  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN   EUROPE 

idea  of  conquering  the  whole  of  Asia  after  having  con- 
quered Europe,  be  among  those  plans  absurd  to  the 
ordinary  man,  yet  capable  of  legitimate  execution  in  the 
hands  of  a  genius  ?  Instead,  therefore,  of  condemning 
wholesale  all  the  actions  of  Napoleon  from  1810  to 
181 5,  we  might  do  better  to  suspend  our  judgment  and 
restrict  ourselves  to  the  statement  of  the  main  facts, 
leaving  our  criticism  for  those  parts  of  the  narrative 
where  criticism  is  probably  possible. 

It  is  now  evident  that  from  18 10  to  18 12  Napoleon's 
power  was  implicitly  and  explicitly  recognized  as  in- 
vincible all  over  the  continent  of  Europe.  From  Met- 
ternich  downwards,  there  was  no  serious  statesman  nor  a 
general  who  honestly  believed  that  Napoleon's  military 
supremacy  could  be  broken.  After  18 12,  after  the 
disaster  in  Russia,  that  all  but  universal  belief  in  the 
invincibility  of  Napoleon  began  to  fade  away ;  in  1 8 1 3, 
after  the  disaster  of  Leipsic,  it  ceased  to  exist,  and  in  18 14 
and  18 1 5  it  was  turned  into  its  opposite.  These  are  the 
main  points  of  the  facts  and  opinions  we  are  now  to  con- 
sider. There  remains  another  point  in  which  we  can- 
not but  offend  the  national  and  traditional  feelings  of  a 
great  nation,  or  at  any  rate  of  the  majority  of  that  nation  : 
we  mean  the  almost  unanimous  opinion  in  England  that 
England  saved  Europe  from  Napoleon.  That  opinion, 
frequently  accepted  in  books  written  by  French  authors 
too,  has  not  the  slightest  possible  basis  in  fact.  In  all 
the  immense  struggles  between  England  and  the  French 
from  1793  to  181 5,  the  English  were  able  to  secure  not 
a  single  decisive  victory  on  land  single-handed,  and  it 
was  only  on  sea,  in  1798  in  Aboukir  Bay,  and  in  1805 
off  Trafalgar,  that  the  English  secured  a  decisive  victory 


NAPOLEON.  — Ill  S;^ 

over  the  French  and  Spanish  fleets.     Nothing  can  alter 
:  these  facts.     The  attempts  of  the  English  to  drive  out 
the  French  from  Belgium  in  1793-94-95  met  with  ab- 
'  solute  failure  and  terminated  in  the  hasty  retreat  of  the 
i  British  army  under  the  Duke  of  York.     Other  attempts 
\  to  land  armies  on  French  soil,  such  as  in  1 799  under 
I  Abercrombie,  and  in  1809  under  the  Earl  of  Chatham, 
met  with  absolute  disaster.     The  British  were  unable  to 
I  deprive  the  French  of  any  one  single  victory,  or  of  the 
conquests   they   made  on  the  Continent  from  1792   to 
1812.     It  was  only  when  the  French  army  after  twenty 
years'  continuous  fighting  had  been  reduced  in  number, 
I  in  force,  and  in  morale,  that  in  the  last  battle  Wellington, 
I  most  decisively  aided  by  the  Prussians  under  Bliicher, 
won  a  victory  over  Napoleon.     The  victories  of  Welling- 
I  ton  in  the  Peninsular  War  have  been  described  with  all 
I  the  exaggeration  and  **  advertisement "  natural  in  the 
case  of  smaller  nations,  who  succeed  in  securing  a  vic- 
tory over  a  greater  nation.     As  the  Scotch  to  the  present 
day  vaunt  their  victory  of  Bannockburn,  ignoring  Halli- 
don-Hill,  Neville's  Cross,  and  other  innumerable  English 
I  victories  over  them,  so  the  English,  then  very  much  smaller 
I  in  numbers  than  the  French,  have  by  constant  repetition 
j  so  magnified  the  successes  of  Wellington  in  Spain,  that 
I  the    Peninsular   War   is,   in  the  eyes   of    most  British 
citizens,  a  British    and   nothing  but  a  British  success. 
I  The  truth  is  of  quite  a  different  nature.     It   has   been 
said  that  Spain  was  the  grave  of  Napoleon :  if  that  be 
so,  we  must  hasten  to  add  that  the  diggers  of  that  grave 
were  Spanish.     WelHngton's  activity  in  Spain  did  not 
take  up  one-seventh  of  the  country.     It  was  practically 
limited  in  the  first  five  years  of  the  war  to  a  territory 


88  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

bounded  in  the  north  by  Oporto  and  Valladolid,  in  the 
south  by  a  line  from  Lisbon  to  Algarve,  and  in  the  east 
a  Httle  outside  the  Portuguese  frontier.  In  all  the  other 
six-sevenths  of  the  Peninsula  the  heroic  Spanish  people 
were  maintaining  a  tremendous  struggle  against  200,000, 
sometimes  300,000,  French  regular  troops  under  able 
French  marshals,  such  as  Suchet,  Lannes,  Soult,  and 
others.  The  campaigns,  irregular  and  regular,  waged 
by  the  Spanish  against  the  French  were  incessant,  ac- 
companied by  the  utmost  disregard  for  life  and  the 
wholesale  devastation  of  the  towns ;  without  that  unpar- 
alleled resistance  of  the  Spanish  people  Wellington,  as 
he  himself  says  in  his  despatch  dated  Cartaxo,  21st  De- 
cember, 1 8 10,  could  not  have  seriously  thought  of  driving 
the  French  out  of  the  Peninsula.  With  all  due  recog- 
nition of  the  prudence  and  general  efficiency  of  Welling- 
ton (an  efficiency  seriously  impaired  by  his  absolute 
incapability  of  tolerating  any  talent  or  initiative  on  the 
part  of  his  lieutenants),  with  all  necessary  recognition 
of  the  moral  effects  of  his  victory  at  Salamanca  in  18 12, 
one  cannot  but  see  that  his  former  victories  previous  to 
1 8 12,  that  is,  during  the  time  when  Napoleon's  power 
was  still  unbroken,  were  all  merely  of  a  tactical  nature 
and  were  strategically  of  no  importance.  Thus  we  see 
him  in  Spain  in  1809  win,  with  the  help  of  Cuesta,  the 
battle  of  Talavera,  but  having  misread  the  strategical 
position  {i.e.  ignored  the  coming  of  Soult  in  his  rear),  he 
was  forced  to  leave  his  wounded  and  baggage  on  the 
battlefield  and  again  retire  into  Portugal.  The  same 
movement  of  advance  crowned  by  tactical  victories  and 
followed  up  by  retreats  into  Portugal  is  to  be  noticed  in 
18 10,  when  the  advent  of  Mass6na  forced  Wellington, 


NAPOLEON.  — Ill  89 

in  spite  of  a  few  tactical  successes,  to  retreat  behind  the 
intrenchments  of  Torres  Vedras.  It  was  likewise  in 
181 1,  in  spite  of  the  victory  of  Albuera,  most  gloriously- 
won  by  the  soldiers  of  Beresf ord ;  nay,  it  was  even  so  in 
1812  after  the  victory  of  Salamanca,  when  Wellington 
was  again  forced  to  retreat  into  Portugal.  So  that  in 
the  first  four  years  of  his  campaign,  in  spite  of  the 
heroic  help,  direct  and  indirect,  given  him  by  the  Span- 
ish nation,  who  occupied  in  other  engagements  the 
majority  of  the  French  army,  Wellington  was  able  to 
make  no  substantial  headway  compared  with  the  de- 
cisive and  rapid  progress  of  Buonaparte  in  the  few 
months  from  April,  1796,  to  January,  1797,  when,  as 
we  have  seen  above,  he  not  only  won  tactical  but  stra- 
tegical victories,  and  moved  his  small  army  on  one  ad- 
vancing line  right  into  the  heart  of  the  Austrian  Empire, 
with  little  or  no  aid  from  the  Italian  people.  Napoleon 
had  been  forced  already  in  May,  1796,  to  suppress  a 
revolt  of  the  Italians  in  Pavia,  and  later  on  in  Verona, 
where  the  French  sick  and  wounded  were  massacred  by 
the  Italians. 

Considering  the  Peninsular  campaign  in  its  main 
features  only,  and  leaving  out  tactical  details,  for  which 
the  conflicting  reports  of  the  Spanish,  the  French,  and 
the  English  furnish  no  solid  foundation,  we  are  enabled 
to  reduce  it  to  the  following  short  statement.  Welling- 
ton's plan  was  to  move  on  a  straight  line  from  Lisbon 
to  Salamanca,  to  Valladolid,  across  the  Pyrenees,  and  to 
enter  France.  The  length  of  that  line  amounts  to  from 
four  to  five  weeks'  marches.  The  net  upshot  of  all  his 
activity  is  that  it  took  him  six  years  to  arrive  at  the  other 
end  of  that  line  in  France  at  Toulouse  in  April,  18 14. 


90  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

He  made  no  real  headway  on  that  line  before  1813,  that 
is,  before  the  time  that  Napoleon's  power  had  been 
broken  at  Leipsic,  and  Napoleon  had  been  recalling  most 
of  his  better  troops  from  Spain.  It  was  only  when 
Napoleon's  power  had  been  completely  crushed  by  the 
allies,  that  is,  the  Prussians,  the  Austrians,  and  the 
Russians  in  181 3  and  18 14,  that  Wellington  was  able  to 
enter  France,  only  to  learn  that  Napoleon  had  already 
been  forced  to  abdicate. 

Meanwhile  the  Spanish  in  the  southeast  and  north- 
east of  Spain  had  been  carrying  on  a  relentless  guerilla 
war  against  the  French,  but  had  also  failed  to  make 
any  substantial  military  progress.  It  is  therefore  an 
exaggeration  to  say  that  the  Peninsular  War  was  the 
grave  of  Napoleon.  The  Peninsular  War  was,  con- 
sidering the  vast  dimensions  of  Napoleon's  military 
power,  to  be  considered  in  the  light  of  a  local  up- 
heaval, which  certainly  kept  engaged  parts  of  Napo- 
leon's forces,  but  which  could  interfere  with  none  of 
his  essential  military  enterprises  nor  fatally  counteract 
any  of  his  plans.  In  fact,  it  was  during  the  height  of 
the  Peninsular  War  that  Napoleon  undertook  his  most 
gigantic  military  enterprise,  carrying  over  half  a  million 
soldiers  into  the  heart  of  Russia.  Napoleon  himself 
was  more  annoyed  than  angry  over  the  Peninsular  War. 
True  he  would  in  the  end  not  read  the  despatches  from 
his  generals,  but  on  the  whole  he  could  not  doubt,  and 
was  entitled  to  believe,  that  a  decisive  success  in  Russia 
would  have  automatically  ended  any  further  attempt  of 
the  Spanish  nation,  as  his  decisive  success  in  1809  at 
Wagram  automatically  finished  the  fanatic  resistance 
of  the  Tirolese  people.     In  reality,  therefore,  the  grave 


NAPOLEON.  — Ill  91 

of  Napoleon  was  dug  neither  by  Wellington  nor  by  the 
Spanish. 

Whatever  new  details  we  may  still  learn  about  the 
events  during  the  Peninsular  War,  the  above  strategic 
considerations  can  never  be  altered.  Whether  we  con- 
sider the  campaign  of  Gustavus  Adolphus,  who,  with 
an  army  of  his  own  of  no  more  than  30,000  men,  was 
able  to  conquer  Germany  by  a  few  decisive  battles  in 
less  than  eighteen  months ;  or  whether  we  consider 
the  campaigns  of  Marlborough,  who  by  one  rapid 
march  and  a  decisive  victory  in  1704,  saved  the  Ger- 
man Empire  from  succumbing  to  an  invasion  of  French- 
men, Bavarians,  and  Magyars ;  or  whether  we  consider 
the  campaigns  of  Frederick  the  Great,  who  in  exactly 
one  month  defeated,  and  decisively  too,  the  French 
and  the  Imperial  army  at  Rosbach  and  the  Austrians 
at  Leuthen,  from  the  5th  of  November,  1757,  to  the 
5th  of  December  of  the  same  year ;  even  so,  when  we 
are  seriously  contemplating  the  campaigns  of  Napoleon, 
either  in  Italy  or  in  far-off  Egypt  and  Syria,  let  alone 
his  campaigns  in  Austria  or  Prussia,  we  cannot,  unless 
we  yield  to  unthinking  patriotism,  attribute  to  Welling- 
ton any  decisive  action  or  any  great  generalship  in  the 
Peninsular  War. 

Another  and  very  interesting  question  arises  as  to 
the  attitude  of  the  Spanish  people  to  Napoleon.  The 
Spanish  king,  in  whose  name  they  were  fighting  with 
such  terrible  resolution,  was  the  most  worthless  crea- 
ture that  ever  sat  on  the  Spanish  throne,  and  his  son 
and  heir-apparent  was,  if  possible,  more  wretched  still. 
That  alone  is  sufficient  to  confound  any  historian  in  the 
attempt  to   comprehend  the   attitude   of   the   Spanish. 


92  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

But  when  one  considers  that  the  royal  family,  for 
whom  the  Spanish  were  combating  with  such  fanati- 
cism, was  purely  French,  was  Bourbon,  and  that 
Napoleon  was  only  offering  them  one  Frenchman  (his 
own  brother)  for  another  (Charles  IV.  of  Spain),  one 
utterly  fails  to  understand  the  bitterness  of  a  nation 
that  had  quite  lately,  in  1805,  fought  side  by  side  with 
the  French  against  their  common  enemy,  the  English. 
It  seems  certain  that  this  attitude  of  the  Spanish  people 
is  historically  more  important  than  either  their  grand 
coup  in  1808,  when  Castanos  succeeded  in  capturing 
at  Baylen  a  French  army  of  24,000  regulars  under 
Dupont  (the  greatest  military  achievement  in  the  whole 
Peninsular  War),  or  any  other  military  attempt  on  their 
own  part.  For,  on  a  little  consideration,  we  cannot 
but  come  to  the  conclusion  that  a  nation  sacrificing 
life,  money,  and  all  worldly  estate  in  a  desperate  fight 
in  the  interests  of  an  unworthy,  cruel,  and  tyrannical 
royalty  is  thereby  sealing  her  own  fate.  Other  nations 
fought  for  liberty  from  the  French  yoke  that  had  op- 
pressed them  for  years;  the  Spanish  nation  fought 
before  the  French  had  had  any  opportunity  of  placing 
them  under  a  yoke.  The  Spanish  fought,  instigated 
by  their  clergy,  and  when  the  war  of  liberation,  as  they 
erroneously  called  it,  was  ended  in  18 14,  they  found 
out  that  they  had  only  played  the  game  of  the  very 
powers  that  were  most  hostile  to  their  own  interests, 
and  whom  Napoleon  wanted  to  remove.  The  Spanish 
had  wasted  all  their  moral  and  physical  forces  in  an 
absurd  fight  against  the  principles  of  modern  liberal- 
ism offered  to  them  by  Napoleon,  and  thus  lost  all 
capacity  or  real  desire  for  the  modern  system  of  liberal 


NAPOLEON.  — Ill  93 

government.  In  other  words,  it  may  be  said  that  in 
the  Peninsular  War  a  grave  indeed  was  dug,  but  it  was 
not  the  grave  of  Napoleon,  it  was  the  grave  of  the 
Spanish  nation.  The  Spanish,  once  the  most  profound 
politicians,  failed  to  see  that  they  were,  in  this  Pen- 
insular War,  only  helping  the  English  in  a  suicidal 
fashion,  just  as  under  William  III.  and  Queen  Anne 
the  Dutch  followed  the  suicidal  policy  of  helping  the 
English  against  the  French;  and  as  the  Dutch  have 
since  sunk  to  a  fifth-rate  nation,  so  have  the  Spanish. 
It  was  in  the  well-understood  interest  of  Spain  not  to 
oppose  Napoleon  ;  Spain  could  have  only  gained  thereby, 
as  did  Bavaria,  as  did  even  Saxony,  and  so  many  other 
States,  which,  by  adopting  the  wiser  policy  of  friend- 
ship with  Napoleon,  survived  even  his  downfall.  How- 
ever, there  was  no  statesman  able  to  see  the  true  trend 
of  events  in  Spain,  and  between  radical  democrats  and 
a  reactionary  clergy,  the  Spanish  nation  was  falling 
back  into  its  ancient  slavery  under  Church  and  Crown. 
Probably  Napoleon,  who  had  in  the  highest  degree  that 
perfect  equilibrium  of  mental  capacities  which  is  the 
highest  form  of  common  sense,  could  not  but  assume 
that  nations  do,  in  the  end,  follow  the  dictates  of  com- 
mon sense,  and  that  tjie  Spanish  would  sooner  or  later 
see  their  folly  in  prolonging  by  the  interested  help  of 
England  a  war  which  meant  desolation  to  Spain  and 
subjection  to  the  Spanish  people.  However,  nations 
go  by  passions  and  not  by  common  sense.  Even  the 
circumstance  that  the  Spanish  colonies  in  America, 
utilizing  the  plight  of  the  mother-country,  had  actually 
risen  in  open  revolt  in  1810,  and  were  certain  to  cut 
loose  from  Spain,  should  Spain  continue  the  unequal 


94  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

and  murderous  fight  with  Napoleon,  did  not  alter  the 
absurd  policy  of  the  Spanish ;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
it  made  the  Peninsular  War  more  than  worth  continuing 
for  the  English.  England  had  always  desired  the  liber- 
ation of  the  American  Latin  colonies.  The  Spanish 
therefore  in  that  war  dug  the  grave  not  only  of  their 
own  civic  liberties,  but  also  of   their  colonial  empire. 

These  are,  we  take  it,  the  true  proportions  of  the 
Peninsular  War.  The  Spanish  now  begin  to  see  it, 
but  it  is  too  late.  It  is  one  of  the  ironies  of  fate  that 
an  otherwise  worthless  individual,  the  Spanish  minister 
Godoy,  and  the  wretched  king  himself,  by  recommend- 
ing the  French  alliance,  proceeded,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
if  not  by  noble  intention,  on  the  right  Hues  of  policy 
for  Spain.  The  alternative  was  very  simple.  Was 
Napoleon  able  to  continue  his  sway  over  Europe  for 
good  ?  If  so,  then  Spain,  by  being  allied  with  France  or 
even  under  French  suzerainty,  could  only  win  the  pros- 
perity that  France  enjoyed  under  Napoleon,  and  after 
Napoleon's  death  she  could  easily  secure  her  political 
independence.  A  nation  is  certain  to  outlive  an  indi- 
vidual. On  the  other  hand,  was  Napoleon  to  be 
brought  to  fall  as  came  to  be  the  case  ?  Then  Spain 
could  choose  her  own  road  and  her  own  government 
as  she  pleased.  In  either  case  she  would  have  avoided 
the  terrible  Peninsular  War  that  in  the  end  served  only 
the  interest  of  the  most  obscurantist  clergy  in  the  world, 
and  of  Great  Britain. 

While  Napoleon,  in  autumn,  1808,  was  entering  Spain 
and  chasing  Moore  before  him,  he,  to  his  great  surprise, 
learnt  at  Astorga,  that  a  new  coalition  of  England  and 
Austria   had  been  made  against  him.     His   anger   on 


NAPOLEON.  — Ill  95 

learning  the  news  was  not  feigned.  He  had  defeated 
Austria  so  frequently  since  1796 ;  he  had  deprived  her 
of  so  much  of  her  territory,  and  had  humiliated  her  so 
deeply,  that  he  actually  failed  to  see  what  interest 
Austria  could  have  in  commencing  a  new  war,  and 
what  justification  she  had  for  any  legitimate  hopes  of 
success.  He  was  well  aware  that  Austria  was  subsi- 
dized by  England ;  on  the  other  hand,  he  knew  that  the 
finances  of  Austria  were  in  such  a  poor  condition  that 
even  England  could  do  very  little  for  her.  As  a  matter 
of  fact  the  leading  military  authority  in  Austria,  Arch- 
duke Charles,  strongly  advised  his  brother,  the  Em- 
peror Francis,  not  to  wage  a  new  war,  considering  the 
total  unpreparedness  of  Austria  for  war  with  the  trained 
and  victorious  armies  of  Napoleon.  Francis  had  always 
been  obstinate,  vain,  conceited,  and  the  ultimate  success 
of  his  life  seems  a  posteriori  to  confirm  all  the  exagger- 
ated notions  that  that  limited  mind  had  conceived  of 
his  own  power  and  insight.  There  can  be  no  greater 
contrast  than  that  between  Napoleon  and  Francis. 
Nearly  of  the  same  age,  they  differed  in  every  other 
quality.  Francis  was  just  as  small,  petty,  silly,  as  Napo- 
leon was  great,  ingenious,  and  creative ;  yet  Francis  spent 
the  last  twenty  years  of  his  life  as  the  most  powerful 
potentate  in  Europe,  and  Napoleon  wasted  the  last 
six  years  of  his  life  on  a  solitary  rock  in  the  At- 
lantic. 

Napoleon  did  not  hesitate  to  leave  Spain  and  return 
against  Austria  with  the  firm  intention  of  crippling 
Austria  forever.  The  campaign  took  place  in  1809, 
and  consists  of  three  distinct  sections:  ist,  the  cam- 
paign in  the  valley  of  the   Danube  between  Munich 


96  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

and  Ratisbon ;  2d,  the  campaign  of  Aspem ;  and  3d, 
the  campaign  of  Wagram.  In  the  first  campaign  Arch- 
duke Charles  at  first  worsted  the  French  generals,  or 
at  any  rate,  came  near  defeating  their  purpose.  How- 
ever, Napoleon  came  up  in  time,  and  by  one  of  those 
very  rapid  and  bold  movements  that  he  had  so  success- 
fully practised  in  all  his  former  campaigns,  he  placed 
himself  on  the  communications  of  Charles,  worsted  him 
in  the  battles  of  Eckmiihl  and  Ratisbon,  and  forced  him 
to  retreat  through  Bohemia  into  Lower  Austria.  The 
second  campaign  was  disastrous  for  the  Emperor.  As 
we  now  know,  the  Austrians  had  in  the  battle  of  Aspern 
(which  lasted  for  three  days)  considerably  more  soldiers 
than  Napoleon,  and  in  spite  of  all  the  desperate  heroism 
of  Napoleon's  men,  Aspern  was  not  definitely  taken 
by  them,  and  Napoleon  was  obliged  to  re-cross  the 
Danube  and  make  his  headquarters  on  the  isle  of 
Lobau.  By  a  stray  bullet  Napoleon's  best  friend  and 
one  of  his  greatest  marshals,  Lannes,  was  killed  in  this 
battle,  and  Napoleon  seemed  to  be  quite  overcome  by 
grief.  The  news  of  Aspern  went  like  a  thunderbolt 
through  the  whole  of  Europe.  For  the  first  time  the 
invincible  Emperor  had  met  with  a  serious  reverse,  and 
all  the  various  generals,  every  one  of  whom  had  in  his 
pocket  an  infallible  plan  for  securing  the  defeat  of 
Napoleon,  were  now  listened  to  with  greater  attention. 
The  English  having  meanwhile  sent  an  expedition  of 
40,000  men  to  the  isle  of  Walcheren  in  Holland,  so  that 
the  Emperor's  flank  was  apparently  in  serious  danger, 
the  position  of  Napoleon  seemed  very  precarious.  How- 
ever, Napoleon  fully  retrieved  his  reverse  at  Aspern  by 
the  brilliant  victory  of  Wagram  a  few  weeks  later.     He 


NAPOLEON.  — Ill  97 

had  made  his  preparations  for  the  battle  with  such  pro- 
found foresight,  that  scarcely  two  hours  after  the  com- 
mencement of  the  battle,  he  declared  it  virtually  won 
by  him,  and,  feeUng  fatigued,  he  lay  down  on  a  rug 
for  a  short  sleep,  amidst  the  roaring  of  over  1 200  can- 
non and  150,000  rifles.  The  battle  was  won  by  him. 
Archduke  Charles  was  forced  to  retreat,  and  Austria 
was  compelled  to  accept  the  very  harsh  conditions  of 
the  treaty  of  Schonbrunn,  by  which  the  territory  and 
the  population  of  Austria  were  very  considerably  re- 
duced, so  that  Austria,  like  Prussia  in  1806,  was  made 
a  second-rate  power,  and  Napoleon's  ascendency  over 
the  rest  of  Continental  Europe  was  more  consolidated 
than  ever.  The  Walcheren  expedition,  as  is  well 
known,  came  quickly  to  grief  by  disease,  and  so  missed 
entirely  its  point. 

A  study  of  the  campaign  of  1809,  of  the  conduct  of 
Austria  and  England,  and  of  the  minor  powers,  cannot 
but  give  us  the  impression  that  the  wholesale  con- 
demnation of  Napoleon  as  a  man  who  had  no  regard 
for  human  life,  and  who  pandered  only  to  his  own 
boundless  ambition,  cannot  for  a  moment  be  upheld, 
in  the  face  of  the  facts  revealed  by  Austrian  diplomacy 
in  1809,  or,  as  we  have  seen,  by  Prussian  policy  in 
1806.  The  truth  is,  that  the  sovereigns  of  Europe  were 
unteachable,  and  just  as  greedy  for  new  territory  and 
just  as  reckless  and  unfeeling  for  the  sufferings  of  their 
nation  as  Napoleon  had  ever  been,  or  is  said  to  have 
been.  Even  if  we  should  admit  that  Napoleon's  ambi- 
tion exceeded  legitimate  bounds,  we  cannot  but  notice 
that  his  unprecedented  genius  entitled  him  to  hopes  and 
ambitions  far  beyond  what  a  Francis  II.  or  a  Frederick 


98  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN   EUROPE 

William  III.  of  Prussia  could  reasonably  claim ;  and  if 
the  conduct  of  Napoleon  in  1808  and  1809  is  reprehen- 
sible, the  conduct  of  England  and  Austria  is  undoubt- 
edly more  reprehensible  still.  England,  to  satiate  her 
jealousy  and  hatred  of  Napoleon,  whom  for  so  many 
years  she  was  unable  to  touch,  in  spite  of  her  very 
greatest  efforts  —  England  encourage  the  Spanish  to 
bleed  themselves  to  death  in  a  hopeless,  bootless,  and 
objectless  war  against  Napoleon.  In  the  same  way  the 
Emperor  of  Austria  caused  the  heroic  Tirolese,  in  1809, 
and  the  other  numerous  nations  of  his  realm,  to  bleed 
themselves  to  death  in  a  war  which  he  had  recklessly 
provoked,  against  the  opinion  of  the  best  military  judg- 
ment of  his  country,  and  without  any  serious  hope  of 
making  good  the  losses  he  had  sustained  in  1805. 

A  new  man  came  now  to  be  the  first  minister  of 
Austria  —  Prince  Metternich,  one  of  the  strangest,  most 
interesting,  and  for  a  long  time  most  important,  historical 
figures  of  European  history.  His  was  the  power  of 
being  interesting  and  important  during  his  lifetime, 
but,  like  a  sterile  beauty,  his  power  left  no  inheritance, 
and  he  has  long  ceased  to  count  as  a  great  historical 
factor.  Like  the  great  actor  he  was,  he  instinctively 
felt  that  posterity  would  wind  no  wreaths  for  him, 
and  that  his  heyday  and  triumph  depended  on  pass- 
ing circumstances  of  his  own  life.  His  vanity  was 
greater  than  his  genius ;  he  certainly  had  very  much 
diplomatic  dexterity ;  he  knew  the  persons  and  the 
causes  of  his  time  from  personal  and  extensive  know- 
ledge ;  he  was  attractive,  charming,  instructive.  In 
1809  he  counselled  Francis  to  maintain  what  Francis 
ought  to  have  maintained   after    1802,  that  is,  friend- 


NAPOLEON.  —  III  99 

ship  with  Napoleon.  The  marriage  between  Napoleon 
and  Marie  Louise,  the  daughter  of  Francis,  was  chiefly 
Metternich's  work. 

It  is,  one  cannot  help  remarking,  a  very  strange 
coincidence  that,  as  the  West  Indies  have  given  to 
the  French  Crown  two  of  her  most  charming  and 
most  important  royal  spouses  (Madame  de  Maintenon 
had  spent  the  best  years  of  her  first  youth  in  the  West 
Indies,  and  Napoleon's  first  wife,  Josephine,  was  of 
West  Indian  origin),  so,  on  the  other  hand,  Austria 
had  ever  since  the  fated  marriage  of  Marie  Antoinette 
with  Louis  XVI.,  and,  in  fact,  ever  since  the  coalition 
with  Austria,  made  by  Kaunitz  in  1756,  brought  nothing 
but  disaster  to  the  French.  Napoleon,  who,  like  all 
Southern  people,  entertained  a  belief  in  lucky  and 
unlucky  persons,  had  always  thought  Josephine  was 
his  Mascotte,  and  strange  to  say,  a  few  years  after  he 
divorced  Josephine,  his  luck  deserted  him  completely. 
It  is  equally  true  that  the  entrance  of  another  Habs- 
burg  princess  into  the  ruling  house  of  France  brought 
upon  Napoleon  nothing  but  shame  and  disaster. 
Marie  Louise  was  the  most  flippant,  the  most  sensual, 
and  morally  the  weakest  woman  of  her  time.  When 
Napoleon  was  still  in  Elba,  in  18 14,  as  the  prisoner 
of  Europe,  and  while  she  was  already  mother  of  a  son 
by  Napoleon,  she  abandoned  herself  to  a  one-eyed, 
wizened  and  wasted  rou^y  forgetting  both  her  origin 
and  her  duty.  Metternich  himself  had  a  belief  in 
lucky  and  unlucky  persons,  and  it  is  not  unreasonable 
to  assume  that  he  urged  the  negotiations  regarding 
the  marriage  of  Napoleon  with  Marie  Louise  with 
some  mystic  belief  in  the  disaster  to  be  produced  by 


100  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

the  connection  of  Napoleon  with  the  House  of  Austria. 
For,  as  now  everybody  knows,  the  House  of  Austria 
is,  of  all  the  reigning  houses  in  the  world,  the  one 
that  has  been  visited,  to  our  own  times,  with  the 
greatest  number  of  most  shocking  disasters,  just  as  in 
the  eighteenth  century  the  Habsburgs  brought  nothing 
but  ill-luck  to  either  the  Bourbons  or  Napoleon. 

Napoleon  himself,  when  he  learnt  of  the  birth  of 
his  son,  seemed  to  be  at  the  height  of  glory  and 
happiness.  Now  that  his  dynasty  was  assured,  he 
seemed  to  know  no  bounds  in  his  ambitions,  in  his 
dreams.  It  is  here  that,  as  we  said  before,  the  se- 
rious student  of  history  must  pause  and  hesitate  for 
a  long  time  before  venturing  on  a  judgment  of  a 
historic  personality  that,  like  the  great  founders  of 
religion,  is  so  unique,  so  complicated,  that  we  have  in 
reahty  no  measure  to  comprehend  it.  It  is  well  known 
in  ordinary  life  that  nothing  is  easier  than  to  miscon- 
strue any  character  that  exceeds  normal  mediocrity; 
in  the  case  of  Napoleon  we  have  a  character  exceeding 
the  general  and  exceptional  run  of  mankind  to  an  un- 
precedented extent.  This  very  circumstance  must  neces- 
sarily entail  a  lessened  probability  of  sound  judgment 
on  him.  It  appears  that  Napoleon,  after  the  birth  of 
his  child,  had  definitely  made  up  his  mind  to  conquer 
Russia  and  to  start  on  the  realization  of  his  oriental 
plans.  As  he  himself  remarked,  in  all  his  actions  he 
was  prompted  by  some  inner  voice  or  vocation,  not  un- 
Uke  to  that  Daemon  to  which  Socrates  ascribed  his  ideas 
and  the  motives  of  most  of  his  actions.  It  has  been  re- 
served for  a  professor  of  ancient  history  in  Berlin  to  il- 
luminate the  history  of  Socrates  by  the  declaration  that 


NAPOLEON.  — m  lOI 

Socrates's  Daemon  is  only  tantamount  to  the  habit  of 
some  people  of  counting  the  buttons  on  their  coats  in 
order  to  get  a  negative  or  a  positive  answer  in  moments 
of  wavering  resolution.  Should  Professor  Edward  Meyer, 
in  the  course  of  time,  reach  the  period  of  Napoleon,  we 
shall  no  doubt  learn  that  Napoleon's  inner  voices  (let 
alone  those  of  Jeanne  d'Arc)  were  only  like  a  game  of 
toss-up  played  by  boys  for  a  piece  of  cake.  However,  it 
may  be  submitted  that  in  history,  especially  in  that 
part  of  it  that  happens  outside  the  dusty  library  of  a 
scholar,  there  are  such  voices,  there  are  such  inward 
callings  given  to  men  like  Columbus,  Richelieu,  Na- 
poleon, Bismarck,  or  to  women  like  Jeanne  d'Arc.  It 
consists  in  the  absolute,  the  irresistible  conviction  that 
they  are  to  do  some  great  thing  for  humanity,  and 
accordingly  they  do  it.  They  are  unable  to  analyze 
those  voices,  to  formulate  them  scientifically,  or  to  give 
any  reasonable  account  of  them  —  what  they  know  is 
that  the  voices  are  there,  that  they  actuate,  prompt, 
urge,  and  force  them  to  do  what  in  the  end  they  do 
achieve.  It  was  a  feeling  of  that  vocation,  a  vocation 
that  we  may  now  call  the  task  of  spreading  all  over 
Europe  the  ideas  and  principles  of  the  French  Revo- 
lution, such  as  that  of  equality  before  the  law,  the 
abolition  of  feudal  regimes,  the  abolition  of  castes, 
etc.,  that  probably  prompted  Napoleon,  in  spite  of 
himself,  to  undertake  the  Russian  campaign,  which, 
on  strictly  military  principles,  nobody  could  have 
condemned  more  than  he  did  himself.  Let  us  consider 
the  chief  facts  from  the  military  standpoint.  Napoleon 
knew  that  in  going  to  Russia  he  was  violating  all  the 
principles  of  strategy  which,  in  innumerable  despatches 


I02  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

and  conversations,  he  had  inculcated  upon  his  gen- 
erals, which  he  had  unremittingly  required  from  them, 
and  for  the  neglect  of  which  he  had  frequently  severely 
punished  them.  These  were  the  principle  of  concen- 
tration, the  principle  of  the  nearness  of  the  basis,  the 
principle  that  the  enemy  can  be  brought  to  surrender 
only  when  you  can  place  yourself  on  his  communica- 
tions (a  principle  practically  unrealizable  in  Russia). 
All  these  principles  Napoleon  consciously  violated  by 
entering  on  his  Russian  campaign  in  1812. 

If  we  now  consider  the  political  and  economic 
aspect  of  the  question,  we  come  to  the  same  con- 
clusion. To  put  it  plainly,  Russia  was  then  not  worth 
having  ;  it  was  unable  to  feed  the  huge  army  of  Napo- 
leon ;  it  had  none  of  the  treasure  that  Napoleon  found 
in  Lombardy  in  1796  and  1797;  it  offered  no  advan- 
tage whatever  in  point  of  industry  or  commerce  or 
even  agriculture.  Even  nowadays  it  is  economi- 
cally very  backward,  and  it  will  take  generations 
and  generations  before  Russia  can  be  made  an  ob- 
ject of  prey  as  valuable  as  was  Italy  or  Germany  even 
in  Napoleon's  time.  If  we  consider  finally  the  oriental 
plans  of  Napoleon,  there  was  scarcely  anything  to  gain 
from  a  conquest  of  Russia  as  she  then  was,  for  Russia 
had  scarcely  reached  the  Caucasus,  and  the  del  eat  of 
Alexander  gave  Napoleon  no  footing  whatever  in  Asia 
Minor  or  the  Caucasus.  Had  Napoleon  in  18 12,  instead 
of  defeating  Alexander,  attempted  to  destroy  the  Turkish 
Empire,  he  might  have  made  some  substantial  progress, 
considering  that  the  British  fleet  was  more  and  more 
engaged  in  America.  The  destruction  of  the  Turkish 
Empire  had  long  been  in  his  mind,  and  his  instructions 


NAPOLEON.  —  III  103 

in  1809,  to  Marmont,  who  was  governor  of  the  Illyrian 
provinces,  close  to  Turkey,  were  evidently  given  with 
the  view  of  a  near  campaign  against  Turkey. 

All  these  and  other  minor  considerations,  not  one  of 
which  was  alien  to  Napoleon,  rendered  the  campaign 
in  Russia  a  superfluous,  useless,  uninteresting  enter- 
prise. Napoleon  had  learnt  that  even  Austria,  after 
repeated  signal  defeats  at  his  hands,  found  means  of 
rising  against  him  in  1805  and  1809  for  the  third  and 
fourth  time.  How  could  he  reasonably  suppose  that 
even  a  defeated  Russia  would  not  imitate  Austria  at 
leaot  another  two  or  three  times,  trying  to  shake  off  the 
yoke  of  the  French  Emperor  ? 

These  and  similar  arguments  were  put  before  Napo- 
leon after  he  had  arrived  with  his  huge  army  at  Kowno, 
and  Napoleon  seemed  to  be  deeply  impressed  by  them, 
for  he  said  to  Berthier,  the  chief  of  his  military  cabinet, 
that  he  would  give  up  the  campaign  and  return  west. 
The  joy  in  the  army  was  universal.  However,  the  next 
day  the  order  came  to  march  eastward  to  Russia,  and 
when  Berthier  asked  the  Emperor  to  what  motives  he 
had  yielded  in  the  sudden  change  of  yesterday's  resolu- 
tion, the  Emperor  looked  dreamily  into  the  air  and 
said,  "  I  do  not  know."  And  so  the  immense  army,  the 
largest  that  had  up  to  that  time  ever  been  collected  in 
Europe,  went  on  to  the  steppes  of  Russia,  the  left  wing 
of  Napoleon  being  led  by  Macdonald,  his  right  wing 
by  Prince  Schwarzenberg,  and  the  centre  by  Napoleon 
himself.  The  Russians  retreated  before  him  ;  in  all  the 
smaller  engagements  the  French  were  victorious,  but 
in  the  battle  of  the  Moskowa  (also  called  Borodino) 
the  Russians,  under  Kutusow,  offered  the  most  fright- 


104  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

ful  resistance.  The  battle  (September  7th)  lasted  from 
five  o'clock  in  the  morning  till  late  at  night.  Kutusow 
spent  the  night  in  his  own  camp  and  only  retreated  the 
next  day.  In  other  words,  Napoleon's  victory  in  that 
famous  battle  was  only  technical  but  not  strategical; 
he  had  not  annihilated  the  Russian  army,  and  Alex- 
ander was  therefore  not  forced  to  surrender  to  him. 
Napoleon  entered  Moscow,  and  even  his  oldest  veterans 
were,  it  appears,  in  a  state  of  ecstasy  at  the  sight  of 
that  immense  and  —  for  all  the  Slavs  and  many  of  the 
Orientals  —  sacred  town,  which  in  Russia  and  north- 
eastern Asia  is  largely  considered  to  be  what  Mekka 
is  in  southwestern  Asia.  Napoleon  spent  several 
weeks  at  Moscow  waiting  for  Alexander's  surrender; 
however,  Alexander  did  not  surrender.  The  desperate 
Russians  set  fire  to  the  town.  Napoleon  was  forced 
to  retreat,  and  now  followed  that  horrible  disaster,  the 
greatest  in  modern  times,  when  the  French  army, 
harassed  by  the  Cossacks,  emaciated  by  cold  and 
famine  died  by  thousands  every  day,  so  that  the  famous 
disaster  or  catastrophe  on  the  Berezina  is  only  one 
amongst  many,  and  when  the  Grande  Arm^e  reached 
the  western  confines  of  Russia,  it  had  melted  down  to  a 
few  thousand  men.  A  thrill  of  horror  went  through  the 
whole  of  Europe  ;  most  people  saw  in  the  terrible  disaster 
the  finger  of  God,  who  had  punished  an  overambitious 
titan,  and  many  of  Napoleon's  friends  began  to  despair 
of  him. 


VII 

NAPOLEON.  —  IV 

^T^HE  sovereigns  of  Europe  had  no  sooner  learnt  of 
-*-  the  great  disaster  in  Russia  than  they  prepared 
to  make  a  new  coalition  against  Napoleon  in  order  to 
bring  about  his  final  downfall.  If  one  reads  their  proc- 
lamations, one  would  be  induced  to  think  that  their 
only  intention  was  the  general  welfare  of  Europe, 
which  they  said  was  seriously  jeopardized  by  the 
boundless  ambition  of  the  French  Emperor.  How- 
ever, like  all  political  manifestoes,  the  proclamations 
of  the  sovereigns  were  on  the  whole  mere  pretexts  to 
cover  their  real  intentions,  to  disguise  from  the  glance 
of  the  mistaken  nations  of  Europe  the  fact  which, 
a  few  months  after  Napoleon's  downfall,  was  to  be 
manifest  to  the  dullest  of  European  citizens,  but  which 
in  1813,  1 8 14,  and  181 5  neither  the  enthusiastic  poets 
nor  the  learned  professors  were  able  to  foresee.  That 
fact  was  that  the  sovereigns  in  reality  only  meant  to 
place  the  whole  of  Europe  under  a  bondage  far  more 
objectionable,  far  more  injurious  to  all  the  higher 
interests  of  Europe,  far  more  reactionary  than  anything 
that  Napoleon  had  ever  contemplated  doing.  It  is  now 
well  known  that  for  over  thirty-five  years  after  Napo- 
leon's downfall  the  whole  of  Europe  was  kept  under 
a  regime  of  the  most  abominable  reaction ;  that  the 
slightest  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  people  to  establish 

los 


I06  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

any  of  the  more  liberal  institutions  or  even  to  indulge  in 
a  discussion  of  liberal  reforms,  was  ruthlessly  stifled  and 
blotted  out  at  the  hands  of  the  very  self-same  govern- 
ments which  in  1813,  1814,  and  181 5,  in  the  name  of  the 
liberties  of  Europe,  had  led  millions  of  European  citi- 
zens against  Napoleon. 

The  cold  truth  is  that  the  sovereigns  were,  in  18 13, 
even  more  afraid  of  the  new  spirit  that  had  come  over 
their  own  subjects  than  of  Napoleon.  The  coalition  of 
181 3  was  really  pointed  against  the  very  people  that  it 
was  meant  to  "  liberate "  from  the  yoke  of  Napoleon. 
The  sovereigns  knew  the  new  spirit  created  by  the 
French  Revolution  was  directly  opposed  to  all  their 
personal  interests,  that  just  as  France  could  never  again 
become  what  she  had  been  under  the  old  kings,  even  so 
the  days  of  the  absolutistic  kings  in  Prussia,  Germany, 
Austria,  were  destined  to  come  to  an  end  unless  the 
sovereigns  by  an  extreme  effort  succeeded  in  turning 
back  the  tide  of  history. 

This  alone  will  explain  the  fact  that  in  181 3  was 
realized  what  had  never  been  realized  before  in  Europe, 
that  is,  a  complete  union  and  coalition  of  all  the  sover- 
eigns against  one  power.  At  various  times  in  European 
history  there  had  arisen  a  powerful  ruler  whose  ambition 
was  threatening  to  most  of  the  other  sovereigns ;  such 
was  the  case  with  Charles  V.,  with  Louis  XIV.,  and 
great  coalitions  were  made  against  them.  But  those 
coalitions  were  never  literally  complete,  and  both  Charles 
V.  and  Louis  XIV.  easily  contrived  to  secure  allies  of 
their  own  and  thus  to  break  up  the  coalition.  It  was  in 
18 1 3,  and  then  alone,  that  practically  and  literally  every 
single  Christian  country  of  Europe  outside  France  united 


NAPOLEON.  —  IV  107 

with  the  rest  in  one  huge  coalition  against  Napoleon. 
With  the  solitary  exception  of  little  Saxony,  every  ruler 
in  Europe  joined  Prussia,  Russia,  Austria,  England, 
Sweden,  etc.,  to  combat  Napoleon. 

If  one  pauses  to  think  of  the  most  essential  and  most 
patent  character  of  Europe,  that  is,  its  irreconcilable 
differentiation  (even  now  into  forty  odd  sovereign  and 
different  states) ;  if  one  considers  that  the  interests  of 
various  powers  in  Europe  are  as  a  rule,  and  must  for- 
ever be  as  conflicting,  as  diametrically  opposed  to  one 
another  as  they  have  always  proved  themselves  to  be,  so 
that  a  United  States  of  Europe  is  as  impossible  as  is  a 
hereditary  monarchy  in  the  States  of  America:  one 
cannot  but  stand  amazed  at  the  fact  that  for  once  in 
European  history  the  Powers,  forgetting  their  con- 
flicting interests,  overlooking  their  irreconcilable  dif- 
ferences, united  into  one  immense  coalition  animated  by 
one  purpose,  meant  to  accomplish  one  single  great 
historic  fact.  This,  on  the  one  hand,  undoubtedly  sheds 
unparalleled  lustre  on  the  greatness  of  Napoleon,  and  it 
is  evident  that  nothing  short  of  a  man  of  Napoleon's 
grandeur  could  have  ever  terrorized  the  European  sov- 
ereigns into  a  union  and  coalition  into  which  no  pressure 
of  events  had  ever  been  able  to  weld  them  before 
Napoleon. 

As  was  said  in  a  former  chapter,  it  was  Napoleon  who 
overreached  himself,  it  was  the  French  who  deprived 
him  of  his  French  throne,  but  it  was  the  united  might 
of  Europe  that  deprived  him  of  his  ascendency  and 
power  in  the  countries  outside  France.  Had  he  moder- 
ated himself  after  18 10,  he  might  undoubtedly  have  died 
the  Emperor  of  the  French,  even  if  he  had  abandoned 


I08  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

his  conquests  east  of  the  Rhine  River.  Had  the  French 
faithfully  clung  to  him  as  they  had  clung  to  Louis  XIV., 
he  might  have  died  Emperor  of  a  diminished  France,  but 
still  a  French  sovereign.  It  was  the  union  of  Europe 
that  deprived  him  of  his  empire  outside  France,  and 
finally  brought  him  by  way  of  the  desertion  of  the 
French  to  his  last  plight. 

In  studying  the  coalition  of  1813,  one  cannot  overlook 
that  even  then  the  interests  of  many  sovereigns  united 
against  Napoleon  were  such  as  could  be  better  advanced 
by  alliance  with  the  great  French  Emperor.  Even 
Austria  had  perhaps  stronger  reasons  to  side  with 
Napoleon  than  to  join  the  mighty  coalition  against  him; 
Napoleon  himself  knew  that,  and  he  could  never  fully 
believe  in  the  possibility  of  a  general  coaUtion  against 
him.  Austria  was  more  than  threatened  by  Napoleon, 
but  Napoleon's  rule  was  after  all  a  question  of  a  man's 
life.  The  permanent  antagonism  to  Austria  was  to  be 
found  not  in  the  ruler  of  France  but  in  Prussia.  Had 
Austria  followed  her  true  political  interests  in  18 13,  she 
could  have,  by  the  aid  of  Napoleon,  secured  a  position 
of  infinitely  greater  supremacy  in  Germany,  or  of 
stronger  consolidation  in  her  own  hereditary  provinces. 
She  had  very  little  or  nothing  to  gain  from  the  downfall 
of  Napoleon  ;  Prince  Metternich,  however,  was  governed 
by  one  passion  only,  and  that  passion  was  vanity.  He 
saw  that  in  the  circumstances  of  the  year  18 13  his  was 
the  easy  possibility  of  acquiring  the  glory  of  having  de- 
feated Napoleon  diplomatically,  provided  that  he,  Met- 
ternich, identified  himself  with  the  interests  of  Prussia 
and  Russia.  Austria's  interests  were  evidently  rather  in 
favour  of  an  alliance  with  Napoleon,  and  the  decisive 


NAPOLEON,  — IV  109 

r61e  in  the  diplomatic  negotiations  fell  naturally  to 
Metternich ;  but  Metternich,  pursuing  not  the  real  inter- 
ests of  Austria,  which  was  only  his  adopted  country, 
but  the  promptings  of  his  own  boundless  vanity,  identi- 
fied himself  with  Prussia  and  Russia  and  claimed  to 
have  brought  Napoleon  diplomatically  to  his  downfall. 
The  Czar  of  Russia  pursued  a  far  better  policy  :  he,  too, 
was  prompted  by  the  desire  of  revenging  himself  on 
Napoleon,  of  entering  Napoleon's  capital  in  triumph  as 
Napoleon  had  entered  his.  But  beneath  this  wild  and 
blind  desire  for  vengeance  there  was  in  Alexander  a 
deep  and  cunning  scheme  in  perfect  harmony  with  the 
true  interests  of  Russia,  so  that  while  Metternich  was 
more  adroit,  a  better  negotiator,  and  subtler  diplomatist, 
Alexander  was  both  more  cunning  and  more  diplomatic. 
For  Alexander  contemplated  entering  Paris  and  defeat- 
ing Napoleon  completely,  not  only  to  have  his  vengeance 
for  Napoleon's  campaign  in  Russia  and  Napoleon's 
frequent  victories  over  Russian  armies,  but  also  and 
chiefly  to  play  the  r61e  of  the  saviour  of  France,  to 
attach  the  bulk  of  the  French  nation  to  the  Czar  of 
Russia,  to  restore  France  to  her  position  as  a  great 
power  in  Europe,  and  thereby  to  acquire  an  additional 
and  powerful  leverage  in  the  complicated  game  of  Euro- 
pean politics.  More  particularly  the  Czar  wanted  to 
secure  the  French  alliance  in  order  to  have  a  free  hand 
in  his  oriental  plans,  with  regard  to  which  England  and 
Austria,  he  very  well  knew,  were  his  natural  antagonists. 
The  campaigns  of  the  Czar  in  18 13  and  18 14  were 
therefore  based  on  natural  sentiment  and  on  justified 
principles  of  policy.  The  negotiations  and  the  whole 
policy  of  Metternich,  on  the  other  hand,  were  based  on 


no  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN   EUROPE 

personal  vanity  and  had  no  historic  basis  in  the  past, 
and  were  therefore  unable  to  lay  down  solid  founda- 
tions for  the  future. 

The  most  solid,  most  consistent  policy  amongst  the 
sovereigns  was  in  1813  adopted  by  Prussia.  From  her 
terrible  downfall  of  1806  onward,  Prussia  had  constantly 
contemplated  (or  rather  imported  foreign  statesmen  were 
contemplating  for  Prussia)  the  restoration  of  the  whole 
monarchy  and  the  reparation  of  the  immense  loss  in  pres- 
tige and  power  which  the  unprecedented  collapse  of  1806 
had  entailed  upon  her.  Accordingly  Prussia  was  deter- 
mined to  join  the  alliance  against  Napoleon,  to  throw  her- 
self body  and  soul  into  the  new  struggle  against  the  man 
who  had  humiliated  her  beyond  all  expression.  In  that 
struggle  Prussia  might  lose  everything,  and  then  she 
would  have  been  blotted  out  from  existence,  or  she 
might  gain  a  rehabilitation,  without  which  her  power 
in  Europe  was  impossible.  It  was  therefore  to  Prussia 
a  struggle  for  life  or  death ;  for  that  reason  alone  Aus- 
tria ought  not  to  have  joined  the  alliance  against  Napo- 
leon. The  enmity  between  Prussia  and  Austria  was 
historical  and  natural,  it  was  the  bounden  duty  of  Aus- 
trian statesmen  to  help  Prussia  under  no  circumstances. 
However,  the  Austrian  Emperor  was  too  incapable  to 
see  the  right  bearings  of  politics,  and  Metternich  was 
too  vain,  and  so  the  policy  of  Prussia,  instead  of  being 
counteracted  by  Austria,  and  thus  utterly  defeated  by 
Napoleon,  was  helped  on  all  sides,  and  it  was  really 
from  18 1 3  to  18 1 5  that  Prussia  laid  the  foundations  of 
her  present  greatness. 

England,  although  she  promised  help  to  the  allies,  and 
sent  them  subsidies  in  the  shape  of  money,  was  partly 


NAPOLEON.  — IV  III 

engaged  in  Spain,  partly  in  the  United  States,  with 
which,  chiefly  through  the  subtle  manoeuvres  of  Napo- 
leon, England  had  been  at  war  since  1812 ;  the  immense 
campaigns  therefore  in  18 13  and  18 14,  in  which  the  mili- 
tary power  of  Napoleon  was  completely  broken,  were 
carried  on  without  any  participation  of  the  English, 
except  in  the  Basque  corners  of  Spain  and  France. 

It  has  been  necessary  to  take  up  these  diplomatic  con- 
siderations before  entering  on  a  short  description  of  the 
campaigns  of  181 3  and  18 14,  in  both  of  which  the  mili- 
tary genius  of  Napoleon  shows  with  the  greatest  splen- 
dour, but  in  both  of  which  he  was  finally  worsted  owing 
to  superior  numbers  on  the  part  of  his  antagonists,  and 
to  the  treachery  of  his  subordinates,  more  especially  of 
the  commander  of  Soissons.  It  would  be  indeed  an 
untruth  to  say  that  in  18 13  the  allies  (the  Prussians,  the 
Russians,  soon  also  the  Austrians,  the  Swedes,  and 
numerous  smaller  sovereigns)  had  always  the  absolute 
superiority  in  numbers;  as  a  matter  of  fact  Napoleon 
had,  in  addition  to  his  army  in  18 13,  such  an  enormous 
number  of  soldiers,  horses,  artillery,  and  other  ammuni- 
tion of  war  disseminated  in  his  various  strongholds  and 
fortresses  between  the  Rhine  and  the  Elbe  rivers,  that 
had  he  united  all  his  forces,  both  the  garrisoned  and  the 
non-garrisoned,  he  could  have  for  a  long  time  disposed 
of  superior  armies  in  the  field.  For  reasons,  however, 
that  can  be  put  down  to  nothing  but  obstinacy  or  some 
other  mysterious  motive  that  escapes  us,  Napoleon,  in- 
stead of  availing  himself  of  the  vast  number  of  soldiers 
garrisoned  in  his  German  fortresses,  absolutely  refused 
to  draw  upon  them,  and  so  quickly  came  into  a  position 
of  numerical  inferiority. 


NAJPOLBON.-IV  113 

Dennewitz,  so  that  Napoleon's  left  flank  remained  prac- 
tically undefended.  One  of  the  chief  deficiencies  of 
Napoleon's  Minv  in  1813  was  his  lack  of  cavalry,  which 
j)n\ruit«l  N  ijoloon  from  following  up  his  victories,  so 
th.K  i'i>u  lu  I,  in  spite  of  repeated  defeats  at  the  hands 
oi  Nipoi.Mi,  w.ir.  ilways  able  to  rally  and  to  advance 
ui'..iiu  .  tiu'  :-.nMic:.(  (Irfcct,  however,  was,  as  already 
iwrntKuu^i.   N,iiM.K-(.n's  obstinate  refusal  to  call  upon 

hi.'.   ir:.ri\r,   in    III:.   (  ,ri  m.iil    l»)rtreSSeSi 

l\\c  |»M.v  !u;;oh.iih.ii:.  Ill  :i  fir  durlng  that  Campaign, 
by  \\\\u\\  N.ipoKon  lh.|)<-il  to  u'trieve  his  position  dip- 
lom.uu  ill\,  |M  '\(cl  to  be  a  failure  ;  Metternich  —  whom 
Napoleon  lur  1  in  (urn  to  flatter,  to  intimidate,  to  brow- 
boat.  at\(l  i.»  |u  1  nulo  —  only  listened  to  his  own  per- 
son il  \  iniiN .  11  ul  .loiying  in  the  position  of  the  central 
aiplon».iii-.t  *.i  (lu-  tinir.  \\Q  listened  neither  to  the  inter- 
ests oi  An.ti  1,1,  whh  li  1 10  represented,  nor  to  the  argu- 
ment.'; oi  Nil',.!.-..!!,  w  hu  h,  .IS  history  has  long  proved, 
cont.inu-il  .1  \c\\  :.o\\A  .ini.uintof  truth.  It  is  Said  that 
in  [\\o-.r  iu:;,)ti.i(u.n.s  N.ipoloon  uttered,  amongst  other 
phui.sv-;,  nuMiit  to  iniiinid.iio  McttcTuich,  the  terrible 
words,  "What  au  i  nnlli.Mi  li\c  to  me?"  It  is  cus- 
tomary to  quoto  til. It  .r.  .1  piooi  ot  N.ipoK'on's  diabolical 
nature.  In  umIuv,  n  w.i.-.  .1  \\\c\c  \A\[asc.  VVl)cn  Na- 
poleon, after  Waterloo,  wi  otirnl  the  help  of  the 
anarchic  clcnu-nt  of  Ft.nu  r.  lu-  r.ihnlv  refused  it. 

As  a  mattri    ot     t.u  t    N.ipolron    w.is    not  at   all    cruel, 

and  he  n  .1  u  U  jlu  isrs  is  mere  political  devices  to 
m.ikc  A  point  in  nri'.i>t i.it ions ;  he  thought,  and  with 
i  -  t  il  ticc,  ihai  man)  ul  the  members  of  the  coali- 
ht,  on  maturer  consideration,  to  come  to  the 
.\  IK  luMon  that  their  real  interests  were  bound  up  rather 


114  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

with  him  than  with  the  coalition.  It  was  certainly  the 
case  with  Bavaria,  with  Saxony,  with  Wiirtemberg,  with 
Italy,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  with  Austria.  However, 
the  vanity  of  the  princes,  their  desire  to  stop  the  revo- 
lutionary spirit,  and  the  power  and  influence  of  Metter- 
nich  and  Alexander,  undid  what,  with  regard  for 
Napoleon's  profound  remark,  ought  to  have  been  the 
right  policy  of  several  of  the  sovereigns;  and  all  the 
negotiations  failing.  Napoleon  was  forced  to  stake  his 
fortune  on  a  gigantic  battle  which  took  place  near  Leipsic 
on  three  consecutive  days  in  October,  1813.  That  battle, 
called  the  Battle  of  the  Nations,  in  which  the  French 
army  was  confronted  by  the  army  of  the  aUies,  twice  as 
numerous,  ended  in  the  defeat  of  Napoleon's  army. 
Napoleon  retreated  into  France,  was  on  his  way  attacked 
at  Hanau  by  a  Bavarian  army  which  he  completely 
crushed,  and  the  allies  now  decided  to  enter  France  and 
put  a  final  stop  to  the  rule  of  the  great  conqueror. 

The  campaign  of  18 14,  fought  between  the  Seine 
River  and  its  right-hand  affluents,  is  at  once  one  of  the 
most  interesting  military  exploits  of  Napoleon,  and  one 
of  the  least  important  of  his  campaigns.  Napoleon, 
placing  himself  in  the  middle  of  the  allies,  succeeded, 
by  rapid  movements,  in  defeating  several  of  their  gen- 
erals in  pitched  battles.  These  movements,  the  manner 
in  which  Napoleon  utilized  a  relatively  small  army 
against  enemies  possessing  a  crushing  superiority  of 
numbers,  have  always  been  considered  one  of  the  great 
feats  of  modern  warfare.  However,  circumstances,  the 
whole  political  horizon,  and  the  diplomatic  conjuncture 
had  changed  so  profoundly,  that  victories  which  in  1796 
or  1800  would  have  secured  Napoleon's  final  triumph 


NAPOLEON.  — IV  115 

over  his  enemies,  were  in  18 14  brilliant  but  barren 
successes.  The  student  of  military  history  can  indeed 
never  tire  of  studying  those  famous  campaigns  in 
which  Napoleon's  military  genius,  in  the  opinion  of 
most  authorities,  shows  even  to  a  higher  extent  than 
in  his  former  campaigns.  As  a  matter  of  history,  on 
the  other  hand.  Napoleon's  victories  of  Brienne,  Mont- 
mirail,  Craonne,  Reims,  St.  Dizier,  are  of  very  little 
importance.  For  the  allies  had  now  learnt  the  great 
lesson,  that  Napoleon  was  definitely  deserted  by  the 
French  nation;  accordingly,  the  allies  could  afford  to 
ignore  him  and  his  small  army,  although  even  then  they 
were  unable  to  crush  him  by  a  great  military  victory. 

In  studying  the  marches  of  the  allies,  it  is  easy  to 
note  that  the  Austrians  under  Prince  Schwarzenberg 
took  a  very  southern  route,  evidently  with  the  inten- 
tion of  giving  Napoleon  time  either  to  make  a  very 
great  success  or  to  negotiate  with  Austria  as  against  the 
other  allies.  In  18 14,  indeed,  Austria  had  somewhat 
convinced  herself,  that  her  interest  was  not  to  abet  the 
allies  under  all  circumstances,  and  what  Napoleon's 
diplomatic  persuasion  or  power  of  intimidation  had 
failed  to  do  in  181 3,  the  force  of  circumstances  had 
succeeded  in  bringing  home  to  the  Austrians  in  18 14. 
But  it  was  too  late ;  the  allies,  after  indulging  in  sham 
negotiations  at  Chatillon-sur-Seine,  clearly  saw  that 
Napoleon's  power  of  aggression,  as  well  as  his  great 
force  of  resistance  on  merely  defensive  lines,  was  over. 
They  therefore  determined  to  march  on  Paris,  ignor- 
ing the  presence  of  Napoleon  at  the  head  of  40,(X)0  or 
50,000  men  at  Fontainebleau.  In  that,  they  were  per- 
fectly justified   by  the  attitude  of  the  French   nation. 


Il6  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

Even  then,  it  is  true,  Napoleon  could  count  on  the 
sympathies  and  the  profound  loyalty  of  large  s-ections 
of  the  French  nation ;  however,  a  very  powerful  section 
of  the  rich  bourgeoisie  and  the  nobility  had  made  up 
their  minds  to  desert  him.  There  was,  both  in  the 
south  of  France,  where  Wellington  had  advanced  as  far 
as  Toulouse,  and  in  the  northeast  of  France,  where  the 
allies  were  concentrating  ever  increasing  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  soldiers,  much  to  intimidate,  to  frighten, 
and  to  discourage  the  population  of  France.  Moreover, 
in  the  Parliament  of  France,  both  Talleyrand  and 
Fouche  were  manoeuvring  and  intriguing  against  the 
Emperor.  The  strongest  of  all  arguments,  no  doubt, 
was  the  fact  that  France  had,  ever  since  1792,  seen  no 
foreign  power  within  her  precincts,  and  that  the  spectre 
of  war  in  France  acted  upon  the  bourgeoisie  with  a 
power  so  great  that  even  the  prestige  of  Napoleon  was 
unable  to  counteract  it. 

To  the  observant  student  of  French  history  it  is 
quite  evident  that  France  (in  that  so  similar  to  the 
physical  structure  of  the  country)  consists  of  two 
diametrically  opposed  elements :  one  the  steady,  slow, 
methodic,  and  even  pedantic,  bourgeoisie  proper,  whose 
ideal  is  order,  quiet,  work,  and  present  enjoyment  of 
life ;  the  other,  consisting  of  volcanic  forces  ever  tend- 
ing to  upheavals,  revolutions,  political  and  social  erup- 
tions, instinct  with  boundless  ambitions,  and  threatening 
the  existence  of  old  institutions.  It  so  happened  that 
in  1 8 14  the  former,  that  is,  the  bourgeoisie  element,  was 
in  the  ascendency;  to  this  Napoleon  was  forced  to 
succumb,  although  in  his  relatively  long  reign,  from 
1802  to  1 8 14,  he  had  exhausted  the  vast  resources  of 


NAPOLEON.  — IV  117 

his  mind  to  devise  measures  and  institutions  by  which 
huge  classes  and  sections  of  France  were  to  be  solidly 
attached  to  him  and  to  his  dynasty ;  yet  he  was  unable 
to  do  it.  What  the  slowest  and  most  narrow-minded 
of  the  Bourbon  or  Valois  monarchs  had  been  able  to 
do,  the  greatest  of  French  rulers  proved  incapable  of 
achieving.  The  French,  as  a  nation,  never  revolted 
from  sovereigns  as  insignificant  as  Henry  II.  or  Louis 
XV.,  but  they  gladly,  or  at  least  with  apparent  light- 
ness of  mind,  deserted  Napoleon  I.  The  allies  saw 
that,  and  on  entering  Paris  they  knew  that  Paris,  that 
is,  the  majority  of  the  Parisians,  would  gladly  accept 
anything  reasonable  the  allies  meant  to  offer  them,  and 
would  turn  their  backs  on  Napoleon. 

Napoleon  was  forced  to  abdicate;  he  did  so  on 
behalf  of  his  son.  The  allies,  however,  never  meant 
Napoleon's  son  to  ascend  the  throne  of  France,  and 
the  brother  of  Louis  XVI.,  under  the  name  of  Louis 
XVIII.,  was  put  on  the  throne  of  France.  Napoleon 
himself,  under  a  strong  escort,  was  permitted  to  live 
in  the  Isle  of  Elba,  between  Corsica  and  Italy,  although 
even  at  that  time  Prince  Metternich  proposed  that  the 
great  conqueror,  in  order  to  be  efficiently  shelved, 
ought  to  be  sent  to  St.  Helena.  So  ends  the  second 
period  of  Napoleon,  and  we  see  the  mighty  con- 
queror reduced  to  a  trivial  sovereignty  in  a  small  and 
insignificant  island,  deprived  of  all  his  influence,  des- 
tined to  pass  the  rest  of  his  Hfe  in  poverty.  It  is 
at  this  moment  that  we  must  consider  the  conduct 
and  behaviour  of  most  of  the  persons  surrounding 
Napoleon  :  of  his  marshals,  of  his  wife,  of  his  servants, 
of  his  opponents,  in  order  to  obtain  the  right  standard, 


Il8  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

the  right  measure,  with  which  to  judge  the  political  as 
well  as  the  moral  value  of  that  extraordinary  man. 
With  exceedingly  few  exceptions,  such  as  Macdonald, 
one  of  his  marshals,  every  one  of  the  men  whom  he 
had  raised,  frequently  from  the  dust  to  social  heights 
which  they  could  have  never  seriously  hoped  to  realize, 
behaved  toward  Napoleon  with  all  the  vile  ingratitude 
of  valets  and  flunkeys ;  in  speeches  they  reviled  him, 
in  actions  they  insulted  him.  True,  all  their  ingratitude 
and  degrading  baseness  of  conduct  is  like  mere  child's 
play  if  compared  to  the  conduct  of  that  Habsburg 
princess  who  had  the  great  honour  of  being  his  wife : 
she  not  only  did  not  seriously  want  to  join  him,  which 
she,  moreover,  was  forbidden  to  do,  but  she  forgot 
both  her  religious  oaths  and  conjugal  faithfulness  to 
him,  and  threw  herself  away  upon  a  miserable  Aus- 
trian soldier,  who  was  to  Napoleon  what  an  insect  is 
to  an  eagle.  Ney,  Soult,  and  all  the  other  marshals 
and  generals  vied  with  one  another  in  insulting  the 
great  Emperor  and  taking  the  oaths  of  fealty  to  the 
Bourbon  who  again  sat  on  the  throne  of  the  French 
kingdom.  Louis  XVIII.  was  a  heavy,  limited,  stupid, 
and  uninteresting  person ;  none  of  the  current  phrases 
in  history  has  more  truth  in  it  than  the  famous  saying 
about  the  Bourbons,  that  they  have  never  learnt  any- 
thing and  never  forgotten  anything.  During  the  weari- 
some years  of  his  exile,  he  as  well  as  his  brother  and 
other  princes  of  his  House,  instead  of  learning  the 
moral  of  events,  instead  of  really  understanding  the 
new  drift  of  French  history,  had  learnt  nothing,  had 
seen  nothing.  He  came  back  to  the  throne  of  France 
the  same  hopelessly  conceited  Bourbon  that  his  brother 


NAPOLEON.— IV  H9 

Louis  XVI.  and  their  grandfather  Louis  XV.  had  been. 
The  policy  the  Bourbon  government  attempted  was  so 
far  from  being  anything  like  in  harmony  with  the 
political  or  social  attitude  of  the  French  nation,  that  a 
few  months  after  the  accession  of  Louis  the  discontent 
in  the  country  was  general. 

It  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  ordinary  mind  that  it 
cannot  believe  or  really  construct  any  of  those  great 
changes  that  from  time  to  time  have  been  coming 
over  the  nations  of  Europe.  Europe  is  Greater  Hellas 
not  only  in  respect  of  its  immense  differentiation  and 
individualization,  but  more  especially  in  its  intense  love 
of  profound  changes  in  structure.  Europe  is  not  sta- 
tionary ;  it  has  never  been  stationary.  The  Americans 
think  that  of  all  nations  they  are  the  most  rapidly 
changing,  the  most  progressive,  the  most  dynamic.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  no  close  observer  and  student  of 
American  history  can  fail  to  notice  that  all  the  so- 
called  changes  in  America  are  formal,  external,  and 
do  not  really  touch  upon  the  vitals  of  the  nation.  It  is 
quite  different  in  Europe.  In  Europe  alone  there  have 
been  real  revolutions,  such  as  the  great  moral  and  intel- 
lectual revolution  of  the  sixteenth  century  called  the 
Reformation  and  the  Renaissance;  the  great  French 
Revolution;  the  great  Revolution  of  1848.  They  have 
changed  in  Europe  not  only  the  forms  of  government 
but  the  very  structure  of  its  classes  and  its  society. 
Of  this  remarkable  power  of  profound  change  France, 
of  all  European  countries,  has  the  greatest  share.  In 
no  other  country  can  we  notice  the  clear  and  broad 
fact  that  the  nation  made  a  perfectly  clean  sweep  of  all 
its  social  and  political  institutions ;  in  no  other  country 


I20  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

can  we  trace  changes  so  profound,  so  absolute,  as  in 
France.  The  greatest  of  those  changes  happened 
through  the  French  Revolution.  It  was  a  Revolution 
totally  unlike  the  great  Revolution  of  the  Dutch  from 
1565  to  1609;  or  the  Revolution  of  the  English  from 
1642  to  1660;  or  the  Revolution  of  the  Americans 
from  1775  to  1783.  In  none  of  the  three  Revolutions 
were  the  social,  that  is  the  deepest,  elements  of  the 
nation  ever  touched  upon;  all  the  three  referred  to 
purely  political  issues,  leaving  the  rest  of  the  nation's 
organization  untouched.  The  French  Revolution  on 
the  other  hand  was  a  revolution  proper,  that  is  an 
alteration  of  the  very  organs,  social,  religious,  moral, 
and  political,  of  the  entire  nation. 

Yet  the  Bourbons  did  not  see  it.  It  is  well  known 
that  most  people  after  forty  are  absolutely  unable  to 
take  in  any  novel  idea  or  to  conform  to  new  habits. 
The  Bourbons  are  a  glaring  example  of  that  homely 
truth;  they  failed  to  see  that  the  French  nation,  al- 
though largely  opposed  to  the  excessive  ambition  of 
Napoleon,  were  not  meant  to  be  satisfied  with  the  sub- 
ordinate ungracious  policy  of  the  Bourbons.  The  dis- 
content in  the  country  was  constantly  spreading,  and 
Napoleon  in  Elba,  closely  following  the  events,  pre- 
dicted, with  that  supreme  clearness  of  mind  so  char- 
acteristic of  him,  that  he  would  reenter  France  and 
regain  his  throne  without  striking  a  single  blow.  This 
is  precisely  what  he  did.  Early  in  March,  181 5,  he 
landed  at  Port  Jouan,  and  by  Grenoble,  Lyons,  he 
marched  at  the  head  of  a  few  faithful  soldiers  on  Paris 
without  striking  a  blow.  His  old  marshals  that  were 
now  sent  against  him  with  orders  to  capture  him,  Ney 


NAPOLEON.  — IV  121 

in  the  first  place,  had  no  sooner  beheld  that  Imperial 
figure  and  face  that  had  led  them  to  so  many  immortal 
victories,  than  they  forgot  their  formal  duty,  and  in- 
stead of  laying  hands  on  him  as  a  prisoner,  they  went 
down  on  their  knees  before  him,  offering  him  their 
lives.  And  so  Napoleon  entered  Paris  at  the  head  of 
the  whole  of  the  French  army,  received  by  the  people 
who  a  few  months  ago  had  deserted  him,  with  the 
most  jubilant  enthusiasm.  The  Bourbon  fled,  and  thus 
began  the  third  and  shortest  period  of  Napoleon's  Hfe, 
the  so-called  "  Hundred  Days." 

Napoleon,  totally  unlike  the  Bourbon,  had  learnt  the 
lesson  that  the  French  people  would  not  accept  absolu- 
tistic  rule  even  at  his  hands.  Accordingly  he  promised 
them  constitutional  government,  and  there  is  little  doubt 
that  he  meant  to  act  up  to  his  promise.  He  had  there- 
fore little  if  nothing  to  fear  from  those  staunch  Re- 
publicans in  France  that  even  in  the  times  of  his  most 
glorious  victories  had  opposed  his  reign.  At  home  he 
was  thus  in  a  pretty  safe  condition.  It  was,  however, 
different  abroad.  The  Great  Powers  of  Europe  had 
since  October,  1814,  met  at  Vienna  in  the  famous 
Congress  that  was  to  rearrange  the  map  of  Europe, 
and  the  dictates  of  which,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  changed 
the  whole  political  aspect  of  Europe  for  several  genera- 
tions after  the  fall  of  Napoleon.  The  Great  Powers  on 
hearing  of  the  new  and  unexpected  turn  of  events  in 
France  at  once  made  up  their  minds  to  repeat  what 
they  had  succeeded  in  doing  in  18 13  and  18 14,  that 
is,  to  humihate,  to  annihilate  Napoleon,  who  to  them 
was  not  only  the  reminder  and  cause  of  their  greatest 
humiliations,  but  also  and  more  particularly  the  great 


122  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

obstacle  to  their  attempts  and  intentions  to  suppress  all 
political  liberty  in  Europe.  Napoleon  at  once,  by  vari- 
ous declarations  to  the  Courts  of  Europe,  in  which  he 
most  solemnly  declared  himself  to  have  no  intentions  of 
reviving  his  past,  attempted  to  conjure  away  the  coming 
storm.  However,  the  Powers,  by  their  victories  in  1813 
and  1 8 14,  had  taken  heart  and  were  convinced  that  by 
a  new  coalition  they  could  not  fail  to  defeat  Napoleon 
ultimately  and  definitely.  England,  Prussia,  Austria, 
Russia,  in  fact  the  whole  of  Europe  again  united  to 
hurl  over  a  million  soldiers  against  France,  and  to  rid 
the  absolutistic  sovereigns  of  their  great  nightmare, 
and  the  liberties  of  Europe  of  their  possible  protector. 
This  is  how  the  campaign  of  18 15  was  brought  about. 
This  memorable  campaign  has  been  written  up  by  all 
the  nations  that  had  a  part  in  it,  and  its  Hterature  is  un- 
doubtedly far  more  interesting,  and  filled  with  more 
falsehoods  and  distortions  of  facts,  than  that  of  any 
other  campaign  in  European  history.  The  contradic- 
tions in  the  various  reports  of  the  three  days  of  the 
Waterloo  campaign  from  June  i6th  to  June  i8th,  181 5, 
are  so  great  that  no  ingenuity  and  no  research  can  ever 
hope  to  reconcile  them.  To  give  a  few  examples :  —  In 
the  Battle  of  Waterloo  the  Anglo-Dutch  centre  was  at 
La  Haie  Sainte.  Wellington  himself  says  that  the 
French  occupied  La  Haie  Sainte  at  two  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon ;  Major  Baring,  on  the  other  hand,  who  com- 
manded the  post,  declares  that  he  held  his  own  on  that 
post  until  six  o'clock  in  the  evening.  Other  witnesses 
give  other  hours.  Or:  —  The  great  charges  of  the 
French  cavalry  directed  against  the  French  centre  of  the 
Anglo-Dutch  army  were,  the  French  reporters  say,  sue- 


NAPOLEON.  — IV  123 

cessful  in  breaking  the  English  squares.  The  English 
say  the  French  never  broke  it.  The  French  say  that 
entire  British  battalions  were  annihilated;  the  British 
say  not  a  single  battalion  was  annihilated,  and  so  on  in 
infinitum. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  is  certainly  almost  im- 
possible to  hope  for  a  correct  and  faithful  description  of 
the  tactical  details  of  the  campaign  of  Waterloo  ;  fortu- 
nately for  us  the  great  labours,  both  of  French,  English, 
Dutch,  and  German  historians,  enable  us  to  see  with  ab- 
solute clearness  the  strategic  details  of  that  famous  cam- 
paign. It  is  quite  natural  that  the  English,  who  in 
their  fights  from  1793  to  181 5  had,  with  few  exceptions, 
not  been  able  to  worst  the  French  armies  on  land,  and 
had  on  the  other  hand  suffered  in  innumerable  engage- 
ments, at  the  hands  of  the  French,  signal  and  most  an- 
noying defeats ;  it  is  quite  natural,  we  say,  that  the 
English  have  always  tried  to  make  the  best  of  the  cam- 
paign of  Waterloo.  Although  at  the  beginning,  that  is, 
from  181 5  to  1830,  a  series  of  British  generals,  more 
especially  Lord  Vivian,  who  commanded  the  all-impor- 
tant left  wing  of  Wellington's  army,  freely  confessed  to 
the  fact  that  the  Anglo-Dutch  army  could  not  have 
seriously  thought  of  defeating  Napoleon  without  the 
help  of  the  Prussians,  yet  in  times  after  1830  the  legend 
of  the  British  victory  at  Waterloo  was  sedulously  spread 
and  steadily  advertised  until  it  seemed  an  absurdity  to 
deny  it.  It  is,  as  already  remarked,  a  common  feature 
of  all  small  nations  to  exaggerate  their  victories  over 
powerful  nations,  and  all  the  victories  of  the  English 
over  the  Scotch  have  never  been  able  to  efface  the  glory 
of  Bannockburn,  as  all  the  victories  of  the  French  over 


124  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

the  English  will  never  suffice  to  obliterate  the  triumph 
of  Cr^cy  and  Agincourt ;  so  with  the  Boer  victories  of 
Colenso,  Magersfontein,  etc.  However,  the  campaign 
of  Waterloo  has  features  of  such  serious  importance 
that  while  the  historian  may  good-naturedly  tolerate  the 
hymns  of  praise  lavished  on  the  heroes  of  Cr6cy  or  Ban- 
nockburn,  he  cannot  afford  to  leave  the  historical  truth 
with  regard  to  Waterloo  in  the  hands  of  national  adver- 
tisers. For  the  first  truth  about  Waterloo  is  this: — • 
Napoleon  was  a  dead  man  before  he  began  the  cam- 
paign. He  had  in  the  two  former  years,  in  1813  and 
1 8 14,  been  not  only  defeated  in  open  battle,  but  had 
been  deprived  of  nearly  all  his  army,  of  his  prestige,  and 
worst  of  all  of  the  allegiance  of  his  own  nation,  and  it 
is  therefore  absolutely  certain  that  Napoleon,  even  by  a 
possible  victory  at  Waterloo,  could  never  have  retrieved 
his  position.  A  few  more  considerations  will  make 
that  absolutely  clear.  Let  us  suppose  that  Napoleon 
on  June  18th  had  succeeded  in  dispersing  Wellington's 
army,  as  two  days  before  he  had  succeeded  in  scatter- 
ing the  army  of  Bliicher  at  Ligny,  then  he  would  have 
been  at  the  head  of  —  in  the  best  case  —  50,000  men, 
while  the  allies  marching  against  him  already  on  the 
Rhine  were  at  the  head  of  over  800,000  men.  In  other 
words,  a  victory  of  Waterloo  on  the  part  of  Napoleon 
would  have  been  absolutely  identical  with  Napoleon's 
victory  in  1814  at  Montmirail  or  at  Craonne;  the  allies, 
feeling  that  they  had  the  immense  majority  in  num- 
bers, would  have  done  in  18 15  what  they  actually  did 
do  in  1814:  they  would  have  ignored  Napoleon;  they 
would  have  marched  on  Paris ;  they  would  have  forced 
Napoleon  to  abdicate  the  second  and   the   last  time. 


NAPOLEON.  — IV  125 

Nobody  knew  that  better  than  Napoleon.  He,  whose 
master  mind  controlled  details  as  well  as  general  fea- 
tures, had  lost  all  faith  in  his  star.  It  was  not  true 
that  he  was  ill,  but  it  is  true  that  judging  the  situation 
as  it  really  was,  he  lost  heart,  knowing  well  as  he  did 
that  no  victory  over  Bliicher  or  over  Wellington  could 
really  save  him.  The  researches  of  Houssaye  have,  it 
must  be  added,  contributed  one  noteworthy  feature  to 
our  final  judgment  about  that  campaign.  It  appears 
that  Napoleon  might  have  raised  a  new  army  of  about 
800,000  men  in  October,  181 5.  Everything  therefore 
depended  on  whether  Napoleon  was  able  to  hold  out 
until  October,  when  the  new  recruits  might  be  ready, 
or  whether  he  was  forced  to  surrender  before  October. 
In  so  far,  then,  as  the  battle  of  Waterloo  ruined  the 
prestige  of  Napoleon,  gave  such  of  the  French  as  were 
against  him  the  upper  hand  in  the  French  Parliament, 
and  deprived  him  of  any  chance  of  waiting  until  Octo- 
ber ;  in  so  far,  and  in  so  far  alone,  the  battle  of  Water- 
loo may  be  considered  the  final  defeat  of  Napoleon. 
For  it  cannot  be  seriously  doubted  that  Napoleon  at  the 
head  of  800,000  men  (although  most  of  them  would 
have  been  raw  recruits)  might  have  held  his  own  against 
the  allies.  Waterloo  deprived  him  of  that  possibility, 
and  in  that  sense  alone  Waterloo  was  of  greater  effi- 
ciency and  is  of  greater  importance  than  Leipsic. 

The  general  outline  of  the  Waterloo  campaign  is 
simple :  it  consists  of  two  double  battles,  one,  the 
battle  of  Quatre-Bras  and  Ligny  on  i6th  June,  1815; 
the  other,  the  double  battle  of  Waterloo  and  Wavre, 
on  1 8th  June,  18 15.  In  the  first  double  battle  Wel- 
lington  was   at   Quatre-Bras,    Bliicher   at  Ligny ;   the 


126  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

two  battle  places  were  quite  close  to  one  another, 
and  everything  depended  on  Wellington  helping 
Bliicher.  Until  half-past  six  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
i6th  June,  1815,  Wellington  was  opposed  by  a  French 
army,  under  Ney,  more  numerous  than  his  own ;  after 
half-past  six  he  received  succour  and  was  stronger 
than  the  French  army.  Bliicher  expected  him  then 
to  repulse  Ney  and  to  march  on  Bliicher's  right  wing, 
strengthen  the  Prussian  army,  and  help  her  defeat 
Napoleon  at  Ligny.  Wellington  repulsed  Ney  after 
half-past  six,  but  he  did  not  go  to  the  help  of  Bliicher. 
It  is  unknown  why  Wellington  did  not  help  Bliicher. 
Bliicher's  army  held  its  own  against  Napoleon  at  Ligny, 
but  in  the  evening  Bliicher's  centre  was  broken  in, 
whereupon  his  two  wings  also  yielded,  although  Napo- 
leon's army  was  considerably  smaller  than  Bliicher's. 
Bliicher  took  to  flight  and  marched  on  Wavre,  Napo- 
leon sent  after  him  Grouchy  with  30,000;  Grouchy 
mistook  the  direction  of  Bliicher's  flight  and  went  on 
the  old  Roman  road  far  too  far  eastward.  The  selec- 
tion of  Grouchy  in  that  important  manoeuvre  was  a 
great  mistake  of  Napoleon's,  for,  as  Thi6bault  has 
shown  us  in  his  memoirs.  Grouchy  had  always  been 
an  unreliable  character  and  a  poor  general.  On  the 
other  hand.  Napoleon  himself  acted  against  all  the 
principles  of  the  "  art "  he  had  preached  all  his  life, 
for  instead  of  marching  on  Wellington  with  the  greatest 
rapidity  and  annihilating  him  near  Quatre-Bras,  where 
Napoleon  arrived  with  far  greater  numbers  than  Wel- 
lington disposed  of.  Napoleon,  on  June  17th,  moved 
with  inconceivable  slowness  and  so  gave  Wellington 
a  chance  of  escaping.     Wellington  retreated  and  con- 


NAPOLEON.  — IV  127 

ccntrated  in  front  of  Waterloo ;  Napoleon,  in  the  even- 
ing of  the  17th  June,  encamped  opposite  Wellington 
at  Belle  Alliance.  On  the  i8th  June,  the  tactical  and 
strategical  position  was  an  absolute  repetition  of  that 
of  the  1 6th  June :  Blucher  was  at  Wavre  opposed 
by  Grouchy ;  Wellington  was  at  Waterloo  opposed  by 
Napoleon  ;  everything  depended  on  whether  Blucher 
would  join  Wellington  or  Grouchy  would  join  Napo- 
leon. Already  at  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning,  before 
the  battle  of  Waterloo  began,  there  were  9000  men 
under  the  Prussian  general,  Biilow,  near  the  Anglo- 
German  army,  at  Chapelle  St.  Lombard;  and  in  the 
course  of  the  afternoon  Bliicher's  army  arrived  by  in- 
stalments, so  that  at  seven  o'clock  Napoleon,  who  had 
meanwhile  succeeded  in  breaking  in  the  Anglo-German 
centre  at  La  Haie  Sainte,  found  himself  attacked  by 
the  Prussians  in  his  right  wing  and  in  his  rear,  while 
the  Anglo-German  army  was  in  his  front;  Grouchy 
never  moved  from  Wavre.  The  result  was  the  com- 
plete defeat  of  Napoleon  at  the  hands  of  Blucher  and 
Wellington. 

The  rest  was  a  repetition,  in  that  Napoleon  was 
forced  to  abdicate  the  second  and  last  time ;  he  volun- 
tarily surrendered  to  the  captain  of  the  English  ship 
"Bellerophon,"  and  was  then,  at  the  advice  of  all  the 
Powers,  sent  to  St.  Helena,  where,  after  five  years' 
captivity,  he  died  on  the  5th  May,  1821.  Each  of  the 
great  Powers  had  a  separate  agent  at  St.  Helena  to 
convince  himself  of  the  presence  of  Napoleon  in  the 
lonely  island,  and  over  4000  soldiers  were  watching 
the  great  conqueror.  Escape  was  impossible.  That 
was  the  end  of  Napoleon   L 


VIII 


THE    REACTION 


THE  fall  of  Napoleon,  which  the  Russian,  Prussian, 
and  Austrian  monarchs  had  chiefly  brought  about, 
gave  those  rulers  free  scope  to  carry  out  the  real  ideas 
and  plans  that  had  filled  them  ever  since  the  outbreak 
of  the  French  Revolution.  As  already  remarked,  their 
opposition  to  Napoleon  had  been  caused  chiefly  by 
their  desire  to  utilize  the  Napoleonic  wars  as  a  means 
of  depriving  the  nations  of  the  Continent  of  all  their 
political  liberty.  To  that  purpose  they  assembled  at 
Vienna  (autumn,  1814),  determined  to  rearrange  de- 
finitively the  map  of  Europe  and  the  institutions  of 
the  nations  on  the  lines  of  the  most  uncompromising 
absolutism,  thereby  to  undo  forever  the  work  of  the 
greatest  revolution  of  modern  times.  They  very  well 
knew  that  France,  now  again  a  monarchy,  could  not, 
and  that  England  would  not,  lend  herself  to  a  simi- 
lar wholesale  slaughter  and  destruction  of  all  the 
great  ideas  of  liberty  and  constitutional  law,  which  the 
thinkers  and  heroes  of  the  eighteenth  century  had 
spread  and  confirmed  in  the  minds  of  the  people. 
The  scheme  of  Metternich  and  Alexander  was  from 
the  very  outset  to  shelve  France,  or,  at  any  rate,  to 
paralyze  her  diplomatic  influence  at  the  Congress  of 
Vienna.  Prussia,  too,  was  bent  not  only  on  restoring 
her  ancient  territory,  on  continuing  her  old  established 

128 


THE  REACTION  1 29 

autocracy,  but  also  on  having  her  full  revenge  on  the 
French  and  on  the  Saxons,  the  most  faithful  of  the 
allies  of  Napoleon.  The  representatives  of  Prussia  at 
Vienna  were  Hardenberg  and  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt. 
The  latter,  in  his  writings  and  private  correspondence, 
was  a  most  delicately  attuned  instrument  for  sweet 
words  and  noble  thoughts.  In  his  diplomatic  activity, 
however,  he  agreeably  surprised  the  potentates  with  a 
character  so  ruthlessly  materialistic,  so  brutally  high- 
handed, that  he  naturally  formed  the  centre  of  that 
Prussian  group  which  was  determined  to  browbeat 
France  at  the  Congress,  and  to  annihilate  Saxony. 
Humboldt,  who  in  his  "  Letters  to  a  Female  Friend " 
{Briefe  an  eine  Freundht)  had  shown  remarkable  ca- 
pacity for  the  tenderest  expressions  of  those  ideals 
of  which  Schiller,  the  great  German  poet,  had  re- 
peatedly given  such  sonorous  expression ;  Humboldt, 
with  genuine  Prussian  brutality,  told  Talleyrand,  the 
representative  of  France:  "Might  is  Right,  we  do 
not  recognize  the  law  of  nations  to  which  you  have 
appealed." 

However,  Talleyrand,  who  had  behind  him  a  most 
varied  experience  in  all  the  intricacies  of  European 
diplomacy,  was  more  than  a  match  for  either  Hum- 
boldt, Alexander  of  Russia,  or  Metternich.  With  great 
dignity  and  still  greater  cleverness  he  obtained,  by 
playing  off  the  counter  interests  of  the  Powers  one 
against  the  other,  a  decision  of  the  Congress  that  the 
smaller  Powers,  both  in  and  out  of  Germany,  should  vote 
in  the  Congress  as  much  as  the  great  Powers.  The 
interests  indeed  of  the  great  Powers  were  clashing  at 
more  than   one   point.     Now   that   Napoleon   was   re- 


130  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

moved  forever  from  the  scenes  of  his  unparalleled 
achievements,  the  Powers  had  no  more  common  cause 
to  unite  them  in  a  sincerely  common  plan.  For  Prus- 
sia wanted  the  whole  of  Saxony,  pleading  that  Saxony 
had  been  treacherous  to  Germany  and  merited  an- 
nihilation. This,  on  the  other  hand,  Austria  could 
not  possibly  admit.  For  such  an  immense  aggrandize- 
ment of  Prussia  would  make  her  unduly  powerful,  and 
so  render  the  inevitable  conflict  with  Austria  for  su- 
premacy in  Germany  more  imminent,  and  more  dan- 
gerous. Alexander  wanted  to  keep  not  only  his  old 
share  of  Poland  but  secure  a  larger  portion  of  it.  This 
was,  again,  against  the  interests  both  of  Prussia  and 
Austria.  On  the  other  hand,  the  smaller  Powers  of 
Germany,  such  as  Bavaria,  Wiirtemberg,  Baden,  Hesse, 
were  siding  with  Saxony  against  Prussia,  apprehend- 
ing, as  they  did,  that  the  threatened  fate  of  Saxony 
might  strike  them  too. 

Austria  again,  or  rather  Metternich,  desired  to  have 
all  the  strings  both  of  international  and  of  German 
politics  in  his  hands,  to  dominate  the  Congress,  and  to 
play  the  diplomatic  Napoleon  to  the  rest  of  the  Powers. 
He  was  what  the  French  very  well  call  (and  what  is, 
alas  !  a  too  frequent  feature  of  Austrian  statesmen)  a 
finassieVy  a,  man  who  thought  that  he  could  easily  out- 
wit anybody,  and  in  order  to  give  himself  the  pleasure 
of  doing  so,  Metternich  often  created  artificial  posi- 
tions which  only  defeated  his  own  ends.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  Talleyrand  was  the  master  of  the  Congress ; 
he  prevailed  in  the  end  on  the  assembled  representa- 
tives to  assert  publicly  the  principle  of  legitimacy ;  a 
principle  that  he  rightly  thought  would  do  more  for 


THE  REACTION  13I 

the  ultimate  pacification  of  the  princes  at  any  rate 
than  could  any  other  diplomatic  device.  The  principle 
was  simple.  Only  those  princes  were  to  retain  or  to 
obtain  territory  whose  claims  were  based  on  legitimate 
lines  of  inheritance  or  monarchic  traditions.  The  rep- 
resentatives of  England  clearly  felt  that  although 
England  had  combated  France  for  the  twenty-three 
preceding  years,  it  was  now  in  her  interest  to  go  with 
France;  and  by  detaching  England  from  the  great 
Powers,  Talleyrand  easily  became  the  acknowledged 
if  not  the  desired  umpire  of  the  Congress.  Metternich 
amused  his  guests  with  an  unending  series  of  festivals, 
balls,  concerts,  so  that  the  Congress  was  called  the 
dancing  Congress.  It  was  one  of  his  most  cherished 
self-flatteries  that  the  surest  way  of  duping  others  was 
to  bewilder  them  with  pleasures,  the  intoxication  of 
which,  Metternich  believed,  could  do  harm  only  to 
others,  but  not  to  the  august  serenity  of  his  own  su- 
perior mind.  The  amusements  at  Vienna  were  certainly 
most  charming.  However,  the  victory  lay  with  Talley- 
rand. 

The  result  of  the  Congress  was  as  follows  :  —  In 
Germany,  Saxony  alone  was  deprived  of  over  one- 
half  of  its  territory  in  favour  of  Prussia.  The  other 
smaller  Powers,  especially  Bavaria,  that  had  played 
a  double  game  with  remarkable  cleverness  during 
Napoleon's  triumphs  and  after  his  downfall,  were  left 
more  or  less  in  possession  of  the  territories  which 
Napoleon  had  given  them  in  1805  and  1806.  The 
whole  of  the  "German  Confederation"  was  given  a 
Diet,  and  so,  if  in  a  feeble  form,  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire  was  partially  revived.     That   Diet,   however, 


132  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

was  a  mere  farce,  and  all  the  real  power  in  the 
German  Confederation  lay  between  Prussia  and  Aus- 
tria, or,  considering  the  feebleness  of  the  Prussian 
ministers,  in  the  hands  of  Metternich.  Italy  became 
largely  Austrian;  the  Polish  question  was  solved  in 
favour  of  Alexander,  although  Cracow  was  estab- 
Hshed  as  a  republic  and  given  neither  to  Russia  nor 
to  Austria. 

The  worst  feature  of  the  Congress,  however,  was  the 
unwritten  part  of  its  legislation.  As  in  so  many  other 
measures  of  high-strung  politics,  the  unwritten,  the 
latent,  the  implied  portions  were  the  most  important. 
The  Congress  introduced  that  terrible  system  of  reac- 
tion, of  obscurantism,  of  police  persecution,  that  made 
the  period  from  1815  to  1848  one  filled  with  the  most 
shameful  outrages  against  the  liberty  of  the  people. 
The  nations  of  Europe  felt  that  they  had  been  most 
egregiously  duped  by  the  monarchs.  They  had  been 
given  to  understand  in  18 13,  18 14,  and  18 15  that  they 
were  destroying  the  great  oppressor  of  European 
liberties.  Napoleon.  They  now  speedily  learnt  that 
the  so-called  oppression  of  Napoleon  continued  after 
his  removal  worse  than  ever,  without  any  of  the  re- 
deeming features  of  the  great  Emperor's  genius.  The 
sUghtest  attempt  on  the  part  of  any  man  in  Germany 
or  Italy  or  Austria  to  discuss  questions  of  politics,  to 
sing  the  Marseillaise,  to  publish  a  political  poem,  to 
establish  the  most  inoffensive  social  club,  to  wear  a 
round  hat,  in  one  word,  to  do  anything  that  the  stupid 
and  reactionary  instruments  of  monarchical  police  might 
possibly  take  offence  at,  was  visited  with  prison,  with 
enormous  fines,  with  the  most  degrading  searching  of 


i 


THE  REACTION  1 33 

houses,  in  short,  with  every  possible  mode  of  tantalizing 
citizens  short  of  executing  them.  Metternich  in  his 
boundless  vanity  —  which,  alas,  the  successes  of  so 
many  years  did  apparently  fully  justify — actually 
thought  that  he  could  hoodwink  all  the  liberal  aspira- 
tions of  the  nations,  and  dupe  or  browbeat  all  their 
attempts  at  restoring  a  more  popular  government.  Sin- 
gle excesses  on  the  part  of  the  people  were  cleverly 
utilized  by  him  to  obtain  more  and  more  general  ap- 
proval of  his  system.  When,  in  18 19,  one  Charles 
Sand,  a  student,  assassinated  the  famous  Kotzebue,  the 
writer  of  irresistibly  comic  comedies,  but  at  the  same 
time  a  miserable  spy  of  the  Russian  government,  Met- 
ternich knew  how  to  avail  himself  of  that  misdeed  to 
work  upon  the  imagination  of  all  the  great  and  minor 
sovereigns,  and  more  and  more  stringent  police  measures 
became  the  order  of  the  day.  The  prisons  of  Austria, 
especially  the  Spielberg,  near  Briinn,  in  Moravia,  and 
the  Kuf  stein  in  Tyrol,  were  rapidly  filling  with  prisoners 
doomed  to  years  of  captivity,  some  of  them,  like  Kossuth 
or  the  Italian  Silvio  Pellico,  men  of  the  highest  order  of 
intellect  and  of  the  noblest  patriotism. 

In  fact,  the  political  intellect  of  the  Germans,  the 
Austrians,  and  the  Italians  was  locked  up  in  prisons ; 
the  sun  of  liberty,  as  the  German  poet  has  well  said, 
was  screened  off  by  hanging  the  hoods  of  monks  and 
priests  over  it;  and  Metternich  and  his  police  were 
reigning  supreme  over  a  sullen  and  desperate  people  of 
over  50,000,000  souls. 

The  political  history  of  those  countries,  then,  is  re- 
duced to  the  story  of  a  few  measures  made  by  the 
monarchs  and   their  ministers,  the   people   having  no 


134  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

voice  in  these  deliberations.  The  measures  alluded  to 
were  chiefly  splendid  congresses  which  were  held  in 
succession  at  Aix-la-Chapelle(i8i8),  at  Karlsbad  (i 819), 
at  Troppau  in  Austrian  Silesia  (1820),  at  Laibach  (1821), 
and  at  Verona  (in  1822). 

One  of  the  most  brilliant  of  French  conversationalists, 
Chamfort,  once  remarked  that  real  history  is  only  to  be 
found  with  free  nations,  and  that  the  history  of  absolu- 
tistic  governments  consists  of  mere  anecdotes.  The 
remark  of  the  famous  French  wit  is  largely  true,  and 
applies  with  great  force  to  the  period  now  under  con- 
templation. 

The  congresses  in  question  were  proceeding  on  vari- 
ous lines  and  cross  Unes,  and  a  full  statement  of  each  of 
the  ambitions  and  aspirations  of  the  diplomatic  repre- 
sentatives and  of  the  monarchs  would  indeed  present  a 
most  amazing  and  confusing  picture  of  apparently  very 
important  but  confused  events.  However,  as  is  gen- 
erally the  case  in  absolutistic  countries,  the  apparent 
complication  easily  yields  to  the  knife  of  honest  state- 
ment. The  various  lines,  aims,  and  objects  at  the  above 
congresses  were  practically  reduced  to  three  main 
policies.  Alexander  of  Russia,  with  otherwise  laudable 
persistency,  tried  either  to  engage  or  to  dupe  the  rest  of 
Europe  so  as  to  have  a  free  hand  in  his  oriental  policy. 
Like  all  other  Russian  rulers,  his  heart  was  set  on  Con- 
stantinople. It  is  more  than  doubtful  whether  the  pos- 
session of  Constantinople  will  in  future  prove  more 
effective,  more  really  commanding,  than  it  has  so  far 
either  in  the  hands  of  the  Byzantine  emperors  or  of  the 
Turks.  There  may  be  very  much  exaggeration  in  the 
value  attached  to  Constantinople.     Yet  as  a  matter  of 


THE  REACTION  135 

practical  politics  it  is  certain  that  the  Czars  have  always 
desired  that  town  as  the  third  of  their  capitals,  which  in 
addition  to  holy  Moscow  and  to  commercial  and  modern 
St.  Petersburg,  would  add  the  imperial  capital  of  so 
many  Greek  emperors  and  Turkish  sultans.  Alexan- 
der hoped  to  persuade  Europe  in  1818  to  launch  on  an 
immense  enterprise  in  America.  Since  18 10,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  colonists  in  Latin  America  were  in  open,  if 
not  always  successful,  revolt  from  Spain.  Alexander 
now  convened  the  congress  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  in  1818, 
with  a  view  to  persuading  the  Powers  to  send  combined 
and  huge  European  armies  to  the  help  of  the  Spanish 
king  and  for  the  suppression  of  the  revolutions  in  Latin 
America.  Alexander  had  long  secured  the  imperial 
friendship  of  France  by  helping  France  to  get  rid  of 
the  army  of  occupation  which  the  allies  had  left  there 
in  181 5.  He  therefore  hoped  that  France  would  not  se- 
riously counteract  his  schemes.  However,  Metternich, 
who,  both  from  personal  pride  and  from  reasons  of 
policy,  wanted  to  baffle  the  plan  of  Alexander,  contrived 
to  render  the  whole  scheme  futile  and  academic.  Alex- 
ander thus  left  Aix-la-Chapelle  without  having  realized 
his  cunning  device  of  engaging  Europe  in  America,  and 
the  triumph  of  Metternich  was  complete.  Alexander's 
policy  was  several  times  renewed  by  him  and  by  Capo- 
distrias,  his  chief  minister,  but  with  the  exception  of  the 
Greek  troubles  it  was  generally  thwarted  by  Metternich's 
superior  cunning  and  diplomacy. 

The  second  great  line  of  political  aims  at  the  above 
congresses,  and  one  which  all  the  monarchs  were  readily 
accepting,  was  the  determined  suppression  of  any  at- 
tempt at  establishing  popular  liberty,  whether  in  Spain, 


136  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

in  Italy,  Austria,  or  Germany.  Wherever  the  people, 
long  tired  of  the  obsolete  system  of  reactionary  abso- 
lutists, raised  their  voice  in  favour  of  some  progress  or 
amelioration  of  their  lot,  there  Metternich,  Alexander, 
and  all  their  confederates  at  once  employed  all  the 
rigours  of  police  measures  for  the  coercion  and  suppres- 
sion of  the  "  rebellious  spirit."  In  Italy  those  rebellions 
were  either  local  upheavals,  as  in  Naples,  Milan,  and 
Rome,  or  they  were  carried  on  all  through  the  Peninsula 
in  the  form  of  secret  societies,  such  as  the  famous  Car- 
bonari. All  these  risings  and  rebellions  were  put  down 
with  a  ruthless  hand  by  Metternich  and  the  Austrian 
army,  so  that,  for  instance,  in  Naples  the  people  con- 
tinued to  be  under  the  most  wretched,  most  stupid,  and 
most  unpardonable  of  petty  tyrants,  Ferdinand  IV.  It 
was  the  same  thing  in  Spain,  where  the  people  had 
learnt  with  bitterness  that  they  had  driven  out  the 
greatest  of  modern  rulers  in  order  to  fall  back  under 
the  insupportable  and  cruel  rule  of  the  most  wicked  and 
most  insipid  of  the  Spanish  Bourbon  kings,  Ferdinand 
VII.  The  Spanish  had  fought  Napoleon  and  his  army 
for  six  years,  only  to  find  that  the  Inquisition,  the  su- 
premacy of  the  clergy  in  every  walk  of  life,  the  lack  of 
all  commercial  enterprise,  the  constant  spread  of  poverty, 
in  short,  all  the  obsolete  features  which  Napoleon's 
legislation  had  swept  away,  or  was  certain  to  remove, 
were  now  again  reestablished.  Patriotic  Spain  combated 
Napoleon,  as  we  have  seen,  moved  by  a  wrong  motive. 
The  result  was  that  patriotic  Spain  sealed  the  fate  of  its 
own  decadence  to  the  present  day.  The  very  French 
whom  they  had  combated  for  six  years  were  enabled  in 
1823  to  march  through  the  Peninsula  to  the  Trocadero 


THE  REACTION  1 37 

of  Cadiz,  and  to  put  down  the  liberties  of  the  nation  for 
the  sake  of  that  very  Ferdinand  VII.  for  whom  the 
Spanish  had  bled  by  their  hundreds  of  thousands  a  few 
years  previously. 

In  Austria  and  Germany  the  gagging  of  the  Press, 
the  imprisonment  of  anybody  who  ventured  to  utter 
a  word  for  liberal  institutions,  the  curtailing  of  all  the 
possible  rights  of  the  Diet,  in  one  word,  the  introduc- 
tion of  the  most  absolutistic  r^gime^  was  scarcely  inter- 
rupted by  a  little  rising  here  and  there.  With  each 
successive  congress  more  and  more  severe  measures 
were  proclaimed  by  Alexander  and  his  colleagues  for 
the  radical  extinction  of  liberals.  The  so-called  Holy 
Alliance,  or  mystico-political  treaty,  that  Alexander 
made  with  a  few  Continental  Powers,  in  which  his 
reactionary  views  were  clothed  in  a  religious  garb, 
was  in  reality  partly  superfluous  and  partly  inefficient. 
The  reactionary  spirit  of  the  Holy  Alliance  was  prac- 
tised well  enough  by  Metternich  without  any  religious 
garb,  and  the  people  in  Germany  have  never  been 
able  to  make  a  real  revolution.  The  people  in  Italy 
were  likewise  unable  to  join  in  an  open  revolution,  and 
thus  both  nations  rendered  Metternich's  absolutism 
possible,  and  in  the  opinion  of  very  many,  even  desir- 
able. The  student  of  the  works  of  the  great  philosopher 
Schopenhauer  cannot  but  be  amazed  when  he  reads 
in  the  writings  of  that  undoubtedly  profound  thinker, 
that  the  period  of  reaction  following  after  Waterloo 
was  the  wisest,  the  best,  the  most  praiseworthy  attempt 
on  the  part  of  paternal  government  for  the  benefit  of 
people  who  had  been  enticed  into  imitating  the  "  most 
absurd  "  and  most  criminal  act  of  modern  times :  the 


138  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

French  Revolution.  Schopenhauer  only  expresses  the 
views  of  thousands  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Con- 
tinentals for  whom  politics  is  a  terra  incognita^  and 
who  imagine  that  any  form  of  government  that  secures 
peace,  tranquillity,  and  order  is  infinitely  preferable  to  a 
government  under  which  disorder  at  home,  war  abroad, 
and  blunders  everywhere  are  rife.  This  quietistic  ideal 
of  a  state  has  no  doubt  great  charms  for  invalids,  incur- 
ables, miUionaires,  and  monks.  However,  the  world,  in 
addition  to  these  worthy  people,  consists  of  an  enor- 
mous number  of  men  and  women  desirous  of  change,  of 
advancement,  of  stir,  of  progress.  Nor  can  it  be  doubt- 
ful that  errors  and  blunders,  disorders  and  wars,  are  the 
price  that  one  must  pay  for  the  temporary  blessings 
of  honourable  peace.  The  ideal  of  Metternich,  of 
Alexander,  of  Schopenhauer,  spells  decadence,  stag- 
nation, death.  There  is  no  general  system  of  politics 
fitting  forever  the  needs,  the  wishes,  the  ideals  of 
nations.  The  reaction  under  Metternich  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  has  done  Germany  more  harm  than 
did  the  Thirty  Years'  War  in  the  seventeenth  century, 
though  under  Metternich  only  a  few  hundred  people 
were  executed  and  no  great  battles  at  all  were  fought. 
The  system  of  Metternich  paralyzed  and  has  to  the 
present  day  crippled  the  people  of  Austria.  It  has, 
moreover,  so  impoverished  the  political  vitality  of  the 
Itahans,  and  so  sorely  beggared  their  resourcefulness 
in  the  fights  for  national  ideals,  that  although  they 
are  now  united,  they  are  so,  thanks  not  to  their  own 
forces  or  efforts,  but  owing  to  the  ma<ynanimous  if  ill- 
advised  help  of  the  French.  There  are  few  great  min- 
isters in  the  history  of  Europe  who  have  in  their  lives 


THE  REACTION  1 39 

done  more  harm  to  the  people  than  has  the  fatuous 
leader  of  Austrian  policy  from  1815  to  1848.  For, 
with  the  exception  of  the  Greeks  and  to  a  large  extent 
the  French,  no  nation  in  Europe  then  was  able  to  shake 
off  the  torpor,  the  hypnotic  condition  of  idleness  and 
indifference,  of  dreaminess  and  morbid  sentimentality, 
that  Metternich  and  his  colleagues  were  able  to  infuse 
into  the  peoples  of  Europe.  If  the  historian  had  the 
powers  of  the  ancient  witch-finders  and  inquisitorial 
judges,  he  would  not  hesitate  to  say  that  Metternich 
bewitched  Europe.  He  was  a  demon  of  twilight  as  Na- 
poleon was  a  hero  of  light.  Even  the  blunders  of  Na- 
poleon were  blunders  of  a  genius,  in  whom  was  embodied 
and  by  whom  were  represented  many  of  the  real  historic 
tendencies  of  Europe.  While  triumphant.  Napoleon 
did  incalculable  good  through  his  institutions  to  the  na- 
tions he  conquered  ;  by  his  defeat  he  gave  them  an  un- 
precedented chance  of  recovering  liberties  that  they  had 
long  been  weaned  from.  However,  so  inferior  were  all 
the  nations  to  that  one  unparalleled  man  that  after  his 
downfall  they  were  unable  to  utilize  their  opportunities, 
and  sank  into  the  state  of  Helots  under  a  man  immeasur- 
ably inferior  to  the  imperial  Corsican. 

In  spite  of  Metternich's  antagonism  to  any  attempt 
at  liberation,  more  particularly  on  the  part  of  the  Hel- 
lenes, these  descendants  of  the  noblest  and  greatest 
people  of  all  history  had  already  in  the  second  decade 
of  the  nineteenth  century  concluded  to  rise  against  the 
Turks,  their  rulers.  As  is  well  known,  the  Greek 
descent  of  the  modern  Hellenes  has  been  questioned 
in  elaborate  and  very  learned  works,  such  as  that  of 
Fallmerayer,  and  much  ingenuity   has  been  spent  in 


140  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

proving  or  disproving  the  pure  or  mixed  origin  of  the 
modern  Greeks.  We  venture  to  say  that  the  pure  or 
mixed  condition  of  Greek  blood  is  a  supremely  indiffer- 
ent matter  to  the  student  of  modern  Greek  history.  No 
nation  has  pure  blood,  no  nation  has  one  racial  element 
alone,  and  what  constitutes  a  nation  is  not  the  blood 
but  the  mental  attitude  of  every  one  of  its  members 
towards  the  fundamental  questions  of  the  country.  If 
the  Greeks  actually  believed,  as  beHeve  they  did,  that 
they  were  the  descendants  of  the  victors  of  Marathon 
and  Salamis,  then  for  all  historic  and  practical  purposes 
they  may  be  considered  to  be  Hellenes;  just  as  any 
man  is  an  Englishman  who  in  his  heart  of  hearts  really 
means  to  live  in  and  for  England,  and  eventually  to  die 
for  her.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  equally  doubtful 
whether  the  Turks  really  so  misgoverned  the  Greeks 
as  to  drive  the  latter  into  despair.  The  Turks  are  a 
noble  race ;  they  are  indeed  what  Bismarck  long  since 
called  them,  "the  only  gentlemen  of  the  Orient."  In 
any  case  where  the  Turks  are  under  the  shadow  of  an 
accusation  of  cruelty  or  tyranny,  the  serious  student 
would  do  well  to  suspend  his  judgment  until  more  accu- 
rate sifting  of  the  facts. 

However  that  may  be,  the  Hellenes  had  made  up 
their  minds  to  liberate  themselves,  both  on  the  Con- 
tinent of  Greece  and  in  the  Greek  islands,  and  with  the 
most  reckless  disregard  for  Hfe  they  fought  the  trained 
and  terrible  armies  of  Mahmud  II.,  the  Turkish  Sultan, 
with  the  courage  of  despair  and  the  success  of  men 
actuated  by  the  highest  ideals.  True,  with  their  revolt 
from  the  Turks  they  started  also  civil  troubles  amongst 
themselves,  and  many  an  act  of  infamous  treachery  and 


THE  REACTION  I4I 

most  revolting  cruelty  was  perpetrated  by  Greek  on 
Greek.  Their  success  in  the  Greek  seas  was  so  great 
that  the  Sultan  finally  was  forced  to  ask  for  help  from 
Mehmed  Ali,  his  governor  of  Egypt,  who  sent  his  son 
Ibrahim  with  a  considerable  fleet  to  Greece.  So  far 
the  Powers  had  been  paralyzed  by  mutual  fears  and 
jealousies.  England  had  not  extended  a  friendly  hand 
to  the  Greeks,  fearing  that  the  ultimate  profit  from  the 
Greek  revolution  would  accrue  to  Russia.  In  France 
there  was  then,  in  1824,  a  most  reactionary  king, 
Charles  X. ;  and  Metternich,  chiefly  from  jealousy  of 
Russia,  was  so  opposed  to  the  whole  Greek  adventure 
that  he  naturally  did  everything  in  his  power  to  thwart 
the  influence  of  the  European  concert  upon  the  issue 
of  the  Greek  revolution.  Finally,  however,  the  Powers 
united  and  agreed  to  send  a  fleet  to  the  help  of  the 
Greeks.  This  was  done  chiefly  because  latterly  the 
Turks  had,  in  retaliation  of  Greek  excesses,  committed 
acts  of  the  most  harrowing  cruelty  and  destruction, 
such  as  the  wholesale  massacre  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  island  of  Chios  in  1822.  The  outcry  in  Europe  was 
universal ;  the  Philhellenes,  the  most  famous  of  whom 
was  Lord  Byron,  collected  money,  armies,  volunteers,  to 
help  the  cause  of  the  descendants  of  those  great  Greeks 
whose  works  were  then  studied  more  than  ever,  and 
whose  art  had  finally  begun  to  be  appreciated  as  the 
highest  manifestation  of  the  human  mind.  In  1827  at 
last  the  fleets  of  Russia,  England,  and  France  went  into 
Greek  waters,  met  the  Turkish  fleet  in  the  harbor  of 
Navarino,  and  completely  destroyed  it.  The  Czar  Nich- 
olas sent  an  army  into  the  Balkan,  contrived,  although 
with  great  difficulty,  to  advance  on  the  Turkish  capital. 


142  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

and  so  finally,  in  the  treaty  of  Adrianople  (1829),  the 
Sultan  acknowledged  the  independence  of  the  Greeks. 
The  great  reaction  sweeping  over  Europe  after  the 
fall  of  Napoleon  sterilized  political  life  to  such  an  ex- 
tent, that,  with  the  exception  of  the  revolutionary  events 
mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter,  nothing  of  real 
political  importance  occurred  in  Europe.  The  most 
remarkable  feature  of  that  reaction  was,  however,  the 
intellectual  movement  of  Europe,  which,  too,  was  a 
reaction  strikingly,  and  profoundly  different  from  all 
the  former  movements  in  literature,  art,  and  poetry. 
For  such  is  the  Hellenic  nature  of  Europe  that  all  great 
political  events  have  at  all  times  had  their  intellectual 
and  artistic  counterparts.  In  oriental  countries  kings 
and  dynasties  come  and  go ;  battles  and  campaigns  are 
won  and  lost ;  material  changes  of  all  kinds  are  made ; 
but  the  social  and  intellectual  life  of  the  people  scarcely 
undergoes  any  alteration.  Not  so  in  Europe.  From 
all  the  political  reforms  and  revolutions  that  have  hap- 
pened in  Europe  since  the  times  of  the  Crusades,  a  real 
historian  might  easily  deduce  or  infer  the  drift  of  litera- 
ture, art,  philosophy,  and  even  science.  It  is  thus  quite 
clear  that  the  immense  change  of  politics  all  over  Eu- 
rope, the  cessation  of  all  wars  and  of  all  the  gigantic 
struggles  on  sea  and  on  land  that  had  engaged  the  forces 
and  enthusiasm  of  Europe  from  1789  to  181 5,  necessa- 
rily brought  about  a  change  in  the  mental  and  emotional 
life  of  Europeans.  This  great  change  or  Reaction  in 
Literature  and  Art,  or  as  it  is  more  commonly  called, 
this  romanticism,  was  weighing  upon  the  minds  of  all 
Europeans  until  the  outbreak  of  the  great  revolutions 
of  1 848-1 849. 


THE  REACTION  1 43 

In  the  preceding  period  the  literary  life  of  the  Ger- 
mans, the  Austrians,  the  English,  the  French,  and  of 
most  of  the  other  nations  of  Europe  had  been  proceed- 
ing on  lines  of  classicism.  It  is  difficult  to  put  into  a 
few  words  the  nature  of  classical  poetry  or  literature. 
Yet  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  classical  literature  aims  at 
complete  harmony  between  Form  and  Matter ;  at  any 
rate  the  great  models  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans  excel 
in  that  very  harmony,  and  it  appears  in  the  classical 
works  of  the  Germans,  such  as  the  Laakoon  of  Lessing, 
and  his  dramas,  Emilia  Galotti^  Nathan  the  Wise, 
Minna  von  Barnhelm.  In  the  immortal  works  of  Schil- 
ler and  Goethe  we  are  struck  with  the  beauty  of  form 
corresponding  to  the  soundness  of  the  matter.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  we  consider  the  works  and  the  writers 
who  dominated  European  literature  and  art  after  the 
fall  of  Napoleon,  we  are  chiefly  struck  with  the  re- 
markable phenomenon  of  great  beauty  of  form  joined 
to  morbidness  and  unsoundness  of  matter.  All  roman- 
tic writers,  whether  of  England,  France,  Germany,  or 
Italy,  excel  in  beauty  of  form.  Their  style,  whether  in 
prose  or  in  poetry,  is  a  distinct  advance  upon  the  style 
of  the  classical  writers.  Nothing  could  be  more  perfect 
than  the  prose  style  of  Heine,  the  great  German  poet ; 
and  the  prose  style  of  some  of  the  great  French  roman- 
tics, such  as  Chateaubriand,  Lamartine,  Prosper  Meri- 
mee,  and  others  is  chiselled  and  sculptured  to  an  extent 
far  superior  to  anything  that  had  preceded  them.  It 
is  even  so  in  poetry.  The  power  of  the  romantics, 
whether  in  versification  or  in  blank  verse  and  rhyme, 
reveals  a  richness  of  Hnguistic  resource  such  as  we  sel- 
dom meet  with  in  the  works  of  the  classical  writers. 


144  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

Lord  Byron  in  England  surprised,  it  may  now  be  said, 
the  greatest  students  of  the  English  language  with  the 
incredible  resourcefulness  of  his  versification.  In  Heine 
the  German  language  was  adorned  with  a  grace  and 
light  elegance  such  as  the  most  sanguine  admirer  of  that 
language  could  have  scarcely  hoped  for.  In  Lamartine's 
Elegies  and  Meditations  the  French  language  revealed 
a  mellowness  and  cadence  such  as  the  poets  of  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  had  never  reached. 
But  if  we  look  at  the  matter  used  by  these  romantic 
poets,  we  have  to  draw  an  entirely  different  picture. 
For  it  may  be  said  that  all  of  them,  nearly  at  all  times 
and  in  all  their  works,  selected  morbid  subjects,  or  at 
any  rate  such  as  appear  to  us  now  strange  and  unwhole- 
some. Goethe  used  to  say  that  everything  classical  is 
sound,  and  everything  romantic  is  ill  and  diseased. 
The  Jupiter  of  German  literature,  in  this  as  in  so  many 
other  of  his  sayings,  strikes  at  the  very  essence  of  the 
whole  question.  In  the  poets  of  the  romantic  period 
we  find,  before  everything  else,  strange  and  unwhole- 
some ideas  of  the  position  and  power  of  Woman.  The 
familiar  figures  of  the  poetry  of  Lord  Byron,  of  Lamar- 
tine,  Heine,  and  Leopardi,  the  great  Italian  poet,  are 
creatures  of  a  morbid  fancy.  They  do  not  appeal  to 
man's  vigorous  senses  and  normal  mind ;  they  are  not 
meant  to  be  worthy  mothers  or  heroic  spouses.  They 
float  in  obscure  midair,  surrounded  by  a  halo  of  moon- 
lit romantic  nights.  They  partake  more  of  the  nature 
of  fairies  and  demons  than  of  human  beings.  They 
derange  the  mind  and  the  heart  of  man  instead  of  filling 
it  with  the  holy  enthusiasm  of  love.  Not  one  of  those 
familiar  figures  created  by  the  romantic  poets  has  had 


I 


THE  REACTION  I45 

a  firm  hold  on  the  imagination  of  mankind.  The  classi- 
cal writers  created  their  Emilias,  Margarets,  Ophelias, 
and  Juliets ;  the  romantic  writers  created  only  shadows. 
A  curious  sidelight  is  thrown  on  the  nature  of  these 
female  figures  from  the  private  life  of  these  romantic 
poets.  While  in  their  poems  they  celebrated  in  tones 
of  admiration  the  charms  of  women  utterly  unknown  to 
reality,  they  selected  as  their  loves  in  real  life  women  of 
the  most  material,  most  sensual  nature.  Heine,  whose 
familiar  figures  in  his  poems  are  ethereal,  airy,  demoniac, 
transmundane,  in  reality  attached  himself  in  profound 
and  uncompromising  passion  to  the  most  material,  most 
earthly  creature  that  ever  captivated  the  fancy  of  a 
lover.  So  too  Lamartine,  so  too  Leopardi,  and  so  too 
Lord  Byron.  This  circumstance  alone  shows  that  the 
female  figures  of  these  romantic  poets  were  all  unreal ; 
that  into  the  poems  in  which  they  celebrated  them,  the 
poets  put  not  their  real  heart,  but  the  affectation  of 
heart  and  love.  It  is  thus  certain  that  in  all  these  love- 
poems  of  the  romantic  poets  there  is  a  false  ring,  there 
is  a  permanent  affectation  of  sentiment  in  which  the 
poets  themselves  do  not  believe. 

If  we  now  turn  to  music,  we  find  the  identical  phe- 
nomenon. After  a  long  period  of  strictly  classical 
music  we  find  after  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  a  period 
of  romantic  music  radically  different  from  anything 
that  had  preceded  it.  It  is  possible  to  express  that 
great  change  in  technical  terms  of  music.  Classical 
music  moves  in  the  diatonic  scale ;  romantic  music 
leaves  the  diatonic  scale  as  much  as  possible  and  moves 
almost  entirely  in  the  chromatic  scale.  Romantic  music 
created,  as  may  be  seen,  an  entirely  new  world.     Though 

L 


146  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

romantic  music,  as  well  as  romantic  literature,  is  largely 
unwholesome,  self-conscious,  and  lacks  abandon,  yet,  on 
the  whole,  of  all  the  romantic  intellectual  movements, 
the  romantic  music  is  by  far  the  most  successful.  The 
two  great  exponents  of  romantic  music  at  this  time  were 
Robert  Schumann  and  Frederick  Chopin.  It  cannot  be 
denied  that  both  of  them  sounded  chords  and  made 
vibrate  strings  of  the  human  lyre  such  as  had  never 
been  brought  into  sound  by  even  the  greatest  composers 
before  them.  Schumann  descends  into  depths  for  which 
we  look  in  vain  in  the  works  of  Bach  or  Beetohven. 
The  profound  passion,  the  mysteriousness  of  his  Etudes 
Symphoniques^  his  G  Minor  Sonata  for  the  Piano,  the 
exultant  joy  of  his  B  Flat  Major  Symphony,  stand  un- 
equalled to  the  present  day.  Although  Schumann's 
compositions  are  a  musical  continuation  of  the  literary 
works  of  E.  T.  A.  Hoffmann,  they  are  yet  a  world  by 
themselves,  and  have  been  equalled  by  nothing  since 
the  death  of  their  incomparable  composer. 

Chopin  is  probably  the  most  original  artist  that 
ever  lived.  Much  to  the  detriment  of  his  fame  he 
has  published,  with  few  exceptions,  only  works  of  a 
small  compass.  Moreover,  he  called  them  mazurkas, 
waltzes,  and  polonaises,  and  thus  gave  his  innumerable 
enemies  an  easy  means  of  falling  foul  of  such  "  dance 
music."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Chopin's  music  is  of  the 
most  legitimate  character.  The  author  of  the  present 
work  can  testify  from  experience  that  on  all  his 
travels,  from  California  to  Roumania,  and  from  North 
Germany  to  the  Southern  states  of  America,  he  has 
heard  no  music  played  more  often,  admired  more 
heartily,   and   appealing  to  the   emotions  of  men   and 


THE  REACTION  1 47 

women  more  strongly  than  that  of  the  unfortunate 
Pole.  If  one  considers  the  extreme  simplicity  of  the 
means  employed  by  Chopin  for  the  expression  of  some 
of  our  most  complicated  and  deepest  emotions ;  if,  for  in- 
stance, one  studies  his  B  Minor  Mazurka  or  his  Valses, 
chiefly  with  regard  to  the  number  of  tones  and  rhythms 
and  voices  he  employs,  one  cannot  but  stand  amazed  at 
the  immense  power  that  he  is  able  to  instil  into  tone- 
figures  of  the  simplest  kind  and  into  tone  structures 
of  an  almost  primitive  description.  Whether  he  is 
joyous  or  deeply  melancholy;  whether  striving  under 
the  dark  waves  of  fierce  passions  or  soaring  into  the 
ether  of  heroic  resignation,  his  beauty  of  form  and 
perfect  expressiveness  of  tone  are  unequalled.  Al- 
though as  self-conscious  as  Mozart  was  na'fve,  he  yet 
stands  nearer  to  Mozart  than  any  one  else.  Of  his 
greater  works  his  E  Minor  Concerto  is  by  far  the 
most  precious,  the  most  perfect,  of  all  piano  concertos. 
Chopin  was  able  to  express  in  music  dreams  and  fancies 
that  neither  poetry  nor  art  can  ever  reach.  In  him  we 
hear  all  the  soul's  ill,  all  the  griefs  of  down-trodden 
Poland,  all  the  nervousness  of  a  heart  wrung  by  an 
unhappy  passion,  all  the  deep  discontent  of  an  artistic 
temper  with  a  world  hurting  it  at  all  points,  a  world 
discordant  and  prosaic.  Chopin,  who  died  in  his  for- 
tieth year,  had  long  before  fallen  in  love  with  Madame 
Georges  Sand,  whose  "  xth  affair "  he  was.  Of  this 
woman,  of  whom  the  less  said  the  better,  he  was  fond, 
passionately  fond,  and  it  was  no  doubt  that  unfortunate 
love,  which  Madame  Sand  had  neither  the  means  nor 
the  will  to  reciprocate  as  it  deserved,  that  broke  Chopin's 
heart  and  health.     As  in  the  case  jof  Heine,  one  stands 


148  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

amazed  at  the  fact  that  Chopin,  whose  mind  was  con- 
stantly brooding  over  ideals  high  and  far  off  from  any 
commonplace  human  beings,  could  have  felt  a  passion 
so  deep  and  so  intense  for  a  woman  so  materialistic,  in 
spite  of  all  the  idealism  in  her  novels,  and  so  sensuous. 
As  in  the  case  of  Heine,  the  life  of  the  composer  was 
utterly  diverse  from  his  life  as  an  individual,  and  that 
complete  severance  between  Chopin  the  author  and 
Chopin  the  man  told  very  strongly  on  Chopin's  work. 

If  we  now  turn  to  another  department  of  European 
intellectual  Hfe,  to  Philosophy,  we  find  the  same  remark- 
able phenomenon  of  romanticism.  The  philosophy 
which,  shortly  after  the  downfall  of  Napoleon,  captivated 
and  fascinated  the  mind  of  the  Continent  was  Hegelian- 
ism.  Hegel,  Professor  of  Philosophy  at  Berlin,  had,  in 
a  series  of  works,  and  still  more  by  his  lectures,  pro- 
pounded what  certainly  is  the  most  startling  system  of 
philosophy  ever  proposed  by  a  single  man  in  modern 
times.  There  have  been  philosophers  like  Berkeley, 
Spinoza,  Kant,  and  others,  who  have  given  to  inquisitive 
humanity  replies  to  some  of  the  great  problems  agitating 
the  human  mind.  Spinoza  readily  gives  answers  to  the 
eternal  questions  about  the  relations  of  God  to  the 
world  ;  about  the  fundamental  principles  of  politics  and 
of  private  ethics ;  but  he  leaves  us  alone  and  helpless 
whenever  we  ask  him  for  solutions  of  the  likewise  eternal 
problems  of  art,  of  history,  and  rehgion.  Other  philos- 
ophers, again,  give  us  hints  as  to  an  adequate  attitude 
towards  the  great  questions  of  religion  and  art,  but 
leave  us  helpless  and  resourceless  with  regard  to  politics, 
to  science,  to  ethics.  Hegel  alone  of  all  modern  thinkers 
has  attempted  to  give  us  solutions  to  nearly  all  the  prob- 


THE  REACTION  1 49 

lems  of  religion,  science,  art,  ethics,  and  metaphysics. 
It  cannot  be  denied  even  by  his  greatest  adversary  that 
over  his  works  are  strewn  in  myriads  of  gems,  small 
and  great,  a  large  number  of  insights,  the  suggestive- 
ness  and  fertility  of  which  are  undoubtedly  very  consid- 
erable. Whether  one  accepts  or  rejects  his  system,  it 
remains  certain  that  in  his  works,  now  long  obsolete  in 
Germany,  but  extensively  taken  up  both  in  England 
and  America,  there  is  a  mine  of  thought  and  ideas  that 
we  do  not  find  in  any  other  thinkers  of  modern  times. 

Apart  from  the  ideas  of  Hegel's  system  it  is  historically 
certain  that  he  stands  on  a  line  with  the  poets  and  com- 
posers mentioned  above,  in  that  he,  too,  is  thoroughly 
romantic.  In  his  system,  too,  form  is  very  much  more 
finished  than  matter,  so  that  his  logic,  as  he  himself 
thought,  is  the  best  portion  of  his  system.  In  Hegel, 
too,  as  in  the  other  romantic  writers,  there  is  that  super- 
abundance of  subjectiveness  which  is  so  characteristic  a 
symptom  of  the  romantic  mind,  in  contrast  to  the  objec- 
tive temper  of  the  classical  mind.  It  would  be  a  great 
historical  error  to  trace  Hegel's  immense  influence  in 
Germany  during  his  lifetime  to  the  fact  that  Minister  Al- 
tenstein  countenanced  and  encouraged  Hegel.  Hegel's 
triumph  was  caused  by  the  perfect  sympathy  that  ex- 
isted between  his  system  and  the  intellectual  temper  of 
the  time. 

An  overstrained  subjectivism  may  be  considered  as 
the  chief  mental  feature  of  the  time.  A  philosophical 
system  such  as  Hegel's  was  the  very  system  most  pleas- 
ing and  in  harmony  with  the  trend  of  the  continental  in- 
tellect. Hegel  attempts  to  build  up  the  whole  universe 
from  the  inside,  from  ideas,  by  means  of  a  dialectic  pro- 


150  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

cess  which,  he  says,  is  productive  of  real  truth,  both  in 
mental  and  natural  philosophy.  Nothing  could  be  more 
certain  of  appealing  to  the  minds  of  men  who  turned 
all  their  attention  to  the  internal  mysteries  of  the  human 
soul,  and  who  were,  in  real  life,  in  scientific  research  or 
in  art,  brooding  over  the  enigmas  of  the  human  heart 
and  of  the  human  fate.  When  we  try  to  find  out  the 
causes  of  this  strange  romanticism,  we  must  confess  that 
the  whole  period  is  still  too  near  to  us  to  admit  of  seeing 
all  its  workings  in  their  due  proportions.  One  cannot, 
on  the  one  hand,  deny  that  romanticism  has  produced 
results  of  an  abiding  and  valuable  character.  It  is  cer- 
tain that  our  reformed  and  better  views  of  the  middle 
ages,  which  by  the  writers  of  the  eighteenth  century  had 
been  condemned  and  ridiculed  wholesale,  are  owing  to 
the  interest  taken  by  the  romanticists  in  everything 
mediaeval.  No  doubt  they  exaggerated  it  in  the  novels 
and  historical  works  written  by  them  on  the  middle  ages, 
and  they  tried  to  throw  an  illegitimate  glamour  and  halo 
over  the  crude,  and,  in  many  ways,  barbarous  times  of 
the  mediaeval  period.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  the  ro- 
manticists opened  up  entirely  new  avenues  of  thought 
about  the  mediaeval  growth  of  modern  idioms.  Men 
like  Jacob  Grimm  revealed  to  the  world  the  immense 
treasures  of  mediaeval  and  early  modern  Germanic  lan- 
guage. Even  the  greatest  feat  of  modern  linguistics, 
the  discovery  of  the  near  affinity  of  the  Indo-German 
stock  of  languages,  was  mostly  due  to  the  enthusiasm 
with  which  the  romanticists  studied  language  in  all  its 
branches.  They  dream  of  entering  a  word  of  a  language 
as  one  enters  a  small  boat  and  let  themselves  glide  down 
the  waves  of  the  past  in  this  small  craft  to  the  origins  of 


THE  REACTION  151 

things  and  thoughts.  That  dream  of  theirs  has  done 
much  evil  both  to  history  and  philosophy.  Words  re- 
veal much,  but  they  are  in  the  position  of  pale  photo- 
graphs, and  not  coloured  and  living  pictures  of  things. 
The  influence  of  the  romanticists  in  history,  too,  was 
very  considerable ;  the  interest  taken  by  them  in  periods 
previous  to  the  French  Revolution  gave  rise  to  the  es- 
tablishment of  historical  schools,  such  as  the  £cole  des 
Chartes  in  Paris,  and  similar  institutions  in  Germany. 
The  pupils  and  teachers  of  these  institutions  have,  since 
1830,  so  indefinitely  increased  our  information  about  the 
middle  ages  and  early  modern  times,  that  the  most 
brilliant  and  learned  works  published  before  the  French 
Revolution  on  these  periods  (such  as  Gibbon's  Decline 
or  Robertson's  Charles  V.)  now  appear  obsolete  and 
past.  Nay,  it  must  be  added  that  even  in  science  proper 
the  mystical  pantheism  of  many  of  the  romanticists  has 
contributed  very  considerably  to  a  deeper  and  more  com- 
prehensive insight  into  the  workshop  of  Nature. 

It  is  difficult  to  decide  whether  the  balance  of 
good  things  over  bad  produced  by  the  romanticists  is  in 
favour  of  abiding  results.  What  seems  probable  is  that 
the  whole  immense  reaction  after  the  downfall  of  Napo- 
leon was  caused  in  the  first  place  by  the  political  circum- 
stances of  the  time.  The  immense  effort  made  both  by 
the  French  and  all  the  other  nations  of  Europe  after  the 
gigantic  struggles  from  1792-18 15,  had  practically  ex- 
hausted their  energy  for  active  manly  life,  and  they  re- 
verted from  active  to  contemplative  life.  The  political 
ideals  so  enthusiastically  taken  up  by  the  greater  part 
of  Europe  towards  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century; 
the  energy  of  idealistic  methods  pervading  the  lower 


152  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

classes  of  Europeans  in  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century  —  all  that  had  given  place  to  a  mental  collapse. 
People  were  disgusted  with  the  few  and  miserable  results 
achieved  by  them.  Very  few  of  the  ideals  fought  for 
had  been  realized ;  hundreds  of  thousands  of  families 
had  been  ruined  ;  and  the  downfall  of  the  greatest  figure 
of  the  time,  and  the  man  who  really  incarnated  the  whole 
revolution,  impressed  every  single  person  in  Europe 
with  suspicion  and  with  despair  with  regard  to  all  the 
high-flown  aims  that  had  been  the  chief  cause  of  the  in- 
credible rise  of  Napoleon.  Both  in  the  literature  of  the 
time  and  from  the  conversations  of  men  whose  fathers 
or  grandfathers  had  lived  during  the  period,  one  can 
easily  gather  the  despondent  melancholy  filling  the 
hearts  of  nearly  all  the  continental  people.  After  the 
immense  and  strenuous  efforts  of  the  revolutionary  gen- 
eration, it  was  but  too  natural  that  a  generation  should 
follow  whose  minds  were  diseased,  morbid,  excessively 
sensitive,  unfit  for  the  realities  of  life. 

Yet  among  the  mental  heroes  of  that  period  we  find 
one  who,  while  he  underwent  much  of  the  influence  of 
the  period,  yet  soared  so  high  above  it  that  his  works 
will  for  all  time  remain  the  great  expression,  not  only 
of  one  limited  period,  but  of  the  history  of  modern 
humanity  in  general.     We  mean  Balzac. 

It  is  one  of  the  strangest  phenomena  in  the  intel- 
lectual life  of  the  British,  Germans,  and  French,  that 
none  of  them  was  able  to  recognize  the  surpassing  great- 
ness of  some  of  their  most  extraordinary  geniuses. 
In  England,  Shakespeare's  unparalleled  greatness  re- 
mained unknown  and  unvalued  for  over  one  hundred 
years  after  his  death ;  in  Germany,  the  Titanic  genius 


THE  REACTION  1 53 

of  Bach  was  practically  unknown  for  over  seventy 
years  after  his  death  ;  the  French  have  to  the  present 
day  not  quite  learned  to  appreciate  the  true  dimen- 
sions of  the  vast  genius  of  Balzac.  They  praise  Balzac 
as  the  English  praised  Shakespeare  in  the  seventeenth 
century;  they  consider  him  a  clever  writer,  a  great 
writer,  an  interesting  writer;  they  fail  to  see  that  he 
is  infinitely  more  than  all  that,  that  he  is  not  great 
but  unique.  His  Com^die  Humaine  is  a  greater  ex- 
pression of  modern  Europe  than  is  the  divine  comedy 
of  Dante  of  Europe  in  the  thirteenth  century.  The 
very  form  of  Dante's  work  commands  respect  and 
authority ;  whereas  the  form  of  Balzac's  works  —  novels 
—  is  in  itself  most  unlikely  to  command  respect  and  fill 
the  reader  with  awe.  Balzac  is  not  the  inventor  of  a 
genre ;  he  is  the  creator  of  types  of  humanity  as  im- 
mortal, as  replete  with  individual  life,  as  are  the  types 
of  Shakespeare  and  some  of  the  types  created  by  the 
anonymous  genius  of  peoples,  such  as  Faust,  Don 
Juan,  The  Wandering  Jew,  etc.  His  types  of  men  and 
women  are  in  reality  more  lifelike  and  have  more 
vitality  in  them  than  any  actual  living  man  or  woman 
can  possibly  have.  His  P^re  Goriot  is  like  Shake- 
speare's King  Lear,  an  immortal  type  of  the  paternal 
feeling;  his  Grandet  is  the  classical  expression  of  the 
great  defect  of  most  French  bourgeois,  of  Avarice.  In 
his  works  we  find  types  of  all  classes,  of  all  occupa- 
tions. During  twenty  years  he  worked  as  no  galley- 
slave  ever  laboured,  writing  and  re-writing,  correcting 
and  re-correcting  his  novels,  constantly  intent  upon 
his  great  aim,  that  is,  to  depict  humanity.  Napoleon's 
aim   was   to   govern   men;  Balzac's   to   analyze   them. 


154  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN   EUROPE 

Napoleon  has  created  State  institutions  that  no  change 
of  events  can  materially  alter ;  Balzac  has  created 
types  of  individualities,  types  of  the  institutions  of 
the  soul  and  heart,  as  it  were,  that  no  future  events 
can  destroy.  Balzac  captivates  both  the  fancy  and 
the  intellect,  and  in  him  there  is  as  much  powerful  im- 
agination as  there  is  subtle  analysis.  He  is  the  prose- 
Shakespeare  of  France. 

Even  in  this  cursory  description  of  the  period  of 
Reaction  we  cannot  leave  unmentioned  the  most  fa- 
mous and  the  most  extraordinary  executive  artist  of 
all  times,  Franz  Liszt.  It  is  well  known  that  as  a 
pianist  he  has  never  had  his  equal,  and  when  we  now 
read  about  the  triumphs  that  his  art  won  for  him  from 
Cadiz  to  Moscow  and  from  the  Caucasus  to  London ; 
when  we  hear  of  the  incredible  enthusiasm  devoted  to 
a  man  who  was  apparently  only  a  pianist;  when  we 
hear  of  universities  offering  him  their  Doctor  degrees ; 
innumerable  towns  making  him  their  honorary  citizen ; 
countless  women  prostrating  themselves  before  him, 
nay,  eventually  kidnapping  him ;  we  are,  according  to 
our  modern  tearless  materialism,  prone  to  think  that 
whatever  Liszt's  genius  was,  his  hearers  and  enthu- 
siasts were  probably  decadent  or  subject  to  a  lack 
of  restraint  unknown  to  our  modern  self-conscious- 
ness. On  the  other  hand,  it  is  quite  certain  that  Liszt's 
execution  was  animated  by  a  soul,  the  manifestation 
of  which  on  the  piano  must  have  appealed  with  im- 
mense power  to  the  broadest,  mightiest,  and  most  noble 
sentiments  of  the  Europeans.  The  author  of  the  pres- 
ent work  can  testify  from  personal  experience  that  the 
unique   fascination   of   Liszt   over  all  classes  of  men, 


THE  REACTION  1 55 

cultured  and  uncultured,  was  the  same  in  the  seventies 
and  eighties  of  the  last  century  as  it  had  been  in  the 
thirties  and  forties,  when  Liszt  far  distanced  the  tri- 
umphs obtained  by  the  famous  violinist,  Paganini.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  Liszt  was  not  a  pianist  only,  he  was  a 
great  poet.  He  wrote  his  poems  with  his  fingers  on  the 
keyboard.     It  was  real  poetry. 


IX 

THE    REVOLUTIONS 

IT  had  long  been  foreseen,  for  instance  by  Metter- 
nich's  famous  secretary,  Gentz,  that  the  Reaction 
and  apparent  submission  of  all  nations  to  the  abso- 
lutistic  government  of  the  monarchs  was  not  to  be  of 
long  duration.  The  various  revolutionary  upheavals 
in  Italy,  Spain,  Portugal,  France,  and  Germany  had 
been,  as  we  have  seen,  suppressed  before  1848.  In  the 
previous  chapter  we  have  not  touched  upon  the  great 
revolution  of  1830  in  France,  reserving  a  short  state- 
ment about  that  famous  event  in  connection  with  the 
various  revolutions  which  in  the  end  broke  the  power 
of  absolutism.  The  July  revolution  of  1830  in  France 
was  in  itself  an  event  of  small  dimensions ;  it  can  in 
no  way  compare  with  the  tragic  events  of  the  French 
Revolution.  In  one  respect  alone  it  will  stand  com- 
parison with  the  greatest  event  of  French  history,  and 
that  is,  that  its  effects  upon  the  minds  of  Europeans 
were,  if  not  as  deep  and  lasting,  at  any  rate  memo- 
rable, more  particularly  in  England,  Poland,  and  Bel- 
gium. The  revolution  in  France  had  long  been  prepared 
by  the  dissatisfaction  among  the  French  nation,  and 
it  was  brought  to  a  head  by  the  stupid  obstinacy  of 
Charles  X.,  who,  rather  successful  in  foreign  policy  (in 
Algiers,  in  Turkey,  etc.),  easily  persuaded  himself  that 
by  suppressing  the  liberty  of  the  Press  he  might  re- 

156 


THE  REVOLUTIONS  1 57 

store  the  ancien  regime.  The  liberty  of  the  Press  is  in 
France  what  the  habeas  corpus  act  and  the  jury  system 
are  in  England,  and  it  has  at  all  times  played  a  far 
more  incisive  rdle  in  France  than  in  England.  In 
England  there  have  been  well-organized  Parliamen- 
tary parties  since  the  time  of  Charles  II.,  who  died  in 
1685;  and  politics  have  in  England  always  proceeded 
on  party  lines,  and  have  therefore  given  much  less 
consideration  to  the  academic  expression  of  political 
opinions  whether  by  great  intellects  or  by  the  common 
people.  In  France,  on  the  other  hand,  the  real  political 
parties  of  historical  life  have  never  existed.  In  Eng- 
land the  liberty  of  the  Press  was  in  William  III.'s  time 
granted  in  a  negative  fashion ;  that  is,  the  proposal  to 
renew  the  Hcensing  laws  of  the  Press  in  Stuart  times 
was  simply  shelved.  In  France,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  liberty  of  the  Press  was  given  to  the  nation  in  the 
most  explicit  and  positive  form,  and  was  always  cher- 
ished by  them  as  the  greatest  treasure  of  their  political 
liberty. 

Charles  X.,  a  narrow,  stale,  and  pedantic  man,  mis- 
read the  whole  political  character  of  his  people,  and 
issued  in  July,  1830,  ordinances,  that  is,  laws  on  his 
own  personal  authority,  practically  destroying  the 
liberty  of  the  Press.  The  people  of  Paris  instantly 
rose,  the  army  practically  joined  them ;  Charles  at  the 
last  moment  wanted  to  make  concessions ;  in  the  end 
he  had  to  flee.  The  French  now  established  the  Orleans 
dynasty,  and  Louis-Philippe,  son  of  ''  EgaliU^'  as  his 
father  was  called  in  the  French  Revolution,  was  made 
King  of  France.  As  will  be  seen  from  the  foregoing 
sketch,  the  revolution  of  1830  was,  on  the  whole,  of  a 


158  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

rather  academic  character.  A  change  of  persons  is  not 
a  change  of  institutions.  Yet  its  effect  upon  the  rest 
of  Europe  was  immense.  It  is  well  known  that  it  was 
the  fear  of  a  similar  revolution  in  England  that  finally 
prevailed  upon  the  Tories  to  yield  the  famous  Reform 
Bill  of  1832.  In  Belgium  the  people  rose,  and  so 
violently  clamoured  for  separation  from  Holland  that 
in  the  end  Belgium  was  established  as  a  separate  and 
independent  kingdom,  and  this  it  has  remained  to  the 
present  day.  In  Poland  the  unfortunate  people,  taking 
courage  from  events  in  Paris,  rose  in  a  formidable 
revolution  against  Russia,  hoping  to  be  succoured  by 
the  French.  They  fought  bravely,  and  defeated  the 
Russians  in  various  battles.  In  1832,  however,  they 
were  forced  to  surrender,  and  the  Iron  Czar,  Nicholas  I., 
deprived  them  of  all  the  autonomy  granted  them  by 
Alexander  I.,  his  predecessor,  and  placed  them  on  a 
level  with  every  other  province  of  the  Russian  Empire. 
The  new  King  of  France,  Louis-Philippe,  was  ex- 
pected by  many  of  his  friends  and  admirers  to  read 
the  character  of  his  people  and  of  his  time  far  better 
than  had  been  done  either  by  Louis  XVIII.  or  by 
Charles  X.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  new  King  affected 
an  affability,  a  bourgeois  modesty,  that  won  him  many 
a  heart,  and  seemed  to  promise  well  for  the  future  of 
France.  However,  as  we  now  know,  beneath  that  sur- 
face of  kindliness  and  simplicity  there  was  the  old 
spirit  of  his  race,  tempered  by  the  desire  to  do  by 
France  what  Charles  II.  had  done  by  England. 
Charles  II.,  as  every  one  knows,  secured  to  himself  all 
the  rights  his  father  had  fought  for,  by  means  of  a 
dissimulation  which  his  father  had  been  too  haughty 


THE  REVOLUTIONS  1 59 

to  employ.  In  the  same  way  Louis-Philippe  attempted 
to  secure  the  essence  of  power  while  sacrificing  some 
of  its  apparent  forms.  He  repeatedly  yielded,  whether 
to  his  haughty  minister  Casimir-Perier,  to  the  staunch 
Guizot,  or  to  the  astonishingly  clever  and  adroit 
Thiers.  He  bowed  before  many  a  popular  storm,  and 
in  1840  went  so  far  as  to  consent  to  the  repatriation  of 
the  ashes  of  Napoleon  from  St.  Helena.  Amidst  ex- 
traordinary solemnities  the  remains  of  the  great  states- 
man and  conqueror  were  placed  in  a  magnificent  tomb 
in  the  Hotel  des  Invalides  in  Paris.  Even  the  con- 
spiracy made  by  Napoleon's  nephew  Louis,  subse- 
quently Napoleon  HL,  was  visited  with  the  relatively 
mild  punishment  of  imprisonment  in  the  fortress  of 
Ham.  In  the  various  conflicts  of  France  with  England 
over  the  oriental  question ;  in  the  difficult  diplomatic 
negotiations  between  Russia,  Austria,  and  France, 
Louis-Philippe  tried  to  temporize  and  to  tide  over  dif- 
ficulties by  patience  and  dissimulation.  The  material 
prosperity  of  France  under  Louis-Philippe  was  very 
considerable  ;  in  fact,  with  the  exception  of  England, 
and  probably  on  a  par  with  England,  the  French  were 
the  richest  nation  in  the  world.  In  point  of  science 
they  made  considerable  progress,  and  it  was  then 
practically  acknowledged  that  the  study  of  mathe- 
matics, natural  philosophy,  and  biological  science  in 
France  was  a  model  for  the  rest  of  the  nations  of 
Europe. 

However,  the  mind  of  the  French  nation  was  against 
Louis-Philippe,  as  it  had  been  against  Charles  X.  The 
feeling  against  him  grew,  and  in  their  numerous  at- 
tempts on  the  life  of  the  King  and  of  other  members 


l60  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

of  the  Royal  Family  it  became  quite  manifest  that  the 
French,  so  long  the  leading  nation  in  Europe,  could 
not  and  would  not  brook  their  fall  from  former  great- 
ness under  a  clever  but  spiritless  king.  Already  in 
former  lectures  we  indicated  that  the  French,  like 
every  really  great  historical  nation,  cannot  possibly 
give  up  the  dream  of  greatness,  although  at  times 
both  their  statesmen  and  thinkers  plead  for  peaceful 
and  unaggressive  development.  When  the  French  saw 
that  Louis-Philippe  was  no  more  able  than  Charles  X. 
to  restore  them  to  their  former  position  in  European 
politics;  that  their  exploits  were  now  practically  re- 
duced to  the  slow  and  difficult  conquest  of  Algiers; 
when  they  learned  from  experience  that  their  magnan- 
imous dream  of  Liberty  was  realized  no  more  under 
Louis-Philippe  than  under  the  last  two  Bourbon  kings, 
they  made  up  their  minds  to  put  an  end  to  a  regime 
which  they  neither  loved  nor  feared.  At  that  time 
two  men,  neither  of  whom  was  a  great  statesman  nor 
a  man  of  action  inspired  by  some  great  historical  ini- 
tiative, Ledru-Rollin  and  the  poet  Lamartine,  both 
conscientiously  aided  by  Cavaignac,  precipitated  a  revo- 
lution against  Louis-Philippe  in  February,  1848,  which 
was  very  adroitly  utilized  by  Louis  Napoleon.  Louis- 
Philippe,  like  his  predecessor,  was  driven  from  France, 
and  Louis  Napoleon  became  President  of  the  French 
Republic.  Like  the  Revolution  of  1830,  so  that  of 
1848,  in  itself  devoid  of  any  very  startling  events  or 
of  any  great  convulsions  of  national  life,  proved  to  be 
of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  political  life  of  nations 
other  than  the  French,  for  no  sooner  had  the  news  of 
the  February  revolution  in  Paris  reached  Austria-Hun- 


THE  REVOLUTIONS  l6l 

gary,  Italy,  and  South  Germany,  than  all  these  countries 
rose  in  the  most  formidable  revolutions  they  have  ever 
started  in  modern  times  against  their  rulers.  Of  these 
revolutions  in  1848  the  most  important  and  also  the 
most  interesting  was  the  Hungarian  revolution.  The 
importance  and  interest  of  the  revolution  in  Hungary 
is  owing  to  two  clear  causes:  First,  the  fact  that  the 
revolution  in  that  country  was  not  only  a  change  of 
political  but  also  of  social  institutions.  It  was  the  re- 
generation of  an  entire  nation.  While  in  Germany  and 
Italy  the  revolutions  at  that  time  barely  touched  upon 
the  social  structure  of  the  nations,  in  Hungary  it  rev- 
olutionized the  whole  body  politic  in  all  its  aspects. 
The  second  reason  for  the  superior  interest  of  the 
Hungarian  revolution  is  owing  to  the  fact  that  Hun- 
gary, of  all  the  countries  then  engaged  in  great  political 
upheavals,  was  able  to  produce  the  most  striking  and 
historically  important  personalities,  such  as  Louis  Kos- 
suth, Petofi  the  great  poet.  Count  Sz^chenyi,  General 
Bem,  a  Pole,  and  many  others.  As  at  the  present  day 
everybody  knows,  Kossuth  represented,  not  certain  in- 
dividual or  temporary  aims,  but  an  immense  historical 
tendency.  At  present,  several  years  after  his  death, 
his  son,  in  no  way  equal  or  even  similar  to  his  great 
father,  is  able  to  lead  the  whole  Magyar  nation  owing 
to  the  mere  fact  that  he  is  the  son  and  natural  repre- 
sentative of  his  father.  Kossuth  was  indeed  from  many 
a  standpoint  an  extraordinary  man.  In  foreign  coun- 
tries his  eloquence  has  been  admired  even  more  than  in 
Hungary.  In  Hungary  every  peasant  is  eloquent ;  but 
amongst  a  naturally  eloquent  nation  he  was  the  most 
eloquent.     His  power  of  word  and  persuasion  was  in 


1 62  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

deed  quite  unprecedented.  Gifted  with  a  beautiful  and 
thrilling  voice  and  a  most  majestic  presence,  he  knew 
how  to  play  on  the  sentiments  and  emotions  of  his 
hearers  with  a  facility,  with  a  natural  force  and  fluency, 
such  as  in  those  agitated  times  produced  marvels  of 
enthusiasm.  It  is  doubtful  whether  he  was  a  great 
statesman,  for  although  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the 
historical  tendency  which  he  tried  to  embody  is  one 
of  the  abiding  features  of  the  Hungarian  polity,  so  that 
in  point  of  principle  he  is  and  probably  always  will 
be  the  incarnation  of  one  of  the  fundamental  ideas  of 
the  Magyars,  we  may  yet  say  that  while  his  political 
strategy,  irrespective  of  time,  was  great,  as  a  political 
tactician  he  lacked  too  many  qualities.  Probably  it 
will  be  found  that  his  fame  will  broaden  in  future 
centuries,  and  yet  the  historian  of  his  time  cannot  place 
him  on  a  line  with  the  less  profound  but  more  efficient 
statesman  of  the  great  Magyar  revolution.  Hungary 
had,  ever  since  1825,  undergone  a  social  and  political 
evolution  that  in  its  way  has  no  parallel  in  the  rest  of 
Europe.  The  reform  of  the  ancien  regime  in  other 
countries  came  either  from  above  in  the  form  of  royal 
degrees  conferring  the  boon  on  a  passive  people  ;  or  it 
was  brought  about  by  most  violent  struggles,  termi- 
nating as  a  rule  in  civil  war.  In  Hungary  the  regen- 
eration of  the  nation  was  brought  about  practically 
without  civil  war,  and  assisted  by  the  magnanimous 
and  patriotic  initiative  taken  by  the  noblemen  them- 
selves. Previously  to  1848  the  noblemen  paid  no  taxes 
and  were  altogether  exempt.  Under  the  leadership, 
however,  of  the  greatest  of  **  Magyars,"  Count  Stephen 
Sz^chenyi,  the  Hungarians  in  various  diets,  from  1825 


THE   REVOLUTIONS  163 

to  1848,  held  at  Pozsony  (Pressburg),  carried  out  reform 
after  reform  until  even  before  the  revolution  broke  out 
the  noblemen  had  voluntarily  placed  themselves  on  a 
level  with  all  the  other  citizens  of  the  country,  and 
every  single  citizen  in  Hungary  was  ready  to  go  to 
any  length  of  sacrifice  for  the  amelioration  and  the  re- 
generation of  his  country.  The  reigning  Emperor  of 
Austria,  Ferdinand,  was  an  imbecile.  He  was  quite  un- 
der the  influence  of  his  wife  and  her  court  circle,  and  she 
thought  that  by  hounding  on  the  Croatians  under  Jel- 
lachich  against  the  Hungarians,  she  would  easily  bring 
the  unruly  spirits  of  the  Magyars  to  book  without  mak- 
ing any  concessions.  But  the  Magyars  had  no  sooner 
learnt  of  the  advance  of  the  Creations  than  they  broke 
into  open  revolution  all  over  the  country.  Every  single 
Hungarian,  whether  a  civilian  or  a  monk,  whether  man 
or  woman,  youth  or  old  man,  joined  directly  or  indi- 
rectly the  army.  Money  was  forthcoming  from  all  sides, 
battles  were  speedily  won,  and  in  less  than  a  year  the 
Austrians  were  driven  completely  out  of  Hungary,  owing 
chiefly  to  the  resource  and  genius  of  General  Gorgei. 
The  victory  was  complete,  an  independent  Magyar  gov- 
ernment was  established,  and  Kossuth  was  made  the 
Governor  of  Hungary.  In  her  predicament  Austria 
now  applied  for  help  to  Russia.  Czar  Nicholas,  ever 
ready  to  suppress  liberal  movements,  sent  General  Pas- 
kievitch  at  the  head  of  a  little  over  one  hundred  thousand 
men  into  Hungary,  and  although  even  the  Russians  were 
repeatedly  worsted  by  the  Hungarians,  yet  shortly 
after  the  Russian  invasion  the  Hungarians  lost  heart, 
and  Gorgei  surrendered  with  the  only  remaining  regular 
army  of  the  Hungarians  at  Vilagos  in  1849.     So  ended 


1 64  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

the  Hungarian  revolution.  The  Austrians  now  intro- 
duced political  institutions  intended  to  do  away  with 
the  last  vestige  of  Hungarian  freedom  and  autonomy. 
A  wholesale  process  of  Germanization  was  introduced, 
and  Minister  Bach  and  his  so-called  Bach-Hussars  at- 
tempted to  stifle  the  spirit  of  the  nation  that  had  for 
nearly  a  thousand  years  maintained  its  political  inde- 
pendence and  individuality.  It  is  almost  superfluous 
to  say  that  Bach  failed.  The  passive  resistance  mani- 
fested by  the  Hungarians  from  1849  to  i860  was  of 
such  unconquerable  force  that  even  the  young  Emperor, 
the  present  Emperor-King  Francis  Joseph,  convinced 
himself  that  the  system  was  false,  and  so  in  i860  va- 
rious tentative  proposals  were  made  to  bring  about  a 
better  understanding  between  Hungary  and  Austria. 

The  revolution  in  Austria  was  shorter  because  the 
Austrian  people,  especially  the  German-speaking  per- 
sons in  Austria,  have  at  no  time  realized  the  value  or 
ideal  of  political  liberty,  and  were,  therefore,  unfit 
to  carry  on  a  consistent  struggle.  The  revolution  in 
Austrian  Italy  was  quickly  suppressed  by  Austrian 
generals,  of  whom  Haynau  made  himself  notorious  for 
his  inhuman  cruelty  and  General  Radetzky  for  his  dash. 

On  the  whole,  therefore,  the  revolutions  in  Austria 
and  Austrian  Italy  were  a  failure.  In  Austria  proper 
that  failure  was  never  improved,  and  to  the  present 
day  Cis-Leithania  has  not  yet  reached  the  level  of 
well-balanced  bodies-politic.  In  Hungary  and  Italy 
the  failure  was,  as  we  shall  see,  only  temporary, 
for  both  very  soon  afterwards  secured  perfect  unity, 
independence,  and  prosperity. 

As  the  period  of    Reaction  had   produced  an  intel- 


THE  REVOLUTIONS  165 

lectual  reaction  or  romanticism  in  every  department 
of  literature,  philosophy,  and  art,  so  the  revolutionary 
period  rapidly  introduced  an  era  of  intellectual  revolu- 
tion into  all  the  spheres  of  science  and  literature. 
We  saw  that  the  keynote  of  the  intellectual  world 
during  the  period  of  reaction  had  been  Hegelianism 
in  philosophy  and  romanticism  in  literature  and  art. 
With  the  advent  of  the  great  revolutions  in  1848- 
1849,  both  the  intellectual  movements  of  the  Reaction 
were  fast  disappearing,  and  the  period  of  positivism 
was  introduced.  The  enthusiasm  for  Hegel  and  the 
romanticists  had  been  intense  and  general.  The  reac- 
tion against  them  after  1848  was  equally  vast  and  in- 
tense. Before  the  revolutions  Hegel  seemed  to  satisfy 
the  deepest  desires  of  the  human  mind,  and  in  France 
as  well  as  in  the  German-speaking  countries  he  was 
looked  upon  as  the  prophet  of  a  new  and  perfect 
knowledge.  Now,  when  the  reaction  against  this 
system  came,  he  was  speedily  handed  over  to  igno- 
minious oblivion.  For  a  number  of  years  after  Hegel's 
death  in  1831  his  name  created  an  authority  so  great 
that  some  of  the  most  vital  problems  of  theology,  law, 
politics,  and  literature  were  considered  to  be  definitely 
solved  by  a  reference  to  one  of  the  Master's  guiding 
ideas.  David  Strauss  reconstructed  or  rather  destroyed 
the  life  of  Jesus  on  Hegelian  principles;  Stahl  and 
others  renewed  the  status  of  law  on  the  basis  of 
theories  formulated  by  Hegel ;  the  political  science  of 
the  thirties  and  forties  of  the  last  century  was  almost 
exclusively  dominated  by  the  system  and  thoughts  of  He- 
gel. All  this  now  disappeared.  What  Schopenhauer, 
in  writings  at  that  time  scarcely  read,  had   advanced 


1 66  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

in  tones  of  unparalleled  sarcasm  against  the  value  of 
Hegel's  philosophy  —  in  fact,  against  all  philosophy 
except  his  own  —  was  now  beginning  to  be  the  opinion 
of  the  entire  world.  Philosophy  was  discarded,  tabooed, 
and  despised ;  and  its  place  was  taken  by  the  positive 
sciences.  Already  during  the  height  of  the  reactionary 
period  France,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  cultivating 
the  positive  sciences  so  successfully  that  the  rest  of 
Europe  flocked  to  Paris  for  instruction  in  Astronomy, 
Physics,  Biology,  and  the  other  natural  sciences.  It 
was  in  the  forties  and  fifties  that  a  great  Frenchman 
not  only  summarized  the  chief  teachings  of  the  exact 
sciences,  but  drew  from  them  a  system  of  philosophy 
meant  to  supplant  all  previous  systems,  and  to  impress 
the  human  mind  with  the  spirit  of  an  entirely  new  prin- 
ciple.    That  Frenchman  was  Auguste  Comte. 

A  disciple  of  St.  Simon,  from  whom  he  had  taken 
many  an  idea  and  mental  attitude ;  a  mathematician  by 
profession,  and  by  his  life  and  mental  caliber  purport  - 
ing  to  be  the  prophet  of  a  new  world  of  thought ;  Comte 
in  his  Cours  de  Philosophie  Positive  (6  vols.),  outlined 
what  he  took  to  be  the  coming  mental  revolution  and 
new  religious  system.  He  called  his  philosophy  the 
positive  philosophy  in  sharp  contradistinction  from  the 
existing  systems,  but  denied  that  the  human  mind  will 
ever  be  able  to  grasp  metaphysical  problems.  Accord- 
ing to  him  all  that  the  human  mind  can  do  is  to  coordi- 
nate the  most  general  truths  of  the  principal  sciences 
and  to  accept  them  as  the  highest  system  of  general 
truth.  He  likewise  taught  that  the  existing  systems  of 
reHgion  were  doomed  to  decay,  and  that  the  only  reli- 
gion acceptable  to  the  minds  of  modern  people  will  be 


I 


THE  REVOLUTIONS  1 6/ 

the  Religion  of  Humanity.  Even  from  this  brief  out- 
line of  his  leading  ideas  the  reader  may  see  that  to 
Auguste  Comte  the  connection  between  the  mathemati- 
cal, physical,  and  biological  sciences  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  social  and  historical  sciences  on  the  other,  was 
very  much  more  intimate  than  former  philosophers  had 
ever  taught  it  to  be.  He  taught  that  all  the  sciences 
are  grouped  according  to  a  hierarchy  rising  from  the 
sciences  of  simple  to  those  of  less  simple  subjects. 
Mathematics,  he  said,  must  precede  physics  as  physics 
must  precede  biology  ;  and  as  biology  must  precede  so- 
ciology, or  as  he  called  it.  Physique  Sociale,  and  the 
study  of  history.  Of  this  hierarchy  he  likewise  said 
that  it  is  the  most  natural  expression  of  the  interde- 
pendence of  the  various  sciences  and  of  their  historical 
development.  He  taught  what  he  called  the  Law  of 
the  three  Stages.  In  accordance  with  that  Law  our 
ideas  and  our  social,  political,  and  religious  institutions 
must  all  obey  the  same  law,  according  to  which  they 
pass  from  the  theological  stage  to  the  metaphysical,  and 
finally  reach  the  positive  stage.  It  is  undeniable  that 
if  such  a  law  should  really  hold  good,  it  would  be  rela- 
tively easy  to  formulate  innumerable  facts  of  human 
history.  Comte  really  thought  that  his  law  would  cover 
all  these  facts,  and  in  various  passages  of  his  great 
work  he  attaches  to  that  law  the  same  value  that  we 
attach  to  the  law  of  gravity.  Our  experiences  and  re- 
searches since  the  appearance  of  Comte' s  book  have, 
it  must  be  confessed,  not  borne  out  this  law.  Yet,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  is  one  of  the  clearest  historical  facts 
of  modern  times  that  Comte's  ideas  and  the  bent  of 
his   vigorous  mind  have  in  England   and  America,  in 


1 68  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

France  as  in  the  rest  of  the  Continent,  left  deep  traces 
of  their  influence.  The  present  French  Government  is 
really  carrying  out  some  of  the  ideas  of  Comte.  It 
appears  that  the  Governments  of  Brazil  and  of  most  of 
the  South  American  states  are  proceeding  on  Comte's 
principles;  and  whether  Comte's  hope  of  putting  his 
religion  of  humanity  in  the  place  of  Christianity  will 
or  will  not  be  realized,  it  will  not  be  possible  to  deny 
that  his  ideas  and  teachings  have  to  a  very  large 
extent  prepared  the  era  of  science,  and  have  materially 
contributed  to  the  formation  of  modern  European 
thought.  In  England  both  John  Stuart  Mill  and 
Herbert  Spencer  essayed  to  carry  out  the  principles 
of  Comte ;  and  the  overestimation  of  the  power  and  the 
results  of  Science  proper,  which  is  so  characteristic 
of  the  British  mind  in  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  is  mainly  due  to  the  influence  of  Auguste 
Comte.  At  present  some  of  us,  at  any  rate,  are  trying 
to  shake  off  the  injurious  consequences  of  that  over- 
estimation  of  mathematical  or  exact  methods.  We 
have  learnt  to  see  that  however  great  the  value  of 
Comte's  ideas  with  regard  to  science,  his  application 
of  those  ideas  to  social  knowledge  and  history  has 
proved  a  failure.  Science  can  help  us  very  little,  if  at 
all,  in  the  study  of  history.  Yet  with  all  the  modifica- 
tions now  required  for  a  due  appreciation  of  Comte  we 
cannot  help  classing  him  as  one  of  the  directing  minds 
of  the  period  inaugurated  by  the  great  revolutions  of 
1848  to  1849. 

The  revulsion  from  the  romantic  and  metaphysical 
school  of  thought  was  in  Germany,  too,  embodied  by  a 
man  of  singular  interest,  whose  works  have  had  a  con- 


THE  REVOLUTIONS  1 69 

siderable  influence  on  European  minds.  We  mean 
Alexander  von  Humboldt.  He  was  not  a  philosopher 
proper,  but  he  had  a  rare  capacity  of  synthetizing  the 
vast  knowledge  that  he  acquired  in  his  travels  and  also 
from  books  into  clear  and  convenient  generalizations,  so 
that  the  ultimate  work  of  his  life,  his  Kosmos^  was  for 
his  time  a  fair  resume  of  man's  knowledge  of  Nature, 
written  in  a  most  finished  and  dignified  style.  He,  too, 
contributed  very  largely  to  the  preponderance  of  the 
exact  sciences  in  the  minds  of  European  peoples ; 
the  sale  of  his  Kosmos  was  quite  unprecedented ;  and 
the  nations  of  Europe  seemed  to  be  insatiable  in  the 
acquisition  of  that  natural  science  of  which  Humboldt 
(a  brother  of  the  diplomatist  mentioned  in  a  former  lec- 
ture) was  the  most  prominent  exponent. 

The  contribution  of  England  to  that  new  view  of  the 
worth  and  power  of  Science  was  in  many  ways  even 
greater,  and  is  summed  up  in  the  one  name  of  Charles 
Darwin.  His  immortal  book  on  the  Origin  of  Species 
appeared  in  1859,  and  both  by  the  wealth  of  his  data, 
the  clearness  of  his  expositions,  and  the  absolute  honesty 
and  sincerity  of  the  author,  at  once  revolutionized  bio- 
logical researches.  With  a  fulness  and  precision  hith- 
erto unknown  to  biology,  Darwin  made  an  attempt  to 
explain  the  mystery  of  Species  in  a  manner  such  as 
captivated  and  in  most  cases  convinced  the  student. 
The  term  and  idea  of  Evolution,  tabooed  by  most  of 
Darwin's  predecessors,  now  rapidly  became  the  watch- 
word of  modern  thought.  So  deep  was  the  satisfaction 
of  millions  of  readers  with  the  explanation  offered  by 
the  theory  of  Evolution,  that  finally  the  very  word 
seemed  to  be  a  sufficient   explanation  of   events  and 


170  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

institutions  of  nature  both  dumb  and  animated,  nay, 
human.  In  the  early  sixties  Evolution  was  considered 
to  be  the  key  to  all  the  enigmas  of  history  and  sociology. 
A  host  of  writers,  both  inferior  in  knowledge  to  Darwin 
and  less  cautious  than  he,  did  not  hesitate  to. extend  the 
theories  of  Evolution  to  the  problems  of  history  and 
anthropology,  ethnology,  sociology,  psychology,  and  all 
the  other  branches  of  the  Humanities.  Tyler  and 
Lecky  in  England;  Draper  in  America;  Hellwald  in 
Germany ;  but  especially  Herbert  Spencer,  in  writings 
very  extensive  and  very  numerous,  declared  Evolution 
to  be  the  long-sought-for  means  of  unriddling  the  uni- 
verse. In  our  days  a  reaction  has  set  in  against  the 
overestimation  of  Evolution,  and  as  the  author  has 
tried  to  show  in  another  work,  the  proofs  and  theories 
of  Evolution  do  not  account  for  nor  do  they  explain  the 
leading  events  of  history.  But  for  our  present  purpose 
it  is  sufficient  to  note  that  in  the  sixties,  let  alone  the 
seventies  and  eighties  of  the  last  century,  the  undue 
value  attached  to  the  exact  sciences  led  to  the  extension 
of  their  methods  far  beyond  anything  that  they  can  be 
legitimately  applied  to.  Not  only  philosophy  but  also 
theology,  the  theory  and  law  of  politics  and  Hterature, 
and  similar  subjects,  were  misconstrued  or  tabooed  be- 
cause of  that  exaggerated  love  and  admiration  of  the 
exact  sciences  introduced  into  modern  minds  chiefly  by 
Comte,  Humboldt,  and  Darwin.  As  a  side  consequence 
of  that  overdone  interest  in  science  proper  we  must 
note  the  rise  of  materialism  as  taught  especially  by 
Carl  Vogt,  Lewis  Buechner,  Moleschott,  and  others. 
With  the  characteristic  neglect  of  history  so  prominent 
in  students  of  the  natural   sciences,  the  teachings  of 


THE   REVOLUTIONS  I /I 

materialism  were  submitted  to  a  curious  world  of  en- 
thusiastic students  as  the  latest  outcome  of  the  human 
intellect.  Albert  Lange  had  no  great  difficulty  in  show- 
ing in  his  excellent  History  of  Materialisnty  the  absence 
of  all  claims  to  originality  in  the  modern  materialists. 
However,  the  tendencies  of  the  people  were  so  strong, 
that  materialism  together  with  agnosticism,  and  a  pre- 
posterous neglect  of  the  vast  historical  importance  of 
the  holy  writings  of  Christianity,  made  up  the  intellec- 
tual caliber  of  most  of  the  cultured  people  in  Europe  in 
the  sixties  and  seventies  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

Even  these  few  facts  will  suffice  to  show  that  the 
great  revolutions  in  the  middle  of  the  last  century, 
while  they  purified  the  intellectual  atmosphere  of 
Europe  of  very  many  of  the  worst  miasms  of  roman- 
ticism, undid  on  the  other  hand  many  a  wholesome  and 
valuable  line  of  intellect  cultivated  by  the  romanticists. 
At  the  present  day  we  still  struggle  between  these  two 
conflicting  lines  of  thought,  and  most  of  us  are  incHned 
to  think  that  although  the  romanticists  were  largely 
wrong,  the  scientists  and  positivists  were  not  wanting 
in  deficiencies  of  considerable  gravity. 


THE   UNITY   OF   ITALY 

THE  political  events  in  the  twenty  years  from  185 1 
to  1 87 1  were  so  great  that  they  can,  Hke  all  great 
events,  be  summed  up  in  a  few  clear  words.  They  may 
be  reduced  to  the  following  five  groups  of  facts : 

(i)  The  establishment,  prosperity,  and  downfall  of 
the  second  French  Empire. 

(2)  The  fall  of  the  Austrian  Empire  from  its  former 
greatness. 

(3)  The  defeat  of  the  Russians  by  the  English  and 
French,  and  the  consequent  gravitation  of  Russia  not 
towards  the  West,  but  towards  the  East,  that  is,  Asia. 

(4)  The  rise  of  the  unity  of  Italy. 

(5)  The  rise  of  the  unity  of  Germany. 

It  will  be  seen  that  these  five  groups  of  facts  com- 
pletely changed  the  physiognomy  of  Europe.  France, 
after  a  temporary  rise  to  first-class  importance,  was 
humiliated  and  deprived  of  her  great  influence.  It 
was  so  with  Austria,  which  up  to  1850  was  one  of  the 
great  Powers  and  of  decisive  influence  in  all  Continental 
matters;  it  was  even  so  with  the  influence  of  Russia, 
which  for  a  long  time  back  had  been  appreciable  in 
nearly  the  whole  of  Europe  and  which  now  proved  un- 
able to  make  any  headway,  whether  in  the  southwest 
portion  of  her  Empire,  or  in  Germany,  and  was  forced 
to  seek  for  new  fields  of  conquest  in  uncivilized  Asia. 

172 


1 


THE  UNITY  OF  ITALY  1 73 

Finally,  by  the  rise  of  a  united  Germany  and  Italy,  new 
powers  were  introduced  into  the  concert  of  Europe 
which,  as  everybody  knows,  have  had  influence  not  only 
on  the  Continent,  but  on  the  international  position  of 
England,  America,  and  the  Far  East.  These  momen- 
tous changes  were  realized  chiefly  by  the  genius,  luck, 
and  energy  of  two  men,  Bismarck  in  Germany  and  Ca- 
vour  in  Italy.  If  we  now  add  similar  events,  not  as 
comprehensive,  but  of  almost  equal  importance,  such  as 
the  unification  of  Hungary  by  Francis  Deak  and  the 
rise  of  the  Danubian  principalities  and  kingdoms  (king- 
dom of  Roumania,  kingdom  of  Servia,  principality  of 
Bulgaria,  etc.),  we  have  exhausted  the  number  of  really 
important  and  influential  events  during  the  latter  half  of 
the  nineteenth  century. 

Louis  Napoleon,  as  we  saw,  was  made  President  of 
the  French  Republic,  and  by  the  cotip  d'etat  of  the  2d 
December,  185 1,  he  made  himself  Emperor  of  the 
French.  There  are  few  men  in  modern  history  with 
regard  to  whom  the  judgment  of  their  contemporaries 
was  led  astray  in  a  more  pitiable  manner  than  with 
regard  to  Louis  Napoleon.  As  the  heir  of  the  great 
Napoleon  he  impressed  the  nations  and  gave  rise  to 
an  appreciation  wholly  out  of  proportion  to  his  real 
merits.  Napoleon  III.  was  neither  a  man  of  genius  nor 
a  man  of  action.  He  was  a  strange  combination  of  a 
dreamer  and  yet  a  persistent  worker ;  a  man  lacking 
in  the  chief  quality  of  a  ruler,  that  is,  in  the  sense  of 
proportion  as  applied  to  the  great  events  -and  leading 
persons  of  his  time.  Nearly  all  the  ideals  floating 
before  his  mind  were  impracticable  and  adverse  to  the 
interests  both  of  his  dynasty  and  of  his  subjects.     He 


174  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

pursued  a  nationalist  policy,  dreaming  of  the  union  of 
nations  and  wasting  his  time,  money,  and  power  on  an 
enterprise  that  promised  neither  glory  nor  profit. 

The  Italians,  ever  since  they  had  been  united  into 
the  kingdom  of  Italy  by  Napoleon  the  Great,  had  never 
given  up  the  idea  of  restoring  the  unity  of  the  Penin- 
sula. That  idea  had  been  in  their  minds  and  hearts  for 
over  a  thousand  years  previously.  The  greatest  minds 
and  characters  of  Italy ;  generals  and  admirals,  thinkers, 
poets  and  men  of  action,  all  had,  in  innumerable  books, 
articles,  poems,  and  actions,  attempted  to  pave  the  way 
for  the  restoration  of  the  unity  of  Italy.  All  these 
attempts  had  been,  however,  in  vain.  It  is  one  of  the 
deepest  lessons  of  history  that  Italy,  which  in  times 
before  Christ  had,  under  Roman  rule,  succeeded  in 
uniting  the  whole  Western  world,  was,  after  the  fall  of 
the  Roman  Empire  in  the  fifth  century  of  our  era, 
absolutely  unable  to  make  good  her  own  unity.  It  is 
a  further  curious  teaching  of  history,  it  must  now  be 
added,  that  the  unity  which  Italy  before  Christ  con- 
ferred upon  the  European  world  and  which  after  Christ 
she  was  unable  to  secure  for  herself,  was  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  given  to  her  by  the  great  Powers  of 
Europe,  chiefly  by  France.  Thus  there  is  no  exaggera- 
tion in  saying  that  the  unity  which  Italy  formerly  gave 
to  the  world,  the  world  gave  to  her  in  the  nineteenth 
century. 

The  forces  of  the  Italians  themselves  were  curiously 
inadequate.  In  the  Italian  character  there  are,  as  in 
all  high-strung  natures,  the  most  surprising  contradic- 
tions. In  private  life  there  is  no  more  dramatic  nation 
than  the   Italians,  yet  they  have  never  produced  dra- 


THE  UNITY  OF  ITALY  1 75 

matic  literature  of  any  high  order.  In  public  life  there 
are  no  more  ardent  politicians  than  the  Italians,  and 
their  wonderful  intelligence,  dash,  and  courage  seemed 
to  promise  national  or  concerted  action  on  a  grand 
scale.  In  reality,  however,  the  Italians  of  the  last 
century  consistently  shrank  from  grand  and  open 
actions,  and  their  greatest  statesman,  Cavour,  instead 
of  choosing  the  methods  of  Bismarck  or  of  some  Italian 
hothead  like  Garibaldi,  unswervingly  clung  to  methods 
quite  the  reverse  of  open  warfare  and  military  exploits. 
Already  during  the  time  of  the  Reaction,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  Italians  essayed  to  make  good  their  unity  by 
secret  societies,  anonymous  risings,  and  nameless  politi- 
cal murders.  It  seemed  impossible  to  prevail  upon  the 
people  in  Italy  to  rise  in  a  body.  With  all  due  recog- 
nition of  the  immense  merits  of  the  Catholic  Church  for 
the  rest  of  the  world  it  cannot  be  denied  that  in  the 
nineteenth  as  well,  as  in  the  preceding  centuries  the 
Papacy  prevented  the  Italians  from  accomplishing  any 
great  action  on  behalf  of  Italian  unity.  The  Papal 
States  took  up  the  very  centre  of  Italy  and  thus  cut  the 
Peninsula  into  two  halves,  linked  by  a  state  neither 
national  nor  powerful  enough  to  offer  protection.  This 
"  third  body  "  in  the  polity  of  Italy  has,  as  Machiavelli 
observed,  always  been  the  real  cause  of  the  disunion  of 
Italy.  The  Popes  had  in  former  times  very  frequently 
invoked  the  help  of  foreign  potentates  in  order  to  foil 
any  attempt  on  the  part  of  Italian  princes  or  heads  of 
states  to  secure  the  unity  of  Italy.  Cavour  now  turned 
the  tables  on  the  Popes ;  and  the  very  policy  that  they 
had  used  for  centuries  to  deprive  Italy  of  the  advan- 
tages of  union  was  now  utilized  by  Cavour  to  secure 


1/6  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

that  unity,  despite  all  the  antagonistic  policy  of  the 
Pope  and  of  the  smaller  monarchs  in  Italy.  Bismarck, 
as  is  well  known  and  as  we  shall  see  in  a  subsequent 
chapter,  had  proceeded  on  the  lines  of  a  policy  in  many 
ways  directly  opposite  to  that  of  Cavour.  He,  too, 
laboured  at  the  unity  of  Germany,  but  he  was  con- 
vinced, and  events  proved  him  right,  that  that  unity 
could  only  be  obtained  by  "blood  and  iron."  Cavour, 
on  the  other  hand,  who  had  made  a  deep  study  of  Eng- 
lish, French,  and  Italian  history,  had  come  to  an  en- 
tirely different  solution  of  the  same  problem.  Without 
entirely  discarding  the  more  aggressive  patriots,  he  was 
determined  to  secure  the  unity  of  Italy  by  making  that 
great  aim  an  interest  of  France  in  the  first  place,  of 
England  and  Prussia  in  the  next.  Once,  he  rightly 
thought,  the  great  Powers  of  Europe,  or  most  of  them, 
are  interested  on  behalf  of  the  unity  of  Italy,  their 
combined  forces  will  force  down  all  opposition  on  the 
part  of  Austria,  the  Pope,  or  the  King  of  Naples;  just 
as  had  been  the  case  in  1830  when  Belgium  wanted  to 
become  an  independent  State  and  succeeded,  because 
England  in  the  first  place,  and  also  other  Powers,  had 
an  interest  in  seeing  Belgium  separated  from  Holland. 

The  deep  diplomacy  of  Cavour  was  very  consider- 
ably aided  by  some  of  the  most  excessive  radicals,  dema- 
gogues, and  patriots  of  Italy.  For  this  is  the  unfailing 
sign  of  a  great  policy,  that  circumstances  apparently 
opposed  to  it  are  in  reality  helping  it  forward.  Nothing 
more  contradictory  can  be  imagined  than  the  cautious, 
prudent,  cunning  policy  of  Cavour,  and  the  exaggerated 
zeal  of  some  of  the  Carbonari  who,  like  Mazzini,  Orsini, 
and  others,  were  firm  in  their  belief  that  the  unity  of 


THE  UNITY  OF  ITALY  1 77 

Italy  could  be  achieved  more  rapidly  by  the  dagger  and 
the  bomb  than  by  diplomatic  negotiations.  Yet  these 
very  radicals  and  extremists  helped  Cavour  so  essentially 
that  his  great  triumph  in  July,  1858,  the  secret  alliance 
with  Napoleon  III.,  was  entirely  owing,  in  the  first 
place,  to  the  desperate  action  of  Orsini  in  January  of 
the  same  year.  A  few  words  will  put  that  quite  clearly. 
Cavour  in  reality,  as  an  Italian  statesman,  was  techni- 
cally only  the  minister  of  the  King  of  Sardinia,  that  is, 
of  the  western  part  of  Lombardy,  then  a  small  and  un- 
important country.  The  diplomacy  of  the  House  of 
Savoy  or  the  Kings,  formerly  the  Dukes,  of  Piedmont  in 
Sardinia,  has,  like  that  of  many  a  small  nation  surrounded 
by  mighty  Powers,  always  been  characterized  by  exceed- 
ing subtlety  and  carefulness.  It  was  in  Cavour  that  that 
dexterity  in  seizing  the  reins  of  diplomacy  was  carried 
to  its  highest  perfection.  Cavour  wanted  to  persuade 
Napoleon  to  wage  war  with  Austria,  which  ever  since 
the  Congress  of  Vienna  had  been  the  most  important 
military  power  in  Italy.  Austria  possessed  practically 
the  whole  of  the  north  of  Italy  except  Sardinia,  and  was 
preponderant  in  the  rest  of  the  Peninsula.  The  King 
of  Sardinia  single-handed  could  not  hope  to  cope  suc- 
cessfully with  Austria ;  and  no  serious  hope  of  uniting 
the  other  monarchs  of  Italy  against  Austria  could  be  en- 
tertained. Military  help  therefore  was  bound  to  come 
from  France.  It  was  sufficient  for  Cavour  that  England 
and  Prussia  should  give  their  moral  support  in  the  mat- 
ter, which  they  both  did  in  ample  measure.  Already  in 
1854,  when  England  and  France  had  begun  the  Crimean 
campaign  against  Russia,  Cavour,  in  order  to  place  them 
under  obligations  to  Italy,  had  sent  out  a  considerable 


178  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

corps  of  Italian  soldiers  to  the  Crimea  as  an  auxiliary 
army  for  the  allies. 

The  decisive  event,  however,  was  the  attempted  crime 
of  Orsini.  It  appears  that  Napoleon  III.,  long  before 
he  succeeded  in  ascending  the  throne  of  France,  and 
when  he  was  still  a  roaming  adventurer,  had  promised 
to  the  Italian  patriots  that  whenever  he  should  succeed 
in  his  aspirations  he  would  extend  to  them  a  helping 
hand  and  put  an  end  to  the  political  and  social  anarchy 
of  Italy.  There  is  little  doubt  that  Napoleon  took  these 
promises  pretty  seriously.  Like  all  the  members  of  the 
Napoleon  family,  he  had  deep  Itahan  sympathies ;  and, 
moreover,  his  general  policy  made  him  take  his  early 
promises  to  the  Italian  patriots  as  part  of  a  policy  both 
practical  and  sublime.  However,  the  exigencies  of  his 
home  as  well  as  his  foreign  policy,  the  great  war  with 
Russia  from  1854  to  1856,  had  prevented  him  from  real- 
izing his  promises ;  and  to  numerous  secret  reminders 
on  the  part  of  the  Italian  patriots  he  answered  evasively. 
These  patriots  had  always  threatened  him  with  death 
unless  he  redeemed  the  promises  made  to  them  in  the 
autumn  of  1857.  The  most  resolute  of  these  patriots, 
Orsini,  left  London  for  Paris,  determined  to  put  an  end 
to  the  life  of  Napoleon.  With  several  accomplices  he 
ambushed  Napoleon  in  a  street  near  the  Op^ra  in  Paris, 
whither  Napoleon,  his  wife  Eugenie,  and  other  members 
of  his  court  were  repairing  in  the  evening  of  the  14th 
January,  1858.  Orsini  and  his  accomplices  threw  several 
bombs  at  the  carriage  of  the  Emperor ;  the  bombs  ex- 
ploded, and  killed  and  wounded  over  one  hundred  and 
forty  persons ;  however,  the  Emperor  and  his  wife  es- 
caped unscathed.     Orsini  in  prison  behaved  with  the 


THE  UNITY  OF  ITALY  1/9 

most  heroic  steadfastness.  Napoleon  really  wanted  to 
pardon  him,  but  it  appeared  that  it  would  have  been  un- 
wise to  pardon  the  assassin  of  so  many  persons ;  the  in- 
dignation of  the  French  public  was  too  intense.  Orsini, 
however,  made  the  Emperor  promise  that  a  French  army 
would  enter  Italy  and  wage  war  with  Austria,  and  hav- 
ing obtained  this  formal  promise  from  Napoleon,  Orsini 
mounted  the  scaffold  with  serenity. 

Napoleon  could  no  longer  doubt  the  very  serious 
character  of  the  threats  constantly  levelled  at  him  by 
the  Italian  patriots.  Under  the  pretence  of  taking  the 
waters  at  Plombieres  in  central  eastern  France,  he  had 
an  interview  with  Cavour,  and  there  a  formal  alliance 
was  made  and  a  promise  given  that  at  an  early  date 
war  should  be  made  against  Austria  both  by  France 
and  Sardinia,  and  after  the  successful  termination  of 
the  war  Austria's  power  in  Italy  would  be  put  an  end 
to. 

Although  Napoleon,  as  already  remarked,  was  quite 
sincere  in  his  ideas  about  the  principle  of  nationality, 
and  seriously  believed  that  nothing  but  good  could  come 
from  a  still  greater  union  amongst  the  distracted  terri- 
tories of  Italy  and  other  countries,  yet  personally  he  was 
not  in  favour  of  the  union  of  the  whole  of  the  Italian 
Peninsula.  At  that  time  a  number  of  French  diploma- 
tists and  politicians  warned  him  of  the  inevitable  conse- 
quences that  a  unity  of  all  Italy  could  not  but  entail 
upon  the  prestige  and  power  of  France.  Italy,  they 
said,  if  united,  will  only  be  the  prelude  to  a  similar  union 
in  Germany  and  in  other  portions  of  Europe,  and  France 
will  inevitably  suffer  from  the  rise  of  new  and  powerful 
national  states.     Napoleon  did  not  deny  the  force  of 


l8o  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

these  arguments.  However,  he  hoped  to  keep  the  patri- 
otic enthusiasm  of  the  Italians  within  bounds,  and  to  make 
of  Italy,  not  one  kingdom  under  the  rule  of  the  House  of 
Savoy,  but  four  kingdoms  under  the  suzerainty  of 
France.  In  this  entirely  false  view  he  was  confirmed 
by  the  subtlety  and  diplomacy  of  Cavour,  who  himself 
very  well  knew  that  once  Austria's  power  was  broken 
in  Italy,  and  the  friendship  and  moral  support  of  France 
and  England  secured,  nothing  could  prevent  the  Italians 
from  establishing  themselves  as  one  single  united  mon- 
archy. Napoleon  declared  war  against  Austria,  and  the 
war  was  rapidly  finished  by  the  campaign  of  1859,  the 
two  most  important  engagements  being  at  Magenta, 
near  Milan,  and  at  Solferino,  close  to  Mantua.  The 
Austrian  army,  although  in  no  wise  inferior  to  that  of 
the  French,  was  badly  generalled,  and  a  few  misunder- 
standings sufficed  to  produce  the  defeat  of  Austria  in 
both  engagements.  The  Italians,  drunk  with  enthusi- 
asm, wanted  to  force  Napoleon  to  continue  the  campaign, 
hoping  to  oust  the  Austrians  from  Italy  altogether. 
However,  Napoleon  now  took  fright  at  the  vast  waves 
of  national  enthusiasm  roused  in  Italy.  In  order  to 
keep  it  within  bounds  he  hurried  on  a  peace  with  Austria 
at  Villa  Franca.  According  to  that  peace  the  Austrians 
were  still  to  retain  very  considerable  Venetian  territory 
in  Italy ;  but  the  rest  of  Lombardy  they  handed  over  to 
Napoleon,  who  ceded  it  to  the  King  of  Sardinia.  The 
Italians  were  furious  in  their  disappointment.  They 
considered  Napoleon  a  greater  enemy  of  theirs  than 
were  the  Austrians.  They  claimed,  and  not  without  a 
fair  show  of  justice,  that  one  more  battle,  the  success  of 
which  was  scarcely  doubtful,  would  have  made  secure 


THE   UNITY  OF   ITALY  l8l 

the  unity  of  Italy.  They  reproached  Napoleon  with  a 
childish  fear  of  the  anger  of  the  Pope,  Pius  IX.,  and 
with  the  intention  of  keeping  Italy  in  her  old  anarchy. 
Garibaldi  and  other  Italian  patriots,  especially  Mazzini, 
published  innumerable  pamphlets,  calling  upon  the 
Italian  nation  to  rise  in  a  body  and  to  drive  out  her  ene- 
mies. Cavour,  who  continually  clung  to  his  diplomacy, 
and  who  was,  moreover,  crushed  by  illness,  overwork, 
and  the  considerable  strain  of  continuous  vigilance  and 
diplomatic  negotiations,  still  managed  to  hold  the  balance 
between  the  wavering  of  Napoleon,  the  hostility  of  the 
Austrians  and  the  Pope,  and  the  excessive  claims  of 
the  ultras.  He  died  in  June,  1861,  and  by  that  time  the 
unity  of  Italy  was  a  foregone  conclusion.  The  patriots 
under  Garibaldi  had,  by  their  bold  initiative  in  Sicily 
and  Naples,  so  irretrievably  engaged  and  compromised 
the  people  of  southern  Italy,  that  one  part  of  Italy  after 
another  declared  for  Victor  Emmanuel,  hitherto  only 
King  of  Lombardy,  as  King  of  Italy.  The  inevitable  and 
necessary  advent  of  the  unity  of  Italy  was  finally  quite 
clearly  shown  in  1866,  when  Victor  Emmanuel,  although 
beaten  by  Austria  on  sea  and  on  land  at  Lissa  and  at 
Custozza,  nevertheless  made  good  his  claim  to  the  Ve- 
netian territory  still  in  the  hands  of  Austria,  so  that  the 
whole  of  Italy,  except  the  city  of  Rome,  was  in  August, 
1866,  under  the  rule  of  Victor  Emmanuel  as  King  of 
Italy.  The  City  of  Rome  was  entered  by  the  Italians 
a  few  weeks  after  the  commencement  of  the  Franco- 
German  War,  and  ever  since  Italy  has  been  a  united 
monarchy. 

The  events  of  the  fifties  and  sixties  of  the  last  century 
fully   proved  .the  correctness  of  Cavour's  policy.     He 


1 82  FOUNDATIONS   OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

was  right  in  thinking  that  the  famous  saying,  "  Italia 
fara  da  sh  "  ("  Italy  will  do  it  all  alone  "),  was  a  useful 
war-cry,  but  historically  and  diplomatically  the  greatest 
untruth.  It  was  not  Italy  that  made  the  unity  of  the 
Peninsula:  it  was  France;  it  was,  to  a  certain  extent, 
England ;  it  was  Prussia.  The  result  of  Cavour's  policy 
redounds  to  his  personal  glory  as  much  as  did  later  on 
the  results  of  the  policy  of  Bismarck  to  the  glory  of  the 
Germans.  We  say,  to  Cavour's  personal  glory,  for  we 
mean  to  intimate  that  his  policy  exalted  far  more  his  own 
genius  than  it  contributed  to  the  greatness  of  Italy.  No 
nation  that  has  won  her  liberty  and  independence  at  the 
hands  of  another  people  can  ever  hope  to  rank  as  a  really 
great  nation  before  many  a  generation  after  her  libera- 
tion. Had  the  Italians  won  the  battles  of  Magenta  and 
Solferino  single-handed,  and  without  the  aid  of  any  one 
else,  as  the  Greeks  did  the  battle  of  Salamis,  and  the 
English  their  battles  against  the  Armada,  or  the  Germans 
the  battles  against  France,  there  would  undoubtedly  have 
been  a  far  more  rapid  growth  in  the  social  economy  and 
poUtical  reconstruction  of  Italy.  The  forces  that  made 
Italy  were  not  her  own  forces ;  and  so  the  immense  im- 
petus given  to  a  nation  by  the  triumphs  on  all-important 
battlefields  has  been  lacking  to  her.  More  than  thirty- 
five  years  has  now  elapsed  since  Victor  Emmanuel  was 
made  King  of  all  Italy,  and  while  the  Italians  have  been 
making  great  efforts  to  work  the  regeneration  of  their 
nation,  and  while  by  international  courtesy  they  are  con- 
sidered a  great  Power,  yet  in  reality  they  are  far  from 
being  so.  Internally  sapped  by  the  relentlessly  hostile 
agitation  of  the  Catholic  Church  ;  her  southern  provinces 
cankered  by  ignoble  poverty,  brigandage,  and  total  lack 


THE  UNITY  OF  ITALY  1 83 

of  industrial  enterprise ;  her  population  constantly 
drained  by  emigration  to  South  America ;  Italy  is  still 
far  from  that  greatness  that  her  patriots  hoped  to  see 
as  soon  as  the  enemy,  more  particularly  Austria,  should 
leave  the  country.  There  is  of  course  no  reason  to  de- 
spair of  Italy.  Her  people  as  individuals  are  in  many 
ways  the  most  gifted  in  Europe.  The  resources  both  of 
her  moral  and  intellectual  nature  are  boundless ;  her 
position  in  the  centre  of  the  Mediterranean  opens  im- 
mense vistas  of  material  success  for  her  in  the  near 
future,  but  the  initial  mistake  of  winning  her  independ- 
ence at^the  hands  of  others  will  tell  on  her  heavily  for 
many  a  year  to  come. 


XI 


THE   UNITY   OF   GERMANY 


THE  history  of  the  unity  of  Germany  is  in  many 
ways  one  of  the  most  instructive  chapters  of 
history.  For  in  Germany  perhaps  more  than  in  most 
countries  the  old  perennial  and  terrible  fight  of  man 
against  nature  has  been  fought  out,  and  has  finally 
led  to  results  considerable  and  perhaps  all-important. 
Like  all  the  other  nations  of  Europe,  the  Germans  have 
always  tried  to  make  the  limits  of  their  country 
conterminous  with  the  limits  of  their  language.  Europe 
has  at  no  time  been  given  to  the  Roman  ideal,  and  just 
as  a  United  States  of  Europe  is,  as  we  shall  see,  impossi- 
ble in  the  near  or  in  the  far  future,  so  it  was  impractica- 
ble in  the  last  2000  years.  Europe  consists  at  present 
of  over  forty  highly  organized  polities,  each  of  which 
clings  to  its  personality  in  language,  law,  custom,  and 
every  other  feature  of  national  life  with  uncompromis- 
ing tenacity.  Each  of  these  states  has  at  all  times  tried 
to  combine  and  unite  its  members  and  to  separate  itself 
from  its  neighbours.  The  centripetal  forces  in  Europe 
have  always  been  in  the  minority,  and  even  the  greatest 
emperors  and  conquerors  have  found  that  their  dreams 
of  uniting  Europe  under  one  rule  were  short-lived  and 
sterile. 

This  work  of  union,  this  attempt  to  bring  together 
in  one  highly  differentiated  state  the  members  of  one 

184 


THE  UNITY  OF  GERMANY  185 

and  the  same  nation,  this  old  historical  endeavour  of 
the  European  peoples,  has  been  realized  in  some 
countries  earlier  than  in  others.  The  English  proper 
realized  it  in  the  early  middle  ages,  and  what  is  at  pres- 
ent England  and  Wales  were  one  country  already  in 
1284.  Next  came  the  French.  It  took  an  enormous 
number  of  wars,  battles,  sieges,  campaigns,  intrigues, 
marriages,  treaties,  etc.,  in  fact,  all  the  resources  of 
pacific  and  warlike  policy,  to  unite  the  south  of  France 
with  the  north,  and  the  west  with  the  east.  At  last, 
under  the  Bourbon  kings,  early  in  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury, and  with  regard  to  Lorraine  in  1766,  all  the  parts 
of  modern  France  were  united  under  one  rule,  although 
the  homogeneity  of  the  people  was  still  far  from  com- 
plete, as  we  have  seen  in  the  first  lecture  on  the  French 
Revolution. 

Germany  proper  was  unable  to  secure  her  unity 
before  the  latter  part  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Ger- 
many is  mostly  an  inland  country,  and  has  so  far  had 
no  considerable  sea  power.  It  will  be  noticed  that  in- 
land countries  are  not  easily  united ;  and  even  a  com- 
mon ruler  leaves  the  people,  the  subjects  themselves, 
in  a  state  of  utter  discrepancy  and  divergence  among 
themselves.  It  is  really  the  sea  that  unites  people,  and 
France,  having  a  very  considerable  sea  power  as  early 
as  the  seventeenth  century,  had  in  this  very  circum- 
stance an  enormous  leverage  over  Germany.  Of  the 
diverse  elements  of  what  was  called  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire  of  the  Germanic  nation  in  previous  centuries, 
it  is  very  difficult  to  form  a  definite  idea.  The  number 
of  sovereigns,  from  a  small  lord  to  the  Emperor  of  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  who  all  had  sovereign  rights  over 


1 86  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

their  respective  subjects,  is  positively  amazing.  There 
is  no  exaggeration  in  stating  that  between  the  Rhine 
and  the  Elbe  rivers  the  number  of  very  small,  small, 
great,  and  greater  sovereigns  in  the  seventeenth  century 
was  over  looo.  Even  then  the  fiction  of  a  united 
Holy  Roman  Empire  under  the  German  Emperor  was 
upheld,  but  it  was  a  mere  fiction.  The  emperor  had  no 
fixed  nor  considerable  revenue;  he  had  no  standing 
and  efficient  army;  and  being  at  the  same  time  the 
ruler  of  Austria  and  Hungary  he  had  no  vital  interest 
in  the  welfare  of  his  provinces  outside  his  Danubian 
monarchy.  In  fact,  the  interest  of  the  Habsburg  em- 
perors was  rather  the  other  way.  The  more  Germany 
was  split  up  into  innumerable  little  sovereignties,  the 
more  it  was  unable  to  offer  very  great  resistance  to  the 
Habsburgs.  The  great  international  treaty  of  1648, 
the  so-called  Westphalian  Peace,  had  really  increased 
the  anarchic  state  of  Germany,  and  by  its  terms 
Sweden  and  France  stood  as  guarantors  or  perpetuators 
of  the  German  anarchy.  It  is  at  the  present  day 
almost  impossible  to  realize  the  confusion,  the  chaos, 
the  incredible  disorder,  that  reigned  in  Germany  in  con- 
sequence of  this  political  dismemberment.  Each  sov- 
ereign had  coins  of  his  own,  had  customs-lines  of  his 
own,  had  little  armies  of  his  own,  separate  individual 
codes  of  law  of  his  own ;  the  religion  of  the  sovereign 
decided  as  a  rule  the  religion  of  his  subjects,  and  a  very 
considerable  portion  of  Germany  was  "under  the 
crozier,"  belonging  as  it  did  to  powerful  ecclesiastical 
potentates  such  as  the  Archbishops  of  Cologne,  of 
Mayence,  of  Treves,  and  the  Bishops  of  Bamberg  and 
Wiirtzburg.     Litigation  in  the  courts  of    these  small 


THE  UNITY  OF  GERMANY  187 

sovereigns,  and  appeals  to  the  central  court  of  the  Em- 
peror, were,  as  a  rule,  exposed  to  the  most  exasperating 
delays  and  to  ruinous  expense.  The  great  German 
poet  Schiller,  in  his  tragedy  Kabale  und  Liebe  ("In- 
trigue and  Love"),  has  given  us  a  terrible  picture  of  the 
cruelty  and  oppression  practised  by  these  petty  tyrants. 
Commerce  flourished  very  little,  and  the  German  towns 
had  long  fallen  from  that  commercial  importance  which 
they  had  reached  in  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  cen- 
turies. The  people  were  quite  indifferent  to  their  lot, 
and  did  not  even  rise  when  the  Landgrave  of  Hesse 
sold  them  like  chattels  to  the  English  to  fight  the 
Americans  in  the  war  of  1 775-1 783.  The  position  of 
the  women  was,  especially  in  the  seventeenth  century, 
most  degrading.  The  German  woman,  at  no  time 
endued  with  any  superior  intellectual  energy,  was  in 
the  seventeenth  century  an  altogether  obscure  and 
insignificant  partner  of  her  husband.  It  is  true  that  in 
the  first  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  status  of 
German  women  was  considerably  raised,  and  we  hear 
of  many  an  energetic,  highly  intellectual  and  cultivated 
woman  in  the  lives  of  the  great  German  writers  of  that 
century. 

This  rapid  sketch  of  the  misery  of  the  Germans  for 
lack  of  political  or  economic  unity  must  now  be  supple- 
mented with  a  picture  of  a  more  agreeable  kind.  The 
Germans,  while  politically  paralyzed  and  unable  to 
shake  off  the  torpor  that  had  fallen  upon  them  since 
the  end  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War  in  1648,  had  yet  one 
great  ideal  in  common  ;  as  they  describe  it  themselves, 
while  Germany  was  practically  a  mere  geographical 
expression,  "Germandom"  {Deutschthum)  soon  began  to 


1 88  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

exert  itself.  To  put  it  in  plain  words,  the  unity  of  the 
Germans  was,  in  contrast  to  that  of  the  EngUsh  and 
French,  at  first  not  a  political  unity  but  an  intellectual 
one.  They  were  politically  as  diverse  as  if  they  had 
been  total  foreigners  to  one  another.  Intellectually, 
however,  they  had  begun,  ever  since  the  second  half 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  to  feel  themselves  as  a  na- 
tion, to  learn  the  immense  value  of  their  language  in 
scientific  and  literary  works,  and  so  to  feel  a  conscious- 
ness of  German  nationality  which,  although  still  lack- 
ing political  union,  yet  prepared  the  way  for  the  latter 
too.  In  this  sense  the  history  of  German  literature  is 
even  more  important  to  the  historian  than  is  the  history 
of  French  or  English  literature.  The  works  in  which 
for  the  first  time  the  unparalleled  resources  of  the  Ger- 
man language  were  made  use  of  were  the  greatest 
possible  incentive  to  a  feeling  of  nationality  in  Germany. 
Even  up  to  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  all 
the  most  valuable  works  published  in  Germany  were 
still  written  either  in  Latin  or  in  French.  When,  how- 
ever, in  the  second  half  of  that  century  Lessing, 
Herder,  Goethe,  Wieland,  Schiller,  and  other  very  nu- 
merous German  writers,  in  their  works  —  many  of  which 
will  survive  forever — manifested  the  astounding 
power  of  the  German  idiom,  its  adaptability  to  prose 
and  poetry  alike,  its  capacity  for  the  highest  philosophi- 
cal researches  as  well  as  for  the  lowest  comedy ;  its 
force  in  narrative,  didactic,  and  descriptive  style  alike  — 
when  all  this  became  clear  to  the  enthusiastic  readers 
of  these  authors,  the  Germans  felt  that  a  new  era  had 
begun  in  their  history.  As  in  the  sixteenth  century 
the  spiritual  reform  of  the  Reformation  had  brought 


THE  UNITY  OF  GERMANY  189 

home  to  the  Germans  their  spiritual  unity,  so  in  the 
first  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  and  in  the  first  third 
of  the  nineteenth  century  the  constantly  increasing 
number  of  classical  works  written  in  German  impressed 
upon  the  Germans  the  fact  that  they  were  fast  becoming 
united  intellectually  too. 

The  disasters  falling  upon  the  Germans  from  1805- 
1807  at  the  hands  of  Napoleon,  and  of  which  we  have 
been  speaking  in  former  chapters,  could  not  but  impart 
to  every  single  German  a  feeling  that  a  nation  cannot 
rest  with  a  unity  which  is  only  intellectual  and  spiritual. 
More  than  that  was  needed.  Political  unity  was  re- 
quired, and  it  now  became  not  only  a  dream  but  a 
practical  interest  for  all  Germans  to  consolidate  the 
unity  of  their  political  edifice  in  order  to  reap  the  bene- 
fit of  their  spiritual  and  intellectual  unity  at  leisure. 
At  that  time  the  question  really  was,  not  whether  the 
political  unity  of  Germany  should  be  attempted,  for  on 
that  point  all  German-speaking  nations  were  at  one, 
but  which  German  power  should  realize  the  unity } 

As  we  have  seen,  the  house  of  Habsburg  or  Austria 
played,  even  in  181 5,  a  considerable  r61e  in  the  so-called 
German  Confederation,  and  until  1850  the  King  of 
Prussia,  the  only  rival  of  the  Habsburgs,  could  not  se- 
cure any  ascendency  or  hegemony  in  that  Confedera- 
tion, and  thus  it  was  hoped  by  very  many  people  that 
the  unity  of  Germany  was  to  come  from  Austria.  The 
problem,  therefore,  which  the  Germans  had  to  solve  in 
the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  was  whether 
their  political  unity  should  come  from  south  Germany 
or  Austria,  whence  had  come  their  spiritual  and  intel- 
lectual unity,  or  whether  it  should  come  from  north- 


190  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

ern  Germany  or  Prussia,  which  had  hitherto  done  little 
or  nothing  for  the  intellectual  regeneration  of  the  nation 
except  the  establishment  of  a  few  universities,  and 
which  had  in  1806  and  1807  proved  itself  to  be  utterly 
helpless,  disorganized,  and  decadent.  Such  as  hoped  to 
see  the  unity  of  Germany  realized  by  Austria  were 
singularly  mistaken  about  the  nature  of  that  Power. 
The  Habsburgs,  for  reasons  that  are  not  quite  clear, 
have  never  been  able  to  unite  any  of  the  nations  that 
have  come  under  their  rule  in  a  real  union.  They  have 
always  been  able  to  make  conglomerations  or  external 
accumulations  of  provinces.  Their  only  device  in  as- 
similating or  uniting  the  heterogeneous  people  of  their 
empire  has  always  been  to  ally  themselves  with  the 
Catholic  Church,  and  so  secure  a  certain  kind  of  unity. 
However,  it  is  quite  clear  that  the  Catholic  Church,  in 
spite  of  the  admirable  system  of  centralization  and  her 
great  powers  of  bringing  about  uniformity  of  thought 
and  sentiment,  could  not  produce  that  political  and  in- 
ternal or  national  unity  which  alone  in  modern  times 
can  give  real  power  to  a  state.  Austria,  in  other  words, 
or  rather  the  Habsburgs,  have  at  all  times  been  unsuc- 
cessful in  their  attempts  at  bringing  about  that  political 
and  national  unity  which  in  the  latter  half  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  many  a  patriotic  German  hoped  to  see 
introduced  into  their  own  country  at  the  hands  of  the 
Habsburgs. 

In  order  to  understand  this  important  point  very 
clearly  we  must  hark  back  for  a  moment  to  the  times 
of  a  war  which  happened  long  before  the  period  here 
treated,  but  the  influence  of  which  is  clearly  sensible  to 
the  present  day.     We  mean  the  famous  Silesian  wars 


THE  UNITY  OF  GERMANY  I9I 

which,  with  the  interruption  of  a  few  years  (1748- 1756), 
raged  from  1740  to  1763.  In  1741,  Frederick  the  Great 
succeeded  by  one  victory,  obtained  by  his  generals  at 
Mollwitz,  in  wresting  from  Maria-Theresa,  the  ruler  of 
Austria- Hungary,  the  large  and  fertile  province  of 
Silesia.  All  the  campaigns  that  followed,  with  their 
numerous  battles  until  the  peace  of  1763,  may  from  the 
standpoint  of  our  present  considerations  be  quite 
omitted.  They  were  excessively  numerous,  and  some  of 
them  very  famous,  yet  they  were  unable  to  alter  in  any 
way  whatever  the  effect  of  the  battle  of  Mollwitz,  and 
they  may  therefore  for  our  present  purpose  be  left  out  of 
consideration  altogether.  By  the  conquest  of  Silesia 
Frederick  the  Great  acquired  a  German-speaking  prov- 
ince, and  was  enabled  to  round  off  the  territory  of 
Prussia  both  territorially  and  nationally.  At  that  time 
Prussia  had  very  few,  if  any,  inhabitants  who  were  not 
German-speaking,  and  the  German-speaking  people  all 
but  formed  the  totality  of  Prussia,  whose  nationality 
was  therefore  practically  unbroken.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  loss  of  Silesia  to  Maria-Theresa  affected  the  whole 
subsequent  history  of  Austria.  For  in  1740,  before 
Frederick  wrested  Silesia  from  Maria-Theresa,  the 
majority  of  the  inhabitants  in  the  Austrian  Empire 
were  Germans.  Austria  at  that  time  possessed  neither 
Galicia  nor  Bukovina,  neither  Bosnia  nor  Venetian  Italy. 
The  Germans  were  still  in  numerical  preponderance  in 
Austria.  By  the  loss  of  Silesia  this  preponderance  of 
the  German  element  in  Austria  was  done  away  with. 
Maria-Theresa,  in  order  to  make  up  for  her  territorial 
losses,  was  compelled  to  seek  for  compensation  east- 
ward, that  is,  in  parts  of  Europe  where  there  was  no 


192  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

German  element  By  her  conquests  in  1772  and  1775 
(Galicia  and  Bukovina),  in  1797,  the  Treaty  of  Campo 
Formio  (Venetian  Italy),  etc.,  etc.,  Austria  acquired  prov- 
inces indeed,  but  always  territories  inhabited  by  peoples 
of  an  entirely  divergent  nationality.  Thus  it  may  be 
seen  that  the  Silesian  wars  threw  into  the  heart  of  Aus- 
tria the  seeds  of  perennial  disunion,  and  rendered  Aus- 
tria to  the  present  day  incapable  of  uniting  her  people 
into  a  political  fabric  of  homogeneity.  Frederick  the 
Great  indeed  deprived  Austria  not  only  of  a  province, 
but  in  a  sense  of  all  her  provinces,  because  Austria 
could  never  really  assimilate  those  provinces,  having 
once  lost,  as  she  did,  the  preponderance  of  her  German 
subjects  and  being  unable  to  restore  it.  Prussia,  which 
obtained  the  heterogeneous  elements  of  the  three  por- 
tions of  Poland  in  1772,  1793,  and  1795,  was  yet  so  rich 
in  her  German  provinces,  especially  after  the  Congress 
of  Vienna  in  18 15,  when  she  obtained  large  provinces 
on  the  Rhine,  that  her  national  unity,  although  broken 
into  in  her  eastern  possessions,  was  infinitely  superior 
to  that  of  Austria. 

From  the  preceding  considerations  it  is  evident  that 
Prussia  was  in  1850  in  a  position  of  far  greater  advan- 
tage for  the  national  work  of  the  unity  of  Germany  than 
Austria  could  possibly  be.  For  Prussia  itself  occupied 
a  very  considerable  part  of  Germany  proper,  it  had 
German  people  as  subjects,  a  perfect  unity  of  language 
and  also  largely  of  religion,  and  all  that  she  lacked 
was  some  one  great  statesman  who  by  genius  and  luck 
might  realize  the  old  hope.  In  Austria,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  greatest  of  all  statesmen  could  not  have 
entertained  a  hope  of  realizing  outside  Austria,  that  is. 


THE  UNITY  OF  GERMANY  193 

in  Germany,  what  a  succession  of  rulers  and  statesmen 
in  the  preceding  three  centuries  had  never  been  able 
to  realize  in  Austria  proper.  The  ethnography  of 
Austria  was  against  any  statesman  who  would  have 
tried  to  realize  the  unity  of  Germany.  The  ethnog- 
raphy of  Germany  was  quite  in  favour  of  Prussia. 
Prussia  indeed  wanted  great  men;  Austria  could  not 
have  done  much  even  with  the  greatest  men  at  the 
helm.  In  the  light  of  events  in  our  own  times  we  can 
perceive  with  dazzling  clearness  that  any  hope  of  seeing 
the  unity  of  Germany  realized  by  Austria  was  doomed 
to  failure.  Austria  had  neither  a  powerfully  organized 
and  united  army,  nor  a  regular  and  well-stocked  ex- 
chequer. She  had  no  national  forces  either  in  literature, 
science,  art,  or  any  other  intellectual  or  spiritual  de- 
partment. Without  such  aids  even  the  greatest  states- 
man is  shorn  of  results.  Prussia,  on  the  other  hand 
through  the  reforms  introduced  by  a  number  of  non 
Prussian  statesmen,  such  as  Stein,  Hardenberg,  Schorn- 
horst,  Altenstein,  and  others  from  1807  onwards,  had 
created  a  system  of  national  education  both  in  law  and 
high  schools,  by  works  both  scientific  and  literary,  and 
in  her  army  as  well  as  in  her  national  revenue  she  had 
placed  herself  in  a  state  of  great  efficiency.  Here  in- 
deed a  great  statesman  might,  by  a  clever,  timely,  and 
successful  diplomacy,  achieve  much. 

The  old  question  whether  Athens  made  Themistocles 
or  whether  Themistocles  made  Athens,  is  to  the  mind  of 
many  a  historian  an  unsolvable  problem.  However,  by 
a  coincidence  no  doubt  very  strange,  yet  regular,  we 
find  that  in  any  case  of  a  really  great  man  in  history  the 
possibilities  of  his  career  had  long  been  prepared  by  the 


194  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

State  or  the  nation  to  which  he  belongs.  So  it  is  in  our 
present  case.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  influence 
of  Bismarck  from  the  time  when  he  came  to  power 
and  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  complete  confidence  of 
King  William  of  Prussia  was  a  decisive  power  in  the 
history  of  that  country  and  of  Germany.  Yet  it  is 
equally  certain  that  without  the  previous  reforms  made 
by  such  men  as  Luther,  Melanchthon,  Brenz,  and  the 
still  greater  Hterary  and  artistic  lights  of  the  Germans 
who  gave  them  intellectual  unity,  let  alone  all  the 
labours  of  those  great  reformers  in  Prussia  who  suc- 
ceeded, by  indefatigable  and  ill-requited  work,  in  re- 
storing Prussia  to  her  former  greatness,  Bismarck's 
genius  alone  could  not  have  done  anything.  Bismarck 
at  Vienna  would  have  been  as  helpless  as  was  at  the 
same  place  Schmerling,  or  Count  Beust.  Bismarck's 
genius  is  great,  but  to  him  too  we  may  apply  the  great 
rule  of  history,  "  Est  locus  in  rebus  "  (History  is  largely 
influenced  by  the  locality  where  things  happen). 

From  the  Revolution  in  1848  to  the  end  of  the  fifties 
Prussia  was  still  held  to  be  subordinate  to  Austria 
in  point  of  influence  in  Germany;  and  an  attack  on 
Austria  was  not  considered  in  any  way  as  promising 
sure  success  for  the  Prussian  army.  At  the  same  time 
the  Prussian  army  had  ever  since  the  great  defeat  of 
Jena  in  1806  been  reformed  and  improved  and  made 
an  instrument  of  fighting  second  to  none  in  Europe,  and, 
as  subsequent  events  have  proved,  superior  to  most. 
When  Austria  in  1859  had  been  defeated  by  France 
(as  related  above),  and  had  been  deprived  of  most  of  her 
territory  in  Italy ;  when  at  the  same  time  the  uncom- 
promising position  of  the  Hungarians  towards  Austria 


THE  UNITY  OF  GERMANY  IQS 

rendered  the  interior  security  of  Austria  more  than 
problematic ;  a  new  view  of  the  relation  of  the  Danu- 
bian  monarchy  to  Prussia  was  taken  by  several  Prus- 
sian statesmen.  Of  those  men  of  action,  Bismarck  was 
even  at  that  time  the  most  important.  He  came  from 
a  small  family  in  North  Germany,  and  had  to  recom- 
mend him  neither  wealth  nor  very  remarkable  personal 
connections.  His  strongest  recommendation  was  his 
extraordinary  political  genius.  Now  that  we  have  been 
for  some  time  in  possession  of  his  letters,  his  speeches, 
and  may  with  fair  prospect  of  success  cast  a  construc- 
tive glance  over  the  whole  life  of  the  great  statesman, 
we  may  perhaps  be  entitled  to  formulate  his  peculiar 
genius  in  a  few  concise  words. 

Undoubtedly  Bismarck  was  a  remarkable  personality, 
and  sheer  personality  has  always  proved  a  power  in 
history;  but  in  addition  to  the  unanalyzable  qualities 
and  charms  of  a  strong  personality,  aided  by  an  im- 
posing stature,  force,  and  expressiveness  of  feature,  we 
must  always  underUne  the  fact  that  Bismarck  was  en- 
dowed with  particularly  great  technical  gifts  for  the 
conduct  of  great  political  affairs.  In  the  first  place,  all 
his  diplomatic  measures  and  other  manoeuvres  were 
based  on  information  regarding  the  persons  and  cir- 
cumstances he  was  called  upon  to  deal  with,  such  as 
very  few  statesmen  have  ever  had  at  their  disposal. 
To  a  perfect  knowledge  of  Prussia,  of  the  influential 
men  and  women  of  recent  history,  Bismarck  joined  a 
very  rare  insight  into  the  general  political  state  of  affairs 
in  Europe.  He  was  perfect  master  of  the  French  lan- 
guage, and  had  also  an  astounding  command  of  Eng- 
lish ;  nay,  when  later  on  he  was  Ambassador  in  Russia, 


196  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

he  acquired  a  working  knowledge  of  Russian.  Of  the 
courts  and  the  political  situation  of  the  leading  Powers 
in  Europe  he  had  acquired  from  personal  study  and 
from  a  judicious  course  of  reading  such  ample  and 
accurate  knowledge,  that  as  a  rule  he  was  better  in- 
formed about  the  tendencies  and  character  of  political 
events  than  most  men  dealing  with  them  directly  or 
indirectly.  Through  all  his  life  we  are  struck  with  that 
soHdity  of  information.  As  is  only  natural,  from  a 
basis  so  solid  and  well  knit,  the  vigorous  mind  of  Bis- 
marck could  not  but  infer  sound  and  lasting  conclu- 
sions. Accordingly  he  was  seldom  mistaken  in  the 
strategy  of  his  actions,  although  at  all  periods  of  his 
life  the  wisdom  of  his  methods  was  challenged,  doubted, 
attacked,  and  even  ridiculed  by  men  in  important  and 
commanding  positions.  In  fact,  while  we  cannot  but 
repeat  the  remark  that  Bismarck's  triumph  was  only 
the  concluding  scene  of  the  various  antecedent  histori- 
cal events  preparing  the  unity  of  Germany,  yet  we 
should  fly  in  the  face  of  historical  truth  if  we  did  not 
recognize  that  without  Bismarck's  energy  and  wisdom 
the  last  part  of  the  long  history  of  German  unity  could 
have  been  enacted  only  very  much  later  than  1871. 
Bismarck  certainly  precipitated  a  political  work  un- 
doubtedly inevitable,  yet  still  dependent  on  a  concourse 
of  circumstances  which  only  a  superior  statesman  was 
able  to  focus  and  utilize. 

In  our  own  times,  when  the  passions  roused  by  the 
greatest  events  in  German  history  have  not  yet  subsided, 
we  are  treated  every  year  to  another  work  by  a  German 
professor,  tracing  the  origin  of  modern  Germany  either 
to  the  Emperor  William  I.  alone,  or  to  the  anonymous 


THE  UNITY  OF  GERMANY  I97 

yet  "  exceedingly  important "  influence  of  this  or  that 
minor  German  sovereign ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  to  Bis- 
marck alone  and  exclusively.  The  former  opinion,  de- 
fended by  Professor  Ottokar  Lorenz,  the  latter  by 
innumerable  German  writers,  are,  we  take  it,  both  un- 
tenable. Like  all  great  historical  facts,  the  unity  of 
Germany  was  for  generations  prepared  by  general  and 
vast  causes  embracing  an  infinite  number  of  particular 
phenomena  ;  but  was  consummated  by  the  strong  hand 
of  one  man.  It  is  certain  that  that  one  man  was  not 
Emperor  William  I.  It  is  equally  certain  that  that  man 
was  Bismarck. 

It  will  be  found  on  intimate  study  of  the  times  of 
Bismarck  that  he  had  firmly  seized  the  necessity  of 
bringing  about  the  unity  of  Germany  under  Prussian 
ascendency  by  the  most  careful  conduct  of  Prussia's 
foreign  policy.  He  knew  that  the  consummation  of  the 
great  work  could  not  be  done  by  the  introduction  or 
academical  spread  of  mere  ideas.  He  knew  it  was  pre- 
eminently a  matter  of  diplomacy  and  war.  He  clearly 
pointed  out  in  letters  and  speeches,  that  while  some 
nations  may  bring  about  their  national  unity  through 
treaties,  or  the  slow  work  of  mutual  assimilation,  the 
Germans,  as  he  rightly  held,  could  not  possibly  realize 
their  secular  hope  without  establishing  themselves  as  a 
great  mihtary  power.  This  is  the  sense  of  his  famous 
utterance  that  history  is  made  by  blood  and  iron.  No- 
body admired  Cavour,  the  unifier  of  Italy,  more  than 
did  Bismarck ;  likewise  nobody  acknowledged  the  sur- 
passing merit  of  Francis  Deak  in  bringing  about  the 
unity  of  Hungary  in  a  peaceful  way  more  than  did  Bis- 
marck ;  but  nobody  also  saw  more  clearly  that  the  prob- 


198  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

lems  with  which  Deak  or  Cavour  had  to  contend,  although 
identical  in  their  objects  with  that  of  Bismarck,  yet  had 
a  character  so  different  that  for  their  realization  other 
means  were  required.  It  is  this  clear  insight  into  the 
real  needs  for  the  establishment  of  German  unity  that 
constitutes  the  greatness  of  Bismarck.  It  is  true,  his 
complete  success  has  shed  an  unusual  lustre  upon  his 
name  and  his  policy.  However,  it  is  not  the  success  of 
Bismarck  that  ought  to  prompt  us  to  recognize  him  as 
one  of  the  greatest  statesmen.  It  is,  as  we  shall  see, 
both  the  wisdom  and  the  moderation  of  his  politics.  As 
diplomatic  reverses  at  home  or  abroad  could  never  dis- 
courage him,  even  so  the  greatest  triumphs  in  the  field 
or  in  diplomatic  negotiations  were  never  able  to  beguile 
him  into  excessive  actions.  We  must  admire  both  his 
courage  and  his  moderation,  and  it  is  probably  the  latter 
quality  which  will  make  his  name  forever  that  of  a 
model  statesman.  His  adversaries  were  very  numerous. 
It  is  well  known  that  the  Empress  Frederick  III.,  the 
daughter  of  Queen  Victoria,  was  the  persistent  and  im- 
placable enemy  of  Bismarck.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
historian  Mommsen  was  likewise  continually  hostile  to 
Bismarck;  and  it  is  certain  that  the  great  man  lived  in 
a  world  of  incessant  intrigues  directed  against  his  person 
and  against  his  work.  His  greatest  successes  were  un- 
able to  persuade  the  Empress  Frederick  that  she  was  in 
error,  and  all  his  enemies  and  opponents  were  conspiring 
to  shake  the  nerve  of  the  Titan.  In  vain.  In  addition 
to  physical  resources  of  the  rarest  strength,  Bismarck, 
like  all  great  men,  had  also  an  unusual  amount  of  good 
luck.  Like  Richelieu  and  Mazarin,  the  two  greatest 
ministers  of  France,  Bismarck  could,  under  all  circum- 


THE  UNITY  OF  GERMANY  1 99 

stances,  count  on  the  unswerving  attachment  and  friend- 
ship of  his  sovereign.  Against  this  powerful  friendship 
and  steadfast  confidence  of  the  monarch  all  the  shafts 
of  envy  and  jealousy  were  hurled  in  vain.  Not  that  the 
Emperor  always  shared  the  opinions  or  the  desires  of 
Bismarck;  in  fact  he  was  both  in  1864,  in  1866,  and  in 
1870  very  reluctant  to  accept  the  policy  of  his  great 
minister.  However  reluctant,  he  in  the  end  consented 
to  it,  and  it  is  only  fair  to  say  that  without  that  constant 
and  unfailing  support  and  countenance  on  the  part  of 
his  monarch,  Bismarck  could  not  possibly  have  resisted 
the  unceasing  cabal  undermining  his  position. 

In  English-speaking  countries,  let  alone  in  France, 
the  prevalent  idea  of  Bismarck  is  that  of  a  harsh  man, 
inaccessible  to  any  human  sentiment,  and  obeying  only 
the  dictates  of  political  egoism.  There  is,  however,  very 
much  exaggeration  in  that  picture.  Bismarck  was 
neither  harsh  nor  cruel.  He  certainly  was  imperious 
and  was  conscious  of  the  necessity  of  severe  measures  ; 
but  both  in  private  life,  whether  in  his  relations  to  his 
family  or  to  the  few  personal  friends  he  had  (amongst 
whom  was  the  American  historian  Motley),  and  in  public 
life,  his  was  chiefly  the  character  of  a  man  who  acted  on 
objective  and  not  on  subjecuve  motives.  All  over  Bis- 
marck is  written  the  great  German  term,  Sachpolitik ; 
that  is,  a  policy  of  real  and  objective  State  interests, 
without  regard  to  personal  likes  or  dislikes.  In  his 
personal  character  there  certainly  were  two  redeeming 
features.  In  the  first  place,  he  was  a  man  of  profound 
and  serene  humour.  To  the  modern  mind  even  Richelieu 
and  Mazarin  lack  this  relieving  feature,  and  appear 
therefore  somewhat  stiff.     Bismarck  had  a  remarkable 


zoo  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

share  of  that  North  German  humour  which  is  certainly 
more  grim  than  agreeable,  but  which  no  doubt  helps  us 
to  put  some  of  the  uncouth  things  of  this  'world  into 
better  proportion.  It  was  certainly  worthy  of  the  finest 
humour  when  Bismarck,  at  the  height  of  the  all-decisive 
battle  of  Sadowa  (Koeniggraetz),  anxious  to  know  the 
opinion  of  Moltke,  the  General-in-Chief,  about  the  prob- 
able issue  of  the  engagement,  approached  the  old  and 
very  reticent  general,  not  with  anxious  questions,  but  by 
offering  him  his  cigar-box  and  watching  Moltke's  way  of 
selecting  the  best  of  the  cigars.  When  Moltke  carefully 
examined  the  cigars  and  actually  found  out  the  best  of 
them,  Bismarck  knew  that  the  battle  was  going  on  satis- 
factorily for  Prussia,  and  smilingly  withdrew  from  the 
presence  of  Moltke. 

The  other  and  even  more  satisfactory  feature  in 
Bismarck  was  his  utter  frankness.  In  him  there  was  no 
cant  and  no  hypocrisy.  He  never  said  he  was  righteous 
when  he  was  only  political,  and  it  is  he  who  had  the 
sincerity  of  saying,  **  We  Prussians  make  no  moral 
conquests,"  which  in  plain  English  means  that  Prus- 
sians are  selfish,  interested,  and  ruthless  fighters.  This 
frankness  very  frequently  puzzled  and  quite  misled 
his  diplomatic  opponents.  They  were  unable  to  believe 
in  it,  and  so  invariably  searched  for  other  motives 
behind  that  apparent  frankness.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
Bismarck  was  quite  frank,  and  he  had  absolutely 
broken  with  the  former  habit  of  dissimulation  and 
reticence  considered  to  be  the  two  chief  artifices  of 
diplomacy.  It  is  natural  that  such  frankness  is  repul- 
sive to  people  who  are  habitually  self-conscious  and 
not  frank.      On  the  other  hand,  it  is  equally  certain 


THE  UNITY  OF  GERMANY  20I 

that  the  greatness  of  Bismarck  is  increased  and  not  low- 
ered by  that  noble  and  virile  quality  which  most  men  are 
neither  allowed  nor  able  to  practise  in  their  own  lives. 

We  have  so  far  seen  that  Bismarck's  successes  are 
based  on  sound  information  of  all  the  elements  and 
factors  necessary  for  his  success,  and  on  a  personality 
most  powerful,  sincere,  and  aided  by  the  constant 
friendship  of  his  monarch.  We  may  now  see  the 
details  of  his  three  great  triumphs ;  we  mean  the  war 
with  Denmark  in  1864;  the  war  with  Austria  in  1866; 
and  the  war  with  France  in  1 870-1 871. 

The  Danish  war  we  call  a  triumph,  although  from 
the  military  standpoint  it  was  not  only  not  a  glory  for 
Prussia,  who  acted  against  tiny  Denmark  with  the  aid 
of  Austria,  and  so  could,  even  in  case  of  great  victories, 
have  scarcely  claimed  any  particular  glory  for  it ;  nay, 
it  is  well  known  that  the  Prussian  army  did  not,  in 
1864,  manifest  any  of  that  superiority  which  made 
her  so  famous  in  the  other  two  wars.  We  call  the 
Danish  war  a  triumph  of  Bismarck,  because  it  was  the 
deeply  thought-out  manoeuvre  of  how  to  embroil  and 
compromise  Austria,  and  so  bring  about  the  second  war. 

Briefly,  the  facts  are  these.  The  Southern  provinces 
of  Denmark  are  called  Schleswig-Holstein ;  they  were 
then,  as  they  are  now,  mostly  inhabited  by  German- 
speaking  people,  and  they  commanded  especially  the 
harbour  of  Kiel,  which  it  was  essential  for  Prussia  to 
have  in  order  to  secure  command  of  the  Baltic  and  the 
North  Sea,  by  making  (as  has  been  since  done)  a  canal 
between  Kiel  and  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe  River.  At 
that  time  Austria  and  Prussia  were  still  both  members 
of  the  German  Confederacy,  and  it  was  certain   that 


202  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

Austria  would  not  allow  Prussia  to  possess  herself  of 
the  two  duchies,  Schleswig-Holstein,  single-handed. 
The  Germans,  bulHes  with  regard  to  small  people,  as 
are  all  great  powers,  heeded  not  the  constant  and  just 
recriminations  of  Denmark,  which  had  given  no  umbrage 
or  cause  for  a  war  to  any  German  sovereign,  let  alone 
to  the  German  Confederation. 

It  was  Bismarck's  aim  to  embroil  Austria  in  a  ques- 
tion of  no  possible  interest  to  Austria,  and  thereby  to 
win  diplomatic  leverage  over  her.  It  was  likewise  his 
object  to  feel  his  way  in  the  great  international  ques- 
tion whether  Europe  would  or  would  not  interfere 
with  the  plans  of  Germany.  Although  most  of  the 
statesmen  in  Prussia  seriously  objected  to  Bismarck's 
Danish  policy,  apprehending,  as  they  did,  the  im- 
mediate interference  of  England  (the  Princess  of 
Wales  being  a  daughter  of  the  King  of  Denmark), 
yet  Bismarck  was  right  in  assuming  that  neither  Eng- 
land nor  Russia  would  interfere,  and  that  the  only 
upshot  of  the  whole  enterprise  would  be  to  engage 
Austria  in  what  for  her  was  a  sterile  and  embarrassing 
undertaking. 

In  this  he  completely  succeeded.  The  Danes  were 
of  course  in  the  end  forced  to  submit,  and  Austria  and 
Prussia  administered  the  two  duchies  in  common. 
Bismarck  rightly  calculated  that  such  common  ad- 
ministration of  a  province,  useful  only  to  neighbour- 
ing Prussia,  could  not  but  lead  to  friction,  and  thus 
give  him  a  new  handle  for  complications  with  Austria. 
And  when  matters  did  not  proceed  rapidly  enough, 
Bismarck  forced  a  treaty  upon  Austria,  the  treaty  of 
Gastein,  August  14th,  1865,  in  which  he  apparently  put 


THE  UNITY  OF  GERMANY  203 

an  end  to  possible  friction  in  the  administration  of  the 
two  duchies,  by  giving  Austria  and  Prussia  two  distinct 
territories  for  administration  ;  yet  in  reality  the  treaty 
of  Gastein  was,  by  its  very  nature,  certain  to  lead  to 
still  more  serious  complications.  Austria,  as  Bismarck 
expected  her  to  be,  found  herself  wronged,  and  the  war 
of  1866  became  only  a  matter  of  a  few  incidents  which 
Bismarck  did  not  hesitate  to  provoke.  At  that  time 
Bismarck  was  struggling  both  with  his  numerous 
adversaries  at  the  Court  of  Berlin,  and  with  the  un- 
yielding Parliament  of  Prussia,  the  members  of  which, 
in  utter  ignorance  of  the  necessities  of  the  case,  re- 
fused Bismarck  supplies  for  the  army,  and  so  forced 
him  to  find  the  means  of  keeping  up  the  army,  and 
increasing  it  by  autocratic  ordinances  of  the  King, 
countersigned  by  him.  He  then  (i 863-1 865)  was  the 
most  unpopular  man  in  Prussia.  However,  he  per- 
sisted, because  he  clearly  saw  that  the  war  with  Aus- 
tria was  inevitable,  and  that  by  such  a  war  alone  the 
destiny  of  Germany  and  the  ascendency  of  Prussia 
could  possibly  be  realized. 

As  already  stated.  King  William,  as  he  then  was, 
was  very  much  opposed  to  the  war  with  Austria,  and 
only  with  great  difficulty  could  Bismarck  persuade  him 
to  enter  upon  it.  Moltke,  on  the  other  hand,  was  quite 
confident  of  defeating  the  Austrian  army.  In  fact,  the 
defeat  of  the  Austrian  army  was  for  every  expert  a 
foregone  conclusion.  In  addition  to  the  usual  defect 
of  all  Austrian  armies,  that  is  to  say,  to  their  diversity  of 
languages  and  races  and  the  consequent  lack  of  unity 
so  fatal  to  all  armies,  the  Austrian  army  then  was  still 
armed  with  old-patterned  rifles,  —  with  muzzle-loaders, — 


204  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

whereas  the  Prussians  had  breech-loaders,  so  that  the 
Prussian  infantry  was  able  to  shoot  six  times  more 
quickly  than  did  the  Austrians. 

It  is  to  the  ordinary  contemplator  of  the  manners 
and  actions  of  governments  one  of  the  greatest  riddles 
how  bureaucratic  governments  will,  even  in  the  face 
of  the  greatest  dangers,  scarcely  move  to  introduce 
reforms.  The  fact  that  the  Prussian  army  was  pro- 
vided with  much  superior  arms  had  long  been  known 
by  Austria  and  by  everybody ;  yet  no  attempt  was 
made  to  improve  the  Austrian  rifle.  In  addition  to 
this,  another  characteristic  feature  of  Austrian  military 
organization  was  practised:  the  old  Austrian  mistake 
of  placing  the  wrong  man  in  the  right  place,  and  the 
right  man  in  the  wrong  place.  Bismarck  had,  as  we 
have  seen  in  a  former  chapter,  long  promised  Italy  to 
help  her  in  her  attempts  at  unity,  and  accordingly  he 
had  early  in  1866  concluded  a  treaty  with  the  Italian 
Government,  in  keeping  with  which  Italy  was  bound 
to  attack  Austria  in  Lombardy  at  the  same  time  that 
Prussia  should  attack  Austria  in  Bohemia.  At  that 
time  the  Austrian  general  Benedek  had  from  long  ex- 
perience a  very  complete  knowledge  of  Lombardy,  and 
was  no  doubt  able  to  conduct  a  successful  campaign 
against  Italy.  Archduke  Albert,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
Austrian  Emperor's  uncle,  had  a  very  authoritative  and 
useful  knowledge  of  Bohemia,  and  would  have  no 
doubt  played  a  creditable  r61e  in  a  Bohemian  cam- 
paign against  Prussia.  In  that  war,  therefore,  Benedek 
should  have  obtained  the  chief  command  in  Lom- 
bardy, which  he  knew  very  well,  and  Archduke  Albert 
the  chief  command  in  Bohemia,  with  which  he  was  so 


THE  UNITY  OF  GERMANY  IfeOS 

intimately  acquainted.  However,  Austrian  wisdom,  as 
usual,  intrusted  Benedek  with  the  command  in  Bohemia, 
of  which  he  knew  nothing,  and  sent  Albert  to  Italy, 
where  his  presence  against  the  small  and  untrained 
army  of  Italy  was  scarcely  required. 

The  military  consequences  of  that  blunder  became 
manifest  at  once.  Benedek,  attacked  in  the  northeast 
of  Bohemia  by  the  converging  troops  of  Prussia  under 
Moltke  and  the  Crown  Prince,  lost  his  head  at  once, 
and  by  a  series  of  strategic  mistakes  lost  a  number 
of  minor  engagements,  and  finally,  in  the  great  battle 
of  Sadowa  or  Koeniggraetz,  on  July  3d,  1866,  was 
forced  to  beat  a  hasty  retreat.  The  Prussians  at  once 
followed  him  and  occupied  Moravia  and  marched  close 
to  Vienna.  It  was  then  that  Bismarck's  greatness  and 
real  statesmanship  were  shining  in  the  most  brilliant 
manner.  The  Prussian  army  and  all  its  generals,  to- 
gether with  the  Prussian  king,  were  intoxicated  with 
their  rapid  victories,  and  in  their  enthusiasm  naturally 
insisted  with  violence  on  entering  Vienna.  However, 
Bismarck,  whose  eyes  were  already  directed  towards 
France,  and  who  wanted  to  complete  the  great  scheme 
of  the  German  nation,  clearly  felt  that  he  would  soon 
need  the  friendship  and  alliance  of  Austria,  and  that  he 
could  obtain  neither  by  a  gratuitous  humiliation  of  the 
Austrian  ruler,  such  as  an  entrance  into  Vienna  would 
unfailingly  entail  upon  the  latter.  He  therefore  clearly 
and  unmistakably  declared  to  his  sovereign  that  it  was 
in  the  greatest  interest  of  Prussia  to  discontinue  her 
victorious  progress,  and  to  make  peace  with  Austria  on 
a  basis  not  humiliating  to  the  conquered.  Another 
Prussian  array  had  meanwhile  made  a  most  victorious 


206  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

advance  into  Hanover  and  the  South-German  States, 
who  had  joined  Austria  and  were  trying  to  fight  Prussia. 
On  the  other  hand,  however,  the  Austrians  had  been 
very  successful  against  the  Italians,  both  on  sea  and  on 
land,  and  Italy  was  practically  at  the  mercy  of  Austria. 
Finally,  Bismarck  was  afraid,  as  he  himself  said  later 
on,  that  Napoleon  III.,  Emperor  of  France,  in  order 
to  put  an  end  to  the  rapid  victories  of  Prussia,  might 
attack  the  Rhenish  provinces  and  thereby  render 
Sadowa  and  other  successful  battles  of  the  war  barren 
and  unprofitable. 

When  Bismarck  saw  that  no  ordinary  means  would 
suffice  to  persuade  the  generals  and  the  Prussian  King 
to  adopt  his  view  of  the  situation,  he  threatened  to  take 
his  life  rather  than  consent  to  an  entry  into  Vienna  and 
the  humiliation  of  the  Austrian  ruler.  As  usual  he  pre- 
vailed, and  the  Peace  of  Prague  was  made  (1866),  by 
which  Austria  lost  no  territory  whatever,  and  had  to 
pay  a  merely  nominal  sum  by  way  of  compensation,  but 
by  which  Austria  consented  to  be  no  longer  a  member 
of  the  German  Confederation.  In  consequence  of  that, 
Prussia,  which  had  meanwhile  incorporated  Hanover 
and  other  territories,  especially  Frankfort-on-the-Main, 
had  become  the  leading  Power  in  Germany,  and  Bis- 
marck now  established  the  North-German  Confederacy, 
which  was  a  partial  realization  of  the  great  hope  of  the 
German  nation.  Italy,  as  we  have  seen,  now  obtained 
even  the  Venetian  territory  hitherto  held  by  Austria, 
and  so  the  campaign  of  1866  established  the  ascendency 
of  Prussia  in  Germany,  completed  the  unity  of  Italy, 
and  to  the  present  day  placed  Austria  on  the  level  of  a 
minor  Power. 


XII      . 

THE  FRANCO-GERMAN   WAR 

THE  victories  of  the  Prussians  in  1866;  the  ascen- 
dency of  Prussia  in  Germany  since  the  day  of 
Sadowa,  were  events  the  importance  of  which  was 
clear  to  many  a  statesman  and  diplomatist  in  Europe. 
Thiers,  Edgar  Quinet,  and  other  leading  politicians 
and  public  men  of  France,  clearly  pointed  out  that 
Bismarck  could  not  possibly  rest  on  the  laurels  of  his 
Austrian  campaign ;  that  he  was  necessarily  striving 
to  complete  the  unity  of  Germany,  which  in  1867  was 
yet  far  from  being  completed.  Bismarck  in  1866  had 
united  the  Northern  states  of  Germany  into  the  North- 
German  Confederacy  ;  but  the  Southern  states  —  Ba- 
varia, Wiirtemberg,  and  Baden  —  were  not  yet  combined 
with  Prussia.  It  is  a  question  quite  open  to  historical 
discussion  whether  Bismarck  could  not  already  in  1866 
have  brought  about  the  unity  of  the  Northern  with  the 
Southern  states  of  Germany.  In  fact,  many  a  modern 
historian  has  reproached  Bismarck,  with  great  show  of 
justice,  with  a  deliberate  plan  of  retarding  the  unity  of 
all  Germany  between  1866  to  1870.  Bismarck,  it  is 
said,  whose  military  success  over  Bavaria  in  1866  had 
been  as  complete  as  his  success  over  Austria,  might 
have  very  well  forced  Bavaria  and  other  Southern  states 
of  Germany  to  join  the  North-German  Confederacy. 
In  that  way  the  Franco-German  war  might  easily  have 

207 


208  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

been  avoided,  and  the  unity  of  Germany  secured  in  a 
peaceful  manner,  without  the  terrible  loss  in  men  and 
money  entailed  by  the  gigantic  war  in  1870  and  1871. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  in  the  preceding  arguments 
there  are  some  elements  of  truth;  and  Bavaria,  al- 
though at  all  times  highly  differentiated  from  the  rest 
of  Germany,  and  more  especially  from  Prussia,  might 
have  been  persuaded  to  join  the  North-German  Con- 
federacy without  the  terrible  war  against  France.  On 
the  other  hand,  Bismarck's  considerations  were  of  a 
deeper,  and,  on  the  whole,  of  a  juster  nature.  He 
felt  that  the  South-German  states  could  not  be  per- 
manently held  as  members  of  a  united  Germany,  un- 
less a  great  and  successful  war  would  put  an  end  to 
any  attempt  at  local  separation,  and  to  the  numerous 
centrifugal  tendencies  of  the  Catholic  Church  and 
Catholic  sovereign  families  in  the  south  of  Germany. 
Moreover,  it  is  well  known  that  those  Southern  states 
in  1867  as  well  as  in  1740  or  1645,  were  always  co- 
quetting with  France,  and  had,  by  secular  tradition 
and  habit,  a  policy  of  friendship,  nay,  of  alliance,  with 
the  French.  These  old  historical  traditions  and  ten- 
dencies, Bismarck  rightly  felt,  could  not  be  efficiently 
combated  by  anything  short  of  a  successful  war  against 
France,  in  which  the  Bavarians  too  would  be  obliged 
to  undergo  the  sufferings  and  to  accept  the  sacrifices 
necessary  to  the  completion  of  the  great  plan.  Bis- 
marck, therefore,  made  no  definite  attempt  at  persuad- 
ing Bavaria,  Wiirtemberg,  and  Baden  from  1866  to 
1870  to  join  the  North-German  confederates. 

In  France,  the  fates  of  the  nation  were  partly  in  the 
hands  of  Napoleon   III.,    partly  in  those   of  an   ob- 


THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR  209 

streperous,  hysterical,  and  aimless  opposition.  Napo- 
leon III.,  at  no  time  a  great  statesman,  was  then  more- 
over enfeebled  and  rendered  practically  useless  by  his 
physical  inability  —  he  suffered  from  stone  disease  — 
and  his  plans  were  easily  overridden  by  those  of  his 
wife  Eugenie.  The  Empress  was  one  of  the  most 
beautiful  women  in  Europe.  In  body  endowed  with 
the  most  astounding  vigour  and  health,  she  was  in 
mind  a  narrow,  resourceless,  and  badly  advised  woman, 
whose  only  plan  was  to  secure  the  inheritance  for  her 
son  Louis  (Lou-Lou).  She  was  intimately  connected 
with  the  Catholic  Church,  with  the  French  clergy,  and 
prevailed  upon  Napoleon  to  extend  to  the  Pope  con- 
siderations and  regards  that  from  a  political  standpoint 
were  most  injurious  to  France;  and,  like  so  many  other 
female  sovereigns  of  France,  she  had  a  genius  for  ig- 
noring the  right  man,  and  for  encouraging  the  wrong 
minister.  For  even  at  that  time  there  was  no  lack  of 
information  about  the  coming  danger.  Colonel  Stoffel, 
who  was  the  military  attach^  in  Berlin,  never  ceased 
informing  the  Emperor  (whom  he  had  aided  in  writing 
the  life  of  Caesar)  about  the  superior  organization  of 
the  Prussian  army.  In  fact,  Stoffel  had  the  clearest 
impression  of  the  hopeless  inferiority  of  the  French 
army  as  against  the  army  of  Prussia.  When  the  dis- 
aster deprived  Napoleon  of  his  throne,  several  of  the 
most  incisive  reports  of  Stoffel  to  the  Emperor  on  the 
Prussian  army  were  found  —  unopened  —  in  the  bureau 
of  the  Emperor.  In  Parliament  also,  Adolphe  Thiers 
repeatedly  implored  the  Deputies  to  abstain  from  any 
hostility  to  Germany,  and  although  Thiers's  imprecations 
may  have  been  somewhat  interested,  in  that  he  did  not 


2IO  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

want  to  increase  the  power  of  the  opposition  in  Parlia- 
ment by  encouraging  their  anti-Prussian  policy,  yet  in 
the  fervent  and  very  statesmanlike  speeches  of  Thiers, 
directed  against  the  anti-Prussian  politics  of  the  French 
Parliament,  there  was  a  large  element  of  honesty  and 
truth.  Everybody  felt  that  Napoleon's  mistake  in  1866 
of  having  abstained  from  an  attack  on  Prussia  imme- 
diately after  Sadowa  had  caused  an  irreparable  loss  of 
prestige  to  France,  and  more  particularly  to  the  Napo- 
leonic dynasty.  The  opposition  in  the  French  Parlia- 
ment constantly  attacking  Napoleon,  and  forcing  him 
in  the  end  to  very  broad  and  considerable  concessions, 
positively  refused  to  help  him  in  the  reconstruction  of 
the  army ;  and  there  is  now,  in  the  light  of  the  latest 
memoirs  of  that  time,  little  doubt  that  the  opposition  is 
more  directly  responsible  for  the  terrible  military  dis- 
asters of  France  in  1870  and  1871  than  even  Napoleon 
himself.  By  refusing  to  give  any  supply  for  the  mili- 
tary force,  the  necessity  of  which  Napoleon,  Marshal 
Niel,  and  several  other  leading  military  officials  had 
clearly  seen  and  pressed  upon  the  nation,  the  French 
Parliament  increased  the  inferiority  of  France  and  so 
raised  the  boldness  of  Prussia,  which,  as  we  know,  was 
most  minutely  informed  about  every  public  or  secret 
move  of  the  French  Government  and  the  French  mili- 
tary authorities. 

In  spite  of  the  lack  of  any  military  reform  Napoleon, 
or  rather  Eugenie,  became  more  and  more  convinced 
that  a  war  with  Prussia  was  absolutely  indispensable  in 
order  to  recoup  the  prestige  of  the  Emperor's  reign,  and 
the  hopes  of  his  son.  Accordingly,  a  pretext  was  easily 
found,  and  that  pretext  was  the  well-known  Hohenzollern 


THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR  211 

question.  One  of  the  princes  of  the  house  of  Hohenzol- 
lern,  that  is,  related  to  the  Prussian  dynasty,  was  pro- 
posed as  candidate  for  the  Spanish  throne,  and  Bismarck 
in  the  beginning  acted  as  if  he  encouraged  that  candida- 
ture. The  French  Government  affected  to  see  in  that 
move  an  attempt  "to  restore  the  Empire  of  Charles  V." 
The  very  exaggeration  lying  in  these  words  clearly 
shows  that  Napoleon  and  Eugenie  were  only  trying  to 
find  a  pretext  to  make  war  on  Prussia.  Nothing  could 
be  more  ridiculous  than  to  see  in  the  candidature  of  a 
Hohenzollern  prince  for  the  throne  of  Spain,  a  serious 
attempt  at  restoring  a  universal  Empire.  The  French 
Government,  however,  affected  to  be  greatly  agitated  by 
that  candidature,  and  finally  Benedetti,  the  French  am- 
bassador at  Berlin,  was  despatched  to  interview  King 
William  of  Prussia  himself.  King  William  readily  ad- 
mitted that  the  candidature  of  the  Hohenzollern  prince 
ought  to  be,  and  was  to  be,  dropped.  Under  ordinary 
circumstances,  the  incident  would  have  ended  there. 
However,  Grammont,  the  French  foreign  minister,  de- 
termined to  bring  about  a  rupture  with  Prussia.  Con- 
vinced as  he  was  that  the  Southern  states  of  Germany 
would  join  France  against  Prussia  ;  confiding  as  he  did 
in  the  absurd  statement  of  Marshal  Leboeuf,  that  the 
French  army  was  completely  ready  "  to  the  last  button  "  ; 
confiding  likewise  in  the  conditional  promise  of  Austria 
to  join  France  and  in  a  similar,  if  vague,  promise  on  the 
part  of  Italy;  Grammont  wanted  to  exercise  pressure 
upon  King  William  through  Benedetti,  to  the  effect  that 
not  only  should  King  William  undertake  to  discounte- 
nance a  Hohenzollern  candidature,  but  also  that  the 
King  should  give  a  formal  promise  never  to  entertain 


212  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

such  a  candidature  in  future.  King  William  declined 
to  give  such  a  promise.  The  form  in  which  he  did  that 
was  neither  offensive  to  France  nor  derogatory  to  his 
own  honour.  The  interview  between  the  King  and 
Benedetti  was  at  Ems,  a  watering-place  on  the  Rhine. 
Bismarck,  Moltke,  and  Roon,  who  had  been  anxiously 
watching  the  manoeuvres  of  Grammont,  and  were  hoping 
for  an  immediate  rupture  of  relations  and  outbreak  of 
the  war,  on  receiving  the  answer  of  King  William  given 
to  Benedetti,  learnt  to  their  dismay  that  the  answer  was 
so  worded  as  to  avoid  any  great  affront.  At  this  critical 
moment  Bismarck,  by  omitting  certain  words  of  the 
King's  reply,  and  by  abbreviating  it  in  an  artful  manner, 
gave  it  the  appearance  of  a  most  offensive  declaration 
to  France ;  and  by  this  Machiavellian  manoeuvre,  Bis- 
marck secured  what  he  and  his  two  colleagues  had  been 
waiting  for,  that  is,  an  instantaneous  declaration  of  war 
on  the  part  of  France ;  for  no  sooner  had  the  garbled 
reply  reached  Paris,  than  both  Parliament  and  the  Pari- 
sian people  became  frantic  with  indignation,  and  under 
the  cries  "i  Berlin!  d  Berlin/"  forced  upon  the  Gov- 
ernment a  declaration  of  war. 

This  action  of  Bismarck,  some  twenty  years  later 
related  by  himself  to  an  Austrian  journalist,  has  been 
frequently  held  up  as  a  specimen  of  his  most  ruthless 
and  unrighteous  policy.  No  doubt,  in  giving  the  King's 
reply  a  version  calculated  to  outrage  French  dignity, 
Bismarck  acted  upon  purely  political,  that  is  to  say,  un- 
sentimental principles.  On  the  other  hand  the  prov- 
ocation really  had  come  from  France;  the  war  was 
inevitable;  and  both  Bismarck  and  Moltke  knew  that 
the  French  army  was  then,  and  just  then,  in  a  state  of  in- 


THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR  213 

f eriority  and  unpreparedness,  promising  well  for  a  rapid 
and  complete  victory  of  the  Prussians.  To  neglect  such 
a  conjecture  of  circumstances,  rightly  seemed  to  Bismarck 
a  failure  in  patriotism ;  and  from  a  strictly  historical, 
that  is,  practical  standpoint,  one  cannot  but  approve  a 
diplomatic  move  that  has  secured  for  Germany  complete 
peace  and  prosperity  for  now  over  thirty-four  years ;  and 
at  the  same  time  put  the  balance  of  Europe  on  a  safer 
and  steadier  basis. 

Bismarck,  who,  as  we  have  seen,  used  all  his  modera- 
tion in  the  moment  of  his  wonderful  triumph  over 
Austria,  now  used  all  the  energy  and  dash  he  was  capa- 
ble of  to  precipitate  a  terrible  conflict  with  France.  In 
both  cases  he  was  guided  by  the  soundest  and  coolest 
considerations  of  policy.  In  both  cases  he  was  right. 
The  question  of  war  or  peace  is  one  that  most  people 
are  unable  really  to  discuss  ;  for  nothing  short  of  a  very 
complete  or  comprehensive  knowledge  of  war  gives  us 
the  means  of  placing  the  great  question  in  its  right  per- 
spective. Such  a  knowledge  of  war  is  of  very  rare  oc- 
currence. They  who  constantly  preach  peace  and 
condemn  men  like  Bismarck  have  not  learnt  the  great 
lesson  of  war,  that  war  in  the  right  time  with  the  right 
means  saves  many  a  nation  sacrifices  very  much  greater 
than  those  entailed  by  the  war.  One  has  only  to  com- 
pare the  policy  of  Bismarck  with  that  of  Austria  in  1870 
in  order  not  only  to  approve  of  Bismarck's  so-called 
Machiavellian  manoeuvre,  but  to  consider  his  whole  policy 
as  one  eminently  meant  to  secure  the  true  benefits  of 
peace.  It  is  self-evident  that  Austria  in  1870  ought  to 
have  joined  France  unconditionally.  It  is  evident  that 
Austria  ought  to  have  learnt,  if  not  from  the  bygone 


214  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

events  of  her  own  history  in  the  eighteenth  century, 
at  any  rate  from  the  palpable  mistake  of  Napoleon  in 
1866,  that  it  was  her  duty  to  attack  Germany  in  the 
East  as  soon  as  Germany  invaded  France  in  the  West ; 
just  as  Napoleon  in  1866  ought  to  have  invaded 
Prussia  in  the  West  when  Bismarck  attacked  Austria 
in  the  East.  Instead  of  that,  Austria  —  ever  unready 
—  abstained  from  joining  in  the  colossal  conflict.  The 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  neglected  what  was  then  his 
chief  duty  —  that  is,  to  become  a  strong  and  faithful 
ally  of  the  French ;  to  reduce  the  possible  victories  of 
Prussia;  to  recoup  his  position  and  to  raise  Austria 
to  the  international  position  that  she  occupied  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  when  Maria  Theresa,  in  a  spirit 
of  infinitely  greater  statesmanship,  never  missed  an 
opportunity  of  interfering  in  the  great  international 
affairs  of  Europe.  The  peaceful  policy  of  the  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph  in  1870  has,  as  we  now  know,  been  the 
death-blow  of  Austria-Hungary  in  her  position  as  an 
international  Power.  Austria  has  at  all  times  lived 
more  by  pressure  from  abroad  than  thanks  to  cohesion 
from  the  inside;  and  since  1870,  when  she  exercised  no 
pressure  upon,  nor  received  any  from,  the  rest  of  Europe, 
she  has  necessarily  drifted  into  interior  anarchy,  and 
has  been  the  prey  of  the  most  unruly,  aimless,  and 
hopeless  party  struggles. 

The  peaceful  policy  of  Austria  in  1870  has  entailed 
upon  her  the  greatest  losses,  economic,  moral,  and 
political;  losses  infinitely  greater  than  any  loss  she 
could  have  sustained  in  1870  by  joining  the  French 
against  Prussia. 

The  war  between  Prussia  and  France  at  once  mani- 


THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR  215 

f ested  the  inner  unity  of  the  German  nations ;  for  the 
Southern  states  in  Germany — Bavaria,  Wurtemberg, 
and  Baden  —  at  once  joined  Prussia  and  the  Northern 
states,  and  under  the  leadership  of  Moltke,  of  the 
Crown  Prince  Frederick,  and  of  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  the  German  armies  invaded  France,  and  in 
nearly  every  single  battle  worsted  the  French ;  even 
when,  as  at  Gravelotte,  the  Germans  had  not  the 
superiority  of  numbers.  It  is  needless  to  dwell  here  on 
the  details  of  the  war,  the  various  tragic  scenes  of 
which  are  still  within  the  memory  of  many.  It  is 
well  known  how  absolutely  unprepared  the  French 
were ;  it  is  equally  well  known  that  while  each  indi- 
vidual German  officer  was  full  of  the  most  independent 
and  daring  initiative,  the  French  officers  and  generals, 
from  Bazaine  and  Marshal  MacMahon  downwards,  lost 
all  initiative  and  every  particle  of  that  famous  French 
resourcefulness  which  in  1859  had  carried  Napoleon's 
army  victoriously  through  the  Italian  campaign,  al- 
though the  French  army,  then  as  in  1870,  was  very 
sadly  unprepared  and  ill-provided  for. 

The  most  incapable  of  the  French  generals  was 
Bazaine,  the  commander  of  Metz.  At  the  first  blush  it 
appears  inexplicable  why  the  German  generals,  none 
of  whom  had  seen  or  experienced  a  great  war,  except 
the  war  of  1866,  which  lasted  only  a  few  weeks,  should 
prove  so  immeasurably  superior  to  the  French  gen- 
erals, every  one  of  whom  had  gone  through  numerous 
campaigns  previous  to  1870.  In  fact,  it  must  be  said 
that  in  1870  theory  proved  infinitely  superior  to 
practice;  and  the  German  officers,  mere  theorists,  so 
to  speak,  undid  all  the  plans,  practice,  and  routine  of 


2l6  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

the  French  generals.  The  explanation  of  this  remark- 
able puzzle  may  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  experi- 
ence of  the  French  generals  was  great  indeed,  but  it 
had  been  acquired,  not  in  Europe  and  against  Euro- 
pean armies  so  much  as  in  Mexico,  in  Algiers,  in 
China;  that  is,  against  nations  of  a  civilization  and 
science  inferior  to  that  of  Europe.  We  have  only 
lately  seen  that  a  war  with  an  ever  so  small  European 
nation  is  an  affair  of  a  totally  different  character  from 
wars  against  black,  yellow,  or  mixed  races.  The  Ger- 
mans were  prepared  for  that  war,  and  for  over  two 
generations  had  studied  all  its  possibilities  in  the 
minutest  detail. 

After  the  terrible  disaster  of  Sedan  and  Metz  came 
the  siege  of  Paris.  The  French,  maddened  by  their  un- 
precedented disasters,  accepted  for  a  time  the  guidance 
of  Gambetta,  a  man  of  energy  and  insight,  but  one 
who  lacked  the  more  ruthless  virtues  of  an  efficient 
dictator.  He  was  able  to  create  new  armies,  to  offer 
to  the  Germans  a  resistance  on  the  Loire  and  in  the 
north  of  France  which  in  many  ways  was  more  efficient 
than  that  offered  to  the  Germans  by  the  old  regular 
army  of  France.  The  Germans  were,  after  October, 
1870,  unable  to  repeat  those  wholesale  captures  of 
armies  which  characterized  the  first  stage  of  their  war 
with  France ;  yet  Gambetta,  it  must  now  be  said  with 
regret,  was  not  quite  a  match  for  the  entirely  different 
situation  created  in  France  through  the  German  victo- 
ries. Not  a  Gambetta,  a  Danton  was  needed.  Gam- 
betta, who  rightly  pursued  the  policy  of  resistance  to 
the  bitter  end,  ought  to  have  done  away  with  all  the 
elements  of  possible  opposition  to  his  right  plans. 


THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR  217 

We  now  know  from  German  military  writers  that 
the  Germans  could  not  have  continued  the  war  for 
another  two  or  three  months,  after  January,  1871. 
The  winter  was  terribly  cold ;  Bismarck,  as  he  tells  us 
himself  in  his  memoirs,  spent  sleepless  nights  in  appre- 
hensions of  international  interference ;  the  financial 
resources  of  Germany  began  to  be  exhausted,  and  a 
popular  and  implacable  war,  in  the  manner  of  the 
Spanish  resistance  to  Napoleon,  would  have  forced  the 
German  army  to  retreat,  and  might  possibly  have  de- 
prived them  of  Lorraine,  if  not  of  Alsace  too.  However, 
in  the  French  nation,  as  usual,  there  were  strong  parties 
filled  by  nothing  but  personal  ambition,  who,  in  the 
collapse  of  the  old  r^gimey  welcomed  an  opportunity 
for  raising  themselves  into  power.  Of  these  parties 
Adolphe  Thiers  was  the  head.  He  wanted  peace,  and 
peace  by  all  means,  for  he  knew  that  peace  meant  his 
own  coming  to  power.  He  had  been  unsuccessful  in 
his  long  and  wearisome  travels  to  the  various  courts 
of  Europe,  asking  for  help  and  intervention.  Bismarck 
—  and  that  is  his  greatest  diplomatic  feat  —  had  so 
completely  isolated  France  that  neither  England  nor 
Russia,  let  alone  Austria,  seriously  thought  of  inter- 
vening ;  although,  as  we  have  seen,  such  intervention 
was  to  the  vital  interest  of  Austria,  and,  as  we  now 
see,  would  have  been  no  mistake  on  the  part  of  Eng- 
land. Surely  it  would  have  paid  England  to  retard 
somewhat,  by  intervention,  the  precocious  growth  of 
German  ascendency.  However,  Bismarck  was  quite 
successful,  and  peace  on  terms  proposed  by  Thiers 
was  impossible.  Peace  was  Thiers's  great  stepping- 
stone  to   power;   that  alone  explains  why   Gambetta 


2l8  FOUNDATIONS  OF   MODERN   EUROPE 

ought  to  have  despatched  Thiers  in  one  way  or 
another,  so  as  to  carry  out  Gambetta's  own  plan  of 
unflinching  resistance.  Gambetta,  however,  lacked  the 
power  and  deep  if  cruel  insight  of  Danton ;  and,  after 
the  occupation  of  Paris,  France  was  obliged  to  accept, 
in  1 871,  the  terms  of  peace  dictated  by  Bismarck  at 
Frankfort-on-the-Main,  by  the  terms  of  which  France 
lost  Alsace  altogether,  and  the  portion  of  Lorraine 
inhabited  by  German-speaking  people;  and,  more- 
over, was  obliged  to  pay  an  indemnity  of  ;£200,oc)0,ooo 
sterling  (1,000,000,000  dollars).  The  real  cost  of  the 
war  to  France  was  5,000,000,000  dollars,  and  but  for 
the  immense  wealth  of  the  country  the  war  would 
have  ruined  it  financially  as  it  did  politically. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  terrible  military 
disasters  inflicted  on  France  by  the  Germans  have 
done  to  that  old  and  historic  country  of  Europe  an  in- 
calculable harm;  harm,  it  must  be  admitted,  incom- 
parably more  severe  than  any  losses  that  a  continuance 
of  the  war  after  February,  1871,  could  have  possibly 
brought  upon  France.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Germans 
at  Versailles  —  that  is,  in  the  very  palace  of  Louis 
XIV.,  who  in  the  seventeenth  century  had  so  deeply 
humiliated  the  Prussian  Elector  and  the  Germans  gen- 
erally—  constituted  themselves  into  the  German  Em- 
pire. King  William  of  Prussia  accepted  the  new 
dignity  rather  reluctantly;  and  there  were  great  diffi- 
culties about  the  title,  which  was  finally  settled  as  King 
William,  German  Emperor.  Thus  the  great  political 
concepts  of  Bismarck,  to  bring  about  the  unity  of  Ger- 
many by  a  successful  war  with  France,  rather  than  by 
negotiations   and   treaties   with   and   between   German 


THE  FRANCO-GERMAN   WAR  219 

sovereigns  themselves,  was  completely  realized ;  and 
Germany,  that  had  hitherto  been  a  lax  and  inefficient 
conglomeration  of  small  and  big  sovereignties,  was  now 
launched  on  a  great  career  of  political  and  commercial 
prosperity,  and  is  now  attempting  to  become  a  world- 
power. 

The  fate  of  Napoleon  is  well  known.  Like  his  uncle, 
the  great  Napoleon,  he  repaired  to  England  and  died  in 
exile.  The  great  Napoleon  wanted  to  accomplish  too 
much  and  failed ;  Napoleon  III.  wanted  to  accomplish 
too  little  and  failed.  The  great  Napoleon  obeyed  the 
dictates  of  his  own  vast  mind;  Napoleon  III.  obeyed 
the  dictates  of  an  ambitious  and  intellectually  inferior 
woman.  France  herself  was  in  a  desperate  position. 
The  indemnity  she  was  able  to  pay  off  very  soon ;  but 
the  terrible  reaction  from  her  dreams  of  glory,  from 
her  conceit,  from  her  irregular  ambition  and  disorga- 
nized home  policy,  was  the  most  appalling  that  has  ever 
come  over  any  modern  nation.  She  had  lost  all  pres- 
tige in  the  eyes  of  her  contemporaries ;  from  having 
been  the  leading  nation  in  Europe  she  sank  down  to  a 
second-rate  and  third-rate  Power.  Yet  people  were 
mistaken  in  considering  France  lost  and  fallen  forever. 
Military  defeats  have  as  yet  not  really  ruined  a  great 
nation.  A  nation  worsted  in  fight  may  lose  much,  but 
she  is  sure  to  recover.  It  is  the  nation  that  does  not 
fight,  like  Austria,  that  loses  all  the  forces  of  possible 
recovery ;  because,  like  nature,  mankind  is  made  by 
constant  fight,  and  a  sentimental  and  effeminate  desire 
for  peace  is  the  forerunner  of  a  nation's  complete  ex- 
tinction* 


w 


EPILOGUE 

FROM  a  consideration  of  the  period  we  have  just 
traversed,  it  is  evident  that  in  European  history 
as  well  as  in  the  history  of  the  nations  dependent  on 
Europe  or  Europeans,  a  few  but  very  incisive  changes 
have  altered  the  physiognomy  of  the  political  world. 
In  the  eighteenth  century  Europe  consisted  of  a  chaos 
of  so-called  enclaves ;  that  is,  no  single  monarchy  or 
republic  on  the  continent  consisted  of  a  continuous 
territory.  The  territory  of  each  state  was  broken  into 
and  interrupted,  as  it  were,  by  possessions  belonging 
to  another  state;  so  that  Prussia,  for  instance,  had 
territory  straggling  over  various  latitudes  east  and  west 
of  the  Elbe,  all  over  North  Germany.  Austria  had 
absolutely  no  territorial  continuity.  The  great  wars 
from  1740  to  181 5  have  very  considerably  simplified  the 
map  of  Europe.  At  the  present  day  the  forty-six  sov- 
ereign states  of  Europe  have  each  of  them  a  continuous 
and,  so  to  speak,  self-contained  territory.  This  fact  is 
of  the  utmost  importance  in  international  policy.  As 
long  as  the  various  states  had  territories  rounded  off  in 
a  most  primitive  fashion,  or  not  at  all,  international  wars 
were  matters  of  necessity.  The  interests  of  Austria, 
for  instance,  were  as  great  and  as  vital  on  the  Escaut 
River  in  Belgium,  as  on  the  Po,  or  on  the  Middle  Rhine. 
Any  move  on  the  part  of  the  French,  the  Dutch,  the 
English,  the  Italian,  or  German  sovereigns  that  touched 


EPILOGUE  221 

upon  those  territories,  gave  rise  in  Vienna  to  great  anxi- 
eties and  diplomatic  countermoves.  At  present  this  is 
no  longer  the  case.  Unless  some  very  powerful  motive 
comes  into  play,  the  several  states  of  Europe  have  no 
proper  reason  to  start  international  wars;  and  as  a 
matter  of  history,  there  has  been  no  international  war 
in  Europe  since  1815.  It  is  only  owing  to  the  complete 
neglect  of  history  that  we  are  still  constantly  being 
treated  to  predictions  of  international  wars  in  Europe. 
There  is,  it  must  be  admitted,  one  possibility  for  such 
an  international  war,  and  that  is  the  alleged  disruption 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  so  readily  predicted 
by  well-informed  journalists,  after  the  death  of  the  pres- 
ent Emperor-King.  However,  it  may  be  submitted, 
that  Austria,  like  France,  has  in  the  last  one  hundred 
and  sixty  years  been  constantly  declared  to  be  on  the 
verge  of  extinction.  Austria-Hungary  is  no  nearer  her 
disruption  now  than  she  was  in  1740.  The  Powers  that 
keep  Austria  from  within  are  somewhat  weakened ;  on 
the  other  hand,  the  Powers  that  keep  it  from  without 
are  so  great  and  so  conscious  of  the  need  of  Austria  for 
the  balance  of  politics  in  Europe,  that  Austria  will  in 
the  worst  case  survive,  owing  to  the  same  reasons  by 
which  Saxony  or  Bavaria  has  been  enabled  to  weather 
all  the  storms  of  inner  corruption  or  foreign  attacks. 

It  may  therefore  be  taken  for  granted  that  interna- 
tional wars  in  Europe  have  been  rendered  very  unlikely, 
not  to  say  impossible,  by  the  gigantic  fights  of  the 
eighteenth  century  up  to  181 5. 

In  addition  to  this,  the  most  salient  and  important 
result  of  those  much-maligned  wars  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  there  is  another,  and  in  its  way  almost  equally 


222  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODEE^   EUROPE 

important,  result  which  the  eighteenth  century  was  con- 
sciously and  unconsciously  fighting  for,  and  which  in 
the  nineteenth  century  has  come  to  be  one  of  the 
factors  of  history  —  we  mean  the  idea  of  nationalism. 
The  nineteenth  century  is  the  age  of  the  still  higher 
national  differentiation  of  Europe.  Each  of  the  nu- 
merous little  and  great  nations  of  Europe,  far  from 
dropping  their  various  languages,  customs,  mental  atti- 
tudes, political  ambitions,  etc.,  have  in  the  course  of  the 
nineteenth  century  more  and  more  accentuated  all  their 
differences,  so  that  in  the  southeast  of  Europe  —  in 
Hungary,  Servia,  Bulgaria,  Roumania,  Macedonia, 
Greece,  as  well  as  in  the  north  —  in  Denmark,  in  Nor- 
way, in  Sweden,  and  in  other  parts  of  Europe  —  we 
have  now  to  deal  with  full-fledged  political  individuali- 
ties, each  of  them  based  on  a  most  determined  idea  of 
fighting  for  its  own  nationality.  The  process  going  on 
in  Europe  is,  it  may  be  seen,  the  very  reverse  of  that 
which  had  been  going  on  in  America.  In  spite  of  the 
unprecedented  immigration  of  Europeans  to  America 
during  the  nineteenth  century,  the  American  people 
show  socially,  economically,  politically,  and  mentally, 
the  most  astounding  homogeneity.  All  over  the  United 
States  there  is  one  language  and  one  description  of 
mind,  of  manners,  customs,  views.  In  Europe,  while 
the  old  lack  of  territorial  uniformity  has  been  remedied 
to  a  large  extent,  the  lack  of  national  unity  has  been 
going  on  increasingly,  and  we  may  now  indeed  say  of 
Europe  that  it  is  a  greater  Hellas.  As  in  the  times  of 
the  ancient  Greeks,  small  Greece  or  Sicily  contained 
hundreds  of  autonomous,  absolutely  different,  hostile, 
and   mutually  irreconcilable  city-states,  so   Europe  is 


EPILOGUE  223 

based  on  a  wholesale  diversity  of  interests,  views,  lan- 
guages, laws,  and  customs. 

This  immense  difference  between  nation  and  nation 
in  Europe  has  produced  in  Europe  a  number  of  inter- 
esting and  important  literatures ;  it  has  stimulated  into 
life  ever  new  modes  of  thought ;  ever  new  arts  and  in- 
ventions; ever  new  forms  of  music;  of  amusement;  in 
short,  of  every  form  of  intellectual  and  emotional  life. 
Considering  these  beneficial  results,  it  is  certainly  not 
desirable  that  Europe  should  cease  from  cultivating  its 
differences  more  than  its  affinities.  Historically  speak- 
ing, the  rise  of  a  United  States  of  Europe  is  out  of  the 
question.  Military  efforts  made  for  that  purpose,  either 
by  Charles  V.  in  the  sixteenth  century ;  by  Louis  XIV. 
in  the  seventeenth  century ;  or  by  Napoleon  in  the  nine- 
teenth century,  have  all  completely  failed.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  rise  of  such  a  United  States  of  Europe  from 
below,  from  the  mutual  assimilation  of  the  nations,  is 
evidently  an  impossibility. 

Europe  has  proved  a  more  difficult  problem  than  either 
the  philosophic  thinkers  or  the  great  men  of  action  of 
the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries  could  foresee. 
Europe  to-day  is  neither  Russian  nor  Republican,  as  Na- 
poleon is  credited  with  predicting.  Europe  is  neither 
entirely  Protestant  nor  entirely  Catholic.  In  Euro^^e 
neither  the  Germanic  nor  the  Latin  races,  let  alone  the 
Slav  races,  dominate  politics.  The  absorption  of  Europe 
by  the  Slav  races,  so  confidently  predicted  in  the  fifties 
and  sixties  of  the  nineteenth  century,  has  not  been  real- 
ized in  the  least.  The  economic  absorption  of  Europe 
at  the  hands  of  America,  predicted  with  equal  confidence 
by  many  an  American  and  European,  will  prove  as  f  alii- 


224  FOUNDATIONS  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

ble  as  was  the  prediction  of  the  religious  absorption  of 
Europe  by  Protestantism ;  or  the  political  absorption  of 
Europe  by  the  French.  The  Latin  "  races "  —  and 
most  of  all  the  French  and  the  Italians  —  are  to-day  in 
a  condition  ready  for  some  of  the  greatest  problems  of 
humanity.  Amongst  the  Teutonic  people  the  Germans 
are  undoubtedly  very  powerful ;  on  the  other  hand,  the 
Austrian  Germans  are  as  decadent  for  the  time  being  as 
are,  amongst  the  Latin  races,  the  Spanish. 

It  is  high  time  that  people  studying  history  give  up 
the  untenable  idea  of  "  race."  In  Europe,  at  any  rate, 
history  is  not  made  by  "  races,"  but,  in  addition  to  the 
constant  influences  of  geo-politics,  by  the  mental  vigour 
and  the  moral  grit  of  nations.  The  Russians  are  crippled 
by  their  church  —  the  Greek  Orthodox  Church  —  very 
much  more  than  by  their  "racial"  qualities;  and  the 
Italians,  although  of  a  different  "  race  "  from  that  of 
the  Russians,  are  handicapped  by  the  hostile  influence 
of  the  Pope  and  the  Catholic  Church,  infinitely  more 
than  by  their  "  racial  "  deficiencies.  Europe,  like  Hellas, 
is  influenced  to  an  incomparably  higher  degree  by  intel- 
lect and  character,  than  by  ethnographic  or  physiological 
qualities  of  the  nations. 

There  is  little  doubt  that  on  the  foundations  of  public 
and  private  life,  laid  during  the  period  which  we  have 
been  studying,  Europe  will  continue  to  rear  another 
fabric  of  real  civilization ;  which,  if  not  essentially  higher 
than  that  left  us  by  the  immortal  efforts  of  the  Greeks 
and  the  Romans,  will  at  any  rate  permit  a  greater  num- 
ber of  people  to  share  in  its  benefits. 


INDEX 


Abercromby,  disaster  of,  87. 

Aboukir  Bay,  battle  of,  64,  87. 

Abscisses  and  ordinate  in  history,  9. 

Absolutism:  of  European  sovereigns, 
109;  reestablishment  of,  128;  intro- 
duction of,  137. 

Acre,  Napoleon's  failure  at,  64. 

Adair,  James,  and  the  hinterland,  10. 

Adrianople,  treaty  of,  142. 

Agincourt  and  Waterloo,  124, 

Aiguillon,  Due  d',  and  abolition  of 
ancien  regime,  36. 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  Congress  at,  134, 135. 

Albert,  Archduke,  commands  in  Italy, 
204. 

Albuera  and  Salamanca,  89. 

Alembert,  d',  18. 

Alexander  I.:  and  Napoleon,  59; 
dismay  of  (1805),  77;  partition 
with  Napoleon,  82;  and  Austria, 
109;  and  England,  ib.;  courts 
French  alliance,  ib. ;  Oriental  plans 
of,  ih.\  the  saviour  of  France,  ib.; 
vengeance  of,  ib.-,  and  Metternich, 
attitude  to  France,  128;  and  Talley- 
rand, 129;  and  Polish  question, 
132,  158;  aims  of,  134;  and  Con- 
stantinople, ib.\  and  American 
enterprise,  135;  at  Aix-la-Chapelle, 
ib.\  wins  French  friendship,  ib.; 
and  popular  liberty,  ib.;  and 
"Holy  Alliance,"  137;  severe 
measures  of,  ib.;  ideal  of,  138. 

Alexander  the  Great  and  Napoleon, 

50. 

Algarve  on  strategic  line,  88. 

Algiers:  and  Charles  X.,  156;  French 
conquest  of,  160;  French  experi- 
ence gained  in,  216. 


Alleghany  Moimtains,  9;  vide  hinter- 
land. 

Alsace,  allies  expelled  from,  45. 

Altenstein  and  Hegel,  149;  and  Prus- 
sian efficiency,  193. 

Althusius  and  the  Encyclopedie,  19. 

Alvinczy,  defeat  of,  61. 

America:  homogeneity  of,  30,  78,  222; 
and  British  fleet,  102;  fixed  char- 
acteristics of,  119;  and  Hegel's  sys- 
tem, 149;  influence  of  Comte  in, 
167,  168;  influence  of  European 
changes  on,  173;  South,  Italian 
emigration  to,  183. 

American:  Independence,  war  of, 
1-25;  colonies  lost  through  action 
of  Europe,  6 ;  discontent,  causes  of, 
ib.;  Independence,  assumed  ideal- 
ism of,  7;  army,  disabilities  of,  22; 
war,  geography  of,  23;  war,  strat- 
egy of,  ib. ;  Revolution,  not  social, 
120;    enterprise  and  Alexander  I., 

135. 

Americans:  and  idealism,  7;  and 
Lafayette,  74. 

Amiens,  Peace  of,  72. 

Ancien  regime:  a  cause  of  revolution, 
28  sqq.;  abolition  of,  in  Hungary, 
and  elsewhere,  36,  161;  and  spirit 
of  the  times,  36;  return  to,  impos- 
sible, 52;  attempt  by  Charles  to 
restore  the,  157. 

Aranda  and  Beaumarchais,  21. 

Arcole:  Napoleon  at,  50;  victory  of, 
61. 

Armada,  battle  of  the,  182. 

Army  and  Robespierre,  47. 

Arras,  appreciation  of,  46. 

Arrigo  de  la  Rocca,  51. 


225 


226 


INDEX 


Asia,  Napoleon's  scheme  to  conquer, 
85,  86. 

Aspern  campaign,  effect  of,  96. 

AsscmblSe:  Constituante  constituted, 
35;  Natiotiale  constituted,  ih.; 
and  general  principles,  36;  Mira- 
beau  and  Rousseau,  ib.,  37. 

Astorga:    Napoleon  at,  94. 

Astronomy  at  Paris,  166. 

Athens  and  Themistocles,  193. 

Attila  and  Duke  of  Brunswick,  42. 

Auerbach  and  Goethe,  28. 

Auerstaedt,  battle  of,  80. 

Augier,  strategy  of,  in  Italy,  61 . 

Austerlitz:  Napoleon  at,  59;  battle 
of,  70,  77;    and  Trafalgar,  72. 

Australia  and  a  hinterland,  9. 

Avistria:  no  territorial  unity  in,  5; 
and  Bismarck,  13,  18;  and  Seven 
Years'  War,  14;  hostile  to  revolu- 
tionary ideas,  40,  41,  128,  136; 
French  attack  on,  60;  Italian  pos- 
sessions of,  60,  177;  reaches  the 
Adriatic,  62 ;  peace  with,  at  Campo 
Formio,  62,  192;  defeated  at  Aus- 
terlitz, 72;  and  Russia  in  Danube 
valley,  75:  treaty  of  Pressburg,  77; 
conquest  of,  80;  proper  policy  of, 
82;  and  England,  coalition  of,  94; 
humiliations  of,  95;  defeated  by 
Napoleon,  96,  97;  a  second-rate 
power,  97,  206;  and  treaty  of 
Schonbrunn,  97;  and  Tirolese  re- 
sistance, 98;  and  French  crown, 
99;  house  of,  unlucky,  100;  re- 
peated risings  of,  103;  joins  the 
Coalition,  107,  122;  joins  Prussia 
and  Russia,  108;  and  Napoleon, 
interests  coincident,  108,  114;  and 
Prussia,  natural  antagonists,  108, 
109;  cautious  action  of,  115;  and 
Prussia,  rivals  for  supremacy,  130; 
press  gagged  by,  137;  paralyzed  by 
reaction,  138;  appeals  to  Russia, 
163;  greatness  and  decline  of,  172; 
and  Italian  unity,  176;  arrange- 
ment to  attack,  179;  promise  of 
Napoleon  III.  to  attack,  ib.;  cedes 
Lombardy,  180;    defeat  of  (1859), 


ib.;  makes  peace  at  Villa  Franca, 
ib.;  retains  Venetian  territory,  ib.; 
and  Cavour,  181;  defeats  Victor 
Emmanuel,  ib. ;  and  Prussia,  rivalry 
of,  189;  prominent  in  German  Con- 
federation, ib.;  lacking  in  assimi- 
lative power,  190,  192;  efifects  of 
loss  of  Silesia  on,-  191,  192;  terri- 
tories of,  in  1 741,  ib.\  disunion  of, 
192;  an  unsuitable  political  centre, 
192,  193;  and  the  Hungarians,  194, 
195;  apparent  subordination  of 
Prussia  to,  194;  defeated  by  France, 
ib. ;  loss  of  Italian  territory  of,  ib. ; 
and  Prussia  members  of  German 
Confederacy,  201 ;  and  Schleswig- 
Holstein,  ib. ;  Bismarck's  war  with, 
ib.;  compromised  in  Danish  war, 
ib. ;  and  Prussia  administer  Schles- 
wig-Holstein,  202;  and  treaty  of 
Gastein,  ib.;  considers  herself 
wronged  (1866),  203;  Moltke  con- 
fident of  victory  over,  ib.;  simul- 
taneously attacked  in  Lombardy 
and  Bohemia,  203;  joined  by  South 
German  States,  206;  success  of,  in 
Italy,  ib. ;  and  Peace  of  Prague,  ib. ; 
loses  Venetian  territory,  ib.;  mis- 
taken policy  of,  214;  Russia,  Eng- 
land, possible  French  allies,  217; 
and  France,  comparative  state  of, 
219;  enclaves  of,  220;  enclaves  of, 
on  Escaut,  ib.;  enclaves  of,  on 
Po,  ib. ;  enclaves  of,  on  Rhine,  ib. ; 
and  the  balance  of  power,  221. 

Austria-Hungary:  and  her  peace 
policy,  79;  revolution  in,  160,  161; 
fall  of,  as  an  international  Power, 
214;  disruption  of,  prophesied,  221. 

Austrian  army:  badly  generalled, 
180;  disunion  of,  203;  old-fash- 
ioned rifles  of,  ib. 

Austrian  Italy,  failure  of  revolution 
in,  164. 

Austrian:  Succession,  war  of,  inter- 
national, 5;  alliance,  disastrous  to 
France,  15,  99;  statesmen,  char- 
acter of,  59,  130;  diplomacy,  dis- 
cussion of,  97;   political  writers  im- 


INDEX 


227 


prisoned,  133;  prisons  filled,  ib.; 
revolution,  failure  of,  164;  Empire, 
fall  of,  1 72 ;  Germans  and  Spanish, 
234. 
Austrians:  on  the  Rhine,  42;  de- 
feated at  Jemmapes,  43 ;  and  peace 
of  Luneville,  67;  defeated  at  Ho  hen- 
linden,  ib.;  and  Mack  at  Ulm,  76; 
and  allies  compel  Napoleon's  ab- 
dication, 90;  under  Schwarz- 
enberg,  southern  route  of,  115; 
expelled  from  Hungary,  163. 

Bach  and  Schumann,  146;  tardy 
recognition  of,  153. 

Bach-Hussars  and  Hungarian  lib- 
erty, 164. 

Bach,  Minister,  and  Hungarian  lib- 
erty, 164. 

Baden:  and  Napoleon's  code,  70; 
apprehensions  of,  130;  Wiirtem- 
berg  and  Baden,  207,  208;  joins 
Prussia,  215. 

Balkan  invaded  by  Nicholas  I.,  141. 

Baltic,  Prussia  and  the  North  Sea,  201. 

Balzac:  appreciation  of,  152-154; 
sums  up  modern  humanity,  152; 
analytical  powers  of,  153;  and  Na- 
poleon, ib. ;  greatness  of,  not  recog- 
nized by  French,  ib.;  inventor  of 
no  genre,  ib.;  a  creator  of  types, 
154;    imaginative  powers  of,  ib. 

Bamberg,  Bishop,  possessions  of,  186. 

Bannockburn:  Scotch  pride  in,  87; 
and  Waterloo,  124. 

Banque  de  France  created  by  Napo- 
leon, 69. 

Baring  on  La  Haie  Sainte,  122. 

Barras:  and  Josephine,  60;  and  Na- 
poleon's first  command,  ib. 

Basle,  treaty  of,  47. 

Basques,  the,  and  St.  Ignatius,  51. 

Bastille,  the,  demolished,  32,  36. 

Bavaria:  no  territorial  unity  in,  5; 
Napoleon's  map  of,  54;  becomes  a 
kingdom,  77;  less  useful  than  Po- 
land, 81 ;  friendly  to  Napoleon,  93 ; 
and  Napoleon,  interests  coinci- 
dent, 114;    apprehensions  of,  130; 


left  in  statu  quo,  131;  defeat  of,  in 
1866,  207 ;  Wiirtemberg  and  Baden, 
207,  208;  Bismarck's  treatment  of, 
discussed,  208;  joins  Prussia,  215; 
Saxony  and  Austria,  221. 

Bavarians,  French  and  Magyars  in- 
vade Germany,  91. 

Baylen,  French  army  surrenders  at, 
92. 

Bazaine:  incapacity  of,  at  Metz,  215; 
want  of  initiative  of,  ib. 

Beaulieu  separated  from  ColH,  61. 

Beaumarchais,  20-22,  24:  neglect 
of,  2;  and  Aranda,  21;  and  Ver- 
gennes,  ib.;  at  Le  Havre,  ib.;  and 
Arthur  Lee,  22;  and  de  Kalb,  ib.; 
and  Silas  Deane,  ib. ;  and  Steuben, 
ib.;   and  Franklin,  ib. 

Beethoven  and  Schumann,  146. 

Behar,  12. 

Belgian  independence,  attitude  of 
Powers  to,  1 76. 

Belgium:  and  France,  37;  occupa- 
tion of,  43 ;  allies  expelled  from,  45 ; 
and  July  Revolution,  156. 

Belle-Alliance,  Napoleon  at,  127. 

Bem,  General,  161. 

Benedek:  attacked  in  northeast 
Bohemia,  204;  commands  in  Bo- 
hemia, ib.;  knowledge  of  Lom- 
bardy,  ib.;  strategic  mistakes  of, 
205;    defeated  at  Sadowa,  ib. 

Benedetti:  despatched  to  interview 
William  I.,  211 ;  and  William  I.  at 
Ems,  212. 

Bengal,  12. 

Berezina,  disaster  on  the,  104. 

Bergen,  battle  of,  65. 

Berkeley,  philosophy  of,  148. 

Berlin:  and  Bourges,  38;  entered 
by  Napoleon,  80;  Hegel,  Professor 
at,  148. 

Bernard,  Little  St.,  and  Napoleon,  57. 

Berthier  and  Russian  campaign,  103. 

Beust,  Count,  and  Bismarck,  194. 

Bill  of  Rights  and  Idealism,  7. 

Biology  at  Paris,  166. 

Bismarck:  contrast  to  Chatham,  13; 
and  Austria,  13,  18,  213;   and  Na- 


228 


INDEX 


poleon,  53;  debt  of,  to  Napoleon, 
68;  inner  voices  of,  loi;  criticism 
of  Turks,  140;  genius  of,  173;  and 
Cavour,  175,  176,  182;  and  Ger- 
man unity,  176,  196,  207,  208;  in- 
fluence of,  194;  a  North  German, 
195;  appreciation  of,  194,  200;  a 
good  linguist,  195;  and  political 
technique,  ib.;  solid  information 
of,  196;  admiration  of,  for  Deak 
and  Cavour,  197;  and  Prussian 
foreign  policy,  ib.;  real  greatness 
of,  198;  adversaries  of,  ib.;  courage 
of,  ib. ;  luck  of,  ib. ;  and  Richelieu 
and  Mazarin,  198,  199;  attachment 
of  William  I.  to,  199;  occasional  re- 
luctance of  Wilham  to  follow,  ib.; 
wise  moderation  of,  ib. ;  and  Sach- 
politik,  ib.;  French  and  English 
conception  of,  ib. ;  friend  of  Motley, 
ib.;  humor  of,  ib.;  objectiveness 
of,  ib.;  and  Moltke,  200;  changes 
the  character  of  diplomacy,  ib.; 
frankness  of,  ib. ;  causes  of  success 
of,  201 ;  compromises  Austria  in 
Danish  war,  ib. ;  great  triumphs  of, 
ib.;  anticipates  friction  re  Schles- 
wig-Holstein,  202;  and  treaty  of 
Gastein,  ib.;  forces  Danes  to  sub- 
mit, ib.;  opposed  by  Prussian 
statesmen,  ib.;  and  Prussian  ad- 
versaries, 203;  unpopularity  of, 
ib.;  treaty  of,  with  Italy,  204;  op- 
poses Prussian  entrance  into  Venice, 
205;  prepares  for  Franco-German 
war,  ib.;  statesmanship  of,  ib.; 
fears  a  French  attack  on  Rhine, 
206 ;  establishes  North  German  con- 
federacy, ib. ;  threatens  suicide,  ib. ; 
and  Count  Beust,  ib. ;  and  Schmer- 
ling,  ib.;  reproached  by  modern 
historians,  207;  and  treatment  of 
South  German  states  discussed,  208 ; 
treatment  of  Bavaria  discussed,  ib. ; 
and  Hohenzollern  candidate,  211; 
Moltke  and  Roon,  212;  tampers 
with  William  I.'s  reply,  ib. ;  Machia- 
vellian manoeuvres  of,  212,  213; 
policy  of,  to  France,  213;  afraid  of 


international  interference,  tb.;  suc- 
cessful isolation  of  France,  217; 
projects  of,  reaUzed,  218,  219; 
terms  of  peace,  218. 

Black  Forest,  76. 

Bland,  Richard,  on  constitution,  8. 

Blenheim:  battle  of,  25,  56;  cam- 
paign, problem  of,  ib. 

Bliicher,  82;  and  Napoleon,  59;  and 
Napoleon's  fall,  73;  and  Welling- 
ton defeat  Napoleon,  87;  defeated 
by  Napoleon,  112;  defeated  at 
Ligny,  124-126;  and  Wellington, 
junction  of,  necessary,  125  sqq.;  at 
Wavre,  126,  127;  defeated  by 
Napoleon  at  Ligny,  ib.;  pursued 
by  Grouchy,  ib.;  receives  no  help 
from  Wellington,  126;  arrival  of, 
127. 

Boerne  and  the  French  Revolution, 
28. 

Bohemia:  Albert's  knowledge  of,  204, 
205;    Benedek  commands  in,  205. 

Bohemians  and  White  Mountain,  24. 

Borodino,  battle  of,  103. 

Bosnia  won  by  Austria,  191. 

Boulogne,  Napoleon  at,  75. 

Bourbons:  and  Habsburgs,  15; 
power  of  the,  over  bourgeoisie,  117; 
blindness  of  the,  120;  unadapta- 
bility  of  the,  ib. ;  vide  Louis  XV. 

Bourgeois  and  the  salons,  31. 

Bourges,  the  geo-political  centre  of 
Europe,  37. 

Boutiquiers,  une  nation  de,  55. 

Brazil,  influence  of  Comte  on,  168. 

Brentz,  reforms  of,  and  German 
unity,  194. 

Brest    entered    by    French    convoy, 

47- 
Brienne,  battle  of,  115. 
British:     army    and    Napoleon,    85; 

fleet  in   America,    102;    battalions 

and  French,  123;    debt  to  Prussia 

acknowledged,  ib. 
Bruce  and  Napoleon,  52. 
Brumaire  i8th,  66. 
Brune,  victory  of,  at  Bergen,  65. 
Brimswick,  Duke  of:  and  Atdla,  43; 


INDEX 


229 


and  Coblentz  proclamation,  ib.; 
and  Genghis  Khan,  ib. 

Brunswick,  Prince  of,  at  Valniy,  38. 

Buckle  and  French  Revolution,  27. 

Buechner,  Carl,  teacher  of  material- 
ism, 170. 

Bukovina  won  by  Austria,   191, 

Bulgaria:  rise  of,  173;  nationalism 
in,  222. 

BuUialdus  and  planetary  system,  4. 

Billow:  and  Napoleon's  fall,  73;  de- 
feats Ney  and  Oudinot,  112;  at 
Chapelle    St.    Lombard,    127, 

Bureaucracies,  conservatism  of,  204. 

Burgoyne,  surrender  of,  23. 

Burgundians,   vacillation  of,   74. 

Burke:  diplomacy,  11;  policy  of, 
discussed,  12;  blindness  of,  36; 
condemns  the  Revolution,  ib. 

Byron,  Lord:  a  Philhellene,  141; 
resourcefulness  of,  144;  morbid 
creations  of,  144;    amours  of,  145. 

Byzantines  in  Constantinople,  134. 

Cadiz,  victorious  march  of  French  to, 
136,  137- 

Caesar  and  Napoleon,  50. 

Calonne:  removes  abuses,  27;  and 
Marie  Antoinette,  33;  and  convo- 
cation of  orders,  34. 

Campo  Formio,  peace  of,  62,  192. 

Canada:  and  a  hinterland,  9;  ac- 
quisition of,  17. 

Cannonade  of  Valmy,  38,  43. 

Cape  Henry,  decisive  engagements  off, 
23.  24. 

Capodistrias,  minister  of  Alexander  I., 

135- 
Carbonari,  the,  136,  176. 
Carinthia,  Napoleon  in,  61. 
Carneola,   Napoleon  in,   61. 
Carnot's  plan  of  attack  (1796),  60. 
Carthage  and  Rome,  25. 
Carver,  Jonathan,  and  the  hinterland, 

10. 
Casimir-Perier,  Louis  Philippe  yields 

to,  159. 
Castafios    and    Napoleon's    fall,    73; 

captures  French  army,  92. 


Castiglione,  victory  of,  61. 

Catharine  the  Great,  hostile  to  Revo- 
lution, 40. 

Catholic  Church:  ally  of  the  Habs- 
burgs,  190;  centralization  of  the,  ib. 

Catholicism :  centrifugal  tendencies 
of,  208;  in  Italy,  224. 

Caucasus,  102. 

Cavaignac,  Ledru-Rollin,  and  La- 
martine,  160. 

Cavour:  genius  of,  173;  and  Bis- 
marck, 175,  176,  182, 197;  policy  of, 
175  sqq.;  and  Garibaldi,  ib.;  and 
the  Powers,  176;  and  Italian  pa- 
triots, 176,  181;  secures  French 
support,  176;  hostility  of,  to  Aus- 
tria, 177;  minister  of  King  of  Sar- 
dinia, ib. ;  relations  of,  with  Powers, 
ib.;  secret  alliance  of,  and  Napo- 
leon III.,  ib.;  triumph  of,  due  to 
Orsini,  ib.;  meets  Napoleon  III. 
at  Plombiferes,  179;  deceives  Na- 
poleon III.,  180;  secures  English 
sympathy,  ib.;  death  of,  181;  diffi- 
culties of  (i860),  ib.;  wise  policy, 
proof  of,  ib. 

"Cette  armee  est  h  moil"  77. 

Chamfort  on  history,  134. 

Charles,  Archduke  of  Austria:  Na- 
poleon's estimate  of,  55;  advice  of, 
95;  defeats  the  French,  96;  de- 
feated by  Napoleon,  ib.,  97. 

Charles  I.  of  England,  desertion  of 
London  by,  41. 

Charles  II.  of  England:  and  Par- 
liamentary parties,  157;  and  Louis- 
Philippe,  158. 

Charles  IV.  of  Spain:  and  Joseph 
Bonaparte,  92;  suggests  French 
alliance,  94. 

Charles  V.  Emperor:  and  Napoleon, 
49;  coalition  against,  60,  106;  tries 
to  unite  Europe,  223. 

Charles  X.  of  France:  a  reactionary 
king,  141 ;  successful  foreign  policy 
of,  ib.;  precipitates  Revolution, 
156;  and  Algiers,  ib.;  and  liberty 
of  the  Press,  157;  and  Turkey,  i6.; 
July  ordinances  of,  ib. 


230 


INDEX 


Charles,  Prince  Frederick,  invades 
France,  215. 

Chartes,  Ecole  des,  151. 

Chateaubriand,  prose  style  of,  143. 

Chatham :  diplomacy,  1 1 ;  policy  of, 
discussed,  12;  and  Bismarck,  13; 
hostility  to  France,  14,  18;  blind- 
ness of,  15;  and  Dunkirk,  17;  disas- 
ter of  Chatham's  son,  87. 

Ch4tillon-sur-Seine,    negotiations    at, 

US- 
China,  French  experience  gained  in, 
216. 

Chios,  inhabitants  of,  massacred,  141. 

Chopin,  Frederick:  appreciation  of, 
146-148;  originality  of,  146;  sim- 
plicity of  method,  147;  widespread 
admiration  for,  146,  147;  and 
Georges  Sand,  147;  and  Polish 
misery,  ib.;  and  Mozart,  ib.;  and 
Heine,  147,  148. 

Christianity  and  Sunday,  8. 

Church  possessions  in  Germany,  186. 

Cis-Leithania,  an  ill-balanced  polity, 
164. 

Civil  War:  in  England,  38;  and 
witch  massacres,  42. 

Classicism,  appreciation  of,  143. 

Classical  music,  diatonic,  145. 

Classical  writers,  heroines  of,  145. 

Clinton  in  New  York,  23. 

Clubs  abolished,  132. 

CoaUtion,  60;  against  Napoleon, 
Pan- European,  107  sqq.;  vide 
Napoleon. 

Code  civil  of  Napoleon,  69. 

Code  criminel  of  Napoleon,  69. 

Colbert,  centralizations  of,  31. 

Colenso  and  Waterloo,  124. 

Colli  separated  from  Beaulieu,  61. 

Cologne  Archbishop,  possessions  of, 
186. 

Colonials  and  Encyclopaedists,  18. 

Colonists  and  settlement  beyond  the 
Alleghany,  10. 

Columbus,  inner  voices  of,  loi. 

Coinedie  Humaine:  an  expression 
of  modern  Europe,  153;  and  Divina 
Commedia,  ib. 


Comiti  de  Saint  Public,  a  dictatorship, 
45- 

Comte:  and  Religion  of  Humanity, 
166;  Cours  de  Philosophic  Positive 
of,  ib.;  on  metaphysics,  ib.-,  and 
hierarchy  of  sciences,  167;  Law  of 
the  three  Stages  of,  ib.;  influence 
of,  in  England,  America,  and  the 
Continent,  167,  168;  and  Herbert 
Spencer,  168;  and  Stuart  Mill,  ib.; 
influence  of,  on  Brazil,  ib.;  influ- 
ence of,  on  South  America,  ib. ;  the 
apostle  of  Science,  168,  169. 

Comte,  Auguste,  appreciation  of,  167, 
168. 

Condorcet,  a  political  writer,  18,  31. 

Congress:  at  Erfurt,  83;  at  Vienna, 
121,  128,  177,  192;  voting  at,  129; 
Talleyrand  master  of,  130,  131; 
results  of,  131;  the  dancing,  ib.; 
and  police  persecution,  132  sqq.; 
and  reaction,  ib.;  unwritten  legis- 
lation of,  ib.;  at  Aix-la-Chapelle, 
134;  at  Karlsbad,  ib.;  at  Laibach, 
ib.;  at  Troppau,  ib.;  at  Verona, 
ib.;  and  suppression  of  popular 
liberty,  135. 

Congresses,  aims  of  monarchs  at, 
134  sqq. 

Constant  the  Great,  influence  of,  9. 

Constantinople:  wanted  by  Czars, 
i34»  135;  designs  of  Alexander  I. 
on,  134;  under  the  Turks,  ib.; 
under  the  Byzantines,  ib.;  value 
of,  exaggerated,  ib.;  the  imperial 
capital,  135. 

Contrat  Social,  Du,  19. 

"Convention":  excesses  of  the,  44; 
and  education,  45 ;  and  metric  sys- 
tem, ib.;  and  religious  toleration, 
ib.;  and  reorganization,  ib.;  work 
of,  completed  by  Napoleon,  ii>.; 
anticipates  Napoleon,  68. 

"  Conventionnels,"  death  of,  47. 

Corday,  Charlotte,  appreciation  of, 
46. 

Corniche,   Napoleon  at  the,   57. 

Cornwallis  in  New  York,  23 ;  in  York- 
town,  ib. 


INDEX 


231 


Corsica:  and  Napoleon,  50;  and 
France,  51;  and  Genoa,  ib.;  his- 
tory of,  ib.]  occupation  of,  by 
French,  ib. 

Cossacks  harass  French  army,  104. 

Cracow,  a  republic,  132. 

Craonne,  battle  of,   115,   124. 

Crecy  and  Waterloo,  124. 

Crimea:  campaign,  in  the,  177; 
troops  sent  by  Cavour  to  the,  177, 
178. 

Crimean  War  not  international,  4. 

Croatians  called  in  by  Ferdinand,  163 ; 
under  Jellachich  invade  Hungary, 
ib. 

Cromwell  and  Napoleon,  53,  62. 

Cuesta  and  Wellington  win  Talavera, 
strategical  defeat,  88. 

Cunette,  La,  17. 

Czars  desire  Constantinople,  134,  135. 

Dalmatia  ceded  to  Austria,  62. 

Danes  forced  to  submit,  202. 

Dante,  Divina  Commedia  of,  153. 

Danton:  appreciation  of,  46;  death 
of,  47;   and  Gambetta,  216,  218. 

Danube  valley:  Moreau  in  the,  60; 
campaign  of  the,  95,  96. 

Danubian  provinces,  rise  of,  173. 

Darwin,  Charles:  appreciation  of, 
169;  Origin  of  Species,  ib.;  the 
apostle  of  science,  ib.;  caution  of, 
170. 

Dauphine,  31. 

De^k,  Francis:  unifies  Hungary,  173; 
admiration  of  Bismarck  for,   197. 

Deane,  Silas,  and  Beaumarchais, 
21,  22. 

Decentralization  encouraged  by  em- 
perors, 186. 

Dego,  battle  of,  61. 

Denmark :  war  with,  201 ;  national- 
ism in,  222. 

Dennewitz,  battle  of,  113. 

Desaix:  and  Marengo,  24;  Egyp- 
tian campaign  of,  64;  and  Grouchy, 
67 ;  death  of,  ib. 

Descartes  and  an  infinitesimal  calcu- 


Desmoulins,  Camille,  44,  46. 

Deutschthum,  187. 

Diderot,  18. 

Diet  of  German  Confederation,  131; 
in  Metternich's  hands,  132;  cur- 
tailing of  the,  137. 

Dillingen,  76. 

Directoire,  introduction  of  the,  47. 

Directors:  Italian  policy  of,  60; 
Egyptian  schemes  of,  63;  jealous 
of  Napoleon,  ib. 

Divina  Commedia  and  La  Comidie 
Humaine,  153. 

Doleances:  neglect  of,  30,  31 ;  cahitrs 
de,  35. 

Domr6my,  Jeanne  d'Arc  of,  74. 

Doniol,  H.,  Histoire  de  la  participa- 
tion .  .  .,  3. 

Don  Juan,  a  national  creation,  153. 

Draper  on  Evolution,  170. 

Dresden,  Napoleon  at,  59,  112. 

Dumouriez  at  Valmy,  38,  43;  and 
War  Party,  41 . 

Dunkirk  and  Chatham,  17. 

Dupont,  surrender  of,  92. 

Dutch:  revolt  of  the,  38;  and  Eng- 
lish interests  opposed,  93;  Revolu- 
tion not  social,  120;  on  Waterloo, 
123. 

Eckmiihl,  battle  of,  96. 
Edinburgh  and  Bourges,  37. 
Ed^ucational  reforms  of  Napoleon,  69. 
"  ^galit6,"  father  of  Louis-Philippe, 

157. 

Egypt:  and  a  hinterland,  9;  and 
Syria,  invasion  of,  63;  importance 
of,  ib.;  Leibniz,  and  Louis  XIV., 
ib.;  organization  of,  by  Napoleon, 
64;  Mehmed  Ali,  governor  of,  141. 

Egyptian  Civil  Service,  64. 

Elba,  Napoleon  prisoner  in,  117. 

Elbe,  the:  and  Kiel,  connected  by  a 
canal,  201 ;   enclaves  on  the,  220. 

Elizabeth  and  Prussia,  16. 

Emigration,  effect  of,  on  Italy,  183. 

Emigres,  misrepresentations  of,  41. 

kmile,  20, 

Emilia,  a  classical  type,  145. 


232 


INDEX 


Emperors:  and  the  Empire,  i86; 
encourage  decentralization,  ib. ;  po- 
sition of  the  German,  ib. ;  rulers  of 
Austria-Hungary,  ib. 

Empire:  foreseen  by  Mirabeau,  34. 

Empress  Frederick,  enemy  of  Bis- 
marck, 198. 

Ems,  William  I.  and  Benedetti  at,  212. 

Enclaves,  system  of,  5,  220. 

Encyclopaedists  and  colonials,  18,  24. 

EncydopSdie  ou  Dictionnaire  raisonni 
des sciences,  des arts et  des  metiers,  18. 

England:  and  industrial  power,  12; 
a  real  empire,  ib.;  and  United 
States,  25;  and  Revolution,  37; 
Hellenes^  and  France,  44;  Napo- 
leon's appreciation  of,  55;  makes 
peace  at  Amiens,  72;  watched  by 
Napoleon,  75;  combats  him,  86 
sqq. ;  advantage  of  Peninsular  War 
to,  92 ;  and  Austria,  coalition  of,  95 ; 
policy  of,  discussed,  98;  and  the 
Coahtion,  X07,  iii,  122;  in  United 
States,  in;  in  Spain,  ib. ;  re- 
tains political  liberty,  128;  and 
France,  friendship  of,  131 ;  and 
Greek  liberty,  141 ;  literary  Ufe  of, 
143  sqq.;  and  Hegel's  system,  149; 
and  the  July  Revolution,  156;  Par- 
liamentary parties  in,  157;  the 
Press  in,  ib.;  Reform  Bill  in,  158; 
France,  and  the  orient,  159;  influ- 
ence of  Comte  in,  167,  168;  science 
in,  169;  influence  of  European 
changes  on,  173;  and  Cavour,  176, 
177;  and  Crimean  campaign,  177; 
and  Italian  unity,  182;  unity  of, 
estabUshed,  185;  Russia,  Austria, 
possible  French  alhes,  217. 

EngUsh:  attacked  by  French  (1796), 
60;  and  Russians  defeated  at  Ber- 
gen, 65 ;  view  of  Napoleon's  fall,  73 ; 
resistance  to  Napoleon,  80;  defeat 
French  and  Spanish  fleets,  87 ;  fail 
to  expel  French  from  Belgium,  ib.; 
and  Dutch  interests  opposed,  93; 
and  Spanish  interests  opposed,  ib.; 
in  Walcheren,  96,  97;  Revolution 
not  social,  120;  squares  and  French 


cavalry,  122,  123;  on  Waterloo, 
123;  nationality,  true  test  of,  140; 
romanticism,  143;  tardy  recog- 
nition of  Shakespeare  by,  152;  and 
French  defeat  Russians,  172;  vic- 
tory of  the  Armada,  182;  concep- 
tion of  Bismarck,  199;  interference 
expected  in  Dutch  wars,  202. 

Epinay,  Madame  d',  19. 

Erfurt,  congress  at,  83. 

Espinasse,  Mile,  de  L',  19. 

Essex,  witch  massacres  in,  43. 

Est  locus  in  rebus,  194. 

Eugfene  and  Napoleon,  56. 

Eug6nie:  and  Napoleon,  Orsini's 
attentat  on,  178;  and  Louis  (Lou- 
Lou),  209;  beauty  and  narrow- 
mindedness  of,  ib.;  Catholic  ten- 
dencies of,  ib.;  and  Prussian  war, 
210,  211. 

Europe:  no  international  wars  in, 
after  181 5,  4;  defying,  25;  a 
greater  Hellas,  25,  119,  142,  222, 
224;  hostile  to  French  Revolution, 
47;  peace  pohcy  for,  discussed,  78; 
saved  from  Napoleon,  86  sqq. ;  per- 
manent union  of,  impossible,  107; 
revolutions  of,  119;  coahtion  of, 
against  Napoleon,  121  sqq.;  nations 
of,  duped,  132  sqq.;  Alexander's 
attempt  to  dupe,  134;  and  proposed 
American  enterprise,  135;  degra- 
dation of,  139;  holds  aloof  from 
Greek  struggle,  141;  sends  a  navy 
to  help  Greece,  ib. ;  and  the  orient, 
142;  pohtical  struggles  in,  ib.; 
ideahsm  in,  151;  centripetal  forces 
in,  184;  United  States  of,  impossi- 
ble, ib.;  Bismarck's  knowledge  of, 
194;  changes  in  modern,  220;  in- 
finite variety  of,  223;  prophecies 
on,  223,  224;  Greece,  and  Rome, 
224;   influence  of  intellect  on,  ib. 

European :  international  wars,  preva- 
lence of,  1 61 8-1 81 5,  4;  nations, 
differentiation  of,  78;  disturbance, 
magnitude  of,  79;  sovereigns,  re- 
actionary, 105;  sovereigns  and  the 
Revolution,  106;   Powers,  conflict- 


INDEX 


233 


ing  interests  of,  107;  coalition  over- 
threw Napoleon,  107,  108;  Powers, 
meeting  of,  at  Vienna,  121 ;  Powers, 
attempts  of  Napoleon  to  conciliate, 
122;  Powers,  banish  Napoleon  to 
St.  Helena,  127;  victory  at  Nava- 
rino,  141 ;  enthusiasm  for  I^iszt, 
iS4>  155;  thought,  influence  of 
Comte  on,  168;  Concert,  changes 
in  the,  173;  Powers,  and  Italian 
unity,  174;  Powers,  intimate  corre- 
lation of,  221. 
Evolution :  history  and  sociology,  1 69 ; 
recklessly  applied,  170;  Darwin  on, 
169,  170;  Draper  on,  170;  Hell- 
wald  on,  ib. ;  Lecky  on,  ib. ;  Spen- 
cer on,  ib. ;  Tyler  on,  ib. 

Fallmerayer  and  modern  Greeks, 
139,  140. 

Faust,  a  national  creation,  153. 

Ferdinand,  Emperor  of  Austria,  in- 
fluenced by  wife  and  camarilla,  163. 

Ferdinand  IV.  of  Spain,  a  petty  ty- 
rant, 136. 

Ferdinand  VII.:  cruel  reign  of,  136; 
fight  of  Spain  for,  136,  137;  sup- 
ported by  French,  ib. 

Fersen  and  Marie  Antoinette,  33. 

Figaro,  Le  mariage  de,  20. 

Fleuris,  battle  of,  45. 

Fouche,  intrigues  of,  against  Napo- 
leon, 116. 

Fouquier-Tinville,  44. 

Fox,  ingenious  arguments  of,  11. 

France:  attitude  to  England,  13,  18; 
position  of,  14,  38,  47;  and  Chat- 
ham, 14;  and  Seven  Years'  War, 
ib.;  and  Austria,  15,  38,  60,  99,  159, 
177,  194,  219;  centralization  in,  31 ; 
and  Poland,  37,  41 ;  and  Belgium, 
37;  and  Rhine  country,  ib.;  in- 
vaded by  Prussians,  38;  England, 
and  the  Hellenes,  44;  and  Corsica, 
51 ;  acquires  territory  west  of 
Rhine,  62;  attacked  by  Powers 
(1799),  65;  invasions  of,  65,  90, 
114,  215 ;  influence  of  Napoleon  on, 
68,  71;    and  European  legal  con- 


cepts, 70;  Poland,  and  Italy,  82; 
retains  continental  conquests,  87; 
and  Empire  defeated  at  Rosbach, 
91;  and  Spain,  alliance  of,  92; 
unused  to  war  at  home,  116;  pro- 
found changes  in,  1 1 9 ;  at  Congress 
of  Vienna,  128;  retains  pohtical 
liberty,  ib.;  and  England,  friend- 
ship of,  131 ;  allied  armies  retire 
from,  135;  revolutions  in,  before 
1848,  crushed,  156;  the  July  Revo- 
lution in,  ib.;  wins  liberty  of  the 
Press,  157;  and  Russia,  159;  Eng- 
land, and  the  orient,  ib.;  scientific 
eminence  of,  159,  166;  material 
prosperity  of,  159;  rise  and  fall  of, 
172,  219;  and  Cavour,  176;  and 
Crimean  campaign,  177;  and  Sar- 
dinia arrange  to  attack  Austria,  1 79; 
and  Italian  unity,  182;  German 
victories  over,  ib. ;  Lorraine  joined 
to,  185;  not  homogeneous,  ib.; 
united  under  the  Bourbons,  ib.; 
Sweden  and  Westphalian  peace, 
186;  concessions  of,  to  Pope,  209; 
parties  in,  209,  217;  and  South 
German  states,  208;  lost  prestige 
of,  210;  attitude  of,  to  Hohenzol- 
lern  candidate,  211;  declares  war 
on  Prussia,  212;  isolated  by  Bis- 
marck, 217;  loses  Alsace  and  Ger- 
man Lorraine,  218;  makes  peace  at 
Frankfort-on-Main,  ib.;  war  in- 
demnity of,  ib. 

Francis  11. ,  of  Austria:  sues  for 
peace,  77;  declares  Holy  Roman 
Empire  extinct,  78;  and  Archduke 
Charles,  95 ;  attacks  Napoleon,  ib. ; 
ambitions  of,  97;  and  Metternich, 
98. 

Francis  Joseph:  Emperor-King,  Hun- 
gary and  Austria,  164;  peaceful 
policy  of,  214. 

Franco-German  War:  not  inter- 
national, 4;  concentration  in  the, 
58;  and  Rome,  181;  the,  202,  207- 
219;  foreseen  by  Bismarck,  205; 
necessity  of  a,  208;  effects  of,  on 
France,  218. 


234 


INDEX 


Frankfort-on-the-Main :'  incorporated 
by  Prussia,  206;  terms  of  peace 
at,  218. 

Franklin  and  Beaumarchais,  22. 

Frederick,  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia, 
invades  France,  215. 

Frederick,  Empress,  enemy  of  Bis- 
marck, 198. 

Frederick  the  Great:  great  wars  of, 
international,  16;  and  Katharine, 
ib. ;  and  Maria  Theresa,  1 7 ;  cam- 
paigns of,  57;  and  Wellington,  91; 
success  of,  at  Leuthen,  ib. ;  success 
of,  at  Rosbach,  ib.;  victory  of,  at 
MoUwitz,  191;    wins  Silesia,  ib. 

Frederick  William  II.:  hostile  to 
Revolution,  40;  peace  policy  of,  79. 

Frederick  William  III. :  peace  policy 
of,  79;   ambitions  of,  98. 

French :  colonies  lost,  1 2 ;  peasantry, 
condition  of,  29;  homogeneity  of, 
30 ;  attacks  on  English,  60 ;  attacks 
on  Habsbiurgs,  ib.;  defeated  at 
Aboukir  Bay,  64;  at  Marengo 
saved  by  Desaix,  67;  recover  Lom- 
bardy,  ib.;  character  of  the,  71,  72; 
distaste  for  expansion,  72;  in- 
difference to  Austerlitz,  ib.;  desert 
Napoleon,  73,  108,  117;  desertion 
of  Jeanne  d'Arc,  74;  reviving  in- 
terest of,  in  Napoleon,  75;  and 
Spanish  fleets  defeated  by  English, 
86,  87;  ravages  of,  in  Spain,  88; 
account  of  Peninsular  War,  89; 
sick  massacred  by  Veronese,  ib.; 
Bavarians  and  Magyars  invade 
Germany,  91 ;  under  Dupont  sur- 
render to  Castanos,  92;  defeated 
by  Archduke  Charles,  96;  Crown 
and  West  Indies,  99 ;  guilty  of  Napo- 
leon's downfall,  107;  loyalty  of,  to 
Louis  XIV.,  108;  classes,  attitude 
of,  to  Napoleon,  116;  nation,  com- 
posed of  two  elements,  ib.;  loyalty 
of,  to  Henry  II.,  117;  loyalty  of, 
to  Louis  XV.,  ib.;  at  La  Haie 
Sainte,  122;  cavalry  and  English 
squares,  123;  on  Waterloo,  ib.; 
support  Ferdinand  VII.,  137;   vic- 


torious march  of,  to  Cadiz,  ib.; 
establish  Italian  unity,  138;  tm- 
injured  by  Metternich,  ji. ;  roman- 
ticism, 143;  Balzac's  greatness  not 
recognized  by,  153;  dissatisfaction 
of,  156;  Royal  family,  attempts  on 
life  of,  1 59 ;  Government,  influence 
of  Comte  on  the,  168;  and  English 
defeat  Russians,  172;  Empire,  es- 
tablishment of  the  Second,  ib.; 
Republic,  Louis  Napoleon,  Presi- 
dent of,  1 73 ;  indignation  of,  against 
Orsini,  179;  statesmen  and  Italian 
unity,  ib. ;  conception  of  Bismarck, 
199;  opposition  refuses  supply  for 
army,  210;  opposition  responsible 
for  disaster,  ib.;  and  German 
ofiicers,  215;  beaten  in  every  en- 
gagement, ib.;  ofl&cers,  failure  of 
the,  ib.;  experience  gained  in 
Mexico,  etc.,  216;  under  Gambetta, 
ib. 

French  army:  victories  of,  47;  ex- 
cellence of  the,  79;  efficiency  of, 
reduced,  87 ;  harassed  by  Cossacks, 
104;   retreat  of,  ib. 

French  bourgeoisie :  condition  of  the, 
29  sqq.;  character  of  the,  116; 
hostility  of,  to  Napoleon,  *Z>.;  in 
power,  ib. 

French  Revolution:  causes  of,  a6 
sqq.;  importance  of  the,  26;  prob- 
lem of  the,  27;  social  character  of 
the,  120. 

Friedland,  victory  of,  81,  82. 

Fulton,  steamship  of,  58. 

Galicia  won  by  Austria,  192. 

Gambetta:  and  Danton,  216,  218; 
French  resistance  under,  216; 
policy  of  unflinching  resistance, 
218. 

Garda,  Lake,  fortresses  round,  re- 
duced, 61. 

Garibaldi:  and  Cavour,  175;  com- 
promises South  Italy,  181;  in 
Sicily  and  Naples,  ib. 

Gastein,  treaty  of,  202,  203. 

Gates  at  Saratoga,  33. 


INDEX 


235 


Genghis  Khan  and  the  Duke  of  Bruns- 
wick, 42. 

Genoa  and  Corsica,  51. 

Gensonn^,  43. 

Gentz:  foresees  close  of  Reaction, 
156;  secretary  of  Metternich,  ib. 

Geoffrin,  Madame,  19. 

Geo-politics :  influence  of,  8,  14; 
and  France,  37;  and  Corsica,  50; 
and  Ignatius  Loyola,  51;  and 
Egypt,  63;  and  the  Papal  States, 
175;  and  Italy,  182 ;  and  Germany, 
185;  and  Bismarck,  194;  impor- 
tance of,  224. 

George  III.:  taxes  of,  7;  peace  of, 
with  French,  1763,  10;  proclama- 
tion of  Oct.  7,  1763,  ib.;  policy, 
discussion  of,  11,  12;   ambition  of, 

25- 

German:  code  of  law,  70;  view  of 
Napoleon's  fall,  73 ;  corps  and  Na- 
poleon, 85;  reserves  of  Napoleon, 
113;  writers  on  Waterloo,  123; 
small  states,  apprehensions  of,  130; 
Confederation,  Diet  of,  131;  small 
states  left  in  statu  quo,  ib. ;  political 
writers  imprisoned,  133;  classics, 
143;  romanticism,  ib.;  unity,  rise 
of,  172;  literature,  historical  im- 
portance of,  188;  language,  appre- 
ciation of,  ib.;  Confederation, 
prominent  members  of,  189;  unity 
prepared  by  Luther,  etc.,  194; 
unity,  distant  cavises  of,  196;  Con- 
federacy, N.,  established  by  Bis- 
marck, 206;  armies  invade  France, 
215;  armies,  leaders  of  the,  ib.; 
officers,  bold  initiative  of  the,  ib. 

Germanization  of  Hungary,  164. 

Germans,  tardy  recognition  of  Bach 

by,  153- 
Germany:  and  Talleyrand's  project, 
67,  68;  commencement  of,  78; 
conquest  of,  80;  conquered  by 
Gustavus  Adolphus,  91 ;  invaded 
by  French,  etc.,  ib. ;  saved  by  Marl- 
borough, ib.;  Saxony's  treachery 
to,  130;  incapable  of  a  real  revolu- 
tion,  X37;    Press  gagged  by,  ib.; 


injured  by  the  Reaction,  138; 
literary  life  of,  143  sqq. ;  and  Hegel's 
system,  149;  revolutions  in,  before 
1848,  crushed,  156;  South,  revolu- 
tion in,  161;  union  of,  and  Bis- 
marck, 173,  176,  196,  207;  effect 
of  a  united,  173;  union  of,  foreseen, 
179;  battles  of,  against  France, 
182;  unity  of,  184-206;  absence  of 
sea- power  in,  185 ;  influence  of  geo- 
politics on,  ib.;  anarchy  in,  186; 
Church  possessions  in,  ib.;  in- 
tellectual unity  of,  187,  189;  Refor- 
mation in,  188;  spiritual  unity  of, 
189;  political  unity  of,  j5.  ;  Austria, 
a  bad  political  centre  for,  192,  193; 
Prussia  a  good  political  centre  for, 
ib.;  theories  on  origin  of  modern, 
196;  forced  to  become  a  military 
power,  197;  unity  of,  shown  by 
Franco- German  war,  215;  financial 
exhaustion  of,  217 ;  at  Versailles  be- 
comes the  German  Empire,  218; 
unity  of,  accomplished,  ib.;  am- 
bitions of  modern,  219. 

Gibbon's  Decline,  obsolete,  151. 

Girondists:  and  War  Party,  41; 
growing  influence  of,  43. 

Gneisenau,  82;    and  Napoleon's  fall, 

73- 

Godoy  suggests  French  alliance,  94. 

Goethe :  the  homologue  of  Napoleon, 
26;  at  Valmy,  38;  and  Napoleon, 
48;  works  of,  143;  on  classicism 
and  romanticism,  144;  language  of, 
188. 

Gorgei,  General:  genius  of,  163; 
successes  of,  ib.;  surrenders  at 
ViMgos,  ib. 

Gothard,  St.,  crossed  by  Suwarow,  65. 

Grammont:  and  Austria,  211;  and 
Italy,  ib.;  and  South  German 
States,  ib.;  forces  a  rupture  with 
Prussia,  ib.;   presses  William  I.,  ib. 

Grande  peur,  la,  s^. 

Grandet,  the  type  of  avarice,  153. 

Grasse,  Comte  de,  engagements  of,  23 ; 
prevents  relief  of  Cornwallis,  23,  24. 

Graves  off  Chesapeake  Bay,  23. 


236 


INDEX 


Greece:  European  navy  sent  to,  141 ; 
and  Eiirope,  222;  nationalism  in, 
ib.;  Europe  and  Rome,  224;  vide 
Hellenes. 

Greek  Church  in  Russia,  224. 

Greek  literature,  models  of,  143. 

Greeks:  uninjured  by  Metternich, 
139;  excesses  of,  141;  victory  at 
Salamis,  182. 

Grenoble,  Napoleon  passes  through, 
120. 

Grenville,  policy  of,  disciassed,  12. 

Grenville's  taxes,  7. 

Grimm,  Joseph,  and  Germanic  lan- 
guage, 150. 

Grouchy:  and  Desaix,  67;  an  unre- 
liable general,  126;  pursues  Bliicher 
in  mistaken  direction,  ib.;  and 
Napoleon,  junction  of,  necessary, 
127;    remains  at  Wavre,  ib. 

Guadet,  43. 

Guizot,    Louis    Philippe    yields    to, 

159- 
Gustavus  III.,  hostile  to  Revolution, 

40. 
Gustavus  Adolphus:   a  strategist,  56; 
and  Wellington,  91 ;  conquers  Ger- 
many, ib.;    times  of,  112. 

Habeas  carpus  and  liberty  of  the 
Press,  157. 

Habsburgs:  and  Bourbons,  15;  and 
Kaunitz,  ib. ;  and  Starhemberg,  ib. ; 
attacked  by  French,  60 ;  and  French 
Crown,  99,  100;  Imperial  policy  of 
the,  186;  character  of  the,  190; 
prominent  in  German  Confedera- 
tion, 189;  lacking  in  assimilative 
power,  190;  allies  of  the  Catholic 
Church,  ib. 

Haie  Saint e.  La:  Anglo-Dutch  centre 
at,  122;  occupied  by  French,  ib.; 
Napoleon  defeats  Anglo-Germans 
at,  127. 

Hallidon  Hill  and  Scotch,  87. 

Ham  fortress,  imprisonment  of  Louis 
Napoleon  in,  159. 

Hanau,  battle  of,  114. 

Hanover:   a  cause  of  contention,  13; 


victorious  advance  of  Prussians 
into,  205;  etc.,  incorporated  by 
Prussia,  206. 

Hardenberg :  and  Prussia,  82 ;  repre- 
sentative of  Prussia,  129;  and 
Prussian  eflSciency,  193. 

Haynau,  cruelty  of,  164. 

Hebert:  and  "The  Terror,"  44; 
death  of,  47. 

Hegel:  and  Berkeley,  etc.,  148;  ex- 
tensive field  of,  ib.;  Professor  at 
Berhn,  ib.;  a  "romantic,"  149; 
and  Minister  Altenstein,  ib. ;  causes 
triumph  of,  ib. ;  system  of,  in  Amer- 
ica, England,  and  Germany,  ib.; 
subjectiveness  of,  149,  150;  ad- 
miration felt  for,  165;  death  of,  ib.; 
influence  of,  on  law,  ib. ;  influence 
of,  on  political  science,  ib.;  influ- 
ence of,  on  religion,  ib.;  reaction 
against,  165,  166. 

Hegelianism,  148-150. 

Heine:  grace  of,  143;  prose  style  of, 
ib.;  morbid  creations  of,  144; 
amours  of,  145;  and  Chopin,  147, 
148. 

Helena,  St.,  Napoleon  at,  52,  60. 

Hellas:  and  Persia,  25;  compared  to 
Europe,  142. 

Hellenes:  and  primitive  historical 
concepts,  i ;  England  and  France, 
44 ;  determine  to  rise  against  Turks, 
139;  fight  Mahmud  II.,  140; 
treachery  of,  to  Hellenes,  ib.;  suc- 
cessful on  sea,  141 ;  independence 
of,  recognized,  142. 

Hellwald  on  evolution,  170. 

Henry  II.,  loyalty  of  French  to,  117. 

Henry  IV.  and  Napoleon,  53. 

Henry,  Cape,  one  of  the  most  decisive 
naval  battles  oflf,  23,  24. 

Herder,  language  of,  188. 

Hesse:  apprehensions  of,  130;  Land- 
grave of,  sells  his  subjects,  187. 

Hillsborough,  Lord, and  the  proclama- 
tion of  1763,  10. 

Hinterland:  as  true  cause,  9;  at- 
tempted occupation  of,  11;  acquisi- 
tion of,  18. 


INDEX 


237 


Historical  investigation,  true  method 
of,  8. 

History:  and  romanticism,  151; 
development  of,  151;  place  of 
science  in,  168;  and  evolution,  1 70. 

Hoffmann  and  Schumann,   146. 

Hohenzollern  prince  supported  by 
Bismarck,  211. 

Holbach,  18. 

"Holy  Alliance":  reactionary  char- 
acter of  the,  137;   the,  ib. 

Holland:  occupation  of,  43;  allies 
expelled  from,  45;  and  Belgium, 
separation  of,  176. 

Holy  Roman  Empire:  disrupted,  77; 
partial  revival  of,  131. 

Hood  off  Chesapeake  Bay,  23. 

Houssaye,  researches  of,  125. 

Howe  and  Villaret  de  Joyeuse,  47. 

Huguenots,  a  separate  pohty,  30. 

Humboldt:  a  brutal  diplomatist,  129; 
admiration  of,  for  Schiller,  ib.; 
advocates  annihilation  of  Saxony, 
ib.;  and  Talleyrand,  ib.;  literary 
character  of,  ib.;  wishes  to  keep 
France  powerless,  ib.;  representa- 
tive of  Prussia,  129. 

Humboldt,  Alexander  von,  generaU- 
zations  of,  169;  apostle  of  natural 
science,  169,  170. 

"Hundred  Days,  The,"  121. 

Hundred  Years'  War  and  Jeanne 
d'Arc,  74. 

Hungarian:  revolution,  social,  161; 
revolution,  great  men  produced  by, 
ib.;  diets,  reforms  of,  162;  nobles, 
exempt  from  taxation,  ib.;  nobles, 
patriotism  of,  ib. ;  reforms,  peculiar 
feature  of,  163;  revolution,  failure 
of,  temporary,  164. 

Hungarians:  expel  Austrians,  163; 
surrender  at  Vilagos,  ib.;  ancient 
political  independence  of,  164; 
passive  resistance  of,  ib. ;  attitude  of, 
to  Austria,  194;  vide  also  Ma,gya.TS. 

Hungary:  invaded  by  Russia,  163; 
Kossdth,  Governor  of,  ib.;  Ger- 
manization  of,  164;  unified  by 
Dedk,  173;   nationalism  in,  222. 


Ibrahim,  leads  fleet  against  Greece, 
141. 

Ideal  motives,  value  of,  assessed,  8. 

Idealogists,  the,  and  Napoleon,  64. 

Ideals,  failure  of,  152. 

lUyria,  Marmont  in,  103. 

Indo-Germanic  theory  and  roman- 
ticism, 150. 

Inquisition  reestablished  in  Spain, 
136. 

International  peace,  explanation  of,  5. 

Invalides,  Hotel  des,  Napoleon's 
ashes  placed  in  the,  159, 

Ireland:  settled  condition  of,  13;  the 
basis  of  a  French  invasion,  60. 

Italia  far  a  da  se,  182. 

Italian:  revolt  in  Pavia  crushed,  89; 
political  writers  imprisoned,  133; 
romanticism,  143;  revolution,  fail- 
ure of,  temporary,  164;  character, 
the,  174,  175;  patriots  and  Napo- 
leon III.,  178,  179. 

Italians:  (Verona)  massacre  French 
sick,  89;  furious  at  peace  of  Villa 
Franca,  180;  enthusiasm  of  the, 
ib.;  Garibaldi  and  Mazzini  appeal 
to  the,  181;  defeated  by  Austria, 
206;   and  Catholicism,  224. 

Italian  unity:  promoted  by  Powers, 
6,  182;  promoted  by  Napoleon,  68; 
174;  due  to  French,  138;  an  old 
ideal,  174;  rise  of,  172;  opposition 
to,  1 76 ;  and  French  statesmen,  1 79 ; 
accomplished,  183,  206;  justified, 
181. 

Italy:  entered  by  Napoleon,  57;  in- 
vaded by  Austro-Russian  army,  65; 
Poland  and  France,  81 ;  and  Napo- 
leon, interests  coincident,  114;  be- 
comes Austrian,  132;  revolutions 
in,  136,  156,  161;  no  open  revo- 
lution in,  possible,  137;  sapped  by 
reaction,  138;  unity  of,  172-183; 
Cavovu-  in,  173;  effect  of  a  united, 
ib.;  and  unification  of  the  West, 
174;  influence  of  Papacy,  175; 
secret  societies  in,  ib.;  Austria  su- 
preme in,  177;  declares  for  Victor 
Emmanuel,   181;    South,  compro- 


238 


INDEX 


mised  by  Garibaldi,  ib. ;  and  Catho- 
lic Church,  182;  geographical  posi- 
tion of,  ib. ;  prospects  of  modern,  ib. ; 
weakness  of,  182,  183;  Venetian, 
won  by  Austria,  191;  Albert  com- 
mands in,  204;  treaty  of,  with  Bis- 
marck, ib. ;  wins  Venetian  territory, 
206. 

Jansenists:  a  separate  polity,  30;  and 

Bull  Unigenitus,  31. 
Jeanne   d'Arc:     and   Napoleon,    74; 

deserted  by  French,  ib. ;  imprisoned 

at  Rouen,  ib.;   inner  voices  of,  loi. 
Jellachich  and  Croatians  invade  Him- 

gary,  163. 
Jemmapes,  battle  of,  43. 
Jena:    battle  of,   79;    Prussians  de- 
feated at,  194. 
Jesuits:      and     the     hinterland,     9; 

founded  by  Ignatius,  51. 
Jesus,  life  of,  by  Strauss,  165. 
Joseph  Bonaparte  and  Charles  IV., 

92. 
Josephine:  and  Barras,  60;  marriage 

of,   ib.;    and  Austerlitz,    72;    and 

West  Indies,  99;   Napoleon's  Mas- 

cotte,  ib. 
Jouan,  Port,  Napoleon  lands  at,  120. 
Jourdan  in  the  Main  valley,  60. 
Joyeuse,  Villaret  de,  and  Howe,  47. 
Juliet,  a  classical  type,  145. 
July  Revolution:    effects  of  the,  156, 

157;    Academic  character  of  the, 

158. 
Jury  system  and  the  liberty  of  the 

Press,  157. 
Justinian  and  Napoleon,  69. 

Kalb,  de,  and  Beaumarchais,  21,  22. 
Kant,  philosophy  of,  148. 
Karlsbad,  Congress  at,  134. 
Katharine  II.  and  Prussia,  16,  18. 
Kaunitz:    and  Habsburgs,    15;    and 

Napoleon,   48;    negotiates  French 

alliance,  99. 
Kepler  and  planetary  system,  4. 
Kiel :  and  the  Elbe,  canal  connecting, 

201:     commanded    by    Schleswig- 


Holstein,  ib.;  essential  to  Prussia, 
ib. 

King  Lear  and  Pert  Goriot,  153. 

Koeniggraetz,  battle  of,  200,  205. 

Kossir,  boundary  of,  64, 

Kosstith:  in  prison,  133;  eloquence 
of,  161,  162;  outcome  of  Hunga- 
rian revolution,  1 61-163;  son  of, 
present  greatness  of,  161;  perma- 
nent influence  of,  on  Magyars,  162; 
statesmanship  of,  ib.;  becomes 
Governor  of  Hungary,  163. 

Kotzebue:  assassination  of,  133;  as 
a  Russian  spy,  ib. 

Kowno,  Napoleon  at,  103. 

Kufstein,  prison  of,  133. 

Kutusow:  and  Ulm  campaign,  56; 
failure  to  join  Mack,  76 ;  resistance 
of,  104;  retreat  of,  ib. 

Lafayette:  unimportance  of,  i;  and 
Beaumarchais,  2;  and  Americans, 
74. 

Laibach,  Congress  at,  134. 

Lamartine:  prose  style  of,  143; 
Elegies  and  Meditations,  144;  mel- 
lowed cadence  of,  ib. ;  morbid  crea- 
tions of,  ib.;  amours  of,  145; 
Ledru-RoUin,  and  Cavaignac,  160. 

Lange,  Albert,  History  of  Material- 
ism, 171. 

Lannes :  in  Spain,  88 ;  death  of,  96. 

Latin  America,  revolutions  in,  135. 

Leboeuf,  Marshal,  statement  of,  211. 

Lecky:  and  witch  massacres,  43;  on 
evolution,  170. 

L6dru-Rollin,  Lamartine  and  Cavai- 
gnac, 160. 

Lee,  Arthur,  and  Beaumarchais,  21, 
22. 

Legitimacy,  principle  of,  130. 

Legnago,  fortress  of,  reduced,  61. 

Leibniz:  Louis  XIV.,  and  Egypt,  63; 
and  the  infinitesimal  calculus,  85. 

Leipsic,  25;  Napoleon  broken  at,  90; 
Napoleon  at,  112;  battle  of,  114  J 
and  Waterloo,  relative  importance 
of,  125. 

Leoben,  Napoleon's  march  to,  61. 


INDEX 


239 


Leopardi:  morbid  creations  of,  144; 
amours  of,  145. 

Leopold  II.,  hostile  to  Revolution,  40. 

Lessing:  classical  works  of,  143; 
language  of,  188. 

Leuthen,  Austrians  defeated  at,  91. 

Lexington,  colonial  progress  foreseen 
before,  10. 

Liberty:  suppression  of,  135;  ideal  of, 
not  realized  by  Louis-Philippe,  160. 

Ligny :  Blucher  defeated  at,  1 24 ;  and 
Quatre-Bras,  battles  of,  125,  126; 
Blucher  defeated  at,  ib. 

Lisbon,  on  strategic  line,  88,  89. 

Lissa,  battle  of,  i8r. 

Liszt :  Francis,  genius  of,  1 54, 1 55 ;  and 
Paganini,  155 ;  poetic  genius  of,  ib. 

Literature:  in  England,  143  sqq.;  in 
Germany,  ib.;  in  France,  143. 

Lobau,  Napoleon  at,  96. 

Lodi,  Napoleon  at,  49. 

Lombard,  Chapelle  St.,  Biilow  at,  127. 

Lombardy,  Napoleon  in,  60,  61 ;  in- 
vaded by  Suwarow,  65;  lost  to 
France,  ib. ;  recovered  by  France, 
67;  wealth  of,  102;  ceded  by 
Austria,  180;  ceded  by  Austria  to 
Victor  Emmanuel,  ib.;  Benedek's 
knowledge  of,  204. 

Lonato,  victoiy  of,  61. 

Lorenz,  Professor  Otto,  theory  of,  197. 

Lorraine  united  with  France,  185. 

Louis,  conceit  of  the  later,  118,  119. 

Louis  XIIL,  Savaron's  rebuke  to,  29. 

Louis  XIV:  and  Napoleon,  14;  am- 
bition of,  25;  centralization  policy 
of,  31;  Leibniz,  and  Egypt,  63; 
coaUtion  against,  60, 106;  supported 
by  French,  108;  palace  of,  at  Ver- 
sailles, 218;  tries  to  unite  Europe, 
223. 

Louis  XV.:  and  French  Revolution, 
27;  foreign  policy  of,  ib.;  and 
ancien  regime,  29 ;  loyalty  of  French 
to,  117. 

Louis  XVI. :  and  French  Revolution, 
27;  foreign  policy  of,  ib.;  and 
ancien  regime,  29;  character  of,  32; 
blindness  of,  35 ;  dismisses  Necker, 


36;  attempted  flight,  and  capture 
of,  40;  loyalty  of  French  to,  41; 
and  Marie  Antoinette,  99. 

Louis  XVIII. :  made  king,  117;  exile 
of,  118;  limitations  of,  ib.;  flight 
of,  121. 

Louis-Philippe:  and  popular  con- 
cessions, 75 ;  made  King  of  France, 
157;  affability  of,  158;  and  Charles 
II.,  ib.;  and  Austria,  159;  and 
Russia,  ib. ;  attempts  on  hf e  of,  ib. ; 
incapacity  of,  ib.;  temporizing 
poUcy  of,  ib.;  yields  to  Casimir- 
Perier,  Guizot,  and  Thiers,  ib.; 
Revolution  against,  160. 

Louis  (Lou- Lou)  and  Eugenie,  209. 

Louisiana,  sale  of,  71. 

Louvois,  centralizations  of,  31. 

Loyola,  St.  Ignatius,  and  the  Basques, 

SI- 
Lucien,  conspiracy  of,  66. 
Luneville,  peace  of,  67. 
Luther,  reforms  of,  and  German  imity, 

194. 
Lyons,  Napoleon  passes  through,  120. 

Macdonald,  leader  of  Napoleon's  left, 
103;   admirable  conduct  of,  118. 

Macedonia,  nationaUsm  in,  222. 

Machiavelli  on  the  Papacy,  175. 

Mack,  Napoleon's  estimate  of,  54,  76; 
and  Ulm  campaign,  56;  and  Aus- 
trians at  Ulm,  76;  surrender  of,  ib. 

MacMahon,  Marshal,  want  of  initia- 
tive of,  215. 

Madrid  and  Bourges,  38. 

Magenta,  battle  of,  180,  182. 

Magersfontein  and  Waterloo,  124. 

Magyar  independent  government  es- 
tablished, 163. 

Magyars:  French  and  Bavarians  in- 
vade Germany,  91 ;  permanent  in- 
fluence of  Kosstith  on,  162;  revolt 
of  the,  163;   vide  also  Hungarians. 

Mahan  and  Beaumarchais,  2. 

Mahmud  II.,  armies  of,  140;  asks 
help  of  Mehmed  Ali,  141. 

Main  valley,  Jourdan  in  the,  60. 

Maintenon,  Madame  de,  99. 


240 


INDEX 


Malplaquet,  25. 

Malta  occupied  by  Napoleon,  64. 

Mantua,  fortress  of,  reduced,  61. 

Marat :  and  "  The  Terror,"  44 ;  death 
of,  46. 

Marathon  and  modern  Greeks,  140. 

Marengo:  battle  of,  24,  67;  cam- 
paign of,  66,  67;  and  Waterloo,  67. 

Margaret,  a  classical  type,  145. 

Maria  Theresa:  and  Frederick,  15; 
and  Kaunitz,  ib.;  loses  Silesia,  191 ; 
interference  of,  in  Europe,  214. 

Marie  Antoinette:  character  of,  ^^', 
and  Calonne,  ib.;  and  Fersen,  ib.; 
St.  Cloud  and  Rambouillet,  ib.; 
bhndness  of,  35;  attempted  flight 
and  capture  of,  40 ;  and  Louis  XVI., 
99. 

Marie  Louise:  character  of,  99; 
marries  Napoleon,  ib.;  Napoleon's 
jettatora,  ib.;  conduct  of,  118; 
Napoleon's  marriage  with,  ib. 

Marlborough:  and  Napoleon,  56; 
and  Wellington,  91 ;  saves  Ger- 
many, ib. 

Marmont:  and  Napoleon,  103;  in 
Illyria,  ib. 

Marseillaise  forbidden,  132. 

Massacres  of  September,  42. 

Massena:  strategy  of,  in  Italy,  61; 
victory  of,  at  Zurich,  65;  drives 
Wellington  behind  Torres  Vedras, 
89. 

Materialism^  History  of,  by  Lange, 
171. 

Materialism:  taught  by  Buechner, 
170;  taught  by  Carl  Vogt,  ib.; 
taught  by  Moleschott,  ib.;  effects 
of,  171. 

Max  Emmanuel  and  Blenheim  cam- 
paign, 56. 

Mayence,  Archbishop,  possessions  of, 
186. 

Mazarin  and  Richelieu,  and  Bis- 
marck, 198,  199. 

Mazzini:  enthusiasm  of,  176;  pam- 
phlets of,  181. 

Mediatization  of  small  German  sov- 
ereignties, 68. 


Mehmed  Ali,  governor  of  Egypt, 
141. 

Melanchthon,  reforms  of,  and  Ger- 
man unity,  194. 

Melas:  project  of  French  invasion, 
65;  technical  victory  at  Marengo, 
66. 

Merimee,  Prosper,  prose  style  of,  143. 

Metternich:  and  Napoleon,  48,  59; 
advice  of,  82;  believes  Napoleon 
unconquerable,  86;  character  of, 
98,  129;  advice  of,  to  Francis,  98; 
a  behever  in  luck,  99;  and  Napo- 
leon's marriage,  ib. ;  vanity  of,  108, 
no;  neglects  Austria's  interests, 
109;  deaf  to  Napoleon's  proposals, 
113;  influence  of,  114;  proposes 
St.  Helena  for  Napoleon,  117;  and 
Alexander  L,  attitude  to  France, 
128;  and  Talleyrand,  129;  policy 
of,  130;  and  the  Congress,  131; 
and  national  liberties,  132,  136,  138, 
139;  master  of  Diet,  132;  and  as- 
sassination of  Kotzebue,  133;  and 
police  supreme,  ib.;  and  Alexan- 
der's plans,  135;  triumph  of,  ib.\ 
and  the  Holy  AUiance,  137;  de- 
cadent ideal  of,  138;  reaction  imder, 
ib.;  and  Hellenes,  139;  contrasted 
with  Napoleon,  ib.;  jealous  of 
Russia,  141 ;  opposed  Greek  rising, 
ib. 

Metz,  disaster  at,  216. 

Mexico,  French  experience  gained  in, 
216. 

Meyer,  Edward,  and  Socrates,  loi. 

Middle  Ages:  and  eighteenth  cen- 
tury, 150;   and  romanticism,  ib. 

Milan,  rising  at,  136. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  a  follower  of  Comte,  168. 

Mirabeau:  character  of,  33;  death 
of,  34;  foresees  Empire,  ib.;  mod- 
eration of,  37. 

Moleschott,  teacher  of  materialism, 
170. 

MoUwitz,  battle  of,  191. 

Moltke:  and  Bismarck,  200;  con- 
fident of  defeating  Avistrians,  203; 
and  Crown  Prince  attack  Benedek, 


INDEX 


241 


205;    Roon   and   Bismarck,    212; 

invades  France,  215. 
Mommsen,  enemy  of  Bismarck,  198. 
Mondovi,  battle  of,  61. 
Montcalm,  and  colonial  secession,  10. 
Montenotte,  battle  of,  61. 
Montesquieu,  18. 
Montmirail,  battle  of,  115,  124. 
Moore  pursued  by  Napoleon,  94. 
Moravia:   Austrian  and  Russian  trap 

in,  76;   Napoleon  in,  77;   occupied 

by  Prussians,  205. 
Moreau:    in  the  Danube  valley,  60; 

victory  at  Hohenlinden,  67. 
Moscow:  a  sacred  town,  104;  entered 

by  Napoleon,  ib. ;  fired  by  Russians, 

j6.;  the  sacred  capital,  135. 
Moscowa,  battle  of  the,  103,  104. 
Motley,  a  friend  of  Bismarck,  199. 
Mozart  and  Chopin,  147. 
Music  before  and  after  Napoleon,  145. 

Nantes,  Revocation  of  Edict  of,  30,  31. 

Naples:  and  Italian  unity,  176;  rising 
at,  136;    Garibaldi  in,  181. 

Napoleon:  and  geo-politics,  14;  at 
Marengo,  24;  ambition  of,  25;  the 
homologue  of  Goethe,  26,  48;  and 
**  Convention,"  45 ;  anticipations 
of,  47;  criticisms  on,  48;  military 
exploits  of,  ib.;  and  Charles  V.,  49; 
as  a  legislator,  ib.;  personality  of, 
ib.;  and  Alexander  the  Great,  50, 
63;  and  Caesar,  ib.;  and  Corsica, 
50;  and  family,  ib.;  courage  of,  at 
Arcole  and  Lodi,  ib. ;  cowardice  of, 
ib.;  the  climax  of  a  series,  51 ;  and 
Robert  Bruce,  52;  and  Shamyl, 
ib.;  and  Themistocles,  ib.;  at  St. 
Helena,  52,  60,  127;  phenomenon 
of,  explained,  52;  the  outcome  of 
the  Revolution,  ib. ;  and  Bismarck, 
S3;  and  Henry  IV.,  ib.;  and  Revo- 
lution, ib.;  and  Cromwell,  53,  62; 
character  of,  53  sqq.,  100;  and 
geography,  54;  and  Mack,  ib.; 
and  Richeheu,  ib.;  judgment  of, 
ib.;  the  Ulm  campaign  of,  54,  56, 
75-78;   appreciation  of  English  by, 


55;  appreciation  of  Portuguese  by, 
ib.;  appreciation  of  Spanish  by, 
ib.;  strategy  of,  55-59,  61,  67,  76, 
loi,  114;  and  Eugene,  56;  and 
Marlborough,  ib.;  and  Walcheren 
expedition,  57 ;  at  the  Corniche,  ib. ; 
campaigns  of,  ib.;  enters  Italy  vid 
Little  St.  Bernard,  ib.;  enters  Italy 
vid  Savona,  ib.;  Wagram,  cam- 
paign of,  ib.;  and  concentration,  58; 
and  the  weapons  of  war,  ib.;  his 
theory  of  campaigns,  ib.;  at  Aus- 
terlitz,  59;  at  Dresden,  ib.;  luck 
of,  ib.;  and  Alexander  I.,  ib.;  and 
Bliicher,  ib.;  and  Metternich,  «&., 
139;  and  Wellington,  59,  89,  91; 
causes  of  downfall  of,  59,  72-73, 
107;  coalition  against,  60,  105,  106; 
and  B arras,  60;  in  Lombardy,  ib.; 
marries  Josephine,  ib.;  at  Dego, 
61 ;  at  Mondovi,  ib. ;  at  Montenotte, 
ib.;  near  Vienna,  ib.;  reduces  the 
quadrilateral,  ib.;  separates  Beau- 
lieu  and  Colli,  ib.;  in  Carinthia, 
ib. ;  at  Tolentino,  62 ;  in  Carniola,?6. ; 
in  Styria,  ib. ;  march  of  to  Leoben, 
ib.;  and  peace  with  Austria,  ib.; 
self-reahzation  of,  ib. ;  and  jealousy 
of  Directors,  63 ;  and  Sesostris,  ib. ; 
and  mysticism,  ib.;  and  Egypt, 
63-65;  and  idealogists,  64;  avoids 
Nelson,  ib.;  occupies  Malta,  ib.; 
in  Syria,  ib.;  victory  of,  at  M. 
Tabor,  65;  emotion  of,  66;  First 
Consul,  ib.;  renews  the  Itahan 
campaign,  ib. ;  and  peace  of  Lune- 
ville,  67;  hated  by  Spain,  68;  re- 
organization of  Germany  by,  ib.; 
the  creator  of  Modern  France,  ib.; 
the  forerunner  of  Bismarck,  ib.; 
the  promoter  of  Itahan  unity,  ib.; 
anticipated  by  Convention,  ib.; 
and  Justinian,  69;  and  Frederick 
the  Great,  ib.;  and  Tronchet,  ib.; 
creator  of  the  Banque  de  France, 
ib.;  educational  reforms  of,  ib.; 
ascendency  of,  ib.,  82,  83,  97;  ab- 
dication of,  69,  90,  117,  127;  at 
Austerlitz,  70;  legal  reforms  of,  ib.; 


242 


INDEX 


at  Leipsic,  ib. ;  at  Waterloo,  ib. ;  and 
French  prosperity,  71;  in  finance, 
ib. ;  policy  of,  not  national,  72 ;  and 
Louis  XIV.,  73 ;  and  Jeanne  d'Arc, 
74;  and  England,  75;  at  Bou- 
logne, ib. ;  Austria  and  Russia,  ib. ; 
enters  Vienna,  76;  and  autonomy 
of  Bavaria,  77;  and  autonomy  of 
Saxony,  ib.;  in  Moravia,  ib.;  and 
a  world-empire,  80 ;  conquers  Aus- 
tria, Prussia,  and  Germany,  ib.; 
English  resistance  to,  ib.;  enters 
Berlin,  ib. ;  in  Poland,  ib. ;  Russian 
resistance  to,  ib.;  Spanish  resis- 
tance to,  ib. ;  and  Madame  de  Wa- 
lewska,  81 ;  and  Poland,  ib. ;  Polish 
policy  unwise,  ib.;  Spanish  policy 
unwise,  ib.;  partition  with  Alexan- 
der, 82;  convenes  Erfurt  Congress, 
83;  period  (1810-1815),  84  sqq.; 
and  British  army,  85 ;  and  German 
corps,  ib.;  disproportionate  plans 
of,  ib.;  marries  a  Habsburg  prin- 
cess, ib.;  on  Russian  courage,  ib.; 
believed  unconquerable,  86;  pres- 
tige lessened  in  Russia,  ib.;  pres- 
tige lost  after  Leipsic,  ib. ;  Oriental 
plans  of,  85,  86,  102;  defeated  by 
Wellington  and  Bliicher,  87 ;  crushes 
the  Pavia  rebellion,  89;  attitude 
of,  to  Peninsular  War,  90;  recalls 
troops  from  Spain,  ib.;  success  of, 
broken  at  Leipsic,  ib.;  and  Spain, 
interests  of,  compatible,  91,  92,  93; 
friendly  attitude  to  Bavaria,  93; 
friendly  attitude  to  Saxony,  ib.;  at 
Astorga,  94;  attacked  by  Francis, 
95;  Austrian  campaign  of,  ib.; 
campaign  in  Danube  valley,  ib.; 
and  Lannes,  96;  at  Eckmiihl,  ib.; 
at  Lobau,  ib.;  at  Ratisbon,  ib.; 
campaign  of  Aspern,  ib. ;  campaign 
of  Wagram,  ib. ;  defeats  Archduke 
Charles,  ib. ;  ambition  of,  discvissed, 
97;  Habsburg  marriage  of,  99,  100; 
in  Elba,  99,  120;  marries  Marie 
Louise,  99;  marriage  of,  and 
Metternich,  ib.;  birth  of  son  to, 
100;   Russian  project  of,  100,  loi; 


inner  voices  of,  loi ;  the  apostle  of 
liberty,  loi,  121;  and  Marmont, 
103;  and  the  Turkish  empire,  102; 
at  Kowno,  103;  enters  Moscow, 
104;  greatness  of,  107;  deserted  by 
French,  108,  115,  117;  interests 
and  Austria's  harmonious,  108; 
rule  of,  limited  by  his  hfe,  ib.; 
betrayed  by  subordinates,  in; 
campaigns  of  (1813  and  1814),  ib.; 
German  reserves  of,  ib.;  and  the 
Coalition,  112;  at  Dresden,  ib.; 
at  Leipsic,  ib.;  defeats  Bliicher, 
ib. ;  expected  alliances  of,  ib. ;  mis- 
judges the  diplomatic  situation,  ib.; 
and  anarchy,  113;  lack  of  cavalry, 
ib. ;  peace  negotiations  of,  ib. ;  pro- 
posals to  Metternich,  ib. ;  and  Aus- 
tria, interests  coincident,  114;  and 
Bavaria,  interests  coincident,  ib.; 
and  Italy,  interests  coincident,  ib.; 
and  Saxony,  interests  coincident, 
ib.;  and  Wiirtemberg,  interests  co- 
incident, ib.;  annihilates  Bava- 
rians at  Hanau,  ib.;  defeated  at 
Leipsic,  ib.;  on  European  sov- 
ereigns, ib.;  retreats  into  France, 
ib. ;  at  Fontainebleau,  115;  barren 
successes  of  (1814),  ib.;  ignored  by 
allies,  ib.;  victorious  at  Brienne, 
ib.;  victorious  at  Craonne,  ib.; 
victorious  at  Montmirail,  ib.;  vic- 
torious at  Reims,  ib.;  victorious  at 
St.  Dizier,  ib.;  abdication  of,  mo- 
tives of,  117;  dependents,  beha- 
viour of,  ib.,  118;  prisoner  in  Elba, 
117;  unable  to  attach  the  bour- 
geoisie, ib.;  at  Grenoble,  120;  at 
Lyons,  ib.;  marches  on  Paris,  ib.; 
conciliates  the  Republicans,  121; 
danger  of,  abroad,  ib. ;  enters  Paris, 
ib.;  opposed  by  a  united  Europe, 
121  sqq.;  promises  constitutional 
Government,  121;  safety  of,  at 
home,  ib.;  attempts  to  conciliate 
the  Powers,  122;  defeated  before 
Waterloo,  124;  defeats  Bliicher  at 
Ligny,  ib.;  despair  of,  in  Waterloo, 
campaign,  ib.;  paper  army  of,  125; 


INDEX 


243 


prestige  of,  mined  by  Waterloo 
tb.;  at  Belle- Alliance,  127;  mistake 
of,  in  Waterloo  campaign,  126; 
slow  advance  of,  on  Wellington,  ib. ; 
and  Grouchy,  junction  of,  necessary, 
127;  death  of,  ib.;  defeats  Anglo- 
Germans  at  I-a  Haie  Sainte,  ib.; 
surrenders  to  the  "Bellerophon" 
captain,  ib.;  fall  of ,  128,  130,  152; 
and  boundaries  of  small  states,  131 ; 
represented  an  oppressor,  132; 
wrongly  combated  by  Spain,  136; 
blunders  of,  139;  rule,  benefits  of, 
ib.;  the  governor  of  men,  153;  and 
Balzac,  154;  and  State  institutions, 
ib.;  ashes  of,  brought  from  St. 
Helena,  159;  ashes  of,  placed  in  the 
Hotel  des  Invalides,  ib. ;  and  Italian 
unity,  174;  influence  of,  on  Ger- 
many, 189;  and  Eugenie  and  Prus- 
sia, 211;  Spanish  resistance  to, 
217;  and  Napoleon  III.,  219;  proph- 
ecy of,  223;  tries  to  unify  Europe, 
ib. 

Napoleon  (Louis):  subsequently  Na- 
poleon III.,  73 ;  conspiracy  of,  159; 
imprisoned  in  Ham  fortress,  ib.; 
becomes  President,  160;  aims  of, 
173,  174;  becomes  Emperor,  173; 
character  of,  ib. ;  coup  d'etat  of,  ib. ; 
promise  of,  to  Itahan  patriots,  178; 
vide  also  Napoleon  III. 

Napoleon  III.:  first  conspiracy  of, 
159;  secret  alUance  of,  and  Cavour, 
177;  and  Eugenie,  Orsini's  attack 
on,  178;  and  Orsini,  ib.;  and  Rus- 
sian war,  ib.;  meets  Cavour  at 
Plombieres,  179;  opposes  complete 
Italian  unity,  ib.;  promises  to  at- 
tack Austria,  ib.;  threatened  by 
Italian  patriots,  ib.;  and  Italian 
enthusiasm,  180;  Austrian  cam- 
paign of,  ib.;  cedes  Lombardy  to 
Victor  Emmanuel,  ib. ;  makes  peace 
at  Villa  Franca,  ib.;  misled  by 
Cavour,  ib.;  proposes  four  Italian 
kingdoms,  ib.;  reproached  by 
Italians,  181;  afraid  of  anger  of 
Pius   IX.,    ib.'y    and   Cavour,    ib.; 


attack  of,  feared  by  Bismarck,  ao6; 
disaster  of,  209;  weakness  of,  ib.; 
attacked  by  French  opposition,  210; 
forced  concessions  of,  ib. ;  mistaken 
inaction  of  (1866),  ib.;  urges  mili- 
tary supply,  ib. ;  mistaken  policy  of 
(1866),  214;  and  Napoleon  I.,  219; 
vide  also  Napoleon  (Louis). 

Napoleonic  dynasty,  lost  prestige  of, 
210. 

Napoleons,  Italian  sympathies  of  the, 
180. 

Nationalism,  growth  of,  125. 

NationaUty,  meaning  of,  140. 

Nations,  battle  of  the,  114. 

Navarino,  battle  of,  141. 

Necker:  removes  abuses,  27;  political 
writings  of,  31 ;  dismissed  by  Louis 
XVL,  36. 

Nelson:  avoided  by  Napoleon,  64; 
victory  at  Aboukir  Bay,  ib. 

Neville's  Cross,  and  Scotch,  87. 

Newton:  and  planetary  system,  4; 
and  the  infinitesimal  calculus,  85. 

New  York,  controlled  by  British,  23. 

Ney:  defeated  at  Dennewitz,  112; 
defeated  by  Biilow,  ib.;  ingratitude 
of,  118;  swears  allegiance  to  Louis 
XVIIL,  ib.;  joins  Napoleon,  120, 
121;    defeated  by  Wellington,  126. 

Nicholas  I. :  invades  the  Balkan,  141 ; 
deprives  Poland  of  autonomy,  158; 
sends  help  to  Austria,  163. 

Niel,  Marshal,  lu-ges  military  supply, 
210. 

Nineteen  Propositions  and  Idealism, 

7- 

Noailles,  Due  de,  and  abolition  of 
ancien  regime,  36. 

North  Sea,  Baltic  and  Prussia,  201. 

North:  taxes  of,  7;  policy  of,  dis- 
cussed, II,  12. 

Nouvelle  Heloise,  La,  20. 

Ohio,  French  expelled  from,  10. 
Op6ra,     Orsini's     criminal     attempt 

near  the,  178. 
Ophelia,  a  classical  type,  145. 
Oporto,  on  the  strategic  line,  88. 


244 


INDEX 


Ordinatce  and  abscissa  in  history,  9. 

Orient:  the,  and  Europe,  142;  effect 
of  European  changes  on  the,  173. 

Orissa,  12. 

Orleans  dynasty  estabUshed,  157. 

Orsini:  enthusiasm  of,  176,  177;  and 
Cavour,  177;  criminal  attempt  of, 
178;  French  indignation  against, 
1 79 ;  heroism  of,  ib. ;  execution  of,  ib. 

Otis,  on  constitution,  8. 

Oudinot  defeated  at  Dennewitz  by 
Billow,  112,  113. 

Oxford  Provisions  and  Idealism,  7. 

Paganini  and  Liszt,  155. 

Palafox  and  Napoleon's  fall,  73. 

Paolis,  the,  51. 

Papacy:  and  Italian  unity,  175,  176; 
influence  of  the,  175;  Machiavelli 
on  the,  ib. 

Papal  States,  the,  175. 

Paris :  (second)  treaty  of,  6 ;  indiffer- 
ence of,  to  Austerlitz,  72;  alhes 
march  on,  115;  Napoleon's  march 
on,  120;  entered  by  Napoleon,  121 ; 
the  science  school  of  Europe,  166; 
Orsini's  criminal  attempt  at,  178; 
siege  of,  216. 

Party  system:  in  England,  157;  non- 
existent in  France,  ib. 

Paskievitch  leads  Russian  army  into 
Hungary,  163. 

Peace  pohcy,  disastrovis  results  of  a, 

78.  79- 

Peninsular  Campaign :  conflicting 
accounts  of,  89 ;  plan  of,  ib. ;  strate- 
gic line  of,  ib. 

Peninsular  War:  Napoleon  on  the, 
60;  Wellington  on  the,  87;  a  side 
issue,  90;  and  Russian  campaign, 
ib.;  true  proportions  of,  91-94;  a 
clerical  war,  92 ;  fatal  to  Spain,  92- 
94 ;  Spanish  colonies  lost  in,  93,  94 ; 
England's  interest  in,  94. 

Pere  Goriot  and  King  Lear,  153. 

Persia  and  Hellas,  25. 

Peschiera,  fortress  of,  reduced,  61. 

Petofi,  outcome  of  Hungarian  revolu- 
tion, 161. 


Phelippeaux  defends  Acre,  64,  65. 

Philhellenes,  assistance  of,  141. 

Philosophy:  of  the  exact  sciences, 
166;    science  substituted  for,  ib. 

Physics  at  Paris,  166. 

Piedmont,  pohcy  of  the  Kings  of,  177. 

Pillnitz,  Declaration  of,  38. 

Pitt,  greatness  of,  in  home  pohtics,  59. 

Plombieres,  Napoleon  III.  meets 
Cavour  at,  179. 

Poland:  and  France,  37,  41;  friendly 
to  Napoleon,  81 ;  made  a  duchy  by 
Napoleon,  ib.\  the  three  partitions 
of,  ib. ;  why  not  made  independent, 
ib.',  France  and  Italy,  82;  and 
Alexander  I.,  130;  and  July  Revo- 
lution, 156;  rising  of,  encouraged 
by  July  Revolution,  158;  loses  au- 
tonomy to  Nicholas  I.,  i6.;  portions 
of,  granted  to  Prussia.  192. 

PoUce:  persecution  and  Congress, 
132  sqq.;  coercion  and  Metternich, 
136;   coercion  and  Alexander  I.,  tft. 

Polish:  campaign  (1807),  80;  prob- 
lem, the,  81,  132;  misery  reflected 
in  Chopin,  147. 

Political  writers  imprisoned,  133. 

Politics,  discussion  of,  forbidden,  132. 

Pompadour,   La  Marquise  de,   15. 

Pope  Pius  VI.,  62. 

Pope  Pius  IX.  and  Cavour,  181. 

Popular  government,  dearth  of,  133. 

Portugal :  Napoleon's  appreciation 
of,  55;   revolutions  in,  156. 

Positivism  and  romanticism,  171. 

Powers,  disunion  of,  130. 

Pozsony,  diets  at,  162,  163. 

Prague,  Peace  of,  206. 

Pressburg,  treaty  of,  77;  vide  Poz- 
sony, 

Press:  compared  to  £»cyc/o/>^<ife,  19; 
gagged  by  Austria  and  Germany, 
137;    in  France  and  England,  157. 

Press,  liberty  of  the :  and  Charles  X., 
157;  and  habeas  corpus,  ib.;  and 
jviry  system,  ib. ;  and  William  III., 
ib. ;  won  by  France,  ib. 

Prussia:  no  territorial  unity  in,  $; 
and  Elizabeth,  16;   and  Katharine 


INDEX 


245 


II.,  16,  18;  and  Revolution,  37,  40, 
41;  French  peace  with  (1795),  47; 
foolish  inaction  of,  78;  collapse  of, 
79;  peace  policy  of,  ib.]  conquest 
of,  80 ;  degradation  of,  ib. ;  despair 
in,  82;  makers  of  modern,  ib.;  a 
second-rate  power,  97;  joins  the 
Coalition,  107,  no,  122;  and  Aus- 
tria, natural  antagonists,  109;  foun- 
dations of  present  greatness,  no; 
natural  enemy  of  Austria,  ib.]  de- 
sires of,  at  Vienna,  128,  129;  ag- 
grandizement of,  130;  and  Saxony, 
ib.;  Saxony  cedes  territory  to,  131; 
and  Cavour,  176,  177;  and  Italian 
unity,  182;  King  of,  only  Habsburg 
rival,  189;  Silesia  added  to,  191; 
a  good  political  centre,  192 ;  assimi- 
lates Polish  territory,  ib. ;  efl&ciency 
of,  created  by  Stein,  etc.,  193;  Bis- 
marck's knowledge,  195;  and 
Schleswig-Holstcin,  201 ;  Baltic 
and  the  North  Sea,  ib. ;  and  Austria 
administers  Schleswig-Holstein,  202, 
and  Peace  of  Prague,  206;  incor- 
porates Hanover,  etc.,  ib.;  detailed 
information  of,  re  French,  210; 
war  declared  by  France  on,  212; 
joined  by  Baden,  215;  joined  by 
Wiirtemberg,  ib.;  enclaves  of,  220; 
and  Austria,  rivalry  of,  130,  189; 
and  Austria,  relations  between,  194; 
and  Austria,  members  of  German 
confederacy,  201. 

Prussian:  rulers,  weakness  of,  59; 
campaign,  78;  army,  rottenness  of 
the,  79;  policy  discussion  of,  97; 
hatred  of  political  liberty,  128; 
array,  reforms  in,  194;  army  at 
Jena,  ib.;  victory  at  Sadowa,  200, 
205 ;  adversaries  of  Bismarck,  203 ; 
victorious  advance  into  Hanover, 
205,  206;  ascendency  established, 
206;  victories  and  ascendency,  im- 
portance of,  207;  Elector  humili- 
ated, 218;  King  becomes  King  and 
German  Emperor,  ib. 

Prussians:  on  the  Rhine,  42;  and 
allies   compel   Napoleon's   abdica- 


tion, 90 ;  insist  on  entering  Vienna, 
205;   occupy  Moravia,  ib. 
Puritans    of    New    England,    moral 
force  of,  8. 

Quadrilateral,  reduction  of,  61. 

Quatre-Bras:  and  Ligny,  battles  of, 
125,  126;  Wellington  at,  ib. 

Quinet,  Thiers,  etc.,  realize  Bis- 
marck's aims,  207. 

Race:  and  nationality,  140;  as  a  fac- 
tor in  history,  224. 
Radetzky,  dash  of,  164. 
Rambouillet    and   Marie  Antoinette, 

33- 

Ratisbon,  battle  of,  96. 

Reaction:  after  Napoleon,  106;  the, 
128-155;  a-nd  Congress,  132  sqq.; 
and  Austria,  138;  and  Italy,  ib.; 
compared  to  Thirty  Years'  War,  ib. ; 
in  literature,  143;  close  of,  foreseen, 
by  Gentz,  156;  and  romanticism, 
164,    165;    and  Hegelianism,    165, 

Record  Ofl&ce,  docvunents  in,  re  hin- 
terland, n. 

Reformation,  the,  a  Revolution,  119. 

Reform  Bill,  due  to  July  Revolution, 
158. 

Reims,  battle  of,  115. 

Renaissance,  the,  a  Revolution,  119. 

Republicans  conciliated  by  Napo- 
leon, 121. 

Ripublique,  Place  de  la,  47. 

Revolution:  and  England,  37;  and 
other  Eiu-opean  Powers,  ib.;  geo- 
political aspect  of,  ib.;  and  Prus- 
sia, 37,  41 ;  interest  of  Europe  in, 
38;  European  Powers  hostile  to, 
40,  47;  and  Europe,  47;  effects  of 
the,  ib.;  leaders  of  the,  46;  and 
Napoleon,  48 ;  culminates  in  Napo- 
leon, 52;  of  1848,  119;  the  French, 
European  character  of,  ib.;  the 
July,  156;  in  Austria-Hungary, 
160,  161;  in  Italy,  ib.;  in  South 
Germany,  ib.;  of  1848,  importance 
of,  160;  intellectual,  period  of,  165. 

Revolutions:     before   1848   in   Italy 


246 


INDEX 


etc.,  crvished,  156;  the,  156-171; 
effects  of  the,  171. 

Rhenish:  provinces  and  Napoleon's 
code,  70;  confederation  in  west- 
central  Germany,  81. 

Richelieu:  and  Napoleon,  48,  54; 
inner  voices  of,  loi ;  and  Mazarin 
and  Bismarck,  198,  199. 

Rivoli,  victory  of,  61. 

Robertson's  Charles  F.,  obsolete,  151. 

Robespierre:  and  "The  Terror," 
44;  appreciation  of,  46. 

Rochambeau,  statue  to,  22. 

Rodrigue  Hortalbs  et  Cie,  21. 

Rogers,  Robert,  and  the  hinterland, 
10. 

Roland,  Madame,  a  "Girondis," 
43.  46. 

Roman  Catholic  territories  secula- 
rized, 67. 

Roman:  Curia  and  Jeanne  d'Arc, 
74;   literature,  models  of,  143. 

Roman  Empire,  Holy:  fall  of,  174; 
character  of,  185;  sovereignties  of 
the  186;  commerce  in  the,  187; 
litigation  in  the,  186,  187;  position 
of  women  in  the,  187. 

Romantic  music:  chromatic,  145; 
character  of,  145,  146. 

Romantic  school:  verse  of  the,  143; 
writers  of  the,  ib.;  attitude  of  the, 
to  woman,  144;  matter  of  the,  ib.; 
treatment  of  love  in  the,  145 ;  treat- 
ment of  music  in  the,  ib. 

Romanticism,  142  sgq.;  Philosophy 
of,  148-150;  and  subjectivism, 
149;  and  growth  of  language,  150; 
and  Indo-Germanic  theory,  ib.; 
and  Middle  Ages,  ib.;  results  of, 
150  sgg.;  causes  of,  150-152;  and 
history,  151;  and  science,  ib.; 
political  causes  of,  ib. ;  morbid  sen- 
sitiveness of,  152;  and  Reaction, 
164,  165;  in  Germany,  revulsion 
from,  168;  and  Positivism,  171; 
the  outcome  of  struggle,  ib. 

Rome:  and  Carthage,  25;  and 
Bourges,  38;  King  of,  100;  rising 
at,  136;  a  city  apart  from  Italy,  181 ; 


entered  by  Italians,  ib.;  Europe 
and  Greece,  224. 

Rosbach,  Empire  and  France  de- 
feated at,  91. 

Rostand,  21. 

Roumania :  rise  of,  1 73 ;  nationalism 
in,  222. 

Rousseau,  18;  influence  of,  36. 

Runny mede  and  ideahsm,  7. 

Russia:  and  Manchvuian  hinterland, 
10;  peaceful  western  policy,  ib.; 
and  Seven  Years'  War,  14;  and 
Prussia,  16;  hostile  to  Revolution, 
40;  defeated  at  Austerlitz,  72;  and 
Austria  in  Danube  valley,  75; 
poverty  of,  102;  joins  the  Coalition 
107,  122;  Metternich  jealous  of, 
141;  Poland  revolts  from,  158; 
and  Louis  Philippe,  159;  appeal 
of  Austria  to,  163;  declining  in- 
fluence of,  172;  gravitation  of,  east- 
ward, ib.;  gravitates  towards  Asia, 
ib.;  Austria,  England,  possible 
French  allies,  217;  Greek  Church 
in,  224. 

Russian:  war,  success  impossible  in 
the,  60 ;  view  of  Napoleon's  fall,  73 ; 
resistance  to  Napoleon,  80 ;  courage 
and  Napoleon,  85;  campaign, 
effects  of,  86,  lor;  campaign  and 
Peninsular  War,  90;  campaign, 
economic  aspect  of,  102 ;  campaign, 
political  aspect  of,  ib.;  campaign, 
strategy  of  the,  loi ;  campaign, 
uselessness  of,  103;  hatred  of  politi- 
cal liberty,  128;  war  and  Napoleon 
III.,  178;  foreign  policy,  Bis- 
marck's conduct  of,  197;  inter- 
ference expected  in  Danish  war,  202. 

Russians:  and  EngUsh,  defeated  at 
Bergen,  65 ;  and  allies  compel  Na- 
poleon's abdication,  90;  fire  Mos- 
cow, 104;  retreat  of,  ib.;  invade 
Hungary,  163;  defeated  by  Eng- 
lish and  French,  172. 

Sadowa:    and  Bismarck,   13;    battle 

of,  200,  205,  206. 
St.  Cloud  and  Marie  Antoinette,  33. 


INDEX 


24; 


St.  Dizier,  battle  of,  115. 

St.  Helena:  proposed  by  Metternich, 
117;  banishment  of  Napoleon  to, 
127;  Napoleon's  ashes  brought 
from,  159. 

St.  Just,  appreciation  of,  44,  46. 

St.  Petersburg,  the  commercial  capi- 
tal, 135. 

St.  Simon,  Auguste  Comte,  a  disciple 
of,  166. 

St.  Simonism,  166. 

Salamanca:  victory  of,  88;  on 
strategic  line,  89. 

Salamis:  and  modem  Greece,  140; 
battle  of,  182. 

Salons,  19;   bourgeois  in  the,  31. 

Sand :  Charles,  assasinatess  Kotzebue, 
133;    Georges,  and  Chopin,  147. 

Saratoga:   British  surrender  at,  2,  23. 

Sardinia:  Cavour  minister  in,  177; 
powerless  against  Austria,  ib.\  and 
France  arrange  to  attack  Austria, 
179. 

Satzau,  77. 

Savaron  and  Louis  XIII.,  29. 

Savona  route  and  Napoleon,  57. 

Savoy:  policy  of  the  House  of,  177; 
House  of,  180. 

Saxons:  a.i.s  of  Napoleon,  129; 
Prussian  hatred  of,  ih. 

Saxony:  becomes  a  kingdom,  77; 
less  useful  than  Poland,  81 ;  friendly 
to  Napoleon,  93 ;  aloof  from  Coali- 
tion, 107;  Napoleon's  ally,  112; 
and  Napoleon,  interests  coincident, 
114;  and  Prussia,  130;  treachery 
of,  ib.;  loss  of  territory,  131;  Ba- 
varia and  Austria,  221. 

Scharnhorst,  82;  and  Prussian  effi- 
ciency, 193. 

Schiller:  admiration  of  Humboldt 
for,  129;  and  idealism,  ib.;  works 
of,  143;  Kabale  und  Liebe,  187; 
language  of,  188. 

Schleswig-Holstein :  and  Kiel,  201; 
and  Prussia,  ib. ;  and  Austria,  202 ; 
administered  by  Austria  and  Prus- 
sia, ib. 

Schmerling  and  Bismarck,  194. 


Schonbrunn,  treaty  of,  97. 

Schopenhauer:  on  the  reaction,  137, 
138;  on  the  Revolution,  ib.;  de- 
cadent ideal  of,  138;  on  Hegel, 
165,  166;  on  philosophy,  ib. 

Schumann:  and  Bach,  146;  and 
Beethoven,  ib.;  and  Hoffmann, 
ib.;  appreciation  of,  ib.;  works  of, 
ib. 

Schwarzenberg,  Prince,  leader  of 
Napoleon's  right,  103. 

Science:  substituted  for  philosophy, 
1 66 ;  Comte  the  apostle  of,  1 68, 1 70 ; 
place  of,  in  history,  168;  in  Ger- 
many, ib.;  in  England,  169;  Dar- 
win, the  apostle  of,  1 70 ;  Humboldt, 
the  apostie  of,  ib. 

Sciences,  undue  value  attached  to  the, 
170. 

Sedan,  disaster  of,  216. 

September  massacres,  42-44. 

Servia:  rise  of,  173;  nationalism  in, 
222. 

Seven  Years'  War,  international,  5, 14. 

Shakespeare,  tardy  recognition  of^ 
152. 

Shamyl  and  Napoleon,  52. 

Sicily:  Garibaldi  in,  i8i;  and  Eu- 
rope, 222. 

Sidney  Smith,  Sir  W.,  defends  Acre, 
64. 

Si  eyes,  political  writings  of,  31. 

Silesia:  Congress  in,  134;  ceded  by 
Maria-Theresa  to  Frederick,  191. 

Silesian  wars,  the,  190-192. 

Silvio  Pellico  in  prison,  133. 

Smith,  William,  and  the  hinterland, 
10. 

Sociology  and  Evolution,  170. 

Socrates  and  his  Daemon,  100. 

Soissons,  commander  of,  and  treach- 
ery, III. 

Solferino,  battle  of,  180-182. 

Sorel,  27. 

Soult:  in  Spain,  88;  ingratitude  of, 
118;  swears  allegiance  to  Louis 
XVIIL,  ib. 

Sources  of  period  1810-1815,  84. 

South  Africa  and  a  hinterland,  9. 


248 


INDEX 


Spain:  French  peace  with  (1795), 
47 ;  Napoleon's  appreciation  of,  55 ; 
hatred  of,  for  Napoleon,  68;  Well- 
ington in,  87,  88;  Napoleon  recalls 
troops  from,  90;  and  France,  alli- 
ance of  (1805),  92;  encouraged  by 
England,  98;  England  engaged 
in,  iii;  causes  of  decadence,  136; 
fight  of,  for  Ferdinand  VII.,  ib. ;  re- 
establishment  of  Inquisition  in,  ib. ; 
resistance  of,  to  Napoleon,  ib.; 
under  Ferdinand  VII.,  ib.;  unwise 
resistance  of,  to  Napoleon,  ib.; 
revolutions  in,  156. 

Spanish:  Succession,  war  of,  inter- 
national, 5;  view  of  Napoleon's 
fall,  73;  resistance  to  Napoleon, 
80,  91,  92,  217;  and  French,  88; 
account  of  Peninsular  War,  89; 
guerilla  war,  90;  attitude,  impor- 
tance of,  91 ;  and  English  interests 
opposed,  93;  American  colonies, 
revolt  of,  93,  135;  and  Austrian 
Germans,  224. 

Spencer,  Herbert:  a  follower  of 
Comte,  168;  on  Evolution,  170. 

Spielberg,  prison  of,  133. 

Spinoza:  and  the  Encyclopedic,  19; 
philosophy  of,  148. 

Stahl  on  law,  165. 

Stamp  Act  of  1765,  7. 

Starhemberg,  Count,  and  Habsburgs, 

15- 

Stein  and  Prussian  efficiency,  82,  193. 

Steuben  and  Beaumarchais,  21,  22. 

Stoflei:  attache  in  Berlin,  209;  de- 
spatches of,  unopened,  ib. ;  on  the 
Prussian  army,  ib.;  warnings  of, 
ib. 

Straxiss,  David,  life  of  Jesus,  165. 

Styria,  61. 

Suchet  in  Spain,  88. 

Suez,  boundary  of,  64. 

Suflfolk,  witch  massacres  in,  43. 

SufFren,  Le  BaiUi  de,  off  East  India, 
24. 

Suwarow :  abandons  Switzerland,  65 ; 
in  Lombardy,  ib. 

Sweden:    hostile  to  Revolution,   40; 


joins  the  Coalition,    107;    France 

and  Westphalian   peace,    186. 
Switzerland  abandoned  by  Suwarow, 

65. 
Sybel  and  French  Revolution,  27. 
Syria:    and  Egypt,   invasion  of,   63; 

attacked  by  Napoleon,  64. 
Sz^chenyi:     outcome    of    Hungarian 

revolution,   161;    reforms  of,   162, 

163. 

Tabor,  Mount,  Napoleon's  victory 
at,  65. 

Taine  and  French  Revolution,  27. 

Tallard  and  Blenheim  campaign,  56. 

Talleyrand:  and  German  reform,  67, 
68;  and  Austerlitz,  72;  intrigues 
of,  against  Napoleon,  116;  a  great 
statesman,  129;  and  Alexander  I., 
ib.;  and  decision  of  Congress  on 
voting,  ib.;  and  Humboldt,  ib.; 
and  Metternich,  ib. ;  upholds  legiti- 
macy,   130;    master  of    Congress, 

130,  131- 

Talma,  83. 

Taxation  of  colonists,  not  oppressive, 
7- 

Tennyson  and  Idealism,  'y. 

"  Terreur,  Im"  44. 

Territorial  unity  and  peace,  5. 

Themistocles:  and  Napoleon,  52; 
and  Athens,  193. 

Thiebauit,  memoirs  of,  80,  126. 

Thiers:  Louis  PhiUppe  yields  to,  159; 
Quinet,  etc.,  realize  Bismarck's 
aims,  207;  on  Germany,  209; 
leader  of  the  peace  party,  217;  pro- 
posals of,  impossible,  ib.;  seeks 
foreign  help,  ib. 

Thirty  Years'  War:  strategy  of,  56; 
compared  to  the  reaction,  .138; 
effetcs  of,  187. 

Tiers- Etat  convened,  35. 

Tilsit,  treaty  of,  82. 

Tirolese  resistance,  90,  98. 

Tocqueville  and  French  Revolution, 
27. 

Tolentino,  peace  at,  with  Pius  VI., 
62. 


INDEX 


249 


Toulouse:  on  strategic  line,  89; 
Wellington  at,  90,  116. 

Townshend:  his  taxes,  7;  policy  of, 
discussed,  12. 

Trafalgar:  and  Austerlitz,  72;  battle 
of,  86. 

Treves,  Archbishop  of,  possessions  of, 
186. 

Trocadero,  victorious  march  of  French 
to,  136,  137. 

Tronchet  and  Napoleon,  69. 

Troppau,  Congress  at,  134. 

"  Trop  tard,  Sire,"  75, 

Turgot:  and  colonial  secession,  10; 
removes  abuses,  27;  pohtical  writ- 
ings of,  31. 

Turin,  25. 

Turkey  and  Charles  X.,  156. 

Turkish:  Empire  and  Napoleon,  102; 
fleet  destroyed  at  Navarino,  141.* 

Turks:  in  Constantinople,  134;  re- 
volt of  Greeks  from,  139;  a  noble 
race,  140;  according  to  Bismarck, 
ib.;  retaliation  of,  141. 

Tyler  on  Evolution,  170. 

Tyrol,  Kuf stein  prison  in,  133. 

Ulm:  Napoleon  at,  54;  campaign, 
problem  of,  56;    campaign,  75-78. 

Unigenitus,  the  Bull,  31. 

United  States:  and  England,  25; 
peace  policy  of,  discussed,  78; 
monarchy  in,  impossible,  107; 
England  engaged  in,  iii;  of  Eu- 
rope impossible,  223. 

Vallador.\  88,  89. 

Valmy,  cannonade  of,  38,  43. 

Valois,  power  of,  over  bourgeoisie,  117. 

Varennes,  postmaster  of,  40. 

Venetian  Republic :  ceded  to  Austria, 
62 ;  and  Napoleon,  66. 

Venetian  territory:  retained  by  Aus- 
tria, 180;  secured  by  Victor  Em- 
manuel, 181;  lost  by  A.ustria,  206; 
obtained  by  Italy,  ib. 

Vergennes:  neglect  of,  2;  and  colo- 
nial secession,  10;  and  Beaumar- 
chais,  21;  foreign  minister,  27. 


Vergniaud,  43. 

Verona:  fortress  of,  reduced,  61; 
Congress  at,  134. 

Veronese  massacre  French  sick,  89. 

Versailles,  Parliament  at,  35. 

Victor  Emmanuel  II.:  gets  Lom- 
bardy,  180;  declared  King  of  Italy, 
181;  defeated  by  Austria,  ib.;  de- 
feats of,  ib. ;  secures  Venetian  terri- 
tory, ib. 

Vienna:  Congress  of,  6,  121,  128,  192; 
and  Bourges,  38;  Napoleon  near, 
61;  entered  by  Napoleon,  76; 
amusements  at,  131;  Congress  of, 
effects  of,  177;  and  Bismarck,  205, 
206 ;  and  the  Prussians,  ib. 

Vilagos,  surrender  of  Gorgei  at,  163. 

Villa  Franca,  peace  of,  180. 

Vivian,  Lord:  acknowledges  Anglo- 
Dutch  debt  to  Prussia,  123;  com- 
mands Wellington's  left,  ib. 

Vogt,  Carl,  teacher  of  Materialism, 
170. 

Voltaire,  i8. 

Wagram:  campaign  and  Napoleon, 
57;  effect  of,  on  Tirolese,  90;  cam- 
paign of,  96. 

Walcheren:  expedition  and  Napo- 
leon, 57;   English  in,  96,  97. 

Wales  and  England,  union  of, 
185. 

Walewska,  Madame  de,  and  Napo- 
leon, 81. 

Wandering  Jew,  the,  a  national  crea- 
tion, 153. 

War  Party:  influence  of,  41;  under 
Girondists  and  Dumouriez,  ib. 

Washington,  22. 

Waterloo:  defeat  of  Napoleon  at,  25, 
127;  and  Marengo,  67;  battle  of, 
87;  varying  accounts  of,  122,  123; 
campaign  of,  122-127;  English 
pride  in,  123;  historians  of  various 
nations  on,  ib.;  and  Bannockburn, 
etc.,  123,  124;  real  features  of,  124; 
truth  important  re.  ib.;  and  Leip- 
sic,  relative  importance  of,  125; 
Napoleon's  French  opponents  en- 


250 


INDEX 


couraged  by,  ib. ;  and  Wavre,  battles 
of,  125,  127;  Wellington  at,  126, 
127. 

Wavre:  and  Waterloo,  battles  of,  125 ; 
Bliicher  at,  126,  127;  Grouchy  re- 
mains at,  127. 

Wellington:  and  Napoleon,  59,  88, 
89,  91 ;  and  Napoleon's  fall,  72,  73; 
and  Bliicher  defeat  Napoleon,  87; 
limitations  of  activity  of,  ib.;  and 
Peninsular  War,  87,  88;  and 
Cuesta  win  Talavera,  strategical 
defeat,  88;  and  Salamanca,  ib.; 
Cartaxo  despatch  of,  ib.;  ignores 
Soult,  ib.;  forced  by  Mass^na  re- 
tires behind  Torres  Vedras,  88,  89; 
leaves  wounded  and  baggage  at 
Talavera,  88;  slow  progress  of, 
in  Spain,  89;  strategy  of,  in  Penin- 
sula, ib.;  enters  France,  90;  and 
Frederick  the  Great,  91 ;  and  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus,  ib.;  and  Marl- 
borough, ib.;  at  Toulouse,  116; 
on  La  Haie  Sainte,  122;  at  Quatre- 
Bras,  125,  126;  and  Bliicher,  junc- 
tion of,  necessary,  125  sgq.;  defeats 
Ney,  126;  fails  to  help  Bliicher, 
ib.;  concentrated  before  Waterloo, 
126,  127. 


West  Indies :  convoy  enters  Brest,  47 ; 
and  French  Crown,  99. 

Westphalian  Peace,  the,  186. 

White  Mountain,  battle  of,  24. 

Wieland,  language  of,  188. 

William  I.  of  Prussia:  and  Bismarck, 
194;  as  the  sole  founder  of  modern 
Germany,  196;  occasionally  reluc- 
tant to  follow  Bismarck,  199;  op)- 
poses  war  with  Austria,  203 ;  Bene- 
detti  sent  to  interview,  211;  and 
Grammont,  211,  212;  and  Bene- 
detti  at  Ems,  212;  reply  of,  tam- 
pered with,  ib.;  reply  of,  to  Bene- 
detti,  ib.;  and  Empire,  218. 

Witches  massacred  in  English  Civil 
War,  42,  43. 

Wurmser,  defeat  of,  61. 

Wiirtemberg:  and  Napoleon,  inter- 
ests coincident,  114;  apprehensions 
of,  130;  Bavaria  and  Baden,  207, 
208;    joins  Prussia,  215. 

Wiirtzburg  Bishop,  possessions  of,  186. 

York's,  Duke  of,  hasty  retreat,  87. 
Young,  Arthur,  and  French  peasan- 
try, 29. 

Zurich,  battle  of,  65, 


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